Skip to main content

Full text of "Science, technology, and diplomacy in the age of interdependence"

See other formats












(Ab part of an extended study of the interactions of science and 
technology with United States foreign policy ) 


JUNE 1976 











(As part of an extended study of the interactions of science and 
technology with United States foreign policy) 

JUNE 1976 

-196 WASHINGTON : 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $4.35 


THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan 
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota 
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania 
ROY A. TA YLO R, North Carolina 
LEO J. RYAN, California 
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan 
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey 
DON BONKER, Washington 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 

PAUL FINDLE Y, Illinois 
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama 
PIERRE S. du PONT, Delaware 
EDWARD G. BIESTE R, Jr., Pennsylvania 
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 

Mariax A. Czarnecki, Chief of Staff 

Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs 

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman 

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 

PAUL FINDLE Y, Illinois 

George R. Berdes, Subcommittee Staff Consultant 
Donald R. Fortier, Minority Subcommittee Staff Consultant 
Shelly A. Shelton, Staff Assistant 



Science and technology are compelling determinants of the human 
condition. In September 1975 the United Nations General Assembly 
voted to convene an international conference on science and tech- 
nology. The intent of this move was to allow the technologically 
sophisticated and dynamic elements of the U.N. family to focus the 
efforts of the 1979 General Assembly on a concerted program of 
global advance. The agenda of this program would include economic, 
social, political, and commercial concerns, but its backbone would be 
technological and managerial. 

The depth and pervasiveness of the influence of science and tech- 
nology — the waA's in which technology, especially, has become the 
engine of dynamic change in the lives of the world's peoples — are 
incompletely assessed and exploited. It was out of a conviction of the 
need to understand and better manage the impact of technology on 
human relationships, and on the enduring issues of war and peace, 
of poverty and plenty, that the Subcommittee on International Secu- 
rity and Scientific Affairs, 6 years ago, asked the Congressional Re- 
search Service to undertake a wide-ranging series of studies on Science, 
Technology, and American Diplomacy. 

Under the leadership of Dr. Franklin P. Huddle as project director 
and Mr. Warren R. Johnston as associate director, the CRS series has 
traced in parallel many of the myriad problems in the interface of 
science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. As summed up and 
interpreted in the present publication, Science, Technology, and Diplo- 
macy in the Age of Interdependence, it has also identified many oppor- 
tunities for meeting these problems. The general emphasis of this 
study is parallel to that of the U.N. effort; with respect to the U.S. 
role specifically, it points to the imperative of making better use of 
two great American strengths, technological inventiveness and mana- 
gerial skill, and to the further imperative of systematic efforts to plan 
for the future. 

In March 1970, in the foreword to the first committee print of the 
study series, I stated the belief that the series would prove to be of 
major use to the Congress, the executive branch, the Foreign Service, 
the scholarly community, and others, in a cooperative effort to enhance 
our Nation's ability to conduct its international relations in an age of 
science and technology. With this final report, the research and analy- 
sis phase comes to a close. In the ensuing legislative phase of the 
project, the locus of effort will be the membership and staff of the 
House Committee on International Relations. For this phase, it is my 
hope and expectation that the anah'tical contributions of the Con- 
gressional Research Service — and particularly this final integrating 
study — will prove in a practical w&j to have j^ielded three separate 
sets of products: (1) specific legislative options to strengthen the 



conduct of ongoing technical diplomacy; (2) encouragement of a 
consensus toward stronger and longer-range planning of technical 
initiatives in support of U.S. diplomacy, involving closer cooperation 
of the Executive Office, appropriate governmental departments 
(with special attention to areas often neglected because of their 
primarily domestic orientation), and the legislative branch; and (3) a 
more far-reaching participation in the foreign policy process through- 
out the Federal Government. I would hope to see this participation 
involve the academic and technical communities, private industry, 
and concerned citizen groups, along with the more traditional planning 

Leaders of our diplomatic, technological, and national security 
affairs are not devoid of imagination or insensitive to the oppressive 
weight of danger and insecurity ahead. However, if these leadei > 
propose to meet future threats with the same strength of purpose 
and creative initiative that have largely marked the first two centuries 
of American independence, they must seek new forms and find new 
applications in a world of growing interdependence. The problem of 
how to manage our relationships in such a world resolves in large 
part into the problem of managing technological dynamism and 
directing it to humane ends. Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the 
Age of Interdependence is offered for whatever light it may shed on 
these twin problems. 

Clement J. Zablocki, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on International 

Security and Scientific Affairs. 


A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of Articles, Books, I)oc>n,,< /,/.*, 
Periodicals, and Reference Guides. Compiled by Genevieve Knezo. 
(69 pages.) Issued March 1970. 1 

Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age. An introduction to the 
entire study by Franklin P. Huddle. (28 pages.) Issued April 1970. ' 

The Evolution of International Technology. A review of the emergence 
of technology as a factor of change in international relations by 
Franklin P. Huddle. (70 pages.) Issued December 1970. 2 

The Politics of Global Health. A study of worldwide efforts to prevent 
epidemic disease by Freeman H. Quimby. (79 pages.) Issued May 
1971. 2 

Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. A survey of technical, eco- 
nomic, legal, and political considerations involved in using the 
natural wealth of land below the seas by George A. Doumani. (86 
pages, plus appendixes.) Issued July 1971. 2 

Beyond Malthus: The Food/ People Equation. A study of the inter- 
relation of food and population and the resulting impact on inter- 
national affairs by Allan S. Nanes. (96 pages.) Issued October 
1971. 2 

The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. A 
case study of the accomplishments and failures of the massive 
Indochina works project by Franklin P. Huddle. (86 pages.) Is- 
sued May 1972. 2 

The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. A study 
of an early, serious attempt to bring atomic energy and weapons 
under international control by Leneice N. Wu. (67 pages.) Issued 
August 1972. 2 

Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American 
Diplomacy With a New Technology. Analysis of the interaction 
during last 30 years between American diplomacy and the tech- 
nological development of nuclear power in Europe by Warren H. 
Donnelly. (163 pages.) Issued December 1972. 2 

U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Tech- 
nology Transfer, and Diplomacy. An assessment of the linkages 
in U.S. -Soviet relations among diplomacy, economics, and tech- 
nology transfer by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday. (105 
pages.) Issued June 1973. 2 

The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. An anal- 
ysis of attitudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed in the 
IGY as a step toward detente by Harold Bullis. (64 pages.) Issued 
November 1973. 2 

U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Non- 
governmental Scientific Exchange. A study of major Federal pro- 
grams which send nongovernment U.S. scientists and technical per- 
sonnel abroad by Genevieve J. Knezo. (163 pages.) Issued April 
1974. 2 

1 Documents now out of print and not available from the International Relations Committee or the 
Government Printing Office. 
3 Documents available from the International Relations Committee only. 


Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific 
Mobility. Assessment of the costs and benefits of the migration of 
technically trained persons, especially from developing to developed 
countries, by Joseph G. Whelan. (272 pages.) Issued September 1974. 3 

Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical 
Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations. This concluding study 
of the series, by Franklin P. Huddle, analyzes the impact of science 
and technology on the Department of State, and describes depart- 
mental efforts and opportunities to relate science and technology 
to its mission. (ISO pages.) Issued June 1975. 3 

* Documents available from the International Relations Committee or the Government Printing Office. 



Foreword m 

Other Documents in the Series v 

Letter of Transmittal xvu 

Acknowledgments xix 

Preface xxi 

I. Introdcction 1 

Scope of the Study 2 

Methodology of the Study 3 

Organization of the Report 4 

An Anticipation of the Findings ."> 

Opportunities for Institutional Reform 5 

Importance of Science and Technology for Diplomacy 6 

Problems and Opportunities Facing the Congress 7 

II. The Global Context of Science, Technology, and American- 
Diplomacy 9 

Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R 9 

Deterrence 10 

Weaponry 10 

The P.R.C 10 

Isolationism 11 

U.S. Economic Burdens 11 

The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy 11 

The Shaky Global Economy 13 

At omic Energy 13 

Populations ..* 14 

Food 14 

Oceans 1 •"> 

Resource Allocation IS 

Multinational Corporations 16 

Nationalism 16 

United Nations 16 

Regionalism 17 

Shrinking World Community 17 

Global Flows 1 18 

Disorientation 18 

III. Six Cases Illustrating the Interaction of Science, Tech- 
nology, axd American Diplomacy 20 

Case One — The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the 

Nuclear Age 20 

Statement of the Case 20 

Importance of the Case 21 

How the Case Deyeloped 21 

U.S. Inyoh-ement 22 

Role of Congress 83 

Outcome 23 

Assessment 23 

General Lessons From the Study 25 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 27 

Need for Congressional Inyolyement 27 

Some Illustratiye Questions 2S 



III. Six Cases Illustrating the Interaction of Science, 
NOLO< [ERICAN Diplomacy — Continued 

•nmereial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Inter- Tage 

action of Diplomacy With hnology 28 

Statement of the Case II 

Importance of the Case 28 

How the Case Developed 20 

Purposes of the IAEA 

European Regional Organizations 30 

Non-Prolif oration Treaty. 31 

U. S. Involvement 32 

Support of IAEA 

U.S. Relationship to Euratom and NEA 33 

U.S. Position on Safeguards 34 

Role of Congress 35 

The Congress and Agreements on Nonmilitary Uses-_ 35 

Outcome '_ 36 


Author's Reassessment in 1075 30 

Relevance of Study Themes Today 40 

Some Lessons From the Study of Commercial Nuclear 

Power 41 

Legislative Implications 41 

Some Illustrative Questions 42 

Channeling of U.S. Technical Assistance -in Nuclear 

Power 42 

The International Atomic Energy Agencv 43 

The I AEA as a "Testbed" 43 

Euratom 43 

Joint Euratoni-U.S. Research 44 

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 44 

U.S. Nuclear Fuel Services 44 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Safeguards 44 

Case Three — The Political Legacy of the International Geo- 
physical Year 45 

Statement of the Case 45 

Importance of the Case 45 

H o w the Case Developed 4G 

IGY Concept Replaces That of TPY 47 

Scientific Results of IGY 48 

U.S. Involvement 40 

Role of Congress 40 

Outcome 50 

The Space Program 50 

Congressional Responses 52 

Other Domestic and General Effects of IGY 52 

International Impacts 53 

Assessment 54 

Author's Reassessment in 1075 56 

Global Scientific Cooperation 56 

Improved Transfer of Knowledge 56 

Remaining Obstacles 57 

The Emigration Problem 

A Summing Up 57 

Some Illustrative Questions 57 

Case Four — The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems 

of Regionalism 58 

Statement of the Case 

Importance of the Case 50 

How the Case Developed 50 

U.S. Involvement 60 

The Wheeler and Ford Foundation Reports 61 

The Mekong Project's Broad Base of Support 62 

Role of Congress 63 

Outcome 64 

Assessm ent 65 


III. Six Cases Illustrating the Interaction of Science, Tech- 

nology, and American Diplomacy — Continued 

Case Four— The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems 
4 of Regionalism — Continued 

Assessment — Continued Page 

The Momentum of Nonpoliticized Regionalism 65 

Geography as the Binding Force GG 

Advantages of Multilateral Regionalism 66 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 t.7 

The Mekong Project in Perspective 67 

Some Observations and Conclusions ._ 68 

Some Illustrative Questions 69 

Case Five — Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 71 

Statement of the Case 71 

Importance of the Case 71 

How the Case Developed 72 

U.S. Involvement in the Case 73 

Role of Congress 73 

Outcome 74 

Assessment 75 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 75 

Policy Proposal by Secretary Kissinger 77 

Some Illustrative Questions 78 

Case Six — U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay 

of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy 78 

Statement of the Case " 78 

Importance of the Case 79 

How the Case Developed 80 

Accelerated Movement Toward Detente 81 

U.S. Involvement 81 

Barriers to Trade Expansion 82 

Role of Congress 83 

Outcome 84 

Assessment 84 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Prospects 85 

Political Consequences 86 

Risks Versus Potential Gains 87 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 87 

East- West Trade in Perspective 87 

Expansion of Trade as Element of Detente 88 

Past U.S. Legal Restrictions 88 

Recent Moves Toward Liberalization of Trade 89 

Some Illustrative Questions 90 

IV. Six Substantive Issues "Which Further Illustrate the Inter- 

action 92 

Issue One — The Evolution of International Technology 92 

Statement of the Issue 92 

Importance of the Issue 93 

How the Issue Developed 93 

Technology as a Primary Source of National Power.. 94 
Dimensions of the Impact of Technology on Society 

and on Diplomacy 95 

U.S. Involvement 

Elements of U.S. Technological Structure 9S 

Role of Congress 99 

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 100 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 102 

Science and Technology in the Department of State 104 

Some Illustrative Questions 104 

Issue Two— The Politics of Global Health 105 

Statement of the Issue 105 

Importance of the Issue 105 

How the Issue Developed 10G 

Beginning of Preventive Medicine _ 106 

Earlv International Efforts To Control Disease 107 

Establishment of World Health Organization 108 

Status and Potential of WHO Todav 109 

IV. Six Substantive Issues Which Further Illustrate the Inter- 
action — Continued 

Issue Two — The Polities of Global Health — Continued Page 

U.S. Involvement 110 

Possible Reasons for Early U.S. Delay in Supporting 

WHO 111 

U.S. Government Organization for International 

Health Affairs 111 

The Role of DHEW 112 

The DOD Role in International Health 112 

Role of Congress 113 

Inadequate Budget Justification for U.S. Share of 

WHO Funding Support 114 

Lack of Understanding of Multilateral Health Pro- 
grams 114 

Status of the Issue 11") 

Prospects and Options 116 

Seeming Need of Stronger U.S. Support of Inter- 
national Health Programs 116 

Reasons for Possible Shift of Budget Defence Role 

From State to DHEW 117 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 118 

Implications of Global Health Planning 119 

Some Illustrative Questions "_ 120 

Issue Three — Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation ___ 120 

Statement of the Issue 121 

Importance of the Issue 122 

How the Issue Developed 123 

U.S. Involvement 124 

U.S. Policy Need of Facts About Food and Popula- 
tions 125 

Role of Congress 125 

Status of the Issue in 1971 126 

Food/People Equation as Index of Development 127 

Prospects and Options Suggested by the Study 127 

Bilateral Versus Multilateral Approach 127 

Problems of the Green Revolution 129 

Problems of Stabilizing Populations 129 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 130 

Relevance of the Study 4 Years Later 130 

Food/Population Problem Inseparable From Develop- 
ment Process 131 

Early Congressional Recognition of Problem 132 

Some Illustrative Questions 132 

Issue Four — U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major 

Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange 133 

Statement of the Issue 134 

Importance of the Issue 135 

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 136 

Agencies Involved in U.S. Exchange Programs 137 

The Fulbright-Hays (State Department) Program 138 

Lack of Evaluation Procedures a Program Weakness 139 

National Science Foundation Programs. 140 

The NAS-NRC Inter-Academy Exchanges 142 

Role of Congress 144 

Fulbright-Hays Program 144 

NSF Programs 145 

NAS-NRC Programs 145 

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 146 

FCST Efforts To Improve Management of U.S. 

Exchange Programs 147 

Author's Reassessment as of January 1976 149 

Continuing Need for Better Direction and Coordina- 
tion 149 

Some Illustrative Questions 150 


IV. Six Substantive Issues Which Fukthkk Illustrate the In i 
action — Continued 

Issue Five — Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of P a «« 

* International Scientific Mobility 162 

Statement of the Issue 152 

Importance of the Issue l.",2 

How the Issue Developed 153 

The Heightened Human Mobility of Modern Times 1 54 

Impact of Decolonization on Brain Drain 155 

Effects of Changes in Immigration Priorities L55 

U.S. Involvement 156 

Main Trends in Immigration L57 

The Growing Influx of Foreign Medical Graduates 157 

The Foreign Medical Graduates as a U.S. Domestic 

Problem 158 

The Brain Drain as an International Issue 1 .">•) 

The Complexity of the Brain Drain Problem 160 

Role of Congress ]f»] 

Status of the Issue 162 

Prospects and Options 164 

The Problem of Losing Track of Problems 1 64 

Remedies for the Brain Drain Problem 166 

Some U.S. Options in Coping With Brain Drain 166 

Author's Reassessment as of January 1976 167 

Some Illustrative Questions 168 

Issue Six — Science and Technology in the Department of State. 169 

Statement of the Issue 170 

Importance of the Issue 171 

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 172 

Official U.S. Concern With Science and Technologv.. 172 

The Berkner Report '.._ 173 

Establishment of Post of Science Adviser 173 

The Ups and Downs of Science at State 174 

Functions and Limitations of SCI 175 

Shift of Presidential Science Advisory Functions to 

NSF and State; Creation of OES 176 

Role of Congress 177 

Earlier Congressional Studies of Science, Technology, 

and Foreign Policy 177 

Studies and Hearings by House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee 178 

Studies and Hearings by House Science and Astronau- 
tics Committee 179 

Introduction of National Science Policy Bill 180 

The Murphy Commission Report 181 

Need of Added Congressional Resources 181 

Status of the Issue 182 

Diplomatic Personnel Are Discouraged From Acquiring 

Technical Expertise 182 

The Department Is Not Organized To Conduct Tech- 
nical Planning 183 

Presidential Leadership Has Not Motivated the 
Necessary Technical Modernization of the 

Department 183 

Prospects and Options 184 

Author's Reassessment in January 1976 184 

Kissinger's 19 Proposals to U.N. General Assembly __ 185 
Implications of Kissinger Initiatives for State Depart- 
ment and Congressional Backstopping 186 

New Study of State Department's Management of 

Diplomacj'-Technology Interface 187 

Some Illustrative Questions 187 

Appendix: Letter of Resignation to Secretary Kissinger 
From Assistant Secretary Dixy Lee Ray and Her Letter 

to the President 191 

Explanatory Note on The Essays To Follow _ 195 



V. Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy 196 

Statement of the Hypothesis 196 

Defining the Initiative/Reactive Issue 196 

The Essential Differences 197 

Essentiality of Long-Range Planning 197 

Attention in the Literature to the Initiative and Reactive 

Modes of Diplomacy 198 

Discussion of Initiative and Reactive Modes in Earlier Parts of 

the Study 198 

Case One: The Baruch Plan 199 

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 200 

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International 

Geophysical Year 201 

Case Four: The Mekong Project 202 

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 203 

Case Six: U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations 204 

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology. _ 205 

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 207 

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 208 

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 210 

Issue Five: Brain Drain 210 

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of 

State 211 

Some Concluding Observations T 214 

Some Questions for Further Consideration 215 

VI. Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships. _ 216 

Appearance of the Issue in Earlier Parts of the Study 216 

Case One: The Baruch Plan 217 

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 217 

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International 

Geophysical Year 219 

Case Four: The Mekong Project 220 

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 221 

Case Six: U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations 222 

Issue One : The Evolution of International Technology 223 

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 224 

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 225 

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 226 

Issue Five: Brain Drain 227 

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of 

State 228 

Some Concluding Observations 229 

Some Questions for Further Consideration 230 

Questions 230 

VII. High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplo- 
macy 232 

Emergence of High Technology 232 

Need for Attention to Low Technology 233 

Role of the Department of State 233 

Technology Policy and the Department of State 234 

Obstacles to Diplomatic Planning 235 

The Special Case of Agricultural Technology 236 

Importance of Selectivity in Policymaking 236 

Appearance in the Study of the Question of High-Low Tech- 
nology and Diplomacy 237 

Case One: The Baruch Plan 237 

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 238 

Case Three : The Political Legacy of the International Geo- 
physical Year 238 

Case Four: The Mekong Project 239 

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 240 

Case Six: U,S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 241 

Issue One : The Evolution of International Technology 242 

Issue Two : The Politics of Global Health 245 

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 246 

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 246 

Issue Five: Brain Drain 247 

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of 

State 248 


VII. High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Tkciinoloo Diplo- 
macy — Continued 

Secondary International Aspects of U.S. High and Low Tech- Fa*e 

nology 251 » 

• Some Concluding Observation- 261 

Some Questions for Further Consideration 

Questions J.Y2 

VIII. Roles and Interactions of Rubuc and Private Institi 1 i 

in International Technology 2.">4 

Kinds of Technological Diplomacy Sinee 1 '.».",() 254 

A Conceptual .Model 265 

Problems of Diplomacy Inviting Solution by Private Industry . . _'.")."> 

Support of Diplomatic Coals by Private "Enterprise ... 257 

Lessons for the Public/Private Interface Found in the Stud] . 257 

Case One: The Baruch Plan ... 258 

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 259 

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International ( ieo- 

physical Year 261 

Case Four: The Mekong Project 261 

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 

Case Six: U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations 263 

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 264 

Issue Two: The Politics of GlobaJ Health 265 

Issue Three : Beyond Malthus 265 

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 266 

Issue Five: Brain Drain 267 

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of 

State 267 

Some Concluding Observations 270 

Some Questions for Further Consideration 270 

IX. Independence Versus Interdependence 272 

Independence as an Historic Force 272 

Technology and Interdependence 274 

Interdependence as a Growing Concern of Political and Other 

Leaders 274 

Obstacles and Problems Affecting Constructive Interde- 
pendence 276 

The Obstacle of Political and Economic Nationalism 277 

U.S. Proposals for Global Economic Cooperation 277 

Cultural Obstacles to Interdependence 278 

Growth Versus Environmental Constraints 279 

Attempts to Cure Pollution by Redistribution 280 

The Obstacle of Imperfect Communication 2S1 

The Issue of Independence Versus Interdependence as a Theme 

in This Study 282 

Case One: The Baruch Plan 282 

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 2S3 

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geo- 
physical Year 285 

Case'Four: The Mekong Project 286 

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed— 289 

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 291 

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 292 

Issue Two : The Politics of Global Health 294 

Issue Three : Beyond Malthus - - - 295 

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 297 

Issue Five: Brain Drain 299 

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of 

State., 301 

A Concluding Remark 305 

Some Questions for Further Consideration 

Questions 306 



X. Long-Range and Short-Range Planning 309 

Planning as a Proper Noun 309 

Weaknesses of Short-Range Planning 311 

Difficulties Imposed by Extended Time Frames 312 

Fundamental Virtues of Long- Range Diplomatic Planning 313 

Long-Range Planning Aspects of the National Security 313 

Need for Redefining National Security 314 

National Security Planning in a Broader Context 315 

Corporate Attitudes Towards Long-Range Planning 316 

Lessons from the Six Cases in the Studj r for Short- and Long- 
Range Planning 317 

Case One: The Baruch Plan 317 

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 318 

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geo- 
physical Year 319 

Case Four: The Mekong Project 321 

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 323 

Case Six: U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations 325 

Lessons From the Six Issues in the Study for Short- and Long- 
Range Planning 325 

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 325 

Issue Two : The Politics of Global Health _-_„_ 326 

Issue Three: Bevond Malthus 327 

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 328 

Issue Five: Brain Drain 329 

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of 

State 1 330 

A View of Strengthened Mechanisms of Long-Range Planning. 332 

The Murphy Commission's Design for Foreign Policy Planning. 334 

Suggested Planning Products 335 

Organization for Planning 336 

Some Further Comments on Executive Branch Planning 338 

Some Further Thoughts on Foreign Policy Planning in the 

Legislative Branch 340 

Conclusions and Observations 341 

XI. Some Concluding Observations 342 

The Threat and Promise of Technology for the Future of 

Mankind 342 

Interactions of Technology With Diplomacy 343 

Three Guiding Principles. I 343 

A Framework for a Strengthened U.S. Diplomatic System 344 

A Sense of National Purpose 344 

A Sense of the Sweep of Historical Change 345 

Tools of Technological Diplomacy 345 

Instit utional Tools 346 

The Technological Tools of Diplomacy 346 

Strengthening Executive Branch Management of Technological 

Diplomacy 347 

The Executive Office of the President 347 

The Department of State 347 

Comparative Priorities of War and Diplomacy 348 

Opportunities to Strengthen Diplomatic Institutions. 348 
External Technical Contacts of the Department of 

State 349 

Limits and Constraints on Institutional Reform 349 

Technological Mission Agencies 350 

Institutional Complexities 351 

The Need for Multi- Agency Policy Planning 351 

Implications of the Study for the Congress 352 

The Increasing Congressional Role in Diplomacy 352 

Need for Strengthened Information Supply 353 

In-House Analysis Capability 354 

Congressional Foreign Policy Planning 356 

Congressional Oversight of Foreign Policy Programs 357 

Consultation on Presidential Initiatives 358 

Recapitulation of Major Points.-. 359 


Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: A Selected, Anno- P«Ke 

tated Bibliography by Subject __ 361 

Introduction 365 

Technology and Global Interdependence: General Issues 367 

Formulation of Foreign Policy With a Scientific or Technological 

Content: The United States 375 

Formulation of Policies Dealing With Science and Technology: Re- 
gional and International Organizations __ 389 

Science and Technology in NATO and OECD 393 

International Technology Transfer: Genera] [ssues and Processes 396 

International Technology Transfer and Technical Assistance: The 

Developing Nat ions 402 

International Technology Transfer: The Developed Nations 414 

Multinational Corporations 42 1 

The Brain Drain 425 

Energy 426 

Environmental Quality: International Issues 437 

The Stockholm Conference 444 

Issues of Food and Population 447 

Global Health 453 

Natural Resources 455 

Ocean Resources and Policy 462 

The People's Republic of China: Cooperation and Scientific and 

Technological Infrastructure 472 

Physical Sciences Research: Cooperation 475 

Space Cooperation and Policy 476 

Space Satellite Applications 481 

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Cooperation and Scientific 

and Technological Infrastructure 483 

International Standards and Related Issues 489 

Weather Modification: International Issues 491 


The Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 

Washington, B.C., February 2, 197.6. 
Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, 

Chan-man, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, 
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to submit this concluding docu- 
ment in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy research 
project which the Congressional Research Service has carried out at 
your request. 

The first two submissions, you will recall, were an annotated bibliog- 
raphy and a prospectus. They were followed b} r individual studies in 
some depth (prepared by 10 authors associated with four |CRS 
research divisions) of 12 different policy issues related to the general 
theme. The present study, Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the 
Age of Interdependence, subjects the previous 12 to analysis, first 
examining the 12 studies one by one and then looking at them col- 
lectively from several relevant perspectives. Its purpose is to provide 
the subcommittee with a wide range of insights into the interaction in 
contemporary practice of science, technology, and the formulation and 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. As you asked us to do, we have tried 
to present these insights in terms which the subcommittee could trans- 
late into legislative initiatives or put to other appropriate congressional 

I take particular satisfaction in this study as it appears to employ a 
novel if unpretentious methodology of political science analysis. The 
study demonstrates, I think, the utility of systematic, point-by-pom t 
evaluation of real-life scenarios or cases, based on thorough documenta- 
tion, to yield broad principles of policy in a field of transcendent na- 
tional importance. 

The authors of the present volume are the two CRS senior specialists 
who have guided this major research enterprise from its inception: 
Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, senior specialist in science and technology, 
who with Dr. John H. Sullivan (then staff consultant to the subcom- 
mittee) developed the concept of the study series in I960, and who 
has served as the director of the overall project; and Mr. Warren R. 
Johnston, foimerly assistant chief of the CRS Foreign Affaiis Division 
and now chief of "the CRS Office of Special Programs, the associate 
project director. 

In March 1970, in your Foreword to the first committee print of 
the series, you wrote: "Previous work by the subcommittee has indi- 
cated that, in many instances, U.S. foreign policy has lagged far 
behind technological innovations of worldwide importance. Through 


68-196—76 2 


this study, we hope to find out . . . how America's performance 
can be improved in this vital area." On behalf of all in CRS who 
participated in it, let me express the hope that the study series culmi- 
nating in the present submission will have proved worthy of your high 

Let me also conve} 7 our thanks for the opportunity to undertake 
this challenging assignment. 

Norman Beckman, 

Acting Director. 


It seems fitting on the completion of a research undertaking of the 
magnitude of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy for the 
project director and associate director to claim the privilege of giving 
public recognition to the many significant contributions to the overall 
project, as well as to acknowledge the participation of those who helped 
in the preparation of the final study, Science, Technology, and Di- 
plomacy in the Age of Interdependence. 

To begin at the beginning: two successive staff consultants of the 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Dr. 
John H. Sullivan and Mr. George R. Berdes, are to be thanked for 
their constructive guidance on many occasions during the past 6 
years and for their unfailingly sympathetic support of an enterprise 
that proved much more demanding, and extended over a considerably 
longer period of time, than was originally foreseen. 

Apart from the codirectors, there were 10 authors of studies. They 
meritoriously deserve recognition and gratitude, not merely for 
superior accomplishment but for their tolerance of strenuous condi- 
tions of competing work assignments, their thousands of hours (in the 
aggregate) of volunteered overtime, and their assistance in the review 
and updating of material in this final study. One of the study authors, 
Genevieve J. Knezo, additionally produced the original annotated 
bibliography for the series, now replaced by the current bibliography 
(also prepared by Ms. Knezo) to be found at the end of this volume. 
Dr. Huddle's assistant, Mrs. Elaine Carlson, performed many essen- 
tial editorial and research support tasks. 

Dozens of others in CRS, over the years, contributed their time and 
skills in bibliographic, research, and clerical assistance, and in the 
review of studies in draft. CRS Coordinator of Research James W. 
Robinson reviewed the studies in their entirety and made many helpful 
suggestions. Outstanding clerical assistance in the production of the 
present volume was provided by Mrs. Eula C. Kenely and her staff in 
the CRS Senior Specialists Division and by Mrs. Margaret E. Rice of 
the CRS Office of Special Programs. 

In addition, many scholars and officials outside CRS were generous 
with their help in reviewing portions of the draft and providing 
constructive criticism. Prof. Edgar S. Robinson of American Uni- 
versity submitted extensive notes in review of Science and Technology 
in the~Department of State which were of value in preparing the present 
study; he also served as consultant in the preparation of this con- 
cluding study. To him and to the other scholars, too numerous to cite 
individually, appreciation and thanks are expressed for their assistance 
in collecting facts, offering suggestions, and encouraging the ultimate 
completion of this undertaking. 

A final important acknowledgment : gratitude beyond measure is 
due our wives, Clare Scott Huddle and Eunice C. Johnston, for 6 
years of indispensable support and forbearance. 

Franklin P. Huddle. 
Warren R. Johnston. 



The finding of this study is that U.S. diplomacy is neglecting two 
powerful instruments of policy formation and policy execution: 
technological expertise and management skill. Most of the countries 
of the world look to the United States as the undoubted leader in both 
technological achievement and in the skills of organization and ad- 
ministration to apply technology effectively. But during the rise of the 
United States to technological preeminence, the Department of State 
has given slight attention to the implications of technology for foreign 
policy. Only meager resources have been spared to search for ways to 
turn technology to achievement of diplomatic goals. 

The emerging trend toward congressional participation in the diplo- 
matic process plays a significant role in this context. The opportunity 
is at hand for the Congress to examine the uses of technology made by 
the executive branch toward the purposes of foreign policy. 

More than that, the study suggests that the necessary teamwork of 
the legislative branch with the executive branch in the field of foreign 
policy requires that the Congress equip itself with its own resources of 
equal diplomatic expertise. The impressive array of technological 
implications for U.S. diplomacy further requires that these congres- 
sional resources of diplomatic expertise contain a strong technological 
element for both current oversight and long-range planning of future 

Technology has made intolerable the consequences of failure to at- 
tain the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy. But technology also 
offers many opportunities for the attainment of these objective-. No 
element of national policy and no component of national program 
warrants more respect in the short-range or the long-range future of 
the United States. 

I. Introduction 

This is the concluding chapter in a 6-year study by the Congressional 
Research Service of the problems and functional interactions of science, 

technology, and American diplomacy. The study had its origin- in 
congressional concern with science and technology that had been 
steadily mounting since World War II. The prospectus for the study, 
attributing to science and technology "an ever-increasing influence on 
domestic public policy," added that they ''also appear to have a 
growing effect on the content and conduct of American foreign policy." 1 

The general purpose of the study, as stated in the prospectus, was "to 
provide Congress with background material useful in strengthening 
the resources that support the conduct of American diplomacy." For 
this purpose it would "describe and analyze the formulation and ad- 
ministration of American diplomatic policies having significant science 
and technology components." 

More specifically, the study was designed to examine six "cases" and 
six "issues" in recent diplomatic history in order to — 

1. characterize processes and problems involving the interac- 
tion of science and technology with diplomacy; 

2. define organizational requirements for the effective formula- 
tion of important policies to direct and control activities involving 
this interaction; 

3. identify ways in which the capabilities of agencies serving at 
this interface can be strengthened legislatively or administra- 

4. discover ways in which science and technology can better 
support foreign policy objectives of the United States; and 

5. discover ways in winch the conduct of diplomatic activities 
can better support the healthy growth of national and interna- 
national science and technology. 2 

A quarter-century ago, in a report on "Science and Foreign Rela- 
tions" for the Department of State, Lloyd V. Berkner posed two 

1. How can the potentialities of scientific progress be integrated 
into the formulation of foreign policy, and the administration of 
foreign relations, so that the maximum advantage of scientific 
progress and development can be acquired by all peoples? 

2. How can foreign relations be conducted in such a manner as 
to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective progress of 
science and technology? 3 

The 12 completed studies in the series, and this final chapter of the 
project, are intended to suggest answers to Berkner's two questions. 

I U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Ape. in 
the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National 
Security Policv and Scientific Developments bv Franklin P. Huddle. Science Policy Research Division. 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. '. 
(Committee print.) p. 1. 

J Ibid., p. 4. 

' Ibid., p. 6. 


However, much has happened in the 25 years since the questions were 
posed. It is unlikely that the participants in the Berkner report had in 
mind the vast scope of the impacts that science and technology would 
impose on the world of diplomacy. Space exploration, the use of satel- 
lites for communications and remote sensing, the ballistic missile 
deterrent impasse, the Green Revolution, the technological dedication 
to petroleum that made the oil embargo effective, supertankers, 
nuclear proliferation, and the technology transfer activities of multi- 
national corporations have emerged as important diplomatic concerns 
since the publication of the Berkner report. Even the International 
Geophysical Year, in which Berkner was a leading participant, post- 
dates by some years his scheme to bring science and technology into 
the Department of State. 

The purpose of this final chapter of the extended study is to sift 
through the 12 chapters in which the 6 cases and 6 issues are ana- 
lyzed, in order to present a summarization of the entire project. 
However, unlike most summaries, this publication contains new 
material: further thoughts b} r the authors of the 12 individual studies, 
and by the present authors (the project codirectors) ; assessment of 
the performance of the governmental decisionmaking apparatus in 
relation to the outcomes of these studies; and a discussion of the 
implications of the studies for congressional action. This concluding 
chapter is accompanied by a new annotated bibliography that up- 
dates the bibliography issued in 1970 at the opening of the project. 4 

Scope oj the Study 

The supporting studies of six cases and six issues summarized in this 
concluding study are as follows: 


1. The Baruch Plan for international- 1. International impact of technology 

ization of atomic energy. on diplomacy. 

2. The Eisenhower proposal for peaceful 2. The politics of global health. 

use of the atom. 

3. The International Geophysical Year. 3. Food and population. 

4. The Mekong regional development 4. Temporary placement of U.S. scien- 

proposal. tists abroad. 

5. Efforts to reach international agree- 5. The "brain drain" of technically 

ment on exploiting the resources of trained people, 

the seabed. 

6. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade treaty and 6. Bringing science and technology into 

technology transfer. the Department of State. 

A decision was made at the outset of the project to exclude considera- 
tion of all subject matter that involved security-classified information. 
Accordingly, no military or intelligence topics were considered, and 
arms control was dealt with only to a limited extent in two of the 
papers which examined unclassified aspects of atomic energy cases. 
Several studies were abandoned with regret: those tentatively pro- 
jected on the use of the social sciences in the U.S. Information Agency, 
the computer and information management, scientific research in the 
North Atlantic Treat}^ Organization, and the Treat}?- on Outer Space. 

« Both were prepared by Genevieve Johanna Knezo, analyst in science and technology of the Science 
Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service. The present selective bibliography does not 
encompass all of the references cited in the introduction and the 12 individual studies, for it is a necessary 
feature of the case study approach that neither bibliography nor index can be both useful and comprehensive. 
In lieu of index, the project has adopted the device of frequent and descriptive headings, assembled in a table 
of contents. References consulted by the individual authors are cited fully in footnotes, while a supplemental 
listing of selected publications is presented in the appended bibliography. 

The project director and associate director also .; yas 

not possible to extend the study series to cover some other important 
areas: for example, research and development in the U.S. forei| 
program, global allocation of materia] and fuel resources, and science 
and technology activities in the complex of United Na i ioniza- 

Indeed, one of the difficulties in undertaking a broad policy study 
in the field of diplomacy is the richness of the subject and the i 
tiveness of the issues it presents. What was attempted, therefore, was 
the selection of a representative and mi aageable list of topics that 
were judged to yield instructive guidance to the Congress and to 
policy analysts in the executive branch. Perhaps it will be possible 
for the academic community to extend the analyses begun with the 
present series in 1970 into the topics neglected. 

It w r as a part of the plan for the project that each of the 1 2 separate 
studies should perform 2 functions: It should stand alone a- a 
useful account and analysis of an issue containing important policy 
questions and legislative values; and it should be an integral part 
of the total project on the managing of the interface of science and 
technology with diplomacy. There is evidence that the first purpose 
has already been served. This concluding analysis represents the 
effort to achieve the second purpose. 

Methodology oj the Study 

The six cases and six issues examined in the total study necessarily 
bear some substantive relationship to each other. However, there 
is no intention of presenting them as a time sequence. This is not 
in any sense a chronology of science, technology, and [American 
diplomacy since 1945, when the atomic bomb gave the subject a 
permanent urgency, or since 1950, when an early effort at serious 
appraisal was made in the Berkner Report. Each separate CB 
issue is presented in its own time frame. The focus of the study :i- a 
whole is on the nature of the problem of relating technical problems 
and opportunities to diplomatic methods, processes, and philosophy. 
Each case or issue is presented as a study complete in itself, but the 
series of these studies taken together provides a longitudinal report 
on the subject prepared during the years 1970 to 1975, inclusive, and 
covering selected events over a much longer timespan. Inescapably, 
the individual studies are somewhat time-dependent; accordingly, 
the date of original publication is indicated for each summary in this 
final report. The order of the summaries is determined by the topics 
and substantive matters rather than by the chronological order of 
their original issuance. 

To eliminate some of the awkwardness that this methodology 
introduces, each author has reviewed his or her contribution to the 
study to bring it — more or less — up to date. Questions that have 
emerged since first issuance are indicated and comments on the 
original studies are responded to. 

But to repeat: The purpose of the entire project is not historical 
but analytical; it is intended that the project as a whole w ill provide a 
coherent and reasonably comprehensive set of observations for use 
by the Congress in surveying the broad canvas of science, techni 
and American diplomacy. Is the subject as crucial to the welfare of 
humanity as it is sometimes alleged to be? If so, why, and in what 

ways? What are its major areas of concern? What are its institutional 
and procedural problems? What possibilities are offered for legislative 
strengthening of the institutions and the processes involved? 

In the prospectus which constituted the opening chapter of the 
series, it was promised that the format of the cases would generally 
be as follows: 

Context and emergence of the case. 

Definition of the problem. 

Organizational aspects. 

Chronological development. 

Decisionmaking confrontation. 

The decision process. 

Description of the decision. 


Assessment of the decision. 

Assessment of the decision process. 
A somewhat similar format, with allowances for the difference in 
subject matter, would be followed in treating the issues: 

Definition of the issue. 


Changes in the issue over time. 

Organizational aspects. 

Policies advanced. 

Alternatives available. 

Diplomatic aspects. 

Future prospects. 
In thus imposing some degree of uniformity on the separate cases 
and issues it was hoped that from each separate study or chapter it 
would be possible to draw insights and evidence that could be presented 
in a coherent fashion in this final report bearing on the outstanding 
policy aspects of the science-technology-diplomacy interrelationship. 
These policy aspects would also be identified, and confirmed or quali- 
fied, by the cases and issues themselves. 

Options for congressional consideration to strengthen the U.S. 
diplomatic apparatus, and possible ways to strengthen congressional 
participation in the foreign policy process, are identified from an exam- 
ination of all the cases and issues, taken together. In this final report, 
these findings are offered and discussed, as are a number of questions 
of fundamental policy. 

Organization of the Report 

Following this introduction is a short characterization of the global 
context of trends and circumstances relevant to the subject of the 
project. Next, .the six cases and the six issues are recapitulated, sub- 
jected to further analysis by both individual authors and project 
codirectors, and, where appropriate, brought up to date. Third, the 
report offers 6 essays of a more extended nature on policy alternatives 
that have emerged out of the 12 studies as important questions 
governing future direction of the diplomatic aspects of science and 
technology, and of the technical aspects of diplomac}^. Whereas the 
recapitulations — which might be termed abstracts to which have 
been added observations from a broadened and more current per- 
pective — involve focusing on the circumstances of the 12 studies, 
taken individually, and their implications for the general theme, 

each of the essays examines all 12 of the studies from the perspective 
of one major aspect or dimension of the general theme Finally, the 
report brings to a focus, for consideration by the Congress, the centra] 

problems and opportunities of science, technology, ami American 

An Anticipation of the Findings 

In this final report that concludes the CBS project, a number of 
separate products ought to emerge, properly documented and defined. 
One is a set of general conclusions as to the need for reform of the 
institutional arrangements for dealing with the broad -cope of the 
subject. Another is a better appreciation of the importance of the 
relationship between diplomacy and both science and technology — 
but especially the latter. A third i- the particular Bet of problems 
and opportunities that challenge the Congress to provide for their 
legislative solution or exploitation. 


Many illustrations appear, in the publications of the project, of the 
need to eliminate institutional gaps and deficiencies in the U.S. dip- 
lomatic machinery that result from the emergence of technology as a 
major force, if not the primary force, compelling diplomatic change 
and adaptation to change. Among these illustrations are the following: 

— The United States is preeminent in technology and admin- 
istrative management but neither of these greal attributes has 
been effectively mobilized by the Department of State for pur- 
poses of U.S. diplomacy. 

— Virtually all the great problems facing the United States in 
1975 have a large technological content. let those most knowl- 
edgeable about the generation, management, and utilization of 
new technology are not being inducted into the U.S. diplomatic 
machinery; conversely, too few of those who are part of the 
machinery of diplomacy are equipped by education, training, and 
experience to communicate effectively with the technologists or 
even to recognize when a technological/diplomatic problem exists. 

— Multinational corporations are recognized as the primary 
mechanism for international transfer of technology, yet the United 
States has no policy for enlistment and coordination of this 
great organizational resource to advance the purpose of U.S. 

— In its development of large technological systems. American 
engineering has led the world in its ability to deal with an in- 
finity of variables, design options, and interfaces. Apart from 
mainly military initiatives of the Department of Defense, systems 
approaches congenial to technologists have not been exploited 
to develop technological initiatives beneficial to U.S. diplomacy. 

— In the murky field of national security the emphasis has 
been on the design of nuclear weaponry and high-precision sub- 
nuclear weapons, to the neglect of the broader aspects of national 
security such as: vulnerability of external sources of materials 
essential to the U.S. economy, vulnerability of U.S. transport 
indispensable to heavy industry, and the economic health and 
innovativeness of basic materials industries. 

— In the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, preference is given to 
bilateral agreements and programs. Science and technology are 
major ingredients in these activities but the resources of people 
with both diplomatic and technical expertise to serve these 
agreements — numbering 28 at present in the focal agency, the 
State Department — are seriously deficient. Moreover, resort to 
multilateral programs — which, though difficult, might be a more 
efficient and diplomatically more acceptable way to use these 
resources — is largely neglected or downgraded. Engineering sup- 
port for the United Nations and its family of associated agencies 
is feeble. 

— The style of American diplomacy contrasts sharply with 
that of American industry, in that engineering moves from the 
establishment of goals to the design of programs to achieve them 
while diplomacy waits for crises to appear and then attempts to 
cope with them. 
Thus, the present report proposes that the need is at hand for a 
greater emphasis on long-range planning of diplomacy, with particular 
emphasis on its technological aspects. There needs to be a sustained 
and systematic search for future trends in the world outlook, a sus- 
tained effort to formulate U.S. goals, and a broad-gauge effort to 
discover organizing principles to bring a greater coherence to U.S. 
foreign policy. 

Better and more accessible information is needed about all aspects 
of the global diplomatic scene and about the forces that technology 
brings to bear on it. 

All signs seem to point to the need for a mobilization and coordina- 
tion of the enormous intellectual resources of the United States in 
academic institutions and other nongovernmental centers of intel- 
lectual analysis whose contributions are insufficiently available to 
diplomatic decisionmakers today. At the same time, in the formu- 
lation and furtherance of diplomatic goals, every effort would be 
worth consideration to bring technological skills into closer con- 
junction with those of political and economic policy. 

Finally, the role of technology could usefully be studied for op- 
portunities to design international institutions to reverse the all-too- 
evident trend toward disaffection of the "Third World" toward the 
United States. 


Studies of war and diplomacy up to 1945 assumed that either of 
these two modes of international relationship was the extension of 
the other. The further assumption was implicit that no technology 
of warfare could ever dissolve or destroy the necessary interrelation- 
ship of war and diplomacy. At one stroke the atomic bomb transformed 
the relationship and made the avoidance of total war the prime goal 
of diplomacy; subsequent refinements and delivery systems confirmed 
the new order. At the same time, the nations of the world came to 
recognize technology itself as a principal foundation of national 
power and diplomatic influence. 

The achievements of technology since World War II have done 
nothing to contradict this assessment. Technology has moved to center 

stage in the world diplomatic Scene. The United Stated, as the principal 

national exponent in technological achievement, ought therefore to I"' 
recognized as diplomatically prominent, hut ought also to accepl the 

responsibility for leading tin- way in the application of technology to 
the achievement of goals shared with the other nations of the world. 
Thus, the theses emerge from the study of Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy that — 

(1) In a rapidly changing world, the business of the Federal Govern- 
ment is increasingly the governance of relation- with other States, 
working with them in rational and controlled way- toward global 
development and the betterment of the human condition. 

(2) The historical role of violence or the threat of violence as the 
measure of diplomatic effectiveness has been considerably superseded 
by competitive excellence in technology. 

(3) Domestically, the United States is foremost among world powers 
in technological excellence. 

(4) Exercise of this preeminence for purposes of achieving world 
progress and harmony is both a moral imperative and a requirement of 
national security. As technology brings peoples closer together, these 
two motivations — national interest and international morality — tend 
more and more to reinforce each other. To the extent that they do not, 
the result may be chaos and, ultimately, failure of the human race, or 
at least of the present great civilization^ of the world, to survive 

(5) There are difficulties, not yet susceptible of evaluation as to 
their relative importance, but certainly including — 

(a) The sheer numbers of contacts and agencies concerned with 
technology on the international level, for multiple purposes having 
an infinite variety of sponsorship, affiliation, and structure; 

(b) The grossly inadequate resources allocated by the United 
States to the analysis of its technological resources, with particular 
reference to their applicabilitv toward global objectives of the 
United States; 

(c) Diffusion of effort, both because of the number of interna- 
tional claimants for attention and because of the absence of clearly 
defined foreign policy in technology — in particular, policy as to the 
proper relationship of U.S. efforts to those of other countries and 
of international organization-; 

(d) The tendency of less-developed nations to identify the U.S. 
mix of moral purpose and technological superiority with 

(e) The fact that too much has been expected of American 
money and skills to yield quick results through sheer volume and 
technical virtuosity, and that too little has been said of the need 
for patience, perseverance, and acquired insights to accommodate 
to the psvchologies of other cultures and to solve large problems of 
development by tackling the innumerable small, everyday 


In the 12th study in the series, the importance v j©d of 

the diplomatic role of the Congress: "In the last analy>i^ the Consti- 
tution vests in the Congress of the United States a large share of 


decisionmaking power on foreign as well as domestic affairs. Senatorial 
assent is the sine qua non of treatymaking. The power of the purse 
defines congressional control over all positive actions and programs of 
the Federal Government, foreign as well as domestic. The control of 
foreign trade and international transfers of persons, no less than the 
regulation of Armed Forces and the right to declare war, rests in 
the Congress." 5 

Also, the congressional need was suggested for strengthened insti- 
tutional means to provide assistance in the following ways: 

— Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with 
congressional intent in the area of scientific and technological 
impacts on foreign policy and international relations — and vice 
versa ; 

— Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic 
environment as changes occur in response to the global spread of 
technological innovation; 

— Assessing the secondary impacts and interrelationships of 
'•international" technological issues: 

— Examining the adequacy of U.S. '•international" institutions 
in the face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting 
from the global spread of technological innovation; 

— Structuring and making coherent the array of foreign policy 
interactions with science and technology; and 

— Mamtaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an 
extended institutional memory, and an assistance cadre for 
major studies for "international" committees concerned with 
S. it T. questions, S. <k T. committees concerned with foreign 
policy questions, and committees monitoring major technological 
missions with significant international implications. 5 
The interest of the Congress is inevitably — and more and more 
demonstrably — drawn to the importance of technology in its influence 
on the U.S. world posture, both directly through the diplomatic 
process and indirectly through the contributions of technology to U.S. 
economic health and vitality. Other congressional interests include 
the development of specific diplomatic initiatives employing tech- 
nology for national and international benefit; and the evolution of 
sound policies for the sharing of U.S. technology abroad and for the 
mutually beneficial exchange of technology with other countries. 

From these preoccupations, it would seem to follow that the Con- 
gress has a strong justification for considered action to supply (a) the 
best possible mechanism for long-range diplomatic planning in the 
Executive Office of the President; (bj means to strengthen organi- 
zational resources of the Department of State at home and abroad 
relative to science and technology; (c) positive guidance to the De- 
partment of State in the use of nongovernmental intellectual resources 
and institutions bearing on the relationship of diplomacy with science 
and technology; and (d) means to strengthen the resources supporting 
the Congress itself in making its own independent decisions on all 
these matters. 

'- U.S. Congress. House, Committee on International Relations. Science and Tcckriotopy in tint Department 
of Suae, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on In- 
ternational Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Research DiTisk:. 
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1975, 180 p. (Committee print.) p. 176. 

• Ibid., p. 143. 

II. The Global Context of Science, Technology, and American- 

U.S. foreign policy today as never before is confronted by a world 
of restless strivings and uncertain direction-. The modern world 
presents a complex mixture of dynamic new forces and drift, of active 
or potential conflict and detente, of wayward nationalism and a grow- 
ing curriculum of multinational cooperative activities. The 200th 
anniversary of the beginnings of history's most successful experiment 
in political democracy finds the Nation pondering the question of how 
to define and advance those aspects of its heritage of independence 
that are valuable in a world of growing interdependent ;e. The mid- 
1970s are thus a pivotal time: a time of reassessment of U.S. foreign 
policy, a time to search for a new and more stable, more durable world 
structure that could be realized by creative diplomatic initiative-. 
built deliberately according to a purposeful and coherent design. The 
resources that the United States can mobilize to meet this challenge 
are mainly the technology and managerial skills in which the Nation 
enjoys an unchallenged superiority. These two strengths, by a con- 
venient fact of history, are precisely those needed by mosl of the 
other nations of the w r orld in order to achieve progress toward their 
own internal national aspirations. 

However, elements of this changing w r orld do not automatically 
simplify or facilitate the exercise of U.S. leadership in applying these 
needed skills toward the achievement of a more stable, more durable 
world structure of cooperative and peaceful nations. The enormous 
complexity of the world of the 1970s derives from the great variety 
of nations and groupings of nations, each with its own rate and direc- 
tion of political, economic, and technological change, leading in turn 
to changing goals and national attitudes. Change can generate conflict 
or it can promote harmony and cooperation. All of diplomacy resolves 
ultimately into the balancing of these opposites. Whether by bold 
creative moves or by slow and cautions increments, the largely un- 
recognized challenge facing the United States is to use its skills of 
technology and management to assemble the elements of the presenl 
changing world into the more constructive and reliable order on which 
the future of civilization so manifestly depend-. 

As the first consideration, what are the salient elements of the 
modern world? Some of them are the following: 

Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R. 

The rigidities of the cold war are being replaced by a new flexibility 
in which the still-potent, still-dangerous adversary relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union is moderated by an 
uneasy and partial truce. This truce is marked by trade agreements, 
grain transactions, agreements on scientific and technological co- 
operation, technology transfers, and other unwarlike dealings epit- 
omized by the term "detente." 




The underpinning of detente remains the possession by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union of an overwhelming nuclear 
destructive capability sufficient to deny survival to either party in the 
event of its use. Having learned to live with this fact for nearly two 
decades, leaders of each nation, while still maneuvering for some slight 
and transitory technological advantage, 7 are mainly seeking a pattern 
of beneficial relationships for their own country — recognizing that it 
may incidentally be beneficial to the adversary, but in the nonmilitary 
sphere. Emerging out of this uneasy truce may possibly be a more or 
less conscious balance of cooperation and conflict reflecting both 
ideological opposition and mutual anxiety over survival. 


The purpose of weaponry is national security. However, the enor- 
mous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons accompanied by 
irresistible delivery system possessed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union has created an impasse. Both parties continue to invest 
scientific talents and resources in further refinements of nuclear 
weaponry but after a quarter century of this arms race the impasse 
continues, the destructive capability on both sides has increased, and 
the national security on both sides has diminished. Beneath this 
nuclear umbrella that makes overt conflict between the two super- 
powers an act of insanity, the adversaries have experimented with 
various kinds of war by proxy. Experiments in limited war by the 
United States in Korea and Vietnam showed that U.S. high technology 
weaponry had limited utility against a determined adversary in open 
warfare. Competitive supply of weaponry to the opposing sides in the 
Middle East has raised the level of intensity of that conflict and in- 
creased the risk of confrontation between the superpowers. Exports 
of U.S. weaponry to Latin America, Iran, Jordan, and other countries 
has multiplied the potential destructiveness of warfare involving 
these recipients; the gain to the United States has been measured in 
favorable balance-of-payments increments and varying degrees of 
transitory influence, but the cost has frequently been diminished 
national security for the United States. Proliferation of subnuclear 
weaponry continues but the ultimate consequences appear to offer no 
significant benefit to the United States while making small wars more 
lethal and draining the resources of small states to maintain their 
arsenals of high technology. 

The P. B.C. 

Emergence of the world's most populous nation from the self-im- 
posed isolation of the period of painful transition to a Communist 
dictatorship is now in process. The growing military and economic 
power of this former "sleeping giant" gives indication that in time the 
People's Republic of China will become, in some respects at least, 
the coequal partner/adversary of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Meanwhile the P.R.C., currently more hostile toward 
the Soviet Union than toward the United States, seeks to persuade 
the latter of the dangers of Soviet aggressive designs. 

7 A major technological advantage by either adversary would be intolerable to the other, and would pose 
a serious invitation to preemptive attack before the new weapon could be deployed. 



One lively dispute that divided Americans in the period between the 
two great wars concerned the extent to which this country could re- 
main aloof from European conflicts. The rise of Nazi Germany made 
the dispute salient but it was not resolved until Japanese ambitions 
for Asiatic hegemony precipitated a conflict halfway around the 
world from the initial theater of war. Thereafter, the tie- among the 
Axis Powers undercut the position of those who favored U.S. isolation. 
The views of the interventionists were confirmed by events: It became 
fixed in U.S. foreign policy that the United Stat"- had an inescapable 
role, a compelling interest, and a great power responsibility in assur- 
ing world peace and stability. During the cold war, this theme domi- 
nated U.S. dealings abroad. An attempt to withdraw from this re- 
sponsibility on the mainland of Asia led to the Korean war. The 
attempt to assert it led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The 
declining fortunes of the United State- in Vietnam led to renewed 
questioning of the extent of U.S. responsibility for maintaining 
peace and stability abroad, and even to a denial of such respon- 

The rationale of great power control over small-country wars and 
internal disturbances remains ill-defined, but recent events in the 
Middle East have demonstrated the hazard of a unilateral withdrawal 
of one great power from the scene, and the perhaps equal hazard of 
several great powers' committing themselves to opposing causes of 
small nations. Several lessons ran be drawn from this sequence. 
The most obvious is that the diplomatic reaction to this kind of crisi- 
is necessarily ad hoc and governed by circumstances; rigid adherence 
to either isolationism or interventionism would invite disastrous 
consequences. A less obvious but more fundamental lesson is that the 
most successful kind of diplomacy is that which anticipates, and 
devises initiatives to keep small crises from developing. It is note- 
worthy that such successes generate no headlines and create no 
popular heroes, and are recognized only in a small community. 

U.S. Economic Burdens 

Since World War II the U.S. dollar has remained the primary — 
and until recently the strong and stable — currency of international 
commerce. U.S. assistance has been extended to many nations abroad 
in the form of nuclear deterrence, trained soldiery, and arms ship- 
ments to treaty allies and developing nations. These economic bur- 
dens have been increased by U.S. efforts to raise the technological 
levels of developing countries and by commitments to supply ag- 
ricultural products to needy countries at less than market value. 
Efforts to persuade other developed countries to shoulder more of the 
burden of maintaining an international currency and credit system 
and to evolve, with the Soviet Union, a less demanding level of 
armament programs are features of the contemporary economic 
scene. However, the abrupt rise in world petroleum prices, unease ill 
the Middle East, and persistent ideological and organizational ob- 
stacles to U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation tend to perpetuate the U.S. 
economic burdens. 
The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy 

The word "developed" applied to the U.S. national economy mean- 
that a large territory was >ettled, and that the predominant form of 

6S-196— 76 3 


productive activity changed from agriculture to manufacturing during 
the first third of the 20th century, and from manufacturing to services 
in the second third. The products of agriculture and other extractive 
industries are food, fiber, lumber, and minerals; those of manufacturing 
are the highly diversified items ranging from clothing to automobiles; 
those of services industries are information and noncommodity- 
related activities. This sequence is probably not reversible, and the 
future health of the U.S. economy depends on the development of the 
services industries and the enhancement of their productivity. How- 
ever, much of the services industry is in Government services which 
consume but do not generate income: Teachers, police, firemen, other 
State and municipal employees, Federal workers, and those in military 

The trend in the United States toward services industries is the 
central feature in a complex of developments that include increased 
emphasis on the quality and quantity of security services that are 
provided by governments, such as protections against crime, unem- 
ployment, old age, and medical costs. Environmental protection has 
recently been added to this list. These services are costly and most of 
them are tax-supported instead of yielding tax revenues. Even as 
population movements toward urban centers have increased, erosion 
has occurred in the urban tax base as the wealthier segment of the 
urban population — and industry as well — has left the central city for 
the suburbs. 

Another complicating factor, perhaps more transient, is the shift 
in the demographic distribution of population toward the young and 
old parts of the lifescale; these are less productive than persons in 
the middle range but absorb services at a higher rate. 

The U.S. tax structure, which is effective in an expanding economy, 
tends to amplify cycles of high and low economic activity. 

In turn, depression of the economy tends to worsen all the other 
economic problems that appear as the Nation proceeds further into 
the "services" phase. As the tax base shrinks and the services industries 
grow, the ability of the Federal Government to support ambitious 
programs diminishes, while the demand for services and payment for 
them continues to grow. 

The extractive industries in the United States (accounting for half 
the labor force in 1890) now employ less than 5 percent of the labor 
force; manufacturing perhaps another 25 or 30 percent; and services 
the rest. The trend is toward further shrinkage of the first two and 
expansion of the third. 

Shrinkage of the tax base and expansion of tax-supported activities 
have important implications for diplomacy: as to ability to fund 
military programs, support foreign assistance, contribute to United 
Nations agencies a major fraction of their support, and invest in large 
research and development efforts whose product is increasingly resisted 
by the industrial sector as profit margins narrow. The pattern of U.S. 
trade is likewise disrupted by internal economic dislocations. Stag- 
flation, decline in the value of the dollar, and increasing competitive 
difficulty of U.S. industry all lead, in turn, to balance-of-payments 
deficits, making funding of U.S. programs abroad difficult. 

As public standards in services and welfare rise, demands grow for 
a safer and more wholesome environment, control over hazardous 
conditions in industry, and reduced impacts of mining and forestry on 
wilderness areas. 


While these brakes on industrial growth and productivity have not 
yet reached full strength, they have served to warn thai these rising 
long-term and incremental costs in the industrial economy are ap- 
proaching a serious stage. When coupled with the impact of the pe- 
troleum embargo and price increases from L973 on. the ob-crvable 
result was a mixed situation of recession combined with inflation. The 
effects of these forces were felt most keenly in areas of largest popula- 
tions, notably New York City. Escape from this dilemma i- vital to 
t ho future health of the U.S. diplomatic DOS til re in the world — as 
indeed also for U.S. domestic economic health — but the escape route 
remains undefined. The economic surplus needed to fund past levels 
of global programs may be a product of the U.S. past. I'.s. foreign 
policy may rest more in the future on the -kill of its diplomacy than 
on the weight of its economic programs. 

The Shaky Global Economy 

Economic interdependence lias long prevailed in international re- 
lations. In the 19th century. Central Europe fed on American grain; 
agricultural nations relied on Chilean nitrate-; England supplied 
capital to develop rail transportation systems in Argentina. India, the 
United States, and China; English textile mills wove cloth with United 
States and Indian cotton; and so on. During the 1920s efforts to restore 
this global economy conflicted with internal efforts to stabilize na- 
tional economies and employment; the global monetary system col- 
lapsed in the face of stiff tariff barriers, competitive devaluations, 
multiple currency schemes, and quotas. Restoration of the global 
econonry was a high-priority U.S. goal after World War II but, despite 
real progress, its achievement was obstructed by cold war divisiveness, 
nationalistic tendencies of former colonial regions, and — ultimately — 
the inability of the dollar to serve as a global currency in place of the 
long-defunct gold standard. Achievement of a stable global economy 
continues to be a U.S. goal. Detente with the Soviet Union was con- 
sidered a positive move toward its achievement. But many old and 
some new forces obstruct progress toward the goal: internal obligation- 
of developed countries to sustain economic growth and high levels of 
employment; resistance of developing countries to term- of trade 
which they see as blocking their escape from economic colonialism; 
and most recently the exploitation by the OPEC countries of a 
(probably temporary but severely acute) monopoly position in world 
petroleum supply. Efforts at reaching international agreement on a 
new world economic structure were underway at the time of this 
writing but the issue remains in doubt. 

Atomic Energy 

Atomic energy places such extreme demands on technology that 
its advance m\'ompetition with fossil fuels as a source of electrical 
energy has been slow\ However, the manipulated rise in petroleum 
prices" by OPEC and the complex environmental problems in the 
return to coal as a principal energy source are making atomic energy 
potentially more attractive for the future. This trend make- more and 
more difficult the maintenance of control over fuel elements and by- 
product plutonium to protect the world and its peoples against en- 
vironmental insults and irresponsible conversion of plutonium into 
weapons. Since the early 1960s a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy 
has been prevention of nuclear proliferation. The economics of energy 
now places that goal in serious jeopardy. Scientific efforts to develop 


a safer form of energy from nuclear fusion are proceeding but the prob- 
lem is one of great technical difficulty and the estimates of time to 
achieve success range from 20 to 50 j'ears. Half a century of uncon- 
trolled nuclear proliferation as a consequence of supplying electricity 
to mankind is a fearsome prospect. 


The ultimate concern of all governments, in terms of both ends and 
means, is people. Of growing concern is the relationship between total 
available resources and population in the entire world, but especially in 
the most populous regions and those in winch the rate of population 
increase is sharpest. Populations are significant in relation to resources 
of arable land and materials, ability to buy food, levels of consumption 
of all goods, rates at which environmental pollution occurs, and ability 
to extend governance. As populations increase, problems worsen in all 
these categories unless means are found to exert strong positive con- 
trols or motivations. In an interdependent world, population problems 
in any country have effects on all countries. Rates of population 
increase of different countries in the contemporary world tend to be in 
inverse proportion to achieved levels of development. Technology is 
available to feed large increases in populations as well as to control the 
rates of increase, but the enlistment of technology toward either 
purpose requires institutional support which is generally inadequate. 
Many forces are at work that cause population increases while few 
forces have been devised to inhibit population growth in poor coun- 
tries, other than food deprivation as a consequence of food/population 
unbalance. International tensions resulting from population pressures 
are regarded as serious and worsening but international agreement on 
the resolution of the problem is lacking. The dilemma facing the world 
is that governments of poor countries call for aid from developed 
countries to secure the rights of their citizens to living standards 
achieved by developed countries, but cannot reconcile these expecta- 
tions with their practical impossibility^ in the face of uninhibited 
increases of populations. 


As with population control, the limiting factor on food supply is not 
primarily technological but institutional. Wider exploitation of well- 
established technology of plant genetics, fertilization, storage, process- 
ing, and marketing could treble or quadruple the available food supply 
of the world. But the institutional remedies for the almost inevitable 
increase of famine conditions in the closing quarter of the 20th century 
must deal with food production and distribution as only one ingredient 
in a pattern of development that encompasses health and education, 
nonagricultural employment opportunities in urban and rural areas, 
stable currencies and international exchanges, land management 
reform, and stable institutions of government able to administer 
effective tax and investment programs. Failing achievement of these 
conditions, the poor countries will need to rely increasingly on imported 
supplies of food of which the United States is the leading exporter. 
For the United States the options include (a) short-term economic 
advantage by sales to the best market, (b) stern compulsion on the 
poor countries to effect reforms by deliberate choice of markets to 
reward the countries that do so, and (c) compassionate doling out of 
dwindling food reserves to populations on the basis of relative extremes 
of need. Averting so painful a decision rests not with the United States 


alone but with all potentially food-deficient countries a- well. But if 
effective means of cooperation in development arc not achieved, the 
ultimate decision will rest inescapably with the leadership of the most 
productive country, the United states. 


The status of the three-fifths of the globe covered by oceans was in 
question in the mid-1970s. Squabbles over fishhig right- and seaward 

extent of national sovereignty were frequent. II. S. entrepreneurs 
impatiently waited for some sort of legal determination of seabed 
sovereignty and property light- in order to exploit emerging tech- 
nologies for securing the petroleum and metallic wealth of tins remain- 
ing frontier. Naval use of the international medium of the oceans 
remained a plausible exercise of national power, but question was 
being raised as to U.S. supremacy at sea, once taken for granted and 
now seriously challenged. Environmentalists were vocal in denuncia- 
tion of Japanese and Soviet overfishing of the dwindling population of 
whales and of the pollution of the oceans by oil spills and chemical 
effluents. Failure of the maritime nations to agree on a new law of 
the sea in pending negotiations threatened to leave the ocean common- 
in a state of anarchy, instead of leading to a system of cooperation to 
maximize the management of the oceans as a sustained source of food 
and mineral wealth. 

Resource Allocation 

Consumption of minerals and fossil fuels is proportional to the 
level of economic development of nation-, and levels of development 
differ greatly. Production of minerals and fossil fuels is related to their 
occurrence in the earth, and they are unevenly distributed among 
nations. Since extractive industries arc first to be attempted by 
developing nations, the effect is that of a flow of materials from the 
poor countries to the rich, and a flow of processed good- from the 
rich countries to the poor. Efforts by poor countries to correct these 
evidently disadvantageous terms of trade have brought controversy 
into the United Nations and other forum-. For all poor countries to 
reach the levels of materials consumption already achieved by the 
developed countries would far exceed the available reserves of the 
earth. Demands by the poor countries for a larger share of the benefits 
of the wealth from their mines and oil field- signal the need for eventual 
agreement among nations as to an equitable allocation of these 
resources. The wealth of developed countries i- in the form of tech- 
nology, management, a built industrial plant, and investment 
capital. It remains to be determined how much of a transfer of the 
technical resources of the rich nations to the poor will be acceptable, 
and how large a share of raw materials the poor nation- will insist 
on retaining. Clearly, the developed nations will need to practice a 
greater conservation of imported resources ami the developing coun- 
tries will need to moderate their expectations of equaling the con- 
sumption levels achieved by the rich. There is -imply not enough to 
go around. But by the mid-1970s, these constraints were insufficiently 
appreciated in either the rich or the poor countries. An attempt to 
ascertain the limits to growth, though usefully >ignaling an alert, had 
foundered on dubious assumptions while neglecting the practical 
question of how high a standard of consumption wa- achievable 
over the entire globe with its inexorably increa.>ing population. 


Multinational Corporations 

In response to efforts by many foreign nations to protect their 
own balances of international exchange by restricting the penetration 
of foreign corporations, a form of international commercial institution 
has rapidly proliferated. This form, the multinational corporation 
or MNC, is designed to accomplish the age-old dream of the economist : 
to minimize the economic significance of national boundaries. It 
does help to alleviate once-potent economic causes of international 
disputes, and it can be an effective agent of technology transfer, 
but it also generates new causes of conflict and frustration. Charac- 
teristically, the MNC moves capital, materials, credit, managerial 
expertise, technological skills, intellectual property, and even trained 
labor from country to country in order to maximize its total overall 
and long-term profit. In the process it erodes the national sovereignty 
of host countries, diverts capital and labor from nationally planned 
economic allocations, and competes for economic and even political 
power, while preserving its own economic and technological power 
base remote from the countries it penetrates. At the same time, 
because of the complex and farflung nature of its operations, it tends 
to elude controls which the base country seeks to impose, or even at 
times to outpace the base country's perception that certain controls 
may be needed in its own national interest. In so doing it tends to 
neglect political, social, and institutional costs of its operations. 

As an institution the MNC offers the capability of influencing con- 
structively the evolution of a stable world economy and the develop- 
ment of lagging economies. But as the MNC currently operates, it 
excites resentment among U.S. labor unions as an instrument to 
cause unemployment at home; it excites resentment in developed 
countries by superimposing foreign management over domestic 
labor; and it excites resentment in developing countries by co-opting 
labor and resources to feed into technologies which are often inap- 
propriate to, and tend to distort, the development process in those 


The disintegration of 1.9th century colonial empires has resulted in a 
large increase (to 171 in November 1975) in the number of separate 
sovereign states, each groping toward independence, governance, self- 
determination of national policy, and coherence. Some of these states 
have discovered the ancient formula whereby nationalism, in terms of a 
contrived hostility toward their own neighbors, toward other groupings 
of states, or toward one or another of the great powers, can serve to 
unify and promote coherence of their own political structures. At the 
same time, claims turn into "rights" and exchanges of values become 
"exploitation," creating an attitude of manifest destiny of the poor. 

United Nations 

Born in an epoch of hope for a cooperative world of peaceful nations, 
the United Nations has degenerated into a cockpit of parochial squab- 
bles. Since the penalty for intransigence in the United Nations is 
inconsequential, the motive for compromise has disappeared and deci- 
sions without practical effect are arrived at in the U.N. General 
Assembly by counting the votes of the ministates. Effectiveness of the 
U.N. Security Council is largely nullified b} T exercise of the veto power 
by the leading permanent members. Constructive programs of the 


World Bank and the World Health Organization offer a glimmer of 
hope but the intransigence evident in the Genera] Assembly has round 
its counterpart in UNESCO and ILO. By the mid-1970s, respect for the 
United Nations in the United States had been seriously impaired and 
the cost benefit of the association of nations was widely questioned. 
The very substantial contributions of the U.N. system were largely 
unseen while its futilities were highly visible. Whether public opinion 
would be content to tolerate this unsatisfa< • of affair 

enough to evolve a more workable and useful U.N. structure remainea 
to be seen. 


A basic building block available to U.S. diplomacy in the balancing 
of cooperation and conflict is the circumstance that" many contiguous 
nations share common geographic and economic problems ami oppor- 
tunities. Many such multinational regions exisl throughout the world 
but their effect on the nations that share them varies widely. Some, like 
the Scandinavian countries, have established cooperative relation-: 
others, like the nations of former French Indochina, have a long history 
of strife: some, like the States of Central America, are groping toward 
cooperation; and some, like the Middle East; are fiercely divided by 
religion and ideology. The opportunity for economic and social benefit's 
to such regions is great but largely wasted; cooperative planning, 
division of labor in the development and testing of useful technology, 
shared infrastructures, and the recognition of commonality of prob- 
lems, opportunities, goals, and approaches, are all available as elements 
to reduce the economic significance of national boundaries. Reasons 
for the neglect of this opportunity to strengthen international amity a re 
easy to find, but the want of effort to this end seems hard to justifyi 

Shrinking World Community 

Instant global communications, verbal and visual, bring the whole 
world into the living room. A terrorist attack in the Middle East or 
Northern Ireland, an earthquake in Chile or Turkey, an election in 
Australia or Portgual, is described or shown minutes later everywhere 
else. The infinite variety of events inviting global attention over- 
loads the receptors of the individual and the tune or space of the 
communicators. Censorship is inherent, not only for reasons of na- 
tional policy or economic advantage but because limited capacity 
compels selection according to some policy or principle. "Newsworthy" 
events — like war or unrest in Morocco, Angola, Belize, Ethiopia, Por- 
tugal JCypras, Lebanon, Or elsewhere — are reported while crop statis- 
tics, new schools, technological developments, and other constructive 
events are ignored. Even so, the individual is told more than he can 
assimilate. Excessive demands are placed on his enthusiasm and indig- 
nation. In response, the individual tends to dismiss the information 
flow as irrelevant to his own interests, and to rely on the "expert-" 
to deal with these hopelessly numerous and complex matters. Or else, 
in support of his own tradition or esthetic seme, the individual may 
seize on some one conflict as his own, choosing a side for reasons of 
moral predilection or ethnic, religious, or national origin. Evei 
the average American in 1975 is more aware of the world outside his 
own country than ever before but perhaps more depressed by what 
he perceives. 


Global Flows 

Information on current events is only one of many kinds of flows 
that cross national boundaries. The entire globe is a complex network, 
bound together by systems of transportation and communication by 
land, sea, air, and electronic linkages. Almost all nations contribute 
to and receive these flows, and the traffic along the various media 
continues to grow. The flows include trained persons moving to new 
homes, students seeking further education, tourists learning about 
the world, business people looking for opportunities for profit, scien- 
tists seeking to exchange knowledge, and diplomats bent on facilitating 
the conduct of international relations. Transactional flows also take 
place, in the form of credit, materials and products, ideological views, 
information, diplomatic influence, and expressions of national interests 
and goals. Still other flows, ranging from highly destructive to some- 
thing less than constructive, take the form of terrorist attacks, dis- 
semination of weaponry, the international movement of dangerous, 
drugs, the spread of disease epidemics, hostile signals and threats, 
guerrilla and "underground" movements, and covert operations. 
Encouragement and discouragement of various of these flows is the 
business of every government, some more than others. Together with 
the responses to them that feed back to the original source country, 
these flows aggregate into what is called "foreign relations." Since 
most flows are on the increase, it can be said that foreign relations 
are progressively intensifying for all countries. In the case of the 
United States, the indices of size, wealth, economic activity, military 
strength, and other measures of a dynamic society, are all surpassingly 
high; U.S. foreign relations are accordingly more intensive and com- 
plex than those of any other country in the world. 

However, U.S. institutional mechanisms to manage, plan for, or 
even keep track of these increasing flows are not growing correspond- 
ingly. This fact suggests that the United States is less and less able 
to administer a more and more demanding responsibility for foreign 
policy. It is also probable that the same deficiency exists in other 
highly dynamic developed countries. 


Rarely, if ever, has U.S. foreign polic}' faced so many fundamental 
changes — in the power base of its own political system, in the com- 
plexities of the external w T orld, and in the challenges and obstacles to 
be met in furtherance of its goals. Disorientation is not too strong a 
term for the state of U.S. foreign policy in the mid-1970s. 

At this point in the Nation's history it has just emerged from a 
tragic, divisive, and in the minds of many a futile, war. National 
attitudes are mixed toward further exercise of U.S. power and influence 
in the world, even to the revival of the isolationism of the 1930s. 
Domestic issues are most salient: concern for the deteriorating environ- 
ment, resistance to the achievement of school integration through 
forced busing, worries over unemployment and inflation, apprehension 
over threatened shortage of energy. 

A long list of disruptions abroad were also of public and official 
concern: the festering and periodically explosive Arab-Israeli con- 
flict, the revolt of the Third World in the U.N. General Assembly, 
Third World economic challenges to prevailing patterns of commerce, 
periodically renewed concern over the global increase in populations 


relative to global food supply, assertions of nationalism and intran- 
sigence D3 r the many new nation-, incident- of bombing and terrorism 
around the world, hijacking and kidnaping-, urban guerrilla move- 
ments in several countries, religious conflict in Northern [reland and 
communal conflict in Cyprus and Lebanon, power shifts Or active 
contests at many points in Eurasia and Africa, unease over prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons and the stability of the nuclear deterrent, 
frustration over the issue of seabed sovereignty, growing awarei 
the disintegration of the world monetary structure erected alter World 
War II and of the possibility of world monetary collapse, and a general 
sense that national goals of the many old and new nation- of the world 
were at cross-purposes. 

The want of coherence and shared common purpose in the United 
Nations, the superpowers, NATO, and other groups of nation- that 
once found opportunities for cooperation is a distressing characteristic 
of the contemporary world. It is a time for rebuilding and new- leader- 
ship toward purposes that all can share. That i> the prime challenge 
of American diplomacy in the final quarter of the 20th centiin . 

III. Six Cases Illustrating the Interaction of Science, Tech- 
nology, and American Diplomacy 

In tlio introduction reference was made to the original plan, out- 
lined in Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age, to present a num- 
ber of cases and issues to illustrate the interaction of science, tech- 
nology, and American diplomacy, and in doing so to adopt a common 
format. Despite the widely differing circumstances of the 12 separate 
studies which followed, it did prove possible to achieve substantial 
structural parallelism in treating them. This parallelism is evident in 
the fact that virtually all of the studies contribute illustrations and in- 
sights to each of the 6 major operational issues presented below in 
sections V through X even though the topics of the 12 studies were not 
selected with these operational issues in mind. On the contrary, the 
operational issues were suggested by the independent analyses of 
studies as the series progressed. 

The parallelism is also evident in the ease with which the com- 
mentaries on the various studies fit the somewhat arbitrary formats 
circumscribing all of them — one format for the six cases and a varia- 
tion of it for the six substantive issues. 

The format for the six cases is given herewith, followed by the 
commentaries on the cases themselves: 

Statement of the case 

Importance of the case 

How the case developed 

U.S. involvement 

Role of Congress 



Author's reassessment in 1975 

Some illustrative questions 


Statement of the Case 

The proposal to internationalize the control of atomic energy 
presented by U.S. negotiator Bernard M. Baruch on June 14, 1946, 
at the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Com- 
mission, was the first major postwar step toward coping with a 
foremost technological threat to future world security. Despite wide- 
spread recognition of the dimensions of the threat, 9 the negotiations 

8 U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Xu- 
clcarAqe. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Le- 
neice N. Wu, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, 67 pages. 

• Two Americans whose reaction to the threat when it first became known was essentially optimistic may 
have been representative of many others. One, a military officer who was present at the Alamagordo test of 
the first atom bomb, was heard to remark, with pardonable rhetoric: "At last war has devoured itself." ' 
The other, the associate director of this study— then a U.S. Navy Japanese Language Officer assignpd to 
military government duties on Tinian, near the airfield from which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima 
(August 6, 1945) was flown — wrote to his wife on August 8, 194.5. that the development of "this terrifying new 
weapon" could be seen as strengthening the prospects for world peace, because of the strong possibility that 
"when a certain point was reached in the degree of devastation that war is capable of causing, that knowledge 
would act as a deterrent to war and would do so increasingly as modern weapons increased in power. The 
debut of fthe atomic bomb] seems to me to mark that turning point." 

To the extent that this reaction of characteristic American optimism may have been shared by those mak- 
ing policy, however, it seems clear in retrospect that it was a hazardous one which took for granted the dif- 
ficult negotiations, spurred by a supreme sense of urgency, upon which the achievement of a reliable state of 
deterrence would have to depend. Thirty years later it is by no means certain whether "that turning point" 
has actually been reached. 



on the Baruch proposal ended in failure and the threat continues to 

Importance of the Case 

The arrival of atomic power was a technological event of unparal- 
leled significance for international affairs. It raised the cosl of all-out 
warfare to an intolerable level and substantially altered the basis for 
the positions of diplomats at the bargaining tahle. The problem of how- 
to establish control over both military and peaceful uses of atomic 
energy posed an unprecedented challenge to world diplomacy. At 
the outset, the technological necessities of effective international 
control were politically unacceptable, especially to the Soviet I 
For U.S. diplomacy the problem, -ecu in retrospect, wa9 a h 
ability first to establish an atmosphere of confidence despite differing 
political goals, then to fashion a Btep-by-step control program, keyed 
to common interests, which could serve as a basis for productive 
negotiation. From the perspective of the Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy study series, it was a major best of the capacity 
of the United States to use its scientific, technological, and diplomatic 
expertise in concert to solve a crucial world problem. 

How the Case Developed 

Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been 
demonstrated to the world, the Truman Administration acted bo 
create public understanding of the bomb and it- significance for the 
United State-. The Sm\ th report, containing i grei I deal of previously 
classified, basic scientific information, was relea-ed in August 1945; 
the President took initial steps toward enunciation of U.S. atomic 
energy policy in tw T o major addresses in October. On November 16 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom laid a foundation 
for international action to control atomic energy in the Three Nation 
Agreed Declaration. 

In December the Soviet Union was made a party to the endeavor 
in the signing of the Moscow Declaration. Earlier that month Assist- 
ant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been appointed to head a 
committee to report to the Secretary on U.S. policy for international 
control. In Januan r 1946, the United Nations Atomic Energy Com- 
mission (UNAEC) was created, and a Board of Consultant- headed 
by TVA Chairman David Lilienthal was formed to assemble technical 
advice for the Acheson committee. The finding-* of the Ache-o; 
mittee and the Board of Consultants (which came to be known a- the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report) were released in March 194G. In the same 
month, Baruch was appointed to represent the United S - in the 

The plan which Baruch presented to the UNAE( ' <>n June 14, 1946, 
was a combination of his own ideas on international control of atomic 
energy and the proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal report. A central 
feature of the plan was an international organisation to which would 
be entrusted all phase- of the development and use of atomic e 
The plan also called for inspection and for making violation- of the 
control agreement subject to punishment, and a proposal that the 
veto power in the Security Council would not apply in voting on 
sanctions. In a counterproposal on June 19, the Soviet Union rejected 
the idea of waiving the veto and urged a total prohibition of atomic 
weapons, promotion of peaceful development of atomic energy, and 
agreement on international control but with retention of full 


freedom of action. However. Soviet negotiators stopped short of 
suggesting an actual procedure. There was thus from the outset a wide 
gull between the U.S. plan and the Soviet approach, a gulf that never 
appreciably narrowed. 

The work of the UNAEC proceeded for less than 4 years; a majority 
plan based on the U.S. proposals was accepted. 40-6^4. in a nonbind- 
ing U.N. General Assembly resolution, but rejected (by Soviet v- 
in the Security Council; by November 1949. the work of the UNAEC 
had waned to the point where the General Assembly agreed to suspend 
its activities. 

U.S. Involvement 

As -uggested above, President Truman sought at the ou* 
develop a broad base of understanding and participation in the pr 
of achieving international control of atomic energy. Secretary of War 
Henry L. btimson. asked by Truman to appoint a group to consider 
both domestic and international control needs, brought leading 
scientists together with key Government officials in the Secretary of 
War's Interim Committee in May 1945. Vannevar Bush, eminent 
scientist-engmeer-administrator, and General Leslie Groves, head of 
the Manhattan project which had developed the atom bomb, were 
members of the Acheson committee formed in December 1945, along 
with Harvard President James B. Conant and former A-sistant Secre- 
tary of War John MeCloy. The Board of Consultants appointed to 
advise the committee consisted of TYA Chairman David Lilienthal. 
Xew Jersey Bell Telephone Co. president Chester Barnard, Manhattan 
project participant Harry A. Winne (an engineer and a vice president 
of the General Electric Oo. . and physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer. 
who had directed the Manhattan Project weaponry installation at Los 
Alamos. The Acheson-Lilienthal report which resulted from mee:: ga 
of these two groups identified the basic technological factors that 
would affect the development of an international control system and 
outlined a control plan governed by those factors. 

The delegation named to present the U.S. po-ition to the United 
Xations was of a different character. With financier Baruch were three 
leading bankers, the head of the Xew York State Racing Commission, 
and a scientific adviser who had served in that role with General 
Groves. Baruch contributed a reputation for political acumen: it wa- 
apparently hoped that he could help enlarge the administration's 
freedom of action in international negotiations because he had the 
confidence of Congress, which was concerned about giving away 
secrets and thereby undermining the U.S. strategic position. 

There appear to have been significant differences in perspective 
between those who developed the recommendations for a policy of 
international control of atomic energy, representing mainly a technical 
approach, and- those who were responsible for conducting the diplo- 
matic negotiations to implement the emerging policy. In any case, con- 
tact between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups 
ended after a few meetings. There was fault on both sides: Baruch 
resented open publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal report; he asserted 
that he would introduce his own ideas into the negotiations and con- 
duct them in his own way: the members of the Acheson committee and 
the Board of Consultants declined to serve under Baruch. partly on the 
grounds that they wanted to retain the right to speak out in opposition 
if Baruch pursued policies with which they disagreed. 


Bole of Congress 

Congress played no direct role in the negotiations hut exercised i 
restraining influence. At the time of the December L945 conference 
which resulted in the Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Yanden- 
berg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit tec, and other 
Members of Congress repeatedly sought and received assurances from 
the President that the United States would not release atomic energy 
information before adequate safeguards were established. This pro- 
tective attitude was heightened by the revelation in early 1946 of 
evidence of espionage activities in Canada involving the transmission 
of atomic energy information to the Soviet Union. 


The collapse of the Baruch plan negotiations was a costly diplomatic 
failure. It would be idle to speculate on the consequent diversion of 
resources from peaceful uses to armament expenditures. More con- 
sequential still is the question of how the pattern of cooperation 
established through a diplomatic success in this critical problem area 
might have altered the course of postwar political developments. 
Decisive agreement on an international control system might have 
put an end to the uncertainty which has prevailed ever since: the 
paradoxical uncertainty of escalating military power in conjunction 
with waning security. 10 Further, an early agreement might have 
laid the groundwork for the development of peaceful applications of 
nuclear energy almost a decade earlier than it in fact occurred, and 
on a wider scale — thereby, among other things, possibly heading off 
or making more manageable the present complex economic, energy, 
and diplomatic situation with respect to oil. But apart from the uses 
of nuclear power itself, a successful conclusion to the Baruch plan 
negotiations could have provided an influential precedent — somewhat 
as the IGY did a decade later, but in a more direct intergovernmental 
context — for the acceleration of international cooperative activity of 
many kinds. It is conceivable, in short, that it might have averted or 
mitigated the course of the Cold War. 


What were the reasons for the failure? One way of summing them 
up is to concede that the American political leaders and scientists 
involved did not bring to bear the vision and persistent effort de- 
manded by a problem of this extraordinary nature and magnitude. 
In more specific terms, some of the elements of the failure were the 
following : 

— There was a basic contradiction in the U.S. negotiating 
position. The United States had demilitarized in haste after World 
AVar II, whereas the Soviet Union had maintained very sub- 
stantial forces in combat readiness. This factor argued for 
retention of the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons as long as 

'"Various observers have commented on this paradox. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on August 26, 1973, Dr. Herbert York— Chancellor of the University of California at San Diego 
and previously Director of Defense Research and Engineering— noted that "ever since shortly after World 
War II the military power of the United States has been steadily increasing; over the same period the 
national security of the United States has been rapidly and inexorably dumnishing.' {Technical Information 
for Congress, p. 220.) On May 14, 1968, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown declared:" There can be no 
successful aggression by means of strategic war today." {The Evolution of International Technology, p. 20.) 
Earlier in 1957, Dr. Henry Kissinger had written in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: The destructive- 
ness of modern weapons deprives victory in an all-out war of its historical meaning. (Ibid., p. 19) 


possible — a consideration that was as much in the minds of the 
Soviet leaders as it was a concern of the administration and 
the Congress. Yet the American leadership realized, and stated 
publicly, that the secret could not be kept for long. Therefore, it 
was necessary to move quickly and comprehensively to estab- 
lish international controls. Paradoxically, the U.S. approach — 
in particular, the fact that the United States repeatedly asserted 
its intention of relinquishing atomic weapons but never reached 
the point of denning the conditions and timing of what it would 
consider acceptable controls — appears to have underlined the 
U.S.S.R.'s suspicion that it was the American purpose to retain 
essential control while giving the appearance of vesting it in an 
international body. 

— There was calculated ambiguity in the Soviet position. Gen- 
uinely suspicious of the United States, the U.S.S.R. substituted 
statements of principle for concrete plans while it continued its 
own atomic weaponry program which was to prove much further 
advanced than most American scientists and diplomats sus- 
pected at the time. In retrospect, the fact of understandable — 
and at least partly justified— Soviet suspicions may argue that 
the United States should have adopted a more concilia tor y, 
patient, and persistent negotiating posture. 

— Certain features of the U.S. proposals which some considered 
essential to an effective control system — notably those concern- 
ing limitation of national sovereignty, inspection, and waiver 
of veto in the Security Council in matters of punishment for 
violations of a control agreement — were totally unacceptable 
to the Soviet Union. The question arises as to whether these 
points were in fact essential to a control plan and as to the extent 
to which they prevented meaningful negotiation. A possible 
alternative approach in the U.S. policymaking process might 
have been first to determine what among the basic technological 
and political requirements of an effective control system each 
side would accept, and then try to establish some common ground 
between the two positions. A willingness to proceed on this basis 
might at least have emphasized good faith and signaled an under- 
standing that each side had its special political problems to 
resolve. 11 

— There were conflicts in the relationships and respective roles 
of the American scientists and diplomats. Although the diplomats 
carried the action, with the scientists in a limited advisory role, 
it was the technology of atomic energy which set the scope and 
tone of the negotiations. Disagreements were couched in tech- 
nological terms. Actually, they reflected political differences, but 
the diplomats failed to deal with them accordingly. At the same 
time, scientists who were in a position to influence policymakers in 
the United States and in the UNAEC failed to recognize the 
problems of feasibility of control in the context of emerging 
post-war political relationships. 

» On the other hand, it is of course possible to speculate that nothing could have induced the Soviet leaders 
to compromise on what they considered key issues, as long as (a) 'the U.S.S.R. lacked atomic weapons 
ftlnniif t ■» r ? m n in f e ?i 1I1 T a - weak banjaining position, and (b) the leadership believed it either certain or 
strongly possible that the U.S.S.R. would soon develop its own atomic bomb 


One of the factors which sot the stage for failure was the over- 
estimation by U.S. leaders of the tactical advantage which monopoly 
possession of atomic weapons gave the United States." As the author, 

Leneice N. Wu, observes: 

While exclusive possession of a now technology stemming from a scientific 
discovery may give a nation an advantage in international affairs, thai advantage 
is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear energy, the principal disadvan- 
taged country was able to duplicate the discovery of fission and to create a 
rudimentary initial technology sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device 
while the negotiations were still in progress. Vet during this time U.S. negotiators 
apparently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a comfortably 
long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus [one] lesson from this study is 
that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once the application of a new technology 
has been forcefully demonstrated before the world as in the case of the atomic 
bombs, to prevent other nations from acquiring or recreating this technology. 1 * 

Whatever the reasons for failure of the Baruch plan negotiations, 
they were characterized by insufficient teamwork and discontinuous 
involvement of technologists in the diplomatic process; Possibly 
Presidential and congressional encouragement of a continuing dialog 
between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal croups 
could have helped to shape a U.S. position capable of contributing 
to a successful conclusion of the negotiations. But existing procedures 
and impetus were inadequate for dealing with the impact of a tech- 
nological development of this size and complexity. 


This stud}' of the Baruch plan negotiation- suggests some general 
observations about the interrelationships of Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy. Among those noted by the author are the 
following: M 

— The creation and application of new technologies may so 
change relations among nations that a system of international 
control becomes desirable. Although probably the most dramatic 
example to date, nuclear energy is neither the first nor the last 
example of a technological innovation which suggests the need of 
international machinery and procedures for controlling it. (Some 
others are aviation, warships, supertankers, and communications 

— Intense rivalries among different national interests may 
nevertheless tend to prevent the achievement of an appropriate 
international control system. "Not even an awareness of the 
awesome destructive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient 
incentive to nations to agree on a secure form of control over 
atomic energy." 

'- Another contributing factor was the pervasive lack of understanding of the facts of atomic technology 
which prevailed at the time. The project director of this study series observes that after 3 I years Of exposure 
to atomic technology it is hard to recall how little was generally known about the subject in L945. For even 
a literate observer of tbe political, military, and technical developments of that time, it took several i 
of i he Smyth Report to get the full Import of the technology. It is unlikely tint many Washington I 
crats cave it as much as a single thorough reading. An informal random poll of 30 Washington professionals 
mainly government— taken a few weeks after the Smyth report had been released and at a tim.> when it 
had been much in the news, yielded only one person— a chemist— who had read it. This same source i 
that In a conversation he had at this time with General Qrov ir of the Manhatl in I i 

expressed complete confidence that the Soviets could not possibly produce an atomic weapon for a' 

11 Wu. TV Riruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enttrt the Xuclear Age, p 
" Ibid., p. 63-07. 


" — While exclusive possession of a new technology . . . may 
give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage 
l- likely to shrink quickly." 

Once a new technology has been demonstrated it is unrealistic 
to suppose that the secrets of how it is created can be kept for 
more than a very short time. 

— For scientists and technologists to work effectively with 
diplomats toward the solution of complex political problems with 
important technical components, "the members of each field 
must express their respective points of view fully and in terms 
which can be understood and applied by members of the other 
field. At the same time, there must be a special receptivity by 
members of each field and a special willingness to accommodate 
to the outlook of the other, in order to attain the ultimate goal." 

— Where the technological and political realities which must be 
harmonized are in sharp conflict, a special effort is required of 
negotiators to see that all of the requirements to be reconciled 
are fully anah'zed and taken into account. In the Baruch Plan 
negotiations, the dominant political reality was that an assurance 
of the end of the serious threat to Soviet military security posed 
by U.S. possession of the atomic bomb would have been necessary 
in exchange for renunciation by the U.S.S.R. of its own efforts to 
develop a nuclear weapon and accept international control. The 
dominant technological reality was that the processes associated 
with the peaceful and military uses of atomic energy were ap- 
proximately the same. "And it appeared from the outset that the 
security of a control system would have to be maintained through 
inspections of an exceedingly intrusive character. The Soviet 
Union was faced with this peculiar attribute of the technology of 
atomic energy which weighed heavily on the choices of a control 
system and which seriously challenged the closely guarded society 
of that country. To the United States, a major consideration . . . 
was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in 
order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control 
system . . . The negotiations neglected to reconcile [the respec- 
tive national security requirements of the two countries] with 
these dominant technological and political factors of atomic 
energy in order to attain adequate and acceptable international 

— Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and 
negotiators alike was that the technological necessities of effective 
control would force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the 
drive to devise effectiveness in the control system seems to have 
ignored, if not to have defied, the need for special diplomatic 
efforts to achieve acceptabilit}-. "The area of acceptability re- 
ceived little if any consideration in U.S. policy discussion." 
Underpinning the U.S. approach were "a moralistic attitude 
which characterized the U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance 
generated by the notion of U.S. leverage, or prejudice toward 
Soviet science and technology. ..." 

— In summary: "It is clear that while science and technology 
alone could devise a control system which would be efficient in its 
task, and diplomacy could provide the fundamentals for an 
effective system to protect national security, only a combination 


of the elements from science, technology, and diplomacy could be 
expected to devise a workable system for control which would 
be acceptable to the Leading nation- of the world." 
Author's Reassessment in 1975 

The author of the study makes the following comments 3 years 
after the >tndy was completed (summer 197' 

There appears to have been a general Acceptance by Congn 
Baruch as a competent negotiator in this area, an acceptance which 
might not be as forthcoming today. The question is Btill relevant: to 
what extent does Congress have a voice in. or can it effectively raise 
questions regarding, the selection of a chief arms control negotiator? 
In retrospect, and in light of developments since L946, it would seem 
appropriate for Congress to intensify it > efforts to insure that persons 
nominated for such critical diplomatic assignments as the negotiation 
of arms control agreements were not unduly subject to a particular 
professional, bureaucratic, special-interest, or other bias. 


Although Congress had expressed an anxious determination to 
retain the "secret" of the atomic weapon — a goal which has since 
proven impossible — there was little congressional involvement in the 
Baruch plan negotiations. Was the reluctance in Congress (hiring 
1974 15 to transfer peaceful nuclear technology similarly based on the 
notion that blocking this action would prevent the spread of weapons 
technology? There is a greater need now than ever for Congre-> to 
become intimately familiar with facts of nuclear technology, its 
military and peaceful uses, and the vital question of accelerating 
proliferation versus international controls. 

However, the issue of controlling nuclear energy presents a much 
more complex set of circumstances now than it did in 1946. Congress 
is called on to understand defense need^ in the field of increasingly 
complex and costly strategic weapons. Current arms control negotia- 
tions, especially SALT, require congressional decisions to support or 
reject a specific arms control program. In the face of growing demands 
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to overcome the energy shortfall in 
many parts of the world, and with the offers of U.S. nuclear assi>tance 
to Egypt and Israel last year and the addition of India to the nuclear 
club, Congress has seen the need for, and sought, solutions to the 
problems of nuclear proliferation. 

Further, in relation to such developments as the Vladivostok 
accords, 16 Congress will increasingly be called on to make timely 

15 As Wu states in a chapter on Arms Control and Disarmament in Congress and Foreign Policy: l r <~i 
(prepared for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreipn 
Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service; Washington. U.S. Oovernment Printing Oilice. April IS, 
1975, p. 23): "A major issue in the Congress [in 19741 arose over the offer of U.8 assistance in the field of 
nuclear technology to both Eygpt and Israel, during President Nixon's visits there in June. The primary 
concernin Congress was the arms control implications: whether safeguards were adi nf diver- 

sion to weapon's use, and whether such moves might contribute ultimately to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. These fears were reinforced by the peaceful explosion of a nuclear device in May by India, using 
nuclear material provided through an agreement with Canada for cooperation in peaceful uses." The author 
adds that congressional concern for control was eventually translated into a number of dVferenl 

"LeT, the agreement in principle signed by President Ford and Soviet party leader Brezhnev at Vladi- 
vostok in December 1974. The two leaders agreed to numerical ceilinps on the offensive weapons 
of each country. The SALT teams of negotiators of both countries wer translate the statement 

into a treaty by late 1975, when Brezhnev was scheduled to visit the United States, an event which had been 
postponed several times. [As of April 1976 neither the treaty nor the visit had materialized, but the nego- 
tiations were still in progress.] 

6S-196— 76 4 


political and technical judgments contributing to U.S. decisions to 
accept or reject successive international arms control agreements. 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether Congress is doing 
all it could and should do to come to grips with this greatest of con- 
temporary problems of the interface of science, technology, and 

Some Illustrative Questions 

Cases One and Two of the Science, Technology, and American Diplo- 
macy study series both deal with the question of control of nuclear 
energy. The foregoing analysis of Case One poses important questions 
for Congress. However, because The Baruch Plan deals with an early 
stage in American diplomatic experience with nuclear technology, and 
because the basic issues and their implications were more full explored 
in the decade between the Baruch Plan negotiations of 1946 and 
President Eisenhower's " Atoms for Peace" initiative and related legis- 
lation of the mid-1950s, the questions suggested by this study are 
combined with those following the analysis of Case Two. (See pp. 


Statement oj the Case 

A second major U.S. diplomatic initiative in the post-World War II 
effort involving foreign policy and atomic energy was President 
Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal, conveyed in a speech to the 
United Nations General Assembh r on December 8, 1953. 18 This time 
the emphasis was on nonmilitar}" applications, but the underlying goal 
remained the same: to avert atomic militan r buildup by diverting 
nuclear materials to peaceful uses, and to provide a forum for some 
cooperation between the United States and Soviet spheres of influence. 

The new initiative was successful in furthering the development of 
peaceful uses of atomic energy, thereby serving a secondary U.S. 
policy objective. Whether, on balance, it contributed to the primary 
aim is less evident, for the nuclear arms race continued at a frightening 
pace. At best, it may be said to have helped establish patterns of 
international cooperation and formal agreement on controls and safe- 
guards which might some day carry over into the area of military 
applications. At worst, it may be judged to have encouraged nuclear 
technology transfer, without first achieving reliable international 
safeguards, to the point at which responsible nations adhering to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may one day — perhaps soon — be 
subject to pressures to withdraw and make their own bombs as 
defense against nonadhering nations. Proliferation of nuclear power 
technology and industry also increases the possibility that outlaw 
groups will come to possess nuclear arsenals. 

Importance of the Case 

The Baruch Plan of 1946 had failed to achieve agreement to 
arrest the development of a nuclear arms race before it could get 
started. B}^ the time of the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" message the 

' 7 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Inter- 
action of American Diplomacy With a New Technology, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- 
ments by Warren H. Donnelly, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, 163 pp. (committee print). 

» Ibid., p. 21. 


Soviet Union had assembled it- own stockpile of Hiroshima-type 
atom bombs and had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Meanwhile. 
several "People's Republics" had been established in Eastern Europe 
and China, South Korea had been invaded, attempts to form a 
European Defense Community had not worked out, and international 
disarmament negotiations were deadlocked. emlin 

had pressed a vigorous and considerably successful diplomatic and 
propaganda offensive to persuade the world that nuclear weapon- weri 
not decisive, that they nevertheless were especially horrible and 
should he banned, and that the LT.S.S.R. was prepared to take the 
lead in developing nonmilitary application- of atom;. i 

principal l T .S. reaction to the frustrations of this period oi 
setbacks and declining nuclear advantage was to threaten massive 
retaliation with nuclear weapon- against Communist aggression. 

Another reactive policy was the "Atoms for Peace" proposal. •"With- 
in the United Nation-, the response . . . was instantaneous and favor- 
able. The speech was scored a- a victory h>r tic United States in 
international affairs by undercutting a persuasive Communist pi 
ganda offensive. . . ." 21 

Historically, the proposal represented a unique and constructive 
attempt to shift the emphasis in utilizing a significant new technology 
away from its military potential and toward it- peaceful applications: 

It signaled the start of US. diplomatic effort^ to create an international atomic 
energy agency; American encouragement to two European regional, multinational 
agencies. U r nuclear energy; establishment of a network of In! incut < 

between the United States and individual nations for technical assistance in 
nuclear energy; and a treaty to establish international safeguards over nuclear 
fuel materials. These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of nuclear 
energy abroad, ranging from applications of radioisotopes for re-earch and for 
diagnosis and treatment in medicine to the demonstration of nuclear power for the 
generation of electricity. Underlying the publicized, idealistic purpose f sharing 
U.S. nuclear science and technology were pragmatic, practical consideration- of 
advantages to the United St. 

In the most consequential way. probably, of any of the 12 studies 

in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy serie.-, this 
case (together with the preceding one on the Baruch plan) raises 
questions as to what diplomatic courses of action in fact are, in the 
long run, most advantageous to the U.S. national interest in dealing 
with a potent new technology. 

How the Case Developed 

The international activity most directly associated with atoms for 
peace is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was 
established July 29. 1957. as an international organization within the 
framework of the United Nations. It continues to report annually to 
the U.X. General Assembly and, on occasion, to the Security Council 
and the Economic and Social Council. 

"Heary L K -.■;;>•• \- t -i a' Wt ipm ♦ a >t Fir-;-!' Prfirj. New Y>r'<, published fir the Cv.inai on 
Foreign Rations by Harp--- * Bros., 1957: pp. 363-364. 
2t Donnelly, ojr. eUt, pp. 21-22j 
» Ibid, p. 20: 



In his December 1953 message, President Eisenhower had proposed 
an international body with four main purposes: encouraging worldwide 
investigation into peaceful uses of fissionable materials; cutting back 
on atomic weapons stockpiles; advertising to all nations the desire of 
the great powers to satisfy human aspirations rather than build up 
armaments; and opening up a new channel for peaceful discussion of 
the many difficult problems facing the world. What resulted after 
more than 3 years of negotiations was an international statute which 
specified the following qualified goal for the IAEA: 

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic 
energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall insure, so 
far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its super- 
vision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. 

Dr. Donnelly comments: "As 'military purpose' is nowhere defined 
in the statute, the mission of the International Agency is general 
enough to accomplish as little or as much as the member nations might 
desire". 23 

The IAEA was expected to develop a S3 r stem of international safe- 
guards for nuclear materials. This most difficult issue posed the 
dilemma of satisfjung the general demand for a credible s}^stem of 
inspection and control in the face of the reluctance of the nonnuclear 
nations to surrender any sovereign rights to permit inspection by an 
international agenc}\ The Soviet Union took the side of sovereign 
rights and has since continually opposed international inspection. 24 
The final compromise reached was to restrict safeguards to IAEA 
projects and projects voluntarily placed under the IAEA safeguards 


The two European regional organizations directly and indirectly 
influenced in their origins by the Atoms for Peace initiative were the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). (The latter, originally known as the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation or OECC, includes 
in its membership the United States, Canada, and Japan.) 

Euratom was established b}^ the Treaty of Rome, signed on 
March 25, 1957, to further development of nuclear power in the 
European Economic Community — France, Italy, West Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. An underlying broader 
goal was economic integration of Europe. Setting out ambitiously 
to create a European nuclear technology and power industry, the 
Community sought the advice of outstanding European technologists. 
The result was a report, "A Target for Euratom," which "combined 
the factors of energy and economic policy into a compelling argument 
for European atomic integration." 

« Ibid., p. 48. 

2* Departing from this position only briefly in 1963 at one stage of the negotiation of the Limited Nuclear 
Test Ban Treatv. How far the U.S.S.R. proposes to depart from this principle with respect to the ongoing 
negotiations on extending the scope of the test ban, while also providing for peaceful uses of nuclear explo- 
sions, remains to be seen. 


With the Suez Crisis -till fresh in mind, [the authors] observed thai a Future 
stoppage of oil could be an economic calamity for Europe, and that i •■ ■ 
dependence upon an oil supply from an unstable region might lead to serious 
political trouble throughout the world. Estimating that future energy require- 
ments el the economic community would increase by 83 percent between 1955 
and 107."), they advised that the economic growth of thesix countries was u 

of being seriously hampered by lack of anot h 

Euratom quickly ran into diplomatic difficulties. The Soviet Union 
opposed both it and the European Economic Community, labeling 
Euratom a scheme for the rearmament of Germany with atomic 
weapons and charging that both organizations were instruments of 
NATO. The six European nations disregarded Soviet threats and an 
accompanying Soviet plan for Pan-European economic and atomic 
energy integration. However, there were other problems; for example. 
Euratom failed to win necessary support for building facilities t<> 
manufacture enriched uranium — considered by European proponents 
a top-priority feature of an independent program— but was obliged 
instead to buy enriched uranium from the United States. Further, of 
the 5-year research programs provided for by the Treaty of Rome. 
the first (1958-62) was largely limited to building an organization: 
the second (1963-67) was characterized by dissension and budget 
troubles; and the third (proposed for 196S-72) was not even 
approved — Euratom's research program has since been funded 
annually. Euratom did not produce a nuclear industry for the Com- 
munity, but rather faces competition from the national industries of 
its members. 

The Nuclear Energy Agency of the then OECC was, like Euratom. 
a response to European fears of a fuel shortage. The XEA was estab- 
lished by an international statute effective February 1. 1958, with the 
assigned objective of furthering "the development of the production 
and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by the participating 
countries." Like its parent OECD, the XEA is a forum rather than 
an operational agency. As Dr. Donnelly outsit,'". . .its strong point 
has been coordination and program [review] rather than direct 
operation. The Agency has led its members into agreements on 
radiation health and safety standards, and on nuclear insurance. By 
contrast, Euratom is an operating organization as well as an agency 
involved in establishing an industrial structure for nuclear power in 
Europe." 26 

xox-proliferatiox treaty 

The most recent major diplomatic consequence of the scientific 
discovery of fission was the negotiating of the Treaty on Non-Prolif- 
eration of Nuclear Weapons (XPT). which entered into force March 5, 
1970. The concept of the treaty was a radical one: it divided nations 
into two classes, those which had the atom bomb and those which 
did not; and it committed the non-nuclear-weapons parties to relin- 
quishing their sovereignty to the extent of permitting inspections on 
their territories by international inspection. In return, the nonweapons 

» Ibid., p. 74. 
» Ibid., p. 110. 

parties received assurances through a separate U.N. resolution 27 of 
certain protective measures by the parties possessing nuclear weapons. 
The treaty also provided for a system of bilateral safeguards agree- 
ments between the nonweapons countries and the IAEA. At the same 
time, it obliged nuclear weapons parties not to transfer nuclear 
weapons to other countries, to share the benefits of nuclear energy 
with the other parties, and to support the efforts of the IAEA to 
develop an effective safeguards s} T stem. 

U.S. Involvement 

As the first country to tap nuclear energy, and for a time the sole 
possessor of the atom bomb, the United States was the principal force 
behind virtually all of the early efforts to control and harness the 
atom. It was the source of some constraints, however, as well as 
positive support for the pursuit of these goals. 


U.S. officials worked hard to achieve the establishment of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and, initially, to endow it with 
real powers. Despite the limited goals finally agreed upon for it, the 
official U.S. position heralding it was optimistic. Secretarv of State 
John Foster Dulles assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that the United States had achieved its diplomatic objective and 
gained the widest possible international support for the new agency, 
which would (among other things) provide a forum for the exchange 
of information about nuclear energy discoveries, provide an effective 
s}"stem of safeguards, enhance nuclear health and safety, strengthen 
control of nuclear weapons, reduce pressure for proliferation, and im- 
prove the climate of international relations. At the same time, Secre- 
tary Dulles promised that the Agency would not be a "giveaway 
organization" for U.S. atomic secrets or nuclear fuel materials, and 
that U.S. assistance to and through the Agency would not constitute 
a subsidy to commercial nuclear power in Europe. 

When the Congress authorized U.S. participation in the IAEA, the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had had almost 3 }^ears of experi- 
ence with bilateral agreements to foster the civil use of nuclear energy. 
These agreements involved assistance to some 40 countries ; most were 
for nuclear research, a few for nuclear power. The State Department 
at first advocated channeling such assistance through the IAEA as a 
step toward achieving international agreement on common standards 
for safeguards and gaining acceptance of inspection — in the belief that 
nations would more readily accede to supervision by inspectors from 
an international agency in which they participated than by those of 
another nation. However, the insistence of AEC Chairman Lewis 
Strauss that the United States should not abandon its bilateral agree- 
ments deprived the new agency of an important source of strength. 

27 These assurances were not embodied in the text of the treaty itself. "Non-nuclear-wernons states sought 
guaranteees that renunciation of nuclear arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage 
and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. But, it was argued, the security interests of the various 
states, and groups of states, were not identical: an effort to frame provisions within the treaty that would 
meet this diversity of requirements — for unforeseeable future contingencies— would create inordinate 
complexities. To resolve the issue, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom sub- 
mitted ... a triDartite Droposal that security assurances take the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, 
supported by declarations of the three powers. [The declarations were duly made and the resolution was 
passed, with France abstaining.] The resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression, 
created a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially its permanent members." 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agencv. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and 
History of Negotiations. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1975, p. 83. 


The IAEA's first Director General, W. Sterling Cole who had 
resigned the chairmanship of the Joinl Committee on Atomic Energy 
to take the post — tried to structure the Ag< ucy as a channel for atomic 
energy aid and as a proponenl of international safety standards and 
international controls fornuclear fuel materials. The United State-, did 
not respond to his vision of a strong international agen< y. In 1961 the 
State Department, in agreement with the AEC, established an Ad- 
visory Committee chaired by \)v. Henry I). Smyth author of the 
postwar "Smyth Report"— to conduct a general review of the IAEA. 
The Advisory Committee urged thai the IAEA be strengthened under 
U.S. leadership and that more U.S. nuclear energy aid he channeled 
through the Agency rather than bilaterally. The State Department and 
the AEC rejected the Advisory Committee's recommendations, pre- 
ferring that the IAEA limit itself to -itch technical sen ice functions as 
international safeguards and inspection. 


U.S. backing of Euratom, as of the IAEA, was mixed. Secretary 
Dulles made clear "that the United States wanted Euratom to con- 
centrate exclusively on development of nuclear power and not aspire 
to such greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com- 
munity or the fostering of greater political unity among its member 
states. While some European proponents of Euratom looked to it to 
restore the influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington 
view was the opposite." 28 

Three major issues central to the establishment of Euratom were 
whether it should manufacture enriched uranuim, whether member 
states should be precluded from military u<e of atomic energy, and 
whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear material-. 

For security reasons, the United States opposed foreign production 
of enriched uranium, and retained its monopoly by guaranteeing an 
adequate supply to Euratom at reasonable prices. The idea — derived 
from the Atoms for Peace concept — that Euratom could serve to pre- 
vent nuclear armament in Europe was stillborn because of French 
insistence on the right to produce and use atomic weapons for national 
security. Yet the French pressed successfully for a Euratom monopoly 
of nuclear supplies for commercial purposes. By pointing to the U.S. 
example in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which took title to ail 
nuclear material- in the Nation and forbade private ownership, the 
French prevailed over West German opposition to nuclear monopoly 1 
as incompatible with the principles of a free-market economy. 

The United States did participate with Euratom in a joint power 
program, using U.S. nuclear technology, which resulted ifl the Con- 
struction of three operating nuclear powerplants with a combined out- 
put of about 600 megawatts. The goal had been six plants and 1,000 
megawatts. In the negotiations leading to the bilateral agrei 
covering this program, the only significant issues were over U.S. 
inspection rights and safeguard's with respect to nuclear materials 
supplied by the United States. The U.S. negotiators wanted to send 
inspectors into nuclear facilities of European member states; the 
Euratom negotiators refused. A resulting compromise provided for 

J8 Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 75-7 


Euratom to establish, for U.S. -supplied materials, a safeguard system 
meeting U.S. standards, developed with U.S. technical assistance, and 
indirectly monitored through frequent consultations and visits. 
Euratom also agreed to consult with the IAEA to assure that its safe- 
guard and control system would be compatible with IAEAs. 

The bilateral agreement further provided that if the IAEA should 
establish an international safeguard and control system, the United 
States and Euratom would explore its assumption of the safeguard 
function for all Euratom activities. 

The U.S. relationship with Euratom has been a joint operational one, 
however cautious; that with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 
despite U.S. membership in it, has followed more conventional lines 
of international cooperation and exchange. Dr. Donnelly comments 
on this apparent inconsistency as follows: 

Since both the NEA and Euratom were created to foster commercial use of 
nuclear energy in Europe, and since the membership of NEA represented until 
recently a larger potential market for the U.S. nuclear power industry than the 
six Euratom members, it seems curious that U.S. support to Euratom has so 
exceeded that for NEA. For the latter there are no joint undertakings with U.S. 
funding. One significant difference between the two multinational organizations 
may explain the difference in U.S. support. This, in the opinion of the writer, 
was the presence of the United Kingdom in NEA but not in Euratom. During 
the mid-1950s the U.S. nuclear industry was concerned that the United Kingdom 
with its strongly backed government program for development and application of 
nuclear power would be able to capture much of the world's nuclear power 
market. For the United States to have funded NEA projects may well have seemed 
to give a principal competitor in the international nuclear market still greater 
advantage. In these circumstances, U.S. support could not appear to benefit 
nuclear power research and development of interest to the United Kingdom. 29 


The U.S. relationship to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ques- 
tion of safeguards presents problems too complex and thorny to be 
identified briefly without distortion; the reader is referred to the more 
detailed treatment in pages 136-154 of the basic study. In general: 
the United States has consistently supported the principle of inter- 
national safeguards administered by the IAEA; on signing the NPT 
on July 1, 1968, President Johnson offered to put commercial nuclear 
power in the United States under IAEA safeguards, even though the 
United States was exempt from them as a nuclear-weapons state. 
Presidents Nixon and Ford have reiterated this offer, but it has never 
been carried out. The United States has also consistently supported 
the work of the IAEA Safeguards Committee. One of the most im- 
portant actions of the Committee — created in April 1970 to draft 
safeguards agreements between the IAEA and individual nonnuclear 
weapons states signatory to the NPT — was to specify the use of 
national systems of accounting and control for nuclear materials. 
Another important result of the Committee's work was to assure 
that the legitimate commercial interests of states subject to inspection 
would be protected. Most recently, the IAEA has begun to show lead- 
ership in drafting international guidelines for physical security of 
nuclear materials and facilities. 

« Ibid., p. 114. 


Role of Congress 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower established a pattern of close 

cooperation with the Congress in what was recognizee! as a matter of 
highest concern to I'.s. security and other national concerns. There 
was active participation by the Congress in many of the developments 
attending the sharing of nuclear energy information and materials: 
numerous hearings were held, important legislation was passed, and 
advice and consent was given to treaty provisions. 

To preserve nuclear secrecy as a national security measure, the 
Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1940 terminated nuclear 
collaboration with the wartime allies of the Tinted State-. As the ( 'old 
War intensified, the act was amended in 1951 to authorize the Atomic 
Energy Commission to enter into certain limited arrangements with 
allies, as in NATO, to give them nuclear information. The amendment 
was intended to strengthen military alliance-, not to foster commercial 
uses of nuclear energy. 


The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held extensive healings in 
May and June 1954 on revisions of the act proposed by President 
Eisenhower, calling for international cooperation in nonmilitary uses 
of nuclear energy. The resulting changes in basic atomic energy legis- 
lation greatly expanded U.S. encouragement of the commercial use 
of nuclear energy abroad. As before, international nuclear cooperation 
was to be effected through bilateral agreements with individual 
nations or with regional defense organizations. Not required to take 
the form of treaties, the agreements were to be negotiated by the AEC 
subject to congressional veto. 

This legislative framework is the basis for U.S. cooperation with 
other nations in commercial nuclear energy matters; it made possible 
the IAEA, Euratom, the XEA, the network of bilateral and multi- 
lateral agreements negotiated by the United States, and the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. 

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations expressed a keen interest in the question of 
safeguards when the proposal to establish the IAEA was undergoing 
congressional examination in 1957. In favorably reporting the pro- 
posed Euratom Cooperation Act, the joint committee expressed its 
belief that a vigorous program of cooperation in nuclear power by the 
United States with foreign nations was desirable. The committee was 
more critical of the proposed bilateral agreement with Euratom and 
insisted on changes, particularly in connection with the safeguarding 
of nuclear materials furnished by the United State-. 

Mainly through the joint committee, Members of the Congre-s 
have closely followed proposals to -ell U.S. technology for manu- 
facturing enriched uranium. The committee has expre>sed concern 
over possible moves to provide this technology to foreign countries 
not only from the "giveaway" standpoint but also from that of effects 
on national security and U~S. obligations under the Xonproliferation 


On the whole, the Congress has shown awareness of both the dangers 
and the constructive potential of nuclear energy. However, it might 
have been appropriate — and still might be — for the Congress to 
demand more vigorous efforts on the part of the executive branch to 
resolve longstanding problems of control in view of their vital bearing 
on national and international security. 


The Atoms for Peace initiative seems certain to be judged among 
history's significant instances of the diplomatic response to a new 
science and technology. This initiative set forces in motion which have 
already changed the world. Propelled by some of those forces — the 
move to meet a growing shortfall in the world's oil supply through 
nuclear energy production; continued trends toward the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and the potential for producing them — the future 
course of civil nuclear power is approaching a point of no return. 

To epitomize all that Atoms for Peace set in motion is to oversim- 
plify. Yet oversimplification may be necessary to liighlight certain 
urgent realities and keep them from being obscured by a welter of 
detail. The two essential realities illuminated and acted upon by Atoms 
for Peace are (1) the growing potentialities of nuclear energy to help 
fill urgent world energy needs and, (2) the concomitant growing po- 
tential threat to the world's safety through the increase of national 
capabilities to make nuclear weapons, the potential risk of theft of 
nuclear materials by subnational groups, and possible insults to the 
global environment from escaped radiation. Constructive steps taken 
to meet the energy needs have not yet caught up with it but are on 
the way: the consensus in 1976 is that much of the world's electricity 
supply by the year 2000 can be provided by nuclear power if places 
can be found for nuclear power station sites and the fears of environ- 
mentalists can be allayed. 

The outlook with respect to proliferation is more ominous. As 
Dr. Donnelly points out, European experience with international safe- 
guards offers a working demonstration of inspection for future arms 
control and disarmament. 30 On the other hand, what many observer- 
have characterized as the disappointing record of the May 1975 XPT 
Review Conference in Geneva reinforces doubts as to whether the 
momentum of progress toward an effective universal system of con- 
trols is equal to the overwhelming importance of the goal.' 1 


Some of the more pertinent observations of the 1972 study not 
already cited are listed below, with page number: 

— Safeguards systems do not extend to physical protection 
against theft or diversion, but only to detection of it. Assuring 
the physical security of nuclear materials is a separate respon- 
sibility of the possessing nation, (p. 10) 

30 Ibid, p. 155. 

« See. for example: CI) The reoort of the President of the Conference. Swedish Under Secretary c I 
Inea Thorsson. as inserted by Senator Edward Kennedy in the Congressional Record for July 30, 1975. p. 
S144R2- "What was a failure was not the conference, but the way in which the superpowers proved them- 
selves unable to show the world not only their genuine will but also their capacity for disarmament. They 
didnotmakeacontributionofstrengtheningtheNPTregime." (2) Letterfrom Colgate University Professor 
of Peace Studies Alan Gever to Senator Hubert H. Humphrev as inserted by the latter in the Conoressinruil 
E'cord for June 3, 1975. p. 89353: ". . . it is painfully clear that the joint United States-Soviet line here fin 
Geneva. May 10. 1975] is to downgrade the conference and to stonewall any pressures to reverse their own 
mutual escalation of the nuclear arms race." (3) Arms control and disarmament specialist Thomas A. 
Haisted's "Report from Geneva" in Arm* Control Today, June 1975. p. 1-3: ". . . the Conference under- 
scored the fact that for the most part the Treatv has been an effective instrument for facilitating access to 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Where the Treaty— and the Review Conference— continue to fall short 
remains in the harder questions of security. ..." 


— Despite the importance of a nuclear safety function for the 
IAEA, radiation safety guides arc confused and apparently over- 
lapping. In Europe there are standards issued by both the IAEA 
and Euratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific 

Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation rather than 
transfer the committee 1 '- function- to the IAEA. Meanwhile, the 
latter's role in setting standards for the construction and opera- 
tion of nuclear powerplants i- dormant, (p. 64) 

— Euratom's nuclear supply function has not grow n a- origi- 
nally expected. The safeguards function, in contrasl . ha- been per- 
formed effectively and has demonstrated the practicability of 
international inspection, (p. 86) 

— The Safeguards Committee which the IAEA created in 1970 
was open to all member states of the Agency, in recognition of the 
general interest in Safeguards and the desire of nonweapons mem- 
ber nations to participate directly in developing safeguards 
agreements. The committee met intensively over many months 
and issued three reports covering all aspects of the proposed 
agreements. Nearly 50 delegation-, very different in character, 
were involved. A British member of the IAEA Board of Gover- 
nors who participated commented on the moderate, compronii-ini: 
spirit and friendly atmosphere which prevailed: "Informal con- 
sultation came to count for more and more in our work; and when 
we got back to the Board room even the intractable problems 
had been [more or less worked out]." (p. 142) 

— Atoms for Peace has been unique as an example of inter- 
national cooperation in scientific fields, in that international 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy came about 
as the re-ult of deliberate decision of governments rather than 
of scientific communities. Among its other accomplishments, it 
lias provided mechanisms for working on health, safety, and en- 
vironmental problems which cross national boundaries, (pp. 26-27) 

— Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United S 
and of world peace to - ■•> the Xonproliferation Treaty operate 
at full effectiveness, and granting that the bilateral agreement- 
have provided the United State- with certain benefits, it may 
be time to reexamine the respective role- of bilateral agreements 
and the IAEA with a view to possibly channeling more aid 
through the latter a- a mean- of strengthening it. (p. 45) 

— Although the IAEA evolved out of the discovery of fi>-ion 
by scientists, the scientific community had relatively little pari 
in the negotiations. An eminent European nuclear scientist 
complained in 1960 that "Scientists do not generally know what 
an enormous effort lies behind the creation of a full-fledged in- 
ternational agency. They also do not know what an irresistible 
momentum lies in international organizations ... it is practi- 
cally impossible to terminate one [and it is] therefore only a 
question of the degree of usefulness of these indestructible giants 
which can be influenced . . . the scientists' and technologist oi 
the world . . . have not as a group realized the potential ] 
of the instrument created, and have failed to follow up with 
. . . speaking or writing about the duty of scientists . . 
have not even tried to influence the -election of repres 
of our countries for important positions in the Agency organs. 

— If the IAEA had evolved in the direction indicated by die 
Atoms for Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence 
on development of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a 
channel for technical assistance and nuclear materials. However, 
because of cold war tensions, the United States chose not to 
promote the Agency as a distributor, or custodian of a pool, of 
nuclear materials; neither did it support an international regula- 
tory role for the Agency in the design and operation of nuclear 
powerplants. On the other hand, the Agency provided a forum 
in which United States and Soviet representatives could meet in 
a relatively friendly atmosphere at a time when most contact- 
between the two countries were strained and formal, if not 
hostile, (pp. 71-72) 

— The experience of Euratom illustrated a diplomatic reality: 
the political cohesion of members of an international technologi- 
cal undertaking is a prerequisite to its success, not simply a 
desirable byproduct. As a corollary, the troubles of Euratom's 
R. & D. programs illustrate also how the cohesive force of inter- 
nationalism in science may not be strong enough to withstand 
the divisive forces of national commercial interests, (p. 84; 

— A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an 
organization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that 
seek to create and apply new technologies, (p. 84) 

— The Treaty of Rome is silent on the issue of environmental 
protection. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining 
and controlling the environmental effects of nuclear power and 
fuel reprocessing plants, (p. 91) 

— Euratom and the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency overlap 
in many of their interests and activities. Euratom's usefulness 
appears to be handicapped by the dispersion of human and 
financial resources of its member states between its own pro- 
grams and those of the NEA and IAEA. (p. 92) 

— Moves toward European unity such as the establishment of 
Euratom have been eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism. 
Euratom's successes have come in activities which were linked 
to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of 
France, Italy, and West Germany. Inability to form a common 
European approach to nuclear technology has proved advan- 
tageous to the U.S. nuclear industry [but perhaps at the expense 
of long-range U.S. national goals and interests], (p. 94) 

— The lessons of the diplomatic effort of organizing joint U.S.- 
Euratom programs for nuclear power production could point 
the way toward future joint ventures to develop other new power 
sources, such as large-scale use of solar energy, (p. 108) 

— Front World War II to Sputnik, U.S. world technological 
leadership went unchallenged and was sustained in large part by 
advances in nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek 
to monopolize this leadership, the United States offered and 
supplied technological assistance to many countries, especially 
in Europe, to develop their own use of nuclear power. During 
the late 1960s, U.S. world leadership was challenged by other 
nations. Looking to the 1970s and to an era of greater peaceful 
rather than military competition, there are several fundamental 


issues involving nuclear energy: To what extent should U.S. 
foreign policy and diplomacy continue io foster commercial use 
of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with 
future U.S. technological leadership to be worth the effort, or 
would the required financial and other resources be more profit- 
ably dedicated to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S. 
technological leader-hip be more than offsel by economic losses 
through competition from other countries receiving U.S. tech- 
nological assistance? Mosl important of all. arc there any 
nificant risks and dangers from the standpoint of U.S. national 
security in continued U.S. support of foreign nuclear power 
development? (p. 156) 
Diversity of outlook and experimental approach can lead to weak- 
ness or vulnerability when t he danger is either unclear or not imminent . 
The potential for extreme danger in nuclear proliferation has been 
clear enough to American diplomatic and congressional leaders from 
the outset, but not the imminence of that danger. Reaction to this 
threat has been slow in coming. 

Although many voice- compete in the formulation of U.S. foreign 
policy, there is relatively free play for influential expression of the 
views of strong individuals (as Secretary of State or Secretary of 
Defense, for example) unchecked by sustained and sober analysis of the 
technological implications of any given proposal regarding nuclear 
energy. There is, in short, no central governmental machinery for 
technological assessment in the nuclear field comparable to the Office 
of Technology Assessment with its mandate in other areas. Further- 
more, OTA is a mechanism of the Congre>>. There would appear t<> 
be a compelling need for centralized institutional machinery and 
procedures in the executive branch to provide impartial, measured, 
and long-range assessments of all nuclear energy developments or 
proposals (or needed initiatives) affecting U.S. national interests and 
international security. 32 It would follow that development of counter- 
part oversight machinery, possibly involving in part an extension of 
the OTA mandate, should be considered by the Congress. 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

Author Warren H. Donnelly comments retrospectively as follows; 

Beginning with the explosion of the atom bomb over Hiroshima in 
August 1945 U.S. diplomacy was doubly affected by the discovery of 
nuclear fission. The military use of atomic energy became a mainstay 
of U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. By the mid- 
1950s the civil uses of nuclear power appeared promising enough for 
U.S. diplomacy to back efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy to create international and regional atomic organizations for 
this purpose. With the late 1960s and early 1970s the imperatives of 
nuclear weapons led to international treaties and agreements and to 
the strategic arms limitations talks. During these yea:-, U.S. diplo- 
macy also assisted the domestic development of nuclear power by 
helping to open markets for the infant U.S. nuclear industry and to 
provide opportunities to demonstrate nuclear power abroad before 

3 -' Dr. Donnellv comments (September 1075) that executive branch machinery for policy and management 
relating to civil uses of nuclear energy is now more fragmented than 

latory Commission) regulates the safety and environmental aspects of nuclear power use; aim' 
Energy Research and Development Administration) is developing new or improved technologies for nuclear 
power but is hesitant to promote them; a third (the Federal Energy Administration) is beginning to ad- 
vocate nuclear power, but will expire on June 30, 1976. 


its introduction in the United States. On the whole, the discovery and 
use of atomic energy has afforded the United States new sources of 
leverage for its diplomacy, complicated the conduct of that diplomacy, 
and in many ways fundamentally changed relations between major 
world powers. 


The main themes of the study of this case appear to be as relevant 
near the end of 1975, or more so, than at the time of writing in the 
latter half of 1972. Recent events and factors influencing today's 
themes include: 

— The oil embargo of 1973-74, which reawakened foreign 
interest in nuclear power, particularly in the United Kingdom, 
Europe, and Japan. Conventional wisdom (which a healthy 
skepticism may temper) now assumes that by the year 2000 as 
much as half of the electricity used by these countries will come 
from nuclear powerplants. Their development of strong nuclear 
industries will have implications for future U.S. diplomacy and 
foreign policy. 

— The detonation of a nuclear explosive device by the Gov- 
ernment of India on May 18, 1974, which provided a strong 
reminder that countries other than the leading industrial ones 
can, if they wish, acquire a capability to make nuclear weapons. 
Turkey recently has spoken of acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability after its disagreements with the United States over 

— The congressional concern expressed in 1974 over adequate 
safeguards as a result of proposed bilateral agreements between 
the United States and Israel and Eg} r pt to help them acquire 
and use the technology for nuclear power production and over 
negotiations between West Germany and Brazil for the former 
to supply the latter with nuclear powerplants and a factory to 
recover plutonium from used fuels. 

— The May 1975 NPT review conference in Geneva, which 
stimulated interest in many of the subjects covered in the study. 
— Contemporary Presidential emphasis on international re- 
search to perfect or create new energy technologies. This line of 
activity, together with signs of increasing bilateral cooperation 
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in energy research, 
will call for additional and new diplomatic efforts; these should 
benefit from U.S. experience to date with atomic energy. 
With the benefit of 3 years of hindsight, Dr. Donnelly says, and 
taking into particular consideration events of 1974, if he were to 
rewrite this report he would give more attention to : 

— The Tole of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
international nuclear safeguards under the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, and U.S. support of that role. 

— The interaction between the IAEA and Euratom in the 
carrying out of nuclear safeguards, because of the anticipated 
importance of regional international organizations in the future. 

— Extension of the concept of safeguards from simply detecting 
and announcing diversion or theft of nuclear materials to in- 
clude the prevention of theft and recovery of stolen materials. 


— The question of whether the influence gained by the United 
States' long standing but now diminished role as the principal 
free-world supplier of enriched uranium lias justified the cost, 
and whether it ts in the U.S. interest to expand the Nation's 
capacity to make enriched uranium sufficiently to maintain a 
free world monopoly position. 

— The effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic efforts to persuade 
nulcear supplier countries to limit their exports of dangerous 
nuclear products and technology. 


The subject of commercial nuclear power in Europe continues to !><' 
particularly illustrative of the interaction of science, technology, and 
diplomacy. This interaction is highlighted by such matters as the 
further favorable development of the gas centrifuge, the new prospects 
of laser enrichment of uranium, the possibility of transfrontier pollu- 
tion from nuclear poweiplants, demands that international nuclear 
safeguards be strengthened, and prospects for more vigorous inter- 
national cooperation to develop the breeder reactor. Further prolifera- 
tion of weapons-making ability, as well as attempts to halt such 
proliferation, will place great strains upon American diplomats and 
their diplomacy. Another complication is the congressional quest for a 
greater influence in the negotiation of international agreements for 

American experience suggests that international cooperation in 
energy production and similar high-technology enterprises should gi\ e 
less attention to technologies approaching commercial application and 
emphasize longer-term ventures in their early stages — a- nuclear 
energy was until recently and as solar energy, fusion, or ocean heat 
research are now. 

The author also states that he would now give much more attention 
to the impact of nuclear safeguards upon diplomacy, in anticipation 
of commercial use of the breeder reactor. The long-term future of 
nuclear power may depend upon success of the breeder reactor. If the 
breeder succeeds, it will greatly increase the amount of energy re- 
coverable from world uranium and thorium resources. But it will* also 
introduce great quantities of plutonium into international commerce; 
the control of that plutonium will pose many new problems for 
diplomacy. Indeed, some analysts view these problems a- so unsolvable 
that they might favor barring use of the breeder both in the United 
States and elsewhere. 
Legislative Implications 

The study identified a number of issues for congressional considera- 
tion, most of which have legislative implications. Slightly updated, 
these include: 

— Sustaining U.S. international leadership in nuclear tech- 
nologv in the 1970s. 

— Reducing United States, European, and Japanese depend- 
ence upon imported oil. 

— Controlling the possibilities for nuclear proliferation. 
— Demonstrating the practicability of international inspection 
for arms control. 

— Improving the U.S. position in world trade. 


— Assessing the implications of domestic opposition to nuclear 
energy upon U.S. diplomacy. 

— Maintaining a competitive position for the United States in 
the world market for nuclear goods and services. 

— Cooperating in international efforts to control environmental 
effects of nuclear power. 

— Developing international safety and environmental protec- 
tion standards for nuclear powerplants. 

— Protecting the U.S. position in uranium enrichment and 
fuel reprocessing. 
Finally, the study identified two main lines of thought that the Con- 
gress might wish to pursue: the use of nuclear technology in U.S. 
diplomacy; and the use of diplomacy to advance nuclear technology. 
While separate, these lines do interact and that interaction should be 
systematically taken into account. The study also indicated a close 
interaction of U.S. domestic and foreign interests in commercial nu- 
clear power, which suggests that if present efforts by Mr. Nader, the 
Union of Concerned Scientists, and others, to persuade the Congress 
to enact a moratorium on nuclear power reach the stage of legislation, 
the implications of such an act upon U.S. diplomacy would require 

Further, the study sought to highlight present and coming issues of 
international safeguards for nuclear power. To strengthen interna- 
tional safeguards would necessitate treaty changes, with attendant 
Senate advice and consent; both Houses would be involved with legis- 
lation to authorize and fund new or expanded U.S. agency activities 
to this end. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

Cases One and Two suggest an extensive catalog of questions which 
appear to warrant congressional concern. Because of the special ur- 
geny of the problems of nuclear energy utilization and control, they 
are given in some detail. 


In the light of current concern over risks of theft of nuclear materials, should 
the United States seek renegotiation of the NPT to deemphasize this commitment 
and deliberately slow down technical assistance for nuclear power? 

If U.S. technical assistance should continue, would U.S. interests be best served 
by channeling this assistance through bilateral agreements with recipient countries, 
by supplying it through the IAEA? Conversely, which approach would seem most 
favored by the recipient nations? 

To what extent should U.S. technical assistance be limited to installation and 
operation of nuclear powerplants, with assistance for other parts of the nuclear 
power cycle to be avoided or withheld? 

To what extent should the United States unilaterally proceed to reserve exports 
of nuclear materials, products, information, and assistance to those nonweapons 
nations that agree to place all of their nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA 

What should be the participation of the private U.S. nuclear industry in 
negotiating and carrying out bilateral arrangements — in particular, extension of 
present agreements on commercial use of nuclear power? 

How satisfactory is the present interworking of the Energy Research and 
Development Agency (ERDA) and the State Department in negotiating and 
carrying out bilateral agreements? How consonant with national foreign policy 
have past bilateral agreements been? 

What should be the U.S. position in offering technical aid and assistance to 
Arab nations for nuclear power? 


To what extent should commercial exports of nuclear produ I, and 

technology by private organisations be required to conform to U.S. foreign 
policy, and how should this be don.'.' 

What should be the role of Con^re^s m review and appraisal of major ventures 
in nuclear cooperation or in export of nuclear powerplaD iated goods 

and services? 


W hat should be the U.S. diplomatic position on proposals to establish and 
enforce international standards for the design, construction, and 
nuclear powerplants and other facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle that may present 

risks to the environment, to public health and safety, and to national and inter- 
national security.' 

To what extent would channeling U.S. assistance exclusively through the 
IAEA strengthen that agency in general, and in its capabilities to provide effec- 
tive safeguards for nuclear mater: 

What should be the U.S. position on establishing and enforcing international 
regulations for transportation of fissionable and radi< active materials? 

What should be the U.S. position on future development and use of nuclear- 
powered merchant shi 

What should be the U.S. position on extending international control of atomic 
energy to include location, design, construction, and operation of facilities that 
could cause transfrontier pollution in normal operations or in case of an accident? 

What would be the implications of U.S. participation in such arrangements 
for domestic regulation of nuclear energy? What would be the expected roles of 
the State Department, ERDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and ADCA? 

If the United States abandons its position as the sole supplier of enriched 
uranium to the free world nuclear powerplants, would U.S. self-interest be - 
better by establishing additional production facilities in the IAEA or by encourag- 
ing national or regional ventures? 

To what extent would U.S. interests be served by having the IAEA locate, 
build and operate facilities to reprocess spent fuel, recover plutonium and 
depleted uranium, and store or manage long-term disposal of radioactive wastes? 

Considering questions about safeguards being rai-ed by domestic cril 
nuclear power, what would be the comparative benefits and drawbacks of U.S. 
diplomatic efforts to revive the Baruch-Lilienthal plan in part and make the 
IAEA the sole proprietor of fuel reprocessing plants and all facilities for making 
plutonium into nuclear fuel elements for use in domestic nuclear powerplants? 

The United States has offered voluntarily to place its domestic nuclear power 
industry under IAEA safeguards once hold-out nations have ratified the XPT. 
What would be the advantages and disadvantages of fulfilling that offer now 
without waiting longer for nations such as France, India, Israel, and mainland 
China to ratify? 

What would be the pros and cons of a U.S. policy to promote consolidation of 
various regional nuclear organizations into the IAEA? 


To what extent is this idea inhibited in U.S. circles by the presence in the 
Agency of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China? Conversely, 
does the presence of these world powers in the IAEA make experiments with it a 
potentiallv valuable way to get new, practical working experience? 

To what extent and in what ways could diplon. IAEA operations 

from ideological contests? Is this a realistic goal to postulate? 

Has anything been learned from U.S. experience with the IAEA that applies to 
other fields such as aviation, transfrontier pollution control, communications, or 
disease control? 


To what extent should the United States encourage Euratom to build and oper- 
ate a uranium enrichment plant in Europe" 

To what extent should the United States attempt to recoup some of the national 
investment in nuclear energy through licensing fees, royalties or other charges, 
or exports of nuclear products and technologi 

How long should the United States continue its commitment to supply nuclear 
power in Europe with enriched uranium? What would be the effects on U.S. foreign 
policy of a decision to end this commitment? 

6S-19G— 76 5 


What participation should the United States seek in the setting of standards 
by Euratom governing nuclear power plants and related facilities? How much of 
such participation should be assigned to the Department of State and ERDA? 
How much should be left to voluntary efforts of the U.S. nuclear industry? 

Should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand Euratom work in radioactive waste 
disposal and broaden U.S. participation in such work? 

To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to influence the Euratom breeder 
program, particularly towards developments that could provide a fallback if the 
U.S. breeder demonstration program should fail? 

How should available U.S. resources be divided among Euratom, the OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and the IAEA? 

What benefits would accrue from U.S. diplomatic efforts to expand Euratom's 
programs and laboratories from nuclear energy to fuels and energy in general? 


What did the United States learn from the Atomic Energy Commission's 
participation in the joint U.S.-Euratom research program? What were the strengths 
and weaknesses of the joint venture? 

What are the implications of these lessons for other joint ventures (which the 
Secretary of State appears to be encouraging) : for example, in fusion, solar energy, 
or synthetic fuels from coal? 

To what extent should and could joint ventures with Euratom be revived for 
radioactive waste management and disposal, development and demonstration of 
nuclear safeguards technologies, and development of new and improved ways of 
finding and enriching uranium? 


Should U.S. diplomacy seek to combine Euratom with the NEA? 
What conclusions can be drawn from the comparative success of NEA relative 
to Euratom? 


Should the United States seek to preserve its position as the sole supplier of 
enriched uranium to the free world? If so, what are the financial and other implica- 
tions of such a commitment? 

What would such a commitment imply as to demands on U.S. fuels to supply 
electricity for enrichment, and as to the environmental consequences of supplying 
such fuels? 

If the United States is prepared to relinquish its monopoly position, what al- 
ternatives would best suit U.S. interests: 

— Unilateral construction of enrichment f acilities by man}' nations? 
— Regional organization to build and operate enrichment facilities? 
— International (IAEA) construction and operation? 
— Encouragement to the Soviet Union to expand its enrichment services? 

In retrospect, how useful and effective were U.S. efforts to hold back develop- 
ment of the centrifuge method of enrichment? To what extent are new enrichment 
technologies — for example, centrifuge, laser, nozzle, and other methods — likely to 
present a technological surprise and open the way to easy proliferation of foreign 
enrichment capabilities? 

What diplomatic options are open to the United States should the Soviet Union 
seriously enter the world market for supply of enriched uranium and reprocessing 
of spent fuels? 


How close is the point of no return in the worldwide use of nuclear power beyond 
which it will not be possible to halt, slow down, or contain further growth? 
What are the potential implications for U.S. diplomacy of: 
— A substantial theft of nuclear materials? 

— The successful use of stolen materials for purposes of terrorism, extortion, 
or foreign policy? 
What, if any, preparations should the United States be making now to respond 
to the situations of question (2)? 

What are the potential implications for U.S. diplomacy of: 

—An accident in a nuclear facility at home or abroad that causes large 
offsite injur}' and contamination? 


— State government moratoriums on future construction of nuclear 

Effective safeguards will require extraordinary measures to learn al it, pre- 
vent, or intercept thefts of nuclear materials, or to r< cover stolen materials. \\ hat 
is the U.S. assessment of the need for a world prot< ctive or police force with per- 
haps supranational powers to give safeguards credibility? Axe safeguards important 
enough to the United States to induce it to ai - 1 p1 the problems and risks of such a 
force — especially if its members included national- from the Soviet Union, its 
satellites, and mainland China? 

To what extent should the United Stat. - in its bilateral and multilateral 
ments extend safeguards terms and conditions beyond th< 
IAE Vs functions under the XPT? 

Within the United States what are the respi ctive safeguards functions, i 
sibilities, and authorities of the Department of State, the Arm- Contl 
armament Agency, ERDA, the National Research Council (NR( . and the De- 
partmentsof Defense and Commerce? Who is responsible for coordination < I 
Federal activities? How are these activities coordinated with U.S. foreign policy'.' 

What level of international effort would be needed to assure reason! bly i □ 
safeguards in an international plutonium economy'.' How should this be financed? 
What should be the nature and extent of I'.S. participation? 

Should the IAEA be transformed into a world audi 
Should the safeguards function be transferred t<> a new, separate agency with no 
other functions? 

To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand international safeguards 
to include physical protection of nuclear materials, intt Rception of att< 
materials, and recovery of stolen materials? 

Many developing countries appear to be less concerned with safegui rcis than 
with acquiring the benefits of nuclear power. How are they to be persuaded that 
the need for safeguards is not a "put-on" designed to serve the convenience of the 
nations which already have nuclear power? 

To what extent should the United States geek to influence preparation of tin- 
IAEA guidelines for physical security, and to adopt those guidelines for dome-tic 
l/.S. safeguards? 

To what extent and in what ways should U.S. diplomatic efforts encourage the 
planning, organization, construction, and operation of international, including 
regional, facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuels and related operati 
fuel fabrication and perhaps enrichment'.' 

To what extent would placing U.S. nuclear fuel facilities for civil nuclear power 
under IAEA safeguards by voluntary action reduce or neutralize expressed fear-; 
and concerns of nonweapons nations that IAEA safeguards may violate then- 


Statement oj the Case 

The International Geophysical Year or IGY (July 1, 1957-Decem- 
bei*31, 1958) was the most ambitious venture in international scientific 
cooperation in history. Broadly speaking, it had as it- purpose the 
observation of phenomena relating to the entire Earth and everything 
in and around it. It enlisted the services of tens of thousands of 
scientists and volunteer observers from 67 nations, working at some 
8,000 observation stations around the world. It yielded much scientific 
data, was attended by significant technological achievement-, and 
stimulated other major international cooperative efforts involving 
science and technology in the year- to follow. 

Importance oj the Case 

The IGY's feats of science and technology were impressive and in 
some instances spectacular; its accomplishments in the area of politics 
and diplomacy were also important. 

33 U S Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the Interna' 
physical Year, a studv in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold bull:?. Science Policy 

Research Division, Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, Washington, L .S. Government 

Printing Office, November 1'j73, €4 pages. (Commitue print.) 


Among the latter: (1) the IGY, while generously supported by 
national governments, was successfully run by scientists — for scien- 
tific and not for political purposes; (2) it nevertheless contributed to 
the diplomatic framework for later negotiations leading to such 
developments as the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, 
and the 1967 Space Treaty; and (3) at least one IGY event did have* a 
powerful political impact, especially in the United States: The Soviet 
launching of Sputnik I. 

The IG Y's scientific achievements included the acquisition and pub- 
lication of valuable data relating, among other things, to cosmic rays, 
geomagnetism, ionospheric physics, meteorology, oceanography, solar 
activity, and the upper atomosphere. The Antarctic was opened up to 
scientific exploration on a substantial scale. 

The outstanding technological development of the IGY — a develop- 
ment which has been widely characterized as marking the world's 
entrance into the Space Age — was the launching of artificial Earth 
satellites. Beyond making possible such important IGY scientific 
achievements as discovery of the Van Allen radiation belts, the use of 
satellites for scientific space probes opened "a new era of exploration 
and discovery which has progressed much more rapidly than could 
possibly have been foreseen during the IGY." 34 Progress has been 
so rapid and so extensive, indeed, as to rai>e the question of whether 
a second International Geophvsical Year might be appropriate for 

How the Case Developed 35 

A certain amount of intercountry and interregional scientific 
cooperation has long taken place in such activities as navigation and 
mapmaking. Not until the 18th century, however, did coordinated 
efforts by many observers at different locations begin to become 
common. These efforts were intensified during the 19th century; for 
example, an international conference was held at Brussels in 1853 to 
facilitate coordinated weather observations at sea. Increased coopera- 
tion led to the formation of international scientific organizations in 
various fields, and then to the First International Polar Year (FPY) 
of 1882-83. 

During the FPY, scientists from 20 nations conducted studies in 
the high northern latitudes, with emphasis on surface meteorology, 
geomagnetism, and the aurora borealis. The success of their efforts led 
to the much larger undertaking, 50 years later, of the Second Inter- 
national Polar Year or SPY (1932-33). Scientists from 40 countries 
participated in the SPY; they concentrated on the same subjects 
that had occupied the FPY plus Earth-Sun relationships and atmos- 
pheric electricity. An important result of the SPY was increased 
knowledge of the ionosphere, which facilitated the development of 
radio communications. 

34 Bullis, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year, p. 31. 

35 For a more detailed account of the origins and development of the IGY, see: U.S. Congress, Senate, 
International Cooperation and Organization for Outer Space, staff report prepared by Mrs. Eilene Galloway, 
Legislative Reference Service specialist and special consultant to the committee, for the Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Senate Document No. 56. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
August 12, 1965: 353-373. 



The success of the First and Second Polar Years at interval of ;»!) 
years, led to expectations that a Third International Polar V.' 
(TPY) would he held in 1982-83. However, before even half of another 
50-year period could elapse, it became apparent to some observers 
that the accelerating pace of technology and the fact that available 
basic data m the Earth sciences had been largely exploited were 
making further international observation efforts desirable. Early in 
1950 Lloyd V. Berkner 86 proposed that the TPY he held in 1957 58, 
25 years after the SPY, and coincidentally a period for which unusual 
solar activity was predicted. 

The idea was widely discussed among scientists and scientific 
organizations, and in May 1952 the International ( 'ouncil of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU) established a special committee to take charge of 
planning for a Third Polar Year. [irritations to participate were sent 
to ICSU member nations and to the T.S.S.R. The response was only 
moderate, however, and included the suggestion from several scientific 
groups that the scope should be broadened to encompass worldwide 
phenomena rather than concentrating on the polar regions. [CSU 
considered the suggestion, and in October L952 its gene ably 

approved the enlarged scope, which was reflected in a change of name 
from Third Polar Year to International Geophysical Year. 

The IGY concept gained quick acceptance throughout the world 
scientific community. The ICSU special committee was enlarged and 
designated as CSAGI (initials of the French version of Special Com- 
mittee for the International Geophysical Year); the English scientist 
Dr. Sydney Chapman was named president and Berkner vice presi- 
dent. The number of countries represented at CSAGI meetings grew 
from 26 in 1953 to 67 in 1958. 

Enthusiasm for the IGY idea was not limited to scientists, but was, 

. . . shared by the various governments concerned, by heads of state, and by 
the public at large. This interest was aroused by the strong appeal of the IG1 
a cooperative venture representing many nations working together for the benefit 
of all mankind. Consequently, the collective response of the many legislative 
bodies and governments whose approval was necessary to make the program a 
success was on a far more generous scale than that prompted by any previous 
scientific enterprise. 

Governmental support consisted not only of unprecedented financial contribu- 
tions, but also of equally valuable and necessary Logistic support. Governments 
cooperated by facilitating the movement of participating scientists from one 
country to another, and in assuring prompt movement through customs of 
scientific equipment on which the various programs depended. *~4 

. . . Widespread interest in the IGY was aroused in the general public by 
numerous articles in the daily press and in popular magazines. Consequently, 
more was undoubtedly known concerning tie K'.V than had been the case for 
any previous international scientific effort, and expectations were correspondingly 
raised. 37 

38 Author of the IPSO Berkner report on State Department organization and staffing for science and tech- 
nology. For a description of the report and its consequent • ■. Committee on 
International Relations, Science and Technology in the Department of State Bringing Technical Content Into 
Diplomatic Policy and Operations, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, 
prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Huddle, 
senior specialist in science and technology. Congressional Research Service, Libi . 
ington. U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975, ISO pages (committee print) pp. 18-23. 

37 Bul'.is, The Political Legacy of the International Geophyiiical Year, p. 9. 


IGY programs were selected mainly to assist in solving specific 
planetary problems of the Earth, with emphasis on problems requiring 
concurrent observations at many points around the globe and coopera- 
tive efforts by many nations. These problems fell generally into three 
broad areas: the Earth as a structure, atmospheric and oceanic circula- 
tion, and upper atmosphere physics and solar-terrestrial relationships. 
The broad areas were divided into thirteen scientific areas — for exam- 
ple: oceanography, ionospheric physics, nuclear radiation — in which 
research would be concentrated. 


The scientific results were unprecedented: 

Tremendous masses of data were obtained during the IGY. For example, 17 tons 
of records were generated by American Antarctic stations alone. This dramatic out- 
pouring of information posed more questions than were answered. Berkner likened 
the situation to that of coming from outer space and finding a new planet. 38 

One commentator wrote that cosmic ray physics had emerged from 
the IGY as "the broadest ranging of all man's intellectual endeavors," 
encompassing not only the vast concepts of galaxies and intergalactic 
space but also the microcosm of atomic particles and forces. 39 IGY 
investigations in the Antarctic showed that ice depths may extend to 
more than 14,000 feet. Much was learned concerning the elasticity of 
the Earth and its crust, and concerning the distribution of the Earth's 
mass. Additional valuable information affecting radio communications 
was acquired. Meteorological findings provided the basis for better 
weather predictions and for long-range efforts to exercise some degree 
of control over weather. 

Experiments involving the explosion of small nuclear devices be- 
tween the Van Allen radiation belts represented the first time in history 
that worldwide measurements of a completely controlled geophysical 
phenomenon had been made simultaneously. Studies of ocean currents 
showed that ocean depths are very much in motion, and not stagnant; 
one related finding was that deep ocean trenches are unsuitable for the 
dumping of radioactive wastes, another that life — including fish and 
crustaceans— exists even in the ocean trenches of the Pacific at depths 
of almost 40,000 feet. Studies of solar activity raised the possibility 
that much thermal energy might be transferred to the Earth's atmos- 
phere through direct contact with the hot gases of the Sun's corona. 
Further, IGY research established that there is no definite end to the 
Earth's atmosphere — 

As far distant as 10 Earth diameters a substantial hydrogen atmosphere was 
found to exist, fading into the atmosphere of outer space itself, dominated by the 
effects of untold meteors, X-rays, ultraviolet light, protons, electrons, cosmic rays, 
and electric and magnetic fields. Thus, the upper atmosphere was found to be a 
place of considerable activity, affecting many phenomena on the Earth itself. Of 
tremendous interest was the discovery of the two Van Allen radiation belts, exist- 
ing as annular shrouds about the Earth, shaped by terrestrial magnetic fields. 
These belts of intense radiation were seen as important factors in determining and 
perhaps limiting man's future exploration of space. 40 

" Ibid, p. 28. 
« Ibid. p. 28. 
» Ibid, p. 31. 


U.S. Involvement 

The connection of the U.S. Government with the 1(1 V. like thai of 
other national governments, was unofficial. Nevertheless, about a 
third of the initial [IS. financial support more than $43 million - 
consisted o{ appropriated funds. An equivalent amount was contrib- 
uted by private institutions- mainly universities with the remain- 
ing third provided through existing programs in both public and private 
research laboratories, Of the *4:; million of appropriated money, 
nearly $20 million was for the U.S. Earth Satellite pro-ram." Ulti- 
mately, logistical and operational support for 1(1 V activities bro ight 
the total cost of the U.S. contribution to about $500 million. 

Many different approaches to the administration of funds for the 
IGY were taken by the 07 participating countries. In the United 
States, a National Committee for the I (IV the USXC— w;i> estab- 
lished by the National Academy of Sciences, a member of ICSU. The 
CJSNC served as a focus for all U.S. technical panels, geographical 
committees, and special groups, as well as for a broad ero^-section 
of American geophysicists. It provided technical guidance for the 
National Science Foundation, which was responsible for preparation 
of budget estimates and for obtaining congressional appropriations. 
Among the U.S. Government agencies which assisted the USNC 
were the Departments of State. Defense, and Commerce, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and the Office of Defence Mobilization. 
Role of Congress 

The original budget for the IGY presented to Congress by 
Dr.AJanT. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, was 
for $13 million. Dr. Waterman emphasized that this budget was not 
to be confused with the separate amount of about the same magnitude 
needed for the NSF's regular programs. Altogether a considerably 
greater amount was requested, and more than $43 million was 

With only minor qualifications, congressional reaction to the IGY 
was positive, both in the early stages and after the event. A- author 
Harold Bullis comment-: 

Although both House* of Congress supported IGY requests enthusiastically, 
the House frequently reduced the amount-; requested whereas the Senate usually 
voted for the full amounts. The final figures arrived at represented a compromise 
between the two bodies. Action in the House reflected a belief that the budget 
estimates arrived at by the .scientists were necessarily rough and could be reduced 
without damage to the U.S. IGY program, whereas the scientists insisted that 
the budget estimates were conservative and that any reductions would indeed 
severely damage the program. Irritation was also expressed in the House that the 
scientists were making use of administration prestige to "sell" the IGY ]>r 
thereby relegating the Congress to a back seat in the endeavor. These difficulties 
were relatively minor, however, and for the most part the Congress granted the 
scientists what they requested. 4 -' 

41 In the light of the magnitude of U.S. spending for space exploration in the years following I 
$20 million seems a modest enough investment. However, even ihat amount was not arrived at without 
dissension. The associate director of this study series. Warren R. Johnston, recalls attending meetings 
of the NSC Planning Board in 1956 at which Presidential advisers debated the question of how much— or 
how little— money it would take to assure a minimally successful Earth satellite experiment. With the 
shock of Sputnik I, the emphasis suddenly changed from minimal to maximal. 

•> Bullis, op. cit. p. 16. 


Major elements in persuading Congress to provide the needed funds 
were the desirability of simultaneous observations and on carrying out 
measurements throughout the entire globe, the evident expense of 
doing so, and the assurance that the program was finite and of definitely 
limited duration. Later, when Dr. Berkner, speaking for the TJSNC 
and responding to a Soviet proposal to extend the IGY formula beyond 
the 18-month period earlier decided upon, raised the possibility of 
further development of IGY activities, the congressional reaction was 
mildly favorable. However, the position of the American scientists 
themselves — who had repeatedly emphasized to Congress that the 
IGY was to be a specific, time-limited undertaking — had by then 
become hardened so that support for the Soviet direct continuation 
proposal was impractical. 

The separate question of the impact of the IGY — or Sputnik — on 
the Congress is discussed below. 43 


Some of the scientific results of the IGY have already been touched 
on. The main concern of this study is with its domestic political 
impact and its effect on U.S. diplomacy. These impacts were many 
and substantial. As quoted in the basic study, Walt W. Rostow sums 
up American reaction to the most spectacular of the IGY events: 

There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by the 
launching of the Soviet Earth satellite on October 4, 1957. This intrinsically 
harmless act of science and engineering was also, of course, both a demonstration 
of foreseeable Soviet capability to launch an ICBM and a powerful act of 
psychological warfare. It immediately set in motion forces in American political 
life which radically reversed the Nation's ruling conception of its military problem, 
of the appropriate level of the budget, and of the role of science in its affairs. 
The reaction reached even deeper, opening a fundamental reconsideration not 
only of the organization of the Department of Defense but also of the values and 
content of the American educational system and of the balance of values and 
objectives in contemporary American society as a whole. 44 

The effect of Sputnik I in particular and the IGY in general on 
Government support for basic science in the United States was 
unprecedented. Federal funds were restored for scientific facilities 
previously closed down; the Federal Government's in-house research 
efforts were increased; Federal scientists and engineers received 
ingrade promotions and other preferential treatment. The budget of 
the National Science Foundation shot up from its pre-IGY ceiling of 
$15 million to about $159 million in 1960 and $416 million in 1965; by 
1975 it had reached approximately $690 million. 


The most dramatic development sparked by Sputnik I — and 
probably the most significant, at least in the short run — was the 
"Space Race": 

« For a compact summary of the "vigorous and sustained role [of the Congress] in the adoption and 
implementation of U.S. policy for international space cooperation," see also the account by Mrs. Eilene 
Galloway, CRS Senior Specialist in International Relations, of "Congress and International Space Coop- 
eration" in Senate Document No. 92-57 (International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium), prepared 
for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1971: 3-12. (Mrs. Galloway was appointed by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson in March 1958 to 
serve as Special Consultant to the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, and later to the 
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.) 

» Bullis, op. cit., p. 38. 


The Soviet achievement carried the implication thai the Soviet Union had 
mast Ted (he primary technology required for an intercontinental ballistic missile. 
At one stroke, this achievement erased the issue of the "Bomber Gap," created a 
''.Missile Gap," rendered obsolete the elaborate early warningsyst* mo! the United 

States against bomber attack, reduced the warning time of an attack from bows 
to minutes, and raised the issue as t<> whether maimed strategic bombers would 
not soon be obsolete. It gave a practical demonstration of the possibility and ad- 
vantages of technological surprise. And, finally, it raised the prestige of the So\ iet 
Union as a technological power of the foremost rank. 

The U.S. response was enactment of Public haw 85 568, the National Aeronau- 
tics and Space Act, approved July 29, L958. From this poinl on. the American 
space program was launched OB an arduous and costly technological course for 
more than a decade of competition with the Soviet I'nion; it was to embrace a 

tremendous range of scientific inveMinations, technological ( septs, and practical 

applications. Most importantly, for the purposes of this study, it was a form of 
activity of inherent importance in international relations; its achievements were 
prestigious and enabled the United States to recover and even raise its diplomatic 
Stature; its operations were obviously global in nature and required the cooperation 
of many nations; and the exploitation of its technological capabilities offered 
attractive rewards to many nations, developed and undeveloped alike. 

While space was later to be formally abjured as a military combat regime, 
satellites obviously offered great advantages for surveillance (which would con- 
tribute to the stability of the mutual deterrence evolving between the United States 
and the Soviet Union). Surveillance from space also offered a way out of the 
awkward impasse presented by Soviet reluctance to admit any form of external 
inspection as an adjunct of arms control agreements.'' 

The new space program made heavy demands on the Federal budget 
and caused some reshaping of both executive and legislative branch 
machinery. In addition to the establishment of NASA, there were 
radical changes in the Federal structure for national and international 
science policy and programs, including the appointment of a Science 
Adviser to the President and the location of the President's Science 
Advisory Committee directly within the White House — a step which, 
according to Berkner, had profound implications for making the needs 
of science, scientific research, and science education discussed and 
understood at top governmental levels. 46 The expanded science 
advisory apparatus within the Executive Office led in turn to creation 
of the post of Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, or 
equivalent, in most old-line departments. 

Within the State Department, which had created an Office of 
Science Adviser in 1950 and assigned science attaches to several West 
European countries but had curtailed these activities in 1955, the 
science function was revived. Science attaches were appointed to serve 
at U.S. Embassies in London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, Tokyo, 
Moscow, Xew Delhi, and some South American count ries. 

To promote military applications of space research, the position of 
Director of Research and Engineering was established within the 
Department of Defense, ranking above the Assistant Secretaries of 
Defense and possessing the authority to manage interservice projects 
without following the normal military chain of command. This senior 
officer was supported by an Office of the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering and by the [Defense] Advanced Research Projects 

« Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, p. 24. 
« Bullis, op. cit., p. 41. 



There were corresponding responses in Congress. A House Select 
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration was created on 
March 5, 1958, and replaced on July 21 of the same year by the 
Committee on Science and Astronautics (now styled the Committtee 
on Science and Technology). In the Senate a Special Committee on 
Space and Astronautics was created on February 6, 1958, and was super- 
seded on January 14, 1959, by the Committee on Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences. Appropriations were passed funding NASA and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Council, which had also been estab- 
lished by passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 


Still other important effects are attributable to the IGY and 
Sputnik I: 

— In the words of Walter Sullivan, a perceptive observer of the 
IGY as it progressed, the}" "precipitated an examination of the 
educational system and in fact, of the entire American scale of 
values." 47 Parents, school boards, and legislators became more 
aware of the importance of science training for the Nation's 
youth; curricula were revised, and mathematics and science 
courses which had been dropped reappeared; efforts were made to 
bring textbooks and teaching methods up to date: the National 
Defense Education Act of 1958 was passed, making substantial 
Federal appropriations available for these and related purposes. 

— Sputnik I and its attendant publicity convinced Americans 
that the}^ no longer possessed an undisputed lead over the rest of 
the world in science and technology. The universal concern which 
followed this jolt to American complacency helped focus public 
attitudes upon the necessity for basic research. 

— An important outcome of the IGY earth satellite program 
was the development, under U.S. leadership, of international com- 
munications satellites. Less than two decades later, worldwide 
television broadcasts as events take place, from tennis matches 
and the Olympics to actual combat or meetings of heads of state, 
are taken for granted. The increasing interdependence of peoples 
around the world is accented by the growing network of facilities 
for instant TV, as well as radio, communications between distant 

— Apart from their obvious advantages in arms inspections and 
military operations, satellites are proving to have many surveil- 
lance uses. A NASA stud}^ in 1967 listed these, among others: 
flood warnings; tracking of migrating birds, fish, and animals; 
iceberg reconnaissance ; mapping of land areas and ocean bottoms; 
earthquake prediction; air pollution monitoring and forecasting; 
weather forecasting; and earth resources surveys (agricultural 
and mineral). 48 

— Good progress has been made in the use of satellites for 
weather forecasting. Of increasingly significant potential is their 

< 7 Ibid, p. 42. 

48 Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, pp. 27-28. 


use for surveys of global resources of agricultural and mineral 
wealth and for the management of these resourt i 


The international impacts of the IGV and the Soviet Sputniks 
"were every bit as spectacular as were the impacts upon the United 
States and would be difficult to exaggerate." 

Foremost was the impact upon the cold war. Tensions heightened in East- 
West relations as the Soviet leadership sought to use ite BUCCess in space to further 
its goals in foreign and military policy and as the United States countered Soviet 
thrusts with crash programs in space and missile development. Sputnik I catalyzed 
the cold war and not until the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis 6 years Later 
were Soviet-American leaders able to take the first steps decelerating the spiralling 
pressures of the arms race. Additional impacts were t beetled upon the international 
politics of science, the use of science as a vital element in foreign affairs, and the 
generation of a remarkable degree of international cooperation and good will 
in politically nonsensitive pursuits. 50 

Noteworthy effects on international science included the strengthen- 
ing of the ICSU and its affiliates; the bringing together of Western 
scientists with Soviets and others previously cut off from the Western 
world; the stimulation, on a worldwide basis, of the interdisciplinary 
approach to problem solving; and encouragement of the revival 
of science in underdeveloped countries newly experiencing their 

The IGY and the manner in which it was conducted served also, 
in various w T ays, as a model for other programs involving international 
collaboration in scientific activity. These new programs, govern- 
mentally sponsored, included the International Years of the Quiet 
Sun from January I, 1964, through December 31, 1065; the Upper 
Mantle Program held in 1966-70; a Global Atmospheric Research 
Program; an International Geodynamics Project; an International 
Magnetosphere Survey; the World Weather Watch; Indian Ocean 
Research; and the International Biological Program. 

Apart from organized developments and institutional impacts, 
the IGY was effective in helping to meld the top scientific talent of 
the various participating countries into an international scientific 
leadership element. The pervasive influence of this element has not 
been confined, over the years since the IGY, to purely scientific 
matters, but has moved into the realms of politics and ethics. The 
Pugwash Conferences are a manifestation of this trend; others 
include numerous conferences and movements of recent years in 
such areas as population control, food production and distribution, 
and conservation of the Earth's resources. While many other influences 
have combined to bring about these movements, the IGY appear 
to have played an important part in helping to set the stage for them. 

« Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, pp. 28-29. (For further treatment of this latter subjec- 
see: (1) U.S. Congress. Senate. Earth Resources Satellites. Hearings before the Senate Committer • on Aero- 
nautical and Space Sciences pursuant to S. 23.10 and S. 3484. August 6, 8. and 9 an ' * Baft. 
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1974, 336 n. (2) U.S. Congress. Senate. Earth Resourcee Survey 8ystora 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications. House Science and Astronautics 
Committee, pursuant to H.R. 14978 and H.R. 15781, Oct. 3, 4, and 9, 1974. Washington, C .S. Govt. I nut. 
Off., 1974, 283 p.) 

5° Bullis, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 


Finally, there is highly suggestive evidence that the new communications 
channels, the tremendous cooperative spirit, and the increased understanding 
among participants of the 67 nations which took part in the IGY led directly 
to the Antarctic Treaty. Whether or nut the IGY can be credited in such strong 
terms, it clearly played an important part in helping shape that treaty, which 
in turn reinforced the cooperative pattern for the other treaties and agreements 
which were to follow. Just as scientists approach their objectives through a 
step-by-step process, so did politicians appear to approach these international 
objectives in similar fashion, with similar success. 51 


How can the full significance of an undertaking as far-reaching in 
its ramifications as the IGY be measured? 

Perhaps, by way of caution — especially because, as Bullis notes, 
the record of the IGY as written by contemporary observers is full of 
exuberant praise but apparently lacking in significant critical reac- 
tion — the way to begin is with some negative considerations. He 
observes that it seems unfortunate in retrospect that the occasion of 
the IGY and its achievements was not systematically exploited in the 
United States to influence lasting public attitudes toward basic 

Unlike many of the activities of the IGY, which took place dramatically in 
remote and exciting areas of the globe, basic research was a difficult area of 
scientific activity for the general public to understand and appreciate, and still 
remains so. Although the IGY was, to scientists, primarily an exercise in basic 
research, to the public it appeared largely a matter of polar adventures and space 
satellites. Thus, were such an effort proposed today, it would appear doubtful 
that it would receive widespread public support unless the activities involved were 
sufficiently broadened so as to appeal to a wide variety of interests. 52 

Again in retrospect, the new emphasis in education on science and 
mathematics and on related curriculum, test, and teaching reforms was 
not entirely beneficial: 

Science careers may have been made attractive to some students who lacked 
i ithex the necessary qualifications or the sustained motivation required for such 
careers. Furthermore, as Dean Harvey Brooks has pointed out, curriculum reform 
was largely undertaken for the wrong reason, namely, ". . . on the grounds that 
it was needed to make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counter- 
parts," rather than because of a fundamental desire to improve the way in which 
science was being taught. Thus, while the Sputnik motivation increased interest in 
science and made changes easier, the danger also existed that both interest and 
programs might collapse once the motivation subsided. 53 

In the context of the issue of the nuclear threat, possibly more sus- 
tained and serious attention should have been given to the Soviet pro- 
posal for a continuation of the IGY organization and procedures. 
The spiiit of cooperation engendered by the IGY itself, reaching not 
onl}- scientists but also the world's peoples and their political leaders 
at a time when the prevailing atmosphere was one of cold war hostilit}*, 
could perhaps have been captured and institutionalized in this way to 
bring lasting benefits of a still higher order of magnitude than those 
conferred by the IGY. Would the good will and flexibility implicit in 
such a response to the Soviet initiative have eased Soviet suspicions 
of U.S. intentions in other areas, such as arms buildup, and made for 
earlier and more certain solutions to pressing cold war problems? Or, 
on the other hand, would the Soviet Union have attempted to convert 

si Ibid., p. 62. 
M Ibid., p. 39. 
w Ibid., pp. 42-43. 


the extended Ki^t machinery into a front organization serving it- own 
version of peace and progress? The answers to these q lestions are 
beyond the reach of the present study, but they would - bwhile 

for historians and long-range policy planners to ponder. 

In any case, it is clear that what' the [GY and its sponsors failed to 
to do was far outweighed by its accomplishments. Ii^ outstanding 
achievements in science have been mentioned. Qu thi itionaJ 

level, a formula was invented which made possible the smooth and in- 
dependent functioning of a c< mplex enterprise, under the leadei hip of 
scientists, witli generous support from many governments but a mini- 
mum of interference by them. 64 On the substantia e side, although the 
IGY was primarily an exercise in pure science, it made brilliant use of 
contemporary technology; the scientific spaa prol - - which opened a 
new era of exploration were only the most visible of many such u>e>. 
In the area of international cooperation, to cite one cati ■••: ; of results, 
the same technology employed in the Earth satellite program required 
agreements among; nations which subsequently smoothed the way for 
other agreements in related area-. 

There is, perhaps, a danger attending the euphoria generated by a 
great and successiul enterprise in international cooperation like the 
IGY. Especially among scientists, for whom good will i- an accus- 
tomed accompaniment to cooperation in scientific and techno- 
logical problem solving, there may be a tendency to underestimate the 
problems inherent in the political setting. On this theme, Bullis 
comments : 

One of the difficulties in attempting to transfer scientific methodology into 
political reality is suggested by Sullivan's observation that "science, in treating 
our planet as indivisible, is far ahead of politics, which trc!t< it as t\\' worlds." 
In view of today's multiple ideologies, "multiple worlds" might 1m a more appro- 
priate political designation. During the I G Y. ae a result of their common participa- 
tion in efforts which opened up to man not only Antarctica but outer space, Bcien- 
tists were said to have experienced unusually strong feelings of humility and 
brotherhood. These feelings served to reinforce the traditional attitude- most 
natural scientists develop as a result of sharing with others the common objective 
of unveiling nature's secrets. There is but one universe for scientists to study, and 
its singularity unites all scientific minds. 

Thus scientists tend to have fewer social problems since their research i- generally 
focused upon common, well-defined objectives offering "a natural point 
vergence, namely, the correct result." Unlike politicians, they arc not i 
in conflict resolution as a profession and are not charged with responsibil 
the protection of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the exist* nee 
of a common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency I 
cooperation despite all obstacles, a tendency which h a. b< D el n t<ri<tic 
of the international scientific community. . . . 

In view of the substantial differences between the scientific and political 
communities in the kinds of problems they are respectively called u] 
prudence would suggest caution in looking for too bold a transfer "f tech 
from one community to another. The IGY itself was apolitical and closed 
whereas the political process is, a priori, political and open ended. "S < t, politicians 
and scientists do share some important human charac; i liticiana and 

governments, no less than scientists and scientific organizations, are capable of 
and motivated toward uniting to achieve common objectives. A major diificulty 
is that the procedures for finding solutions to problems facing politicians and 
governments are less clearly defined than are the procedui lufions 

to the specific types of problems commonly faced by scientists and 
Scientific and engineering problems are typically m 'ally defined than 

See ibid, pp. 9-13, for a description of how this was done. 


are political problems, which tend to be overburdened with value systems in which 
rational and irrational factors are intermixed. 

Nevertheless, the author concludes, 

... if men can unite to solve problems under one set of circumstances (the 
scientific), there presumably is room for hope that they can learn to do so under 
another (the political). Scientists, as already indicated, tend to share this hope. 55 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

The International Geophysical Year was an episode, with a begin- 
ning and an end. The interval since the basic study was written has 
yielded no important new revelations about it or interpretations of its 
significance. Nevertheless, its influence continues to be exerted, as 
Bullis points out in the following observations of September 1975: 


The IGY study represented a detailed examination of a specific 
example of how the world scientific community worked together in 
cooperation and good will toward resolving international problems. 
In particular, it analyzed the contributions this massive scientific 
undertaking made in overcoming ideological differences to bridge 
science and diplomacy. In so doing, the study attempted to identify 
and explain the attitudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed 
during the IGY as a step toward detente. 

These themes are as relevant today as when the study was written 
in 1973. However, international cooperation appears to have been a 
mixed affair. On the positive side, international exchange undoubtedly 
experienced sharp growth immediately following the IGY. Precise 
figures are not available, partly because of what is meant by an 
' 'international' ' meeting, partly because so many meetings have been 
held that it is difficult to keep track of them, and partly because 
interest in compiling relevant statistics does not appear to warrant 
the expense of collection. Such data as are available, however, indicate 
that the number of international meetings remained fairly constant 
throughout the early 1950s and through 1957, when the IGY began, 
and then increased by about 25 percent during 1958 and almost 
doubled during the next decade. {Yearbook oj International Organi- 
zations data.) It would seem reasonable to infer that much of this 
growth resulted from activities initiated during the IGY. 


Also on the positive side was the signing by the Soviets of the 
Universal Copyright Convention in May 1973. Prior to this time, 
the Soviets had reproduced about 70,000 pages annually from U.S. 
scientific journals published by the American Institute of Physics, 
and had been in frequent communication with the Institute regarding 
copyright permission and paj^ment of royalties. 56 

It would appear to be a fair assumption that these scientific com- 
munications had a positive effect upon the Soviet decision to sign the 
Copyright Convention. 

m Ibid., pp. 52-54. 

» Physics Today, vol. 28, Jan. 1975, p. 119. 



On the negative side, the Soviets have not always honored tentative 
agreements for exchange of scientific information and research. 

Typical of this failure is hick of cooperation in mental health research, 
first proposed in mid-1971 and discussed in subsequent years as pari 
of an overall health package, hut still not agreed upon by 1 « ) 7* 1 r 

Much of the delay has been due to Soviet unwillingness to discuss 
details of the proposed research and possible exchange of scientists 
between the two countries. More recently, U.S. scientists have devel- 
oped doubts as to the advisability of such cooperation as a result of 
the possibility that some Soviet psychiatrists may he deliberately 
misdiagnosing political dissidents as schizophrenic to silence them by 
confinement in mental hospitals. 


Another problem which has developed recently is friction between 
United States and Soviet scientists over alleged Soviet persecution 
of Soviet scientists who wish to emigrate to Israel. The head of the 
Foreign Relations Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
has expressed the view that such emigration represents a capitalistic 
brain drain to the disadvantage of the Soviets, 8 whereas U.S. scien- 
tists have expressed their strong support for the Soviet scientists 
who wish to move. Correspondence between United States and Soviet 
scientists on this subject has at times been abrasive. As a result of 
these and other incidents, communication and travel by scientists 
between the United States and the Soviet Union have been character- 
ized as recently as May 1974 as being "a difficult problem." 59 


In summary, while it is clear that the "IGY spirit" is by no means 
in universal evidence throughout today's international scientific 
community, international scientific cooperation continues at a higher 
level of activity than it had reached in pre-IGY days. To the extent 
of the difference, there is perhaps justification for greater hope that 
bridges built by this cooperation will increasingly serve constructive 
purposes of science and diplomacy. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

The IGY yielded far more new data for scientists to assimilate 
than did the SPY 1932-33. On the other hand, data assimilation and 
technological application are growing progressively more rapid with 
every passing decade. The following questions are posed in the light 
of this latter consideration: 

In what scientific areas covered by the IGY, and to what extent, is 
there already a need for fresh data? Are there other geophysical areas 
not coveredby the IGY which should now be studied, from a purely 
scientific standpoint, through a similar international cooperative 

« Science, vol. 183, Mar. 8, 1974, pp. 932-935. 
« Physics Today, vol. 27, Aug. 1974, p. 64. 
» Ibid., vol. 27, May 1974, p. 78. 


Besides the international conferences leading up to major treaties 
(Antarctic, Test Ban, and so on) and the government ally sponsored 
scientific efforts like the IYQS, World Weather Watch, and Interna- 
tional Biological Program — two categories of developments influenced 
by the IGY — the past two decades have witnessed a number of other 
major international and regional conferences in winch science and tech- 
nology have played important roles. These conferences, sponsored by 
governments to help solve tough political problems, have dealt with such 
matters as food (see Issue Three), population (also Issue Thi 
health (Issue Two), the exploitation of ocean resources (Case Five) , and 
environmental programs (for citations see bibliography following this 
final chapter). 

Have these, too, been influenced, in their organization and proce- 
dures, by the successful patterns established in the IGY? Has a con- 
scious effort been made, in planning and conducting them, to build on 
the best experience of the IGY, other mainly scientific conferences, 
and the mainly political treaty conference-? Would a systematic, 
comparative study highlighting the goals, methods, procedures, and 
results of all these major conferences, beginning with the IGY, 
conducted by a university or a private research foundation, be likely 
to make a significant contribution in the interests both of scholarship 
and of improved governmental policy formulation and planning? 

Much has happened to change the world in the short time since the 
IGY. Whether or not most of the scientific knowledge gained in 
1957-58 has been assimilated, would it be useful to ''stop the clock'' 
and take fresh readings at IGY-plus-25. or 19S2-S3; i.e., hold a 
second IGY? 

Should some new IGY follow the pattern of the first one in terms of 
scientific leadership with government support (but with minimal 
interference)? Would it be desirable this time for governments to take 
the initiative? Would this be feasible in today's world, with its increas- 
ing trend toward independent behavior by nationalist states and by 
regional or economic blocs pursuing special interests rather than global 

If governments take the initiative — or even if scientists retain it — 
would it be feasible and productive to focus a large part of the scientific 
effort on fields closely related to current human needs, the conscious- 
ness of which has come so much to the fore since the time of the IGY: 
e.g., energy, agriculture, exploitation of ocean resources, mineral 
discovery, and preservation of the natural environment? 


Statement of the Case 

On April 7," 1965, in a nationally broadcast and telecast speech at 
Johns Hopkins University, President Lyndon B. Johnson asserted 
U.S. willingness to negotiate an end to the then-expanding conflict 
in Vietnam, defended the U.S. policy of bombing Xorth Vietnam, and 
offered U.S. support for an extensive program of regional development 
in Southeast Asia, including rehabilitation of Vietnam. 

The President singled out for particular attention the Lower Mekong 
River Basin project, a major development enterprise undertaken in 
the 1950s jointly by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam with 
the support of the United Nations Commission for Asia and the Far 


East (ECAFE) and the cooperation of a large number of D.N 

foundations, and individual countries. 

A< a peace initiative the President's oiler failed; Hanoi and Peking 
emphatically rejected it. In retrospect it is seen as merely a brief 
episode of the eventful period, characterized by mounting opposition 
to the Vietnam War that culminated in the President's decision not to 
seek reelection in 1968. Nevertheless, it called attention to the poten- 
tialities of the Mekong project, both in itself and as a mode!, and of 
regionalism as an approach to development. 
Importance of the Case 

What emerges from this study as significant is not the President's 
proposal, dramatic though it was at the time, but the hardiness of the 
Mekong project and the regional appro 

". . . throughout the 7 yc:ir< from the time of the spe< eh to the | 
1972), the international effort to apply technology to the systematic (!<•%■<■' 
of the Lower Mekong Basin has grown considerably. . . . Despite many strains, 
cooperation among the four countries of the Basin held Bteadfast i multi- 

national development effort it has demonstrated 11 mtinuity, stability, 

and growth." 60 

How the Case Developed 

In a 1946 study of the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
E< OSOC), Herman Finer wrote that — 

"The Council will encourage or institute regional conferences on rconomic, 
social, and humanitarian problems. . . . Some countries by rv r prox- 

imity and certain common characteristics of geography and climate and I 
or the chance of history, have some problems in common. 

Under its charter. ECOSOC on March 28, 1<M7, created an Eco- 
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East ECAFE . with bead- 
quarters in Bangkok, Thailand. ECAFE's scope extended to trade, 
agriculture, transportation, industrial and technological development, 
education, and data gathering. Its member-hip included all memb 
the United Nations in Asia plus Australia, New Zealand, Fiance, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and the S 
Union. (Other regional commissions have been established by 
ECOSOC: for Europe— ECE; Latin America— ECLA; and Africa— 
ECA.) 61 

In 1957 the four Riparian Nations (Cambodia. Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam), in association with ECAFE, established a permanent Com- 
mittee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong. The 
four members of the coordination committee representing the Riparian 
Nations had full powers of decision; an executive agent, heading a 
permanent advisory board of professional engineers created in 1958, 
had authority for making day-to-day decisions in preparing requests 
for technical and financial assistance, program planning and super- 
vision, and staff support of the coordination committee. 

*° U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Xfrkcmg Project: Opportunities and Problems 
of Regionalism, a studv in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 1 : Franklin P. llucli' 

Policy Research Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. Washington, D 
Government Printing Office, May 1972, 70 pages. (Committee print.) The quotation is from p 
a mention of how the Mekong project has survived the tuiluUnt years since the above in 
see below under Avthcr's Reassessment in 1'j75. 

61 Huddle, Tit Mekong Project, p. 16. 


On this rather unusual and extemporized foundation was erected the organiza- 
tion to plan and administer a regional program covering three-quarters of the 
drainage basin of the tenth largest river in the world, a region larger than France, 
with a population of perhaps 30 million. 62 

By the time of President Johnson's proposal for a billion-dollar aid 
program featuring the Mekong regional plan, a complex of 21 countries, 
12 U.N. agencies, and 7 private institutions were contributing support 
to the project — donations and pledges were to reach $68 million by the 
end of 1965 — and the technical and administrative resources of the 
coordination committee's executive agent and staff were expanding. 
France, India, and New Zealand were collaborating on preliminary 
plans for a major dam at Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia; a Japanese 
team was at work on the Sambor Dam, also in Cambodia; the United 
States was taking the lead ($2.5 million in feasibility studies) in con- 
nection with a third great dam at Pa Mong in Thailand. Australia 
had a half-million-dollar program of geologic studies underway at both 
Sambor and Pa Mong Dam sites. In addition, construction was in 
progress on dams, channel markers, and other engineering or pre- 
paratory projects on tributar}^ streams feeding the Mekong. 63 

In short, the enterprise to which the President proposed to extend 
massive support was no mere flight of fancy but a major project in 
being, backed by a strong and broadly based multinational commit- 
ment to see it through. At the same time, it could be considered a 
grossly underfinanced enterprise, proceeding at a pace which would 
require many years for completion of most of its elements and even 
decades for some. Was it not appropriate, then, for the nation which 
had fathered "the first regional development project to command 
worldwide attention — the Tennessee Valley Authority" 64 to offer 
assistance in accelerating the progress of this enterprise, as a construc- 
tive contribution to a negotiated peace? 

The U.S. and world press in general found it appropriate, though 
recognizing the offer as part of a "carrot and stick" approach. 

The timing of the speech coincided with stepped-up bombing of strategic targets 
in North Vietnam by U.S. military aircraft, beginning with isolated strikes in mid- 
February, and broadening into a more sustained air offensive in early March. It 
followed by a week the President's decision, to be disclosed later on, to deploy U.S. 
troops and undertake ground combat operations in South Vietnam (to an extent 
that would number 184,314 military personnel in the area by the end of 1965). 6S 

But Hanoi was not in a bargaining mood : 

The determined nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict ... re- 
mained obdurately aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a 
prospective ultimate victory. 66 

U.S. Involvement 

A succession of three studies was undertaken between 1951 and 
1958 to explore the potential for a regional development program for 
the Lower Basin of the Mekong. The first of these was carried out by 
the Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Development of 
ECAFE. The second, made at the request of the Riparian States 

« Ibid., p. 17. 

M Ibid., p. 26. (Table 1 of the study, pages 27-30, presents an impressive list of resources, including engi- 
neering and other technical services, contributed or pledged by the various countries, agencies, and institu- 
tions supporting the project as of January 1965.) 

•< Ibid., pp. 1-2. 

«s Ibid., p. 2. 

« Ibid., p. 66. 


when the political situation in the area had stabilized briefly after 
the signing of the Geneva Accords of L954, was a reconnaissance by 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under the sponsorship of the U.S. 
International Cooperation Administration (later I'.s. AID). According 
to the study, 

Although the interest of the States themselves was undeniable, it seema likely 
that the initiative for this effort traces ultimately t<> France and tin- United 
States. It may well have been thought that stimulating a genera] interest in 
technological and economic development <>f the region might help to stabilize t In- 
political regimes there. At any event, a Special Project Agreement was signed 
between the Riparian Stales and the United States in November L955. There- 
after, the representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation ranged the area, held 
several meetings with representatives of the four countries, and returned to the 
United States, where their "Reconnaissance Report bower Mekong River 
Basin" was issued in March 1 !).">(>. " 7 

This 36-page report and its detailed appendices received close 
attention in Indochina, the study continued, perhaps because it was 
issued by representatives of the nation that had most to offer in 
support of the project as well as the broadest experience with sys- 
tematic river development. In any case it was a collection of the best 
data available about the region, and it specified what further data 
would be needed to get on with the project: 

Specifically, it called for hydrographic and sediment surveys of the main 
river; surveys of such features of the entire basin as topography, geology, trans- 
portation, communications, and agriculture; establishment of water flow me in- 
uring stations on the main stem and tributaries, weatherstations, and a systematic 
search for preferred dam sites; studies of such special problems as the control of 
the water level of the great lake (Tonle Sap) in central Cambodia, the salty soil 
in the great Plaine des Jones of Vietnam, the technology of double-cropping to 
increase agriculture production, and improved fish capture and processing; and 
such action programs as improved sanitation in water supply, and the training of 
local personnel in the technical skills that would be required later on. The study 
emphasized the need for cooperation among the four Riparian States in collecting, 
maintaining, and disseminating data on a uniform, integrated basis. 68 

The Bureau of Reclamation report was enthusiastically endorsed 
when it was presented at the annual meeting of ECAFE in Bangkok 
in March 1957. Meetings of experts from the Riparian States were 
held in May and September to implement the recommendations of 
the report, and resulted in agreement on a charter for the aforemen- 
tioned Coordination Committee. 69 


When a Preparatory Committee met to adopt this Charter, it also 
asked the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration to 
help recruit a visiting team of water resources experts to review and 
amplify the previous studies. By mid-November 1957 a U.N. team 
had been assembled in Bangkok under the leadership of Lt. Gen. 
Raymond Wheeler (Ret.) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The 
Wheeler Report, completed January 23, 1958, reinforced and went 
beyond the recommendations of the Bureau of Reclamation study, 
proposing a 5-year program of data collection at a total estimated 
cost of $9,200,000. 

•' Ibid., p. 22. 

•• Renamed in 1967 the "Mekong Development Committee." 


In 1961 the Ford Foundation, at the request of the Coordination 
Committee, sent a mission headed by Gilbert F. White to examine 
the economic and social implications of the proposed development. 
The report of this mission was made in Bangkok in Jury 1962: 

It recommended substantial strengthening of the staff of the Coordination 
Committee in social science fields for the purpose of generating and collecting 
social statistics. It called for joint studies with intergovernmental agencies on 
problems of wide interest in the ECAFE region. It proposed that the Bank for 
International Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) be invited to 
participate in a study of methods for determining economic feasibility, and pointed 
out that the primitive economy of the Riparian States imposed inexorable limits 
on the rate of investment in regional development. 70 

The report emphasized the need for a systematic compilation of 
available data concerning resources, resource use, and social charac- 
teristics. It called for a power market survey, a land use inventor}', 
and a study of ways to optimize agricultural use of water. The require- 
ment for training of technicians was again emphasized. Further: 

The report suggested that flood control benefits might be overstated and the 
institution of a flood warning system could reduce losses at moderate cost. It 
suggested that a large demonstration area be set up where the potential impacts 
of the Mekong project upon rural life could be observed. It proposed an elaborate 
program of demonstration projects in forest planting. In the introduction to the 
report, the authors warned that heavy investment in engineering works would 
not automatically lead to solid growth in social structure and economic gains. 71 

Instead of "monolithic concrete structures whose most immediate 
return is inflation of the national ego," the report urged a more modest 
start and suggested that ". . . the first construction be initiated 
on one or more of the tributaries: They can provide essential experience 
with ways of reaping an adequate harvest of benefits from investment 
in water management." This recommendation, the study notes, 
directly conflicted with the views of the Coordination Committee, 
which had given priority to three very large engineering projects at 
Pa Mong, Tonle Sap, and Sambor. 

The committee's views prevailed for a time over the Ford Founda- 
tion Report's concept of a small-scale beginning. On the other hand, 
the Foundation Report suggested a list of investigations and research 
projects which would require more extensive and close supervision 
than the Coordination Committee could manage. Nevertheless, the 
period of the Foundation stud} r and the years immediately following 
was marked by an increased tempo of activity en the Mekong project. 
The number of participating countries increased, as did donations 
and pledges of contributions to support the planning studies, which 
rose from $20 million in March 1962 to $42 million by the end of 
1963 and $68 million a year later. 


Two things stand o ut in a review of the events associated with the 
Mekong project from its beginnings until the time of President 
Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech in April 1965. One is the broad base 

™ Huddle, The Mekong Project, p. 24. 
» Ibid., pp. 24-25. 


of support for the project, with no nation monopolizing the leader- 
ship; the other, the major contributions made by the United States, 
both officially and unofficially. A sampling of activities of the years 
1962-04 will illustrate: 

In 1064, a first geological map of the basin was completed. In France, work was 
proceeding on :i mathematical model of the river while representatives from the 
Columbia River headquarters of the U.S. Corps of Engineers were undertaking 
a system study of the Mekong. Studies were underway by the World Health 
Organization of the problems of malaria and schistosomiasis in the basin. Scores 
of hydrologic and meteorologic stations had been set up and a radio network 
linked them to headquarters in Bangkok, where their reports were collected and 
tabulated. The Bureau of Reclamation was beginning work on a feasibility study 
of the Pa Mong Dam. Stream gradient measurements on the main stem had been 
completed in 1961 and measurement of the capacity of possible reservoirs was 
actively proceeding. In 1964, ECAFE completed an agricultural market analysis. 
Resources for the Future, Inc., had begun a study of world demand for products 
of electro-processing industries. A study of manpower needs and resources was 
begun in 1962, with the International Labor Office as lead agency. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and Israel, were studying 
agricultural improvement methods; plans were underway for farm and timber 
demonstration projects. 72 

With a broad base of support and >tepped-up pace, the character 
of the investigations changed markedly as the project proceeded: 

Not only was the scope of the pertinent data recognized as far wider than it 
had been in the 1950s, but primary emphasis was shifting to the economic and 
social consequences of proposed constructions and development. In the United 
States, river basin development had followed this trend, but the conversion to 
total system planning had taken more than a century; benefiting from U.S. 
experience, the Mekong planning activity had achieved it in less than a decade. 73 

Role of Congress 

Congressional reaction to the President's speech of April 7, 1965, 
was mixed. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield saw the speech 
as a U.S. commitment to help make the peace, once obtained, "a 
dynamic peace, a peace of constructive benefit, not only to the 
people of Vietnam, North and South, but to Southeast Asia as a 
whole." Congressman Zablocki asserted that the "principal object" 
of the speech had been insufficiently recognized: "That is the bold 
move to stabilize Southeast Asia and assist the peaceful progre— - of 
the people in that area through a multi-national program of economic 
assistance, directed by the United Nations, in which Communist 
nations would be invited to participate." Senator McGovern declared 
that peace in Asia " ... . means precisely the kind of imaginative 
effort the President proposed . . ., including regional develop- 
ment , . . and experienced assistance from the best people available 
in the field of international development." Senator Moss added that 
the speech "represents a major breakthrough in international posture." 
On the other hand, Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen ques- 
tioned the feasibility of an attempt to "buy peace with an American 
aid program," and Congressman Gerald R. Ford declared that 
. . . friendship, security, and solid international relationships cannot 
be bought with dollars." 74 

Despite forebodings, Congress supported the proposal advanced in 
the Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, 1965. When the President in a 

B Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
n H>id., p. 26. 
7 « ibid., pp. 4-5. 


special message of June 1, 1965, asked for a supplemental $89 million 
in foreign aid funds for the Mekong River Basin project, Congress 
acted promptly to grant the request. On March 16, 1966, it authorized 
a $200 million subscription to the capital of the new Asian Develop- 
ment Bank. 75 Had the President's initiative succeeded in hastening 
an end to the war, there is little doubt that Congress would have 
given strong support to a postwar reconstruction program in South- 
east Asia with the Mekong project as a major feature. 


President Johnson's initiative ended in failure. It seems clear that 
the main reason it failed was its timing: it was too late, probably by 
several years. The North Vietnamese were dug in and were apparently 
convinced that they held the long-run advantage. There is evidence, 
however, that the proposal was taken seriously at the time, even in 
North Vietnam, and that it had considerable influence on long-range 
thinking about regional development. Presidential emissary Eugene R. 
Black has commented as follows on the political impact of the speech 
in Southeast Asia: 

. . . there is little doubt in my mind that the political impact of President 
Johnson's offer of large-scale post-war assistance to South Asia was substantial. I 
say Southeast Asia rather than the "Riparian States" because the offer of assist- 
ance was not confined to them. I believe the President intended and I acted as 
though Southeast Asia covered the five Mekong countries — Thailand, Cambodia, 
Laos and both Vietnams— and Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines. And I considered the $1 billion offer to be more symbolic than mathe- 
matically precise. My visits and contacts included all of these countries except 
North Vietnam. Both an immediate and shortrange political impact of our offer 
was its positive role as a catalyst in stimulating the interest in and moves toward 
regional cooperation. While nationalism is, of course, the dominant political 
force in the region, this is now tempered by a fairly widely accepted view that 
the states of Southeast Asia have a common interest in working together for 
political, economic and even cultural reasons. Many of the regional organizations 
and groupings in Southeast Asia owe their origin cr vitality to the boost for 
regional cooperation given by the United States in the period 1965-69. Best 
known is the formation in late 1965 of the Asian Development Bank. 76 

Less recognized but no less real, Black continued, was ''the large 
increase in interregional personal contacts which occurred in South- 
east Asia over these years at various levels and in various forums": 

I have in mind such developments as the initiation of plans for a regionwide 
study of transportation infrastructure (the study was completed in 1971 with 
help of the ADB) ; the coming together of ministers of education of the region to 
plan development of training institutions of regional significance and the mush- 
rooming of specialized regional groups to consider one topic or another of economic, 
social or political significance. As for the Mekong "Riparian States," they have 
participated in most of this regionwide activity plus, of course, made progress in 
further developing plans for harnessing the resources from the river itseh. The 
Johns Hopkins speech and the stepped-up interest in the development potential of 
the Mekong which it generated certainly had a healthy political impact in the non- 
Communist Riparian States by focusing attention on the future. I know this 

» Eugene R. Black, former— 1949-62— president of the World Bank and in 1965 a special emissary of Presi- 
dent Johnson in connection with the Mekong project, commented in his response of March 14, 1972, to some 
questions by the author of the Mekong project study that while the idea for the Asian Development Bank 
"had been around for several years and ECAFE circles favored it, its formation in 1965 resulted directly 
from President Johnson's April 7 general offer to Southeast Asia and his July offer to propose the United 
States join such a hank, if formed, which I was able to convey to a special meeting of Asian bankers in Bang- 
kok." [See Appendix to The Mekong Project, p. 69.] 

76 Appendix to The Mekong Project, p. 69. 


from my four trips to the area for President Johnson and subsequent visits. While 
I did not visit North Vietnam, I understand from C. L. Sulzberger's trip to Hanoi 
and other accounts that some political figures there were quite interested in the 
possibility of sharing in the proposed major development effort. At the same time 
it was as unrealistic in 1 965 as it is today [March 1972] to believe that leaders in 
North Vietnam [bent] on conquest of the South would abandon their goals simply 
in response to offers of aid. 77 


Study of the Mekong project as a particular undertaking, a model 
venture in regionalism, and as the subject of a major wartime political 
initiative affords a number of significant insights. 

One is that "as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of co- 
operation in a regional development scheme does not present a con- 
vincing opportunity." 7S Or, to put it in more specific terms, "The 
response of the Hanoi authorities . . . appears to have demon- 
strated . . . that 'dollar diplomacy' does not convince an adversary 
as long as there is any reasonable prospect that he can outlast the 
United States without some form of capitulation." 79 


Another is that a regional enterprise which is essentially apolitical 
and at the same time promises tangible economic benefits throughout 
the region may develop a momentum powerful enough to keep it going 
despite traditional animosities between groups within the region, and 
even under complex conditions of war. "Perhaps the most notable 
events to be chronicled about the Mekong scheme from its inception 
to early 1965, a period of more than a decade, were the events that did 
not happen": 

The rather improvised Coordination Committee was able to maintain coherence 
and control, as well as forward movement. The four Riparian States, despite 
several serious diplomatic contretemps, continued their active participation and 
cooperation in the committee. Communist factions in all four states did not 
impede the field studies or construction, and a minimum of guerrilla incidents 
were reported, even as the conflict in Vietnam worsened. 80 

Underpinning this phenomenon is a range of attractive character- 
istics shared by development enterprises which involve multinational 
regions and multilateral relationships: 

Emphasis is on local participation in development and planning; 

Subregions in greatest need and offering greatest opportunity for advancement 
tend to receive priority by local consent; 

Nationalistic preoccupations appear to be moderated; 

Self-help is encouraged and stimulated by being made more effective in com- 
bined actions with mutual support; 

National sensitivities that bilateral aid would exacerbate are less abraded by 
multinational arrangements; 

Regional cohesiveness — the tendency for people of different countries working 
together on a shared problem to lay aside their national differences — can result 
from attention to geographic regional goals rather than formal national boundaries; 

Burdens of foreign aid tend to be more widely distributed; and 

The process of applying technological means to social and economic objectives 
can be made coherent and understandable to those who expect to enjoy the 
benefits. 81 

" Ibid. 

■ The Mekong Project, p. 66. 
79 Ibid., p. 60. 
M Ibid., p. 30. 
" Ibid., p. 67. 



But the binding force which may be the indispensable condition of 
the success of a regional enterprise is not man-made; it is the unity 
supplied by nature, a matter of geography: 

The ramifications of the Mekong project are beginning to appear almost limit- 
less — encompassing river navigation and channel marking; flood warning and 
control; weather stations; hydroelectric power production-distribution-use; 
irrigation; mineral resource exploitation; primary manufacturing; fertilizer 
production and use; power market surveys; agricultural experiment and demon- 
stration; public health, education, and training; bridges; roads; resettlement 
problems; and even archeological considerations. Were it not for the coherence 
inherent in the plan for a river basin in its entirety, the diffusion of effort would 
almost certainly be unmanageable. 82 

Regionalism — or more precisely, regional development — introduces 
the idea of a system within which technology is applied more co- 
herently to a geographic unit than to a political unit. The technological 
system requires, first of all, an intensive application of science: 

The scientific base of a regional development scheme, of which the Mekong 
Lower Basin project is here the prototype, involves an enormous range of research 
disciplines: meteorology, soil chemistry, biomedicine, forestry, plant genetics, 
sociology, anthropology, marine biology, entomology, and geology, to mention 
only a few. The technology and engineering base of such a regional development 
scheme is similarly broad. It encompasses hydraulics, electric power, flood con- 
trol, electronic communications, computer modeling, electrical industries, large 
demonstration farms, highway and bridge construction, fish and agricultural food 
processing, and many more fields of technological applications. 83 


One of the advantages of the multinational and multilateral regional 
approach is that it provides better guarantees than a unilateral or 
bilateral approach is likely to do that the social and environmental 
impacts of development will be fairly addressed and effectively dealt 
with. The long-range gains of this approach in assuring the purposeful- 
ness and benefits, in human and environmental terms, of a develop- 
ment enterprise, and also the stability of the enterprise, may greatly 
outweigh the short-term costs in inconvenience and (as the principal 
donor nations might see it) lack of control. Patience is required, among 
other things : 

What makes plausible the management of so large a program (as the Mekong 
project) with so miscellaneous an array of resources and authorities is that the 
project has shown an adaptive capability for 15 years, has not committed itself 
to an unmanageably large effort, has concentrated on laying a solid data base for 
each effort, and appears willing to accept a deliberate pace for the future. 84 

The question of adverse ecological consequences received little 
attention during the first decade of planning and development in the 
Lower Mekong Basin. Then rising anxieties in the United States over 
environmental consequences of applied technology spilled over into the 
Mekong project and compelled similar consideration of consequences 
for the inhabitants of the Mekong Basin. For example, the report of a 
field study of the Pa Mong Dam, financed by U.S. AID, predicted ex- 
tensive disadvantages along with the benefits of the dam: bilharzia 
and malaria from the penned-up slack water, the negative conse- 
quences of heavy but seemingly necessary reliance on chemical 

82 Ibid., p. 54. 

83 Ibid., p. 1. 
s* Ibid., p. 17. 


pesticides, resettlement of hundreds of thousands of families from the 
reservoir area, need for large amounts of chemical fertilizer as farmers 
wore displaced from fertile floor plains to less fertile uplands, flooding of 
prime timberlands, and diminished fish population. Nevertheless, as 
Claire Sterling put it in a series of newspaper articles on the Mekong 
project in 1971: "For once, developers and planners are giving some 
study to this sort of thing before the event." 85 

In general, observes the author of the present study, the policies 
of the Coordination Committee and its staff have appeared to be 
progressively more adaptive to both the sociological and the environ- 
mental impacts of the Mekong project. Mohamed Shoaib, a World 
Bank official, has summed up the adaptive process as one involving 
(a) deliberateness and incrementalism, (b) increasing pragmatism — 
learning by doing, and (c) attention to the problems created by 
intervening in depth in the subtle equilibria of established eco- 
systems. Shoaib observes that it can always be shown that the effects 
of any development will be in part adverse, but that the consequences 
of economic stagnation too are demonstrably adverse. He calls for a 
meaningful balance between the urgency of development and the 
demands for conservation . . . through a timely interdisciplinary 
approach to development planning. 86 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

Three and one-half years after the study was completed in the late 
spring of 1972, the author of The Mekong Project: Opportunities and 
Problems of Regionalism sees it in the following light : 


The theme of this study is that a regional approach to develop- 
ment affords a focus for peaceful economic progress, serves as an 
educational process, and establishes a base for wider cooperation 
among participating nations. It offers a possibility for realignment of 
nations and international structures toward diplomatic goals: regional 
stability, international cooperation, tension reduction, a peaceful 
alternative to insurgency, and bridges across ideological and ethnic 
differences. The study does not assert that these are certain con- 
sequences of the regional approach, but suggests that the approach 
warrants further study as a possible way to improve the world system 
to exploit economic and technological resources in a more balanced 
and rational manner. 

The Mekong project was a natural outcome of the application of 
U.N. values and purposes in Southeast Asia. The effort to expand it 
greatly as a means of damping a nationalistic and ideological conflict 
in Vietnam failed. However, the project itself showed remarkable 
durability, even under the stress of conflict and insurgency in the 
region. A possible lesson is that a constructive regional approach can 
help to evolve conditions and relationships favorable to international 
cooperation, but it is not a useful instrument for damping conflict 
already in progress. 

With the withdrawal of the U.S. presence in Laos, Cambodia, and 
South Vietnam, a complete takeover of governmental authority by 

ss Ibid., p. 55. 
« Ibid., p. 56. 


Communist-oriented groups followed. The most recent meeting of 
the representatives of the four Riparian States in the Coordinating 
Committee was in March 1975. A meeting scheduled for October, 
to be held in Vientiane, Laos, was postponed because of silence on the 
part of the Cambodian delegation; the other three were prepared to 
meet and apparently expect the work to continue. The executive 
director of the Coordinating Committee staff, W. J. van der Oord, 
was recently quoted in an interview in Bangkok as expecting the 
contributions for the next year's program from the Riparian States 
to be increased from $30 million to $50 million. U.S. participation is 
currently (December 1975) limited to contractor operations in Thai- 
land. While there is uncertainty as to the future of the project, and 
as to whether it will maintain its previous practices of coordination 
and multilateral consultation, the remarkable fact is that the project 
is still alive with a chance to grow. 87 

The study traced the change in emphasis of the Mekong project 
from large civil works and capital-intensive development to socio- 
economic programs appropriate to the local culture. Concurrently, 
an increased concern is evident for the environmental consequences — 
principally adverse consequences — of large public works. Taken 
together these two trends accentuate the human importance of 
technological impacts. An understanding of the cultures and economic 
systems of parts of a region undergoing development planning is now 
perceived as of foremost importance. The implication of these cir- 
cumstances is that development under local leadership, with local 
participation, may yield slower and less substantial physical results 
but may tend to create institutions and social organization that are 
more stable and compatible with local culture and social forces. The 
study gave some, but perhaps not enough, attention to this require- 
ment. Moreover, the role of regional development as a vehicle for 
cooperation, tension reduction, and social integration seems to be 
furthered by this shift of emphasis. 


Among the conclusions and observations suggested by the study are 
these : 

— Habits of cooperative relationship may be more important 
than formal organization in the mounting of a complex inter- 
national development. 

— A regional development program must harmonize differing 
national objectives rather than overriding them. In particular, 
a regional program cannot win acceptance if it aims explicitly 
to diminish nationalistic aspirations and contravene national- 
istic values. 

— The logical appeal of large civil works that enrich the 
energy, transportation, and resource development of a region, 
whilereducing flood hazards, provides a powerful motivation for 
cooperative effort. It also justifies large capital investment. The 
risks of such large civil works are less obvious, but still real. 
There is a tendency for local leadership to concentrate on the 
gains and ignore the risks. However, unless gains are balanced 

« : Source: U.S. Department of State. 


against risks, the Long-range consequences — both regional and 
diplomatic — may be unfavorable. 

— Political acceptability of a multination regional development 
project requires that benefits be evident to all participants, and 
that costs and benefits to each nation be in reasonable balance. 

A large multination project can attract contributions from many 
nations outside the region; these can aggregate to an impressive 
total investment even though no one contribution is much of a 
burden to the donor. 

— An important benefit of a large project in a developing region 
is the necessary education and training of local participants, and 
the experience gained in local leadership and planning. 

— The subject of regional application of technology for social 
purposes contains many of the elements that make the interaction 
of science and technology with diplomacy important politically. In 
addition to the potential contributions of the subject to diplomatic 
goals, it challenges the ability of the executive and legislative 
branches to exploit opportunities that may require years of 

— When the President presents the Congress with a specific 
regional program, with the costs and benefits adequately defined, 
the Congress tends to respond favorably and promptly. 

— The combining of U.S. interests in international regional 
development as an approach to national security and as an ap- 
proach to economic advancement tends to detract from the effec- 
tiveness of such development for either purpose. A "low profile" 
of external supporting nations tends to yield most fruitful results. 

— For a variety of reasons attention to international regional 
development by the Congress has diminished. Domestic economic 
concerns have attracted attention away from foreign develop- 
ment. Tensions in the Middle East have replaced Southeast Asian 
troubles as the focus of effort in conflict reduction. Confidence in 
the practical utility of social science for public policy has been 
shaken. Finally, there is a tendency for the Congress to give 
principal attention to short-term problems, at the expense of 
longer-range considerations — especially when the opportunities of 
diplomatic gain offered by the latter are at a low confidence level. 

— To conclude with a quotation from the study itself: "It is 
sheer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development 
of the Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus 
for peaceful economic progress, served as an educational process, 
and established a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted 
region. However, the question seems legitimate as to whether 
the consequences of a slowly and deliberately encouraged regional 
development — region by region — in lagging parts of the world 
might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run." 8S 

Some Illustrative Questions 

What U.S. institution might best take the lead in planning for the 
application of regional development principles to advance U.S. diplo- 
matic objectives? 

Might the role of U.N. agencies be usefully expanded for this 

n Ibid., p. 67. 


Would the International Institute for Applied S3'stems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Vienna, Austria, be a possible locus for international plan- 
ning of multination regional development? 

What regions of the world offer the best opportunities for technical 
development, and which of these might yield the greatest diplomatic 
benefits — e.g., the Middle East, the Sahel, the Amazon Basin, the 
Iberian Peninsula, etc.? 

In December 1973 Congressman Clement J. Zablocki spoke on the 
House floor in support of the formation of a Mideast Regional De- 
velopment Bank. Such a Bank, Mr. Zablocki asserted, would "repre- 
sent a positive, reasonable, and promising approach to promoting 
the social and economic development of the entire area, thereby 
creating a climate for true and lasting peace." 89 Is there still merit 
in this proposal as a practical possibility, considering present economic 
conditions in the Middle East and the world at large which reflect 
recent Arab oil price manipulations and revenue accumulations? 
Could it perhaps put some of the new oil wealth to work in ways 
beneficial to the entire Middle Eastern region? 

What constructive roles might be played b}^ multinational corpora- 
tions in supporting multinational regional development projects? 

What geographic features other than river basins might supply the 
central coherence for regional development? 

Does the Tennessee Vallej^ Authorit}^ offer any useful lessons, that 
is, in the relationships among States in the TVA area, on how best 
to exploit the diplomatic advantages of regional development? 

Could TVA personnel serve usefully in educating local leadership 
in developing countries in the principles and methods of regional 

What interactions would be valuable and should be provided 
between subnational and supranational regional institutions and 
activities? What kinds of clearinghouses are needed for the sharing 
of basic data in this field? 

A stronger role is required of political and social scientists in the 
field of regional development; how is it to be defined and given scope? 

How can political and social scientists best go about structuring an 
approach to defining the normative objectives of a region, as a frame- 
work within which economic objectives would be determined — and 
do so in a manner acceptable to the various political leadership 
elements involved? 

Apart from economic factors, are there generalizations about 
regionalism — having to do, for instance, with social patterns reflecting 
adaptation to geographical environment — that need to be incorporated 
into the body of thought and planning doctrine on regionalism? 

An invention is needed that can do for regional programs what the 
systems approach has done for missile and space systems development. 
The thrust of systems development is that all values must be quanti- 
tatively defined and subjected to cost-effectiveness analysis. What is 
the normative counterpart? 

A critical factor to be dealt with in multination regional under- 
takings is the social tensions set up b}' bringing representatives of 
different cultures — however similar — together in working relation- 
ships. What standards and methods can be devised for measuring 

89 Congressional Record, December 11, 1073, H110V6. 


levels of intensity of those social tensions? How can changes in these 
levels (a) be brought about, and (b) measured? To what extent is it 
feasible to attempt to ascertain the ideal level of tension — that which 
would result in the best blend of harmony and accomplishment — for 
an}' given regional enterprise? 


Statement of the Case 

The matter of who owns the ocean floor came into prominence as 
a consequence of technology. Historically, title seabed was an inter- 
national commons of negligible utility. International law afforded no 
substantial provision for its governance or possession because there 
was no need for it. Man's invasion of the ocean deeps came gradually, 
beginning with exploration by deep-submergence vehicles, mapping 
expeditions using the military technology of ultrasonics, systematic 
collection of samples from the ocean floor, and ultimately core drilling 
of the seabed at progressively deeper submergences. Offshore drilling 
for oil by the United States, begun during World War II, led to the 
evolution of a large and complex technology that extended from its 
early application in the Gulf of Mexico to Asiatic waters, and most 
recently to the North Sea. Early discovery of manganese nodules, 
occurring in great profusion on the deep ocean floor, received little 
notice until world consumption of such materials as copper, nickel, 
cobalt, as well as manganese, contained in these nodules began to 
press on world capacity to extract them from sources on the continents. 
As the winning of these resources, as well as petroleum, from the 
seabed neared practicality, the question of who owns the ocean floor 
came to international attention. 

Importance of the Case 

Questions of national sovereignty traditionally rank high among 
the concerns of nations. Determination of seaward jurisdiction of 
coastal States remains an unresolved question with proponents of 
different interests adducing conflicting principles: major maritime 
powers seeking boundaries close in, some smaller states reaching 
out as far as possible, and some states pursuing a mixed strategy 
based on the principle of submarine geography. 

The potential for conflict is inherent in a resource-rich region over 
which no authority of law extends. As on land, the riches of the seabed 
are unevenly distributed and the right of first capture can always be 
challenged by a stronger power. States lacking the technological means 
of exploiting the regime adopt the position that they should be able to 
share the harvest of seabed wealth from the international commons. 
Landlocked states contend that the accident of geography should not 
deprive them of a share in the new source of mineral wealth. Poor 
and less developed states base their claims for some preference in the 
matter on the fact of their relatively greater need. 

The technology of extracting petroleum from the ocean floor is 
already being applied, with ever-increasing expertise. In the face of 
the energy crisis growing out of the OPEC oil embargo and price 
increases, seabed petroleum operations are growing in importance. 

80 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, in the 
series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee oh National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments by George A. Doumani, Science Policy Research Division, Congres- 
sional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1971, 86 p. 


As a practical matter, the resolution of the seabed issue in oil-rich 
areas is an early necessity. 

Although the recovery of solid minerals from the deep ocean floor 
is less immediately in prospect, there is little question that the tech- 
nology will eventually be perfected. The resources sought are enormous 
in their occurrence; indeed, it is estimated that they are accumulating 
by natural processes more rapidly than they could ever be mined. As 
a matter of quantitative perspective, it is reported that mankind will 
never be able to use as much magnesium metal as is contained in a 
single cubic mile of seawater. On the problem of resolving the rights 
of capture of these solid minerals, the diplomats of the world have 
some indeterminate period of advance warning before the issue re- 
quires operational solution. However, if the solution is not reached 
before it is needed, the prospect is that the technologj 7 of ocean mining 
will be put to use regardless, leading to many foreseeable (and doubt- 
less some unforeseeable) international complications. 

How the Case Developed 

The study by George A. Doumani approaches the seabed case from 
two perspectives: the technological and the diplomatic. The focus of 
the case, however, is political. As the author notes, "It is conceded 
that development will be confined, for some time to come, to the 
Continental Shelf areas, and that progress into the deep sea is not 

However [Doumani continues], the confusion created by the Geneva Conven- 
tions, particularly the exploitability clause, invites review; definitive political 
boundaries are needed for the seaward limit of national jurisdictions. Beyond 
this limit, the deep sea areas would then be confirmed as the common domain 
of the community of nations. Whatever regime is suggested for this international 
deep sea domain is subject to legal considerations and international approval, 
but the issue is not as urgent as is the delineation of national jurisdictions at this 
time. 91 

After presenting in some detail the technological state of the art in 
exploiting seabed resources, the author recounts the political and 
diplomatic institutions that were endeavoring to deal with these "inter- 
national legal considerations." A specific proposition was advanced, 
August 17, 1967, by the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United 
Nations that called, among other things, for the reservation of the 
seabed (outside of the limits of present national jurisdictions) from 
appropriation by nations, and the use of its resources primarily to 
promote the development of poor countries. In response, a U.X. ad 
hoc committee was formed to study the Malta proposal. Its report, 
in February. 1968, was referred to a U.N. standing committee in- 
structed to continue the work of developing a rationale for legal 
control of the seabed. As Doumani was completing his report, the 
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction — and especially its 
legal subcommittee — was engaged in an extensive series of studies in 
preparation for a "Law of the Sea Conference." 

The first tangible result of the U.N. effort was the signing, Febru- 
ary 12, 1971, of a "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of 
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Seabed and Ocean Floor and Subsoil Thereof." As the report went 

« Doumani: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, p. 46. 


to press the treaty was awaiting approval by the U.S. Senate of its 
ratification. (The treaty was subsequently ratified.) 

U.S. Involvement in the Case 

The Doumani analysis included a statement of the problem, a 
description of the U.S. and U.N. institutions created to deal with it, 
an account of problems up to July 1971, and an assessment of pros- 
pects for resolution of the problem thereafter. 

Thus, in June 1966 the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- 
ment Act, Public Law 89-454, was passed by the Cdngress. It es- 
tablished ". . . policies and objectives for the U.S. effort to develop 
the Nation's marine resources" and ". . . for the establishment of 
a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- 
ment. . . ." that ". . . represented a wide-ranging mandate over the 
total national program in oceanography." 92 This Council was to make 
a comprehensive investigation and study of all aspects of marine 
science in order to recommend an overall plan for an adequate national 
oceanographic program that will meet the present and future national 
needs. One panel of the Marine Council was the Committee on Inter- 
national Policy in the Marine Environment. Another action by the 
Council was to recommend creation of an operating agency in the 
field. The policy committee lapsed in 1971, and was replaced by an 
Interagency Law-of-the-Sea Task Force, under the chairmanship of 
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. The agency, as created 
by the Congress in October 1970, took the form of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NO A A). 93 

A U.S. policy was proposed May 23, 1970, by President Nixon, 
who called for two types of "international machinery": 

First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the international com- 
munity in an international trusteeship zone consisting of the continental margins 
beyond a depth of 200 meters off their coasts. In return, each coastal State would 
receive a share of the international revenues from the zone in which it acts as 
trustee and could impose additional taxes if these were deemed desirable. 

As a second step, agreed international machinery would authorize and regulate 
exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins. 94 

As the study concluded, it was "too early to predict what success 
the U.S. proposal will achieve". It was likely to encounter opposition 
not only abroad but at home as well. Moreover, the proposal left 
untouched the thorny question of where the seabed began and the 
coastal shelf terminated. The U.S. position favored a 12-mile limit. 
Latin American nations clung to their 200-mile limits. Agreement 
would not come easy. 

Role of Congress 

Numerous committees and subcommittees of the Congress had 
interested themselves in the seabed problem. 95 An early congressional 
action was the creation of the Marine Council. Following the Malta 
proposal to the United Nations, 

About 3 dozen resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate, 
mostly in opposition to vesting control over the deep ocean resources in the 
United Nations. House resolutions were for the most part identical, expressing 

" Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
•» Ibid., p. 80. 

m Ibid., p. 72. 

»s These are enumerated on p. 58 of the study. 


the sense of Congress that any action at that time to vest control of deep ocean 
resources in an international body was hasty and ill advised . . . , 96 

In hearings before several congressional committees, witnesses 
favoring the principle of the Malta Proposal cited as among its 
advantages the following: 

. . . regulation of the depletion of mineral resources, avoidance of an anarchic 
rush to claim and exploit subsea resources, reduced danger of marine pollu- 
tion . . ., reduced threat of a military race to exploit strategic advantages of 
submarine weapons placement, provision of an independent income for the United 
Nations, and a general strengthening and maturity in the U.N. itself, through the 
experience of administering the vast area of the ocean floor. 97 

Objections to any U.N. action "stemmed primarily from fears that 
the United States might be giving away some valuable assets and 
rights the extent of which were not yet known". The qualifications of 
the United Nations to accept the responsibility were questioned. 
Scientific exploration might be hampered by a premature definition of 
political jurisdiction. National security interests might be compro- 

An executive branch proposal, August 3, 1970, became the focus of 
a series of hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Ocean Space chaired by Senator Claiborne Pell. 
Hearings on the proposal were also held by the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, through its Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic 
Lands Policy, chaired by Senator Ernest F. Holdings, and before a 
Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, chaired by Senator 
Lee Metcalf. These sought answers to such questions as: 
— What were the limits of the Continental Shelf? 
— Should the limit be geological or legal? 

— Should it be based on considerations of equity, security, or 
economic advantage? 

— How much did the United States stand to lose by the creation 
of an international regime? 

— Was a new Law of the Sea Conference necessary? 
— Should the States have a narrow or wide Continental Shelf? 
— For areas be}-ond the Continental Shelf, what sort of an 
international regime would be best'? 

— What kind of international machinery should be established? 

— How did all these aspects affect the economy and national 

security of the United States? 

The hearings made evident that two differing sets of policies were 

taking shape, one favoring substantial transfer of jurisdiction beyond 

a narrow Continental Shelf to an international body and the other 

urging extension of the Continental Shelf to the limit of exploitability. 


The case was unresolved by the time the Doumani report went to 
press. In fact, it continues unresolved in early 1976. more than 4 years 
thereafter. As an interim measure, a policy was proposed by the 
United States to the United Nations that "all nations join the United 
States to insure that all permits for exploration and exploitation of 
the seabed beyond the 200-meter limit be issued subject to an inter- 
national authoritv". 98 

« Ibid., p. 61. 
•' Ibid., p. 62. 

Writing in 1971, Doumani concluded his study with the observation 
that evolution of U.S. seabed policy "had been relatively >low". 

Undoubtedly the marine scientists and technologists would have preferred a 
brisker pace than the diplomats were prepared to take. For its part, the Congress 
ins ready to move faster than was the Department of State, although in what 
direction is still not evident." 


The United States and the other interested countries of the world 
have long had the opportunity to resolve the question of who owns 
the seabed before the beginning of a rush of entrepreneurs to exploit 
tiie seabed mineral wealth, using technology certain to be perfected 
sooner or later. The problem is not a technological one, although it is 
created by technology and without the prospect of a technological 
opportunity the problem would be a trivial one. Only when the 
technology is perfected to enable profitable exploitation of seabed 
resources will the problem require urgent solution. 

The advantage of advance resolution of the problem is evident. 
One can imagine the chaos of an international gold rush into a territory 
without law or property rights. The prospect of anarchy in a difficult 
and perilous environment, with many claimants and costly equipment, 
is disturbing to contemplate. For the United States to assert a policy 
of "right of capture," based on this country's technological superi- 
ority, affords no answer if the right should be challenged by another 
nation using officially sanctioned force based on territorial claims. 
Either the seas will be apportioned among national sovereignties, 
perhaps by force, or some device for shared sovereignty in the hands 
of a jointly established regulatory body must be created to regulate 
the international commons. One way or the other, an agreed decision 
must be made among nations as to jurisdiction over every part of the 
ocean floor. Sovereignty, like nature, abhors a vacuum. 

In 1971 the U.S. Department of State had not formulated any 
clear policy on how to resolve the dilemma. The Congress was divided 
between a national and an international solution. There was un- 
certainty over the competence and even the political stability of the 
United Nations. The problem of extent of seaward boundaries re- 
mained unresolved. There were emerging differences in goals between 
the developed and the developing nations. And uncertainty over the 
timing of technological advance permitted the problem to linger in 
controversy until technology itself would eventually compel a crash 
solution under crisis conditions. It is interesting to note that in this 
case the essential facts of the situation are not in question; the case 
is political and diplomatic rather than technological, even though it is 
technology that makes it important. 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

The study defined the legal and physical boundaries of the seabed 
and presented an inventory of its resources. The value of these re- 
sources was then related to economics and the present and future 
technological capabilities for exploring and exploiting them. The 
study discussed potential technological breakthroughs, particularly 
in the areas of offshore oil and hard minerals on the ocean floor. 

» Ibid., p. : 


Political aspects were also considered, with particular attention to 
the U.S. policymaking apparatus. From the national scene, the 
study moved into the international arena and concentrated on the 
concern of the whole world over ocean space. It also explored the 
effect of science and technology in shaping national and international 
policies, as well as the effects of man's activities on the environment. 

Underlying these various discussions was a call for a new sense of 
world community and a new breed of scientist-diplomat to meet the 
pressing need for fair and proper conduct in the international diplo- 
matic process. 

These themes are as relevant today as they were when the study 
was written. The study stopped chronological]}' at the time when 
the world community of nations was preparing for the Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. Thus it served as a reference tool for those in- 
tending to participate in the Conference. The first session of the U.S 
Law of the Sea Conference was held in 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela, but 
no final agreement was reached. 

If the study were to be altered, alteration would be in the form of 
updating the chronology of events rather than alteration in the scope 
of the study. However, since the problems of the seabed have not yet 
been resolved, any alteration to the study at this time would be pre- 
mature. The subject remains relevant to congressional concerns, and 
both Houses have been active in related legislation since the publica- 
tion of the study. As far as the project series is concerned, the study is 
much more relevant today than when it was written. This relevance is 
particularly evident in the executive branch, where the State Depart- 
ment, pursuant to statute, has created the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, headed by an 
Assistant Secretary of State. 

Throughout the text the study showed the interaction of science and 
technological development with the diplomatic process and with the 
process of decisionmaking on the national level toward exploring and 
exploiting the seabed resources. The conclusions reached can be main- 
tained with the same emphasis today. 

Legislative action was initiated or completed in some areas directly 
related to the contents of the study, such as the bills introduced in 
the 92d and 93d Congresses for the exploitation of hard minerals on 
the ocean floor, the resolutions in both Houses regarding the Law of 
the Sea Conference, and the measure introduced in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee for the creation of the above-mentioned bureau 
in the Department of State. 

The significance of the issues raised by this study has not been 
difficult to communicate to the Congress and the American people. 
The subject has been the focus of attention throughout the world 
since 1967, and recognition of its significance has been spreading into 
a wide spectrum of the academic, industrial, economic, and political 
sectors of the Nation. This significance is also reflected in govern- 
mental reorganization in both the legislative and executive branches, 
particularly in the former where several committees and subcommit- 


|te8 have established jurisdiction over ocean matters/ 00 The Senate 
Commerce Committee also initiated the National Ocean Policy Study 
in L974, aimed at focusing Federal attention on, and national recogni- 
tion of, the issues of offshore resources. 

In evaluating the study and its effects, it can summarily be said 
that the study was needed, was timely, and will remain a useful 
reference for the period ending with the Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. It has been useful to Congress in particular, and has had 
Wide use by many different people, governments, and organizations. 


Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a speech given on Align-* 1 1 , 
1975, before the American Bar Association annual convention ad- 
vanced the following set of proposals for seabed policy: 

— An international organization should be created to set rules 
for deep seabed mining. 

— This international organization must preserve the right- of 
all countries and their citizens directly to exploit deep seabed 

— It should also insure fair adjudication of conflicting interests 
and security of investment. 

— Countries and their enterprise- mining deep seabed resources 
should pay an agreed portion of their revenues to the interna- 
tional organization, to be used for the benefit of developing 

— The management of the organization and its voting proce- 
dures must reflect and balance the interests of the participating 
>tates. The organization should not have the power to control 
prices or production rates. 

— If these essent'al U.S. interests are guaranteed, we can agree 
that this organization will also have the right to conduct mining 
operations on behalf of the international community primarily 
for the benefit of developing countries. 

— The new organization should serve as a vehicle for coopera- 
tion between the technologically advanced and the developing 
countries. The United State- is prepared to explore ways of 
sharing deep seabed technology %ith other nations. 

— A balanced commission of consumers, seabed producers, and 
land-based producers could monitor the possible adverse effects 
of deep seabed mining on the economies of those developing 
countries which are substantially dependent on the export of 
minerals also produced from the deep seabed. 101 

100 During the 92d Congress the determination to protect U.S. investment in deep seabed mining opera- 
tions crystallized into legislative proposals. Legislation revised as a result of hearings held in H»72 and 1973 
was introduced during the 93d Congress. S. 1134, as amended, and H.R. 12233— the Deep Seabed Hard 
Minerals Act— would require U.S. nationals to obtain a license from the Secretary of the Interior before 
engaging in the exploration and commercial recovery of manganese nodules on the deep seabed. S. 1134, as 
amended, was favorably reported to the Senate on August 21, 1974 and referred to the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on September 4, 1974. 

During the 94th Congress the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act as reported out of the Senate Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee during the 93d Congress was reintroduced as H.R. 1270/S. 713. 

101 Henry A. Kissinger. "International Law, World Order, and Human Progress." speech before the 
American Bar Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, August 11, 1975. pp. 4-5. 


At this time the Secretary also took note of several other issues that 
must be faced when the Law of the Sea Conference reconvenes in 
New York in 1976: 

Ways must be found to encourage marine scientific research for the benefit of 
all mankind while safeguarding the legitimate interests of coastal states in their 
economic zones. 

Steps must be taken to protect the oceans from pollution. We must establish 
uniform international controls on pollution from ships and insist upon universal 
respect for environmental standards for Continental Shelf and deep seabed 

Access to the sea for landlocked countries must be assured. 

There must be provisions for compulsory and impartial third-party settlement 
of disputes. The United States cannot accept unilateral interpretation of a treaty 
of such scope by individual States or by an international seabed organization. 102 

Some Illustrative Questions 

What are the implications for U.S. policy on the 1976 Law of the 
Sea Conference of the apparent deterioration of the U.N. General 
Assembly into a majority of small states and a minority of large (and 
developed) states? Does the current controversy over the Palestine 
Liberation Organization presage a substantial withdrawal of U.S. 
support for the United Nations? Is the family of U.N. -affiliated agen- 
cies jeopardized by this growing impasse? 

What is the likely timing of technological exploitation of seabed 
minerals today, and what are the implications of this timing for the 
urgency of reaching a resolution of the seabed problem in the 1976 

What factors and trends in the world diplomatic situation have 
tended to obstruct the reaching of agreement on a Law of the Sea, and 
what other emerging diplomatic/technological problems might also be 
obstructed by these factors and trends? What constructive measures 
might be taken by the United States to reverse them? 

Might U.S. technological capabilities provide a leverage to promote 
international agreement in the seabed problem? 

Are there other U.S. -developed technologies having broad geo- 
graphic implications that could provide leverage to promote agree- 
ment on a Law of the Sea? 

Would a regional approach — one which took account of the needs of 
landlocked countries — be useful in working out a system of benefits 
from exploitation of seabed resources? 


Statement of the Case 

"The establishment of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Com- 
mission at the May 1972 Summit Conference and the signing of a 
comprehensive set of trading agreements on October 18, 1972, opened a 
promising new period of economic relations between the two nations." 
(p. 1) It initiated what Secretary of State Kissinger called the process 
of creating a " vested interest in mutual restraint". Although the scope 

no Ibid., p. 5. 

»<" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay 
of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy, in the series, Science, Technology, and American Diplo- 
macy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by John P. 
Hardt and George D. Holliday, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1973, 105 p. (Com- 
mittee print.) 

Throughout this commentary all citations are from this source. Page numbers are given in the text immedi- 
ately after the citation. 


of the agreements is limited to economics, trade, and technology trans- 
fer, its political significance is judged by U.S. leaders to be high; costs 
and benefits of both the economic and political consequences need to 
be assessed. The Hardt-IIolliday study Bought to provide a pre- 
liminary assessment, and in particular to identify the imponderable 
questions that need to be monitored in the future as the process of 
building the relationship unfolds. 

Importance of the Case 

Any bilateral undertaking or transaction involving the United 
States and the Soviet Union is of inherent importance to the extent 
that it reflects change in the relationship of the two superpowers. 
This relationship between two nations which are joint custodians 
of ultimate military power can determine the well-being of the rest of 
the world, as well as their own. Any agreement that promote- accom- 
modation or reduces ten-ion, that promotes peaceful dealings or 
reduces competition in military technology, has importance for 
world peace and security and accordingly for the security of the United 
States, which is the Nation's ultimate diplomatic goal. Trade, accord- 
ing to the hypothesis favoring the 1972 detente, influences internal 
policy as well as external dealings of nations; and. "in the long run, 
selected trade, intelligently negotiated and wisely administered, may 
turn out to have been one of our most powerful tools of national 
policy", (p. 7) 

The importance for the United States of the series of 1972 trade 
agreements is only moderately in the field of economics. U.S. exports 
are limited by Soviet willingness to accept trade deficits, U.S. willing- 
ness to extend trade credits, and U.S. acceptance of Soviet exports. 
Totals allowed by these constraints on Soviet dollar earnings and 
credit are not impressive. 

However, the policy implications of Soviet adjustment to the 
changed U.S. -Soviet trade relationship are seen to be of potentially 
high importance. They affect such factors as the military arms race, 
Soviet allocation of resources as between military weapons develop- 
ment and civil goods production, long-term trade commitments, and 
long-term commitments to technological development programs 
incompatible with a vigorous military posture. 

It would seem beneficial to U.S. diplomatic goals that Soviet 
interest in improved economic relations with the United States should 
be expressed in terms of a reordering of Soviet priorities favoring 
"technological change and improvement in the availability of desirable 
consumer goods to the Soviet workers and peasants", (p. 75) It does 
not appear likely that the Soviets can pursue vigorously both the 
arms race and expanded productivity to sustain exports and pay for 
imports in connection with programs to modernize their economy and 
to increase the availability of consumer goods. 

From the Soviet point of view, the trade pact might be expected to 
yield such selected benefits as: The closing of the technological gap 
in Soviet production of civilian goods (p. 15), expanded production 
of Soviet oil and gas based on U.S. technology (p. 16), increased 
production of nonferrous metals (p. 18), and improved quality of 
consumer goods (i.e., better diet, clothing, personal transportation, 
and housing) (p. 19). But the overall aim is to raise the level of their 
civilian economv to the technical level of the other industrial nations. 

It is also possible that the internal organization of the Soviet Union 
in response to the pressures generated by expanded trade with the 
West ma}' include such reforms as indicators of "profitability," de- 
centralized decisionmaking by enterprise managers, and wage and 
profit "incentives". Thus, "New planning techniques, a more flexible 
price svstem, and increased reliance on market forces are key aspects 
of the reforms", (p. 22) 

As the report pointed out: 

While Soviet reformers have not emphasized the international implications of the 
reforms, it is clear that a more rational economic decisionmaking structure would 
facilitate the integration of the Soviet economy into the international economic 
system. Rationalization of Soviet prices would encourage the importation of goods 
produced inefficiently by domestic industries. At the same time, by fostering effi- 
ciencv in domestic enterprises the Soviet Union may be able to expand its exports 
to Western markets. Moreover, economic reform would remove many of the 
features of Soviet central planning which inhibit Western businessmen from 
dealing with Soviet foreign trade organizations, (pp. 23-24) 

How the Case Developed 

The Hardt-Holliday study traced the uneven course of U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. trade relations from the 1920s through diplomatic relations 
and a trade agreement of 1933; at that time the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank was created to finance trade with the Soviet Union. Then, during 
World War II, U.S. military and civilian goods were delivered to 
the U.S.S.R. through the Lend-Lease Program. After 1945 efforts to 
normalize peacetime trade relations between the two countries and 
to bring the Soviets into the world economic community were largely 
abortive. There were several reasons for this failure. As the report 
observed : 

To a large extent, Soviet foreign economic policy in the late 1940s and early 
1950s was a continuation of its prewar strategy of minimizing its economic ties 
to the industrial West. During the 1930s, Soviet foreign economic relations had 
been characterized by a policy of self-sufficiency or autarky. Although the im- 
portation of high-technology products and, for a time, the services of foreign 
engineers were permitted to meet high-priority, short-run needs, minimum 
reliance on the non-Communist world economj^ was a primary indicator of 
economic success, (pp. 5-6) 

Other factors on the Soviet side were the leadership's ideological 
hostility toward the United States, unresolved questions of pre- 
1920 indebtedness of Russia to the United States, and more generally 
the suspicion of "capitalist" countries and the "Soviet predilec- 
tion for comprehensive planning and control of the domestic 
economy. . . ." 

"Cold war" attitudes began to harden soon after the close of World 
War II, with trade declining to a low point in the early 1950s. Soviet 
moves to relax from an extreme position of autarky in the late 1950s 
and the 1960s were again set back by the Cuban crisis, the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, and the Vietnam War. 

On the United States side, "The central feature of U.S. foreign trade 
policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War period was an 
attempt to deny the Soviet Union the benefits of trade with the more 
advanced industrial West." There were also allegations of unethical 
Soviet trade practices such as dumping, pirating of inventions, de- 
liberate disruption of markets, and use of slave labor. 

However, during the 1960s, several small steps were taken to expand 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade. U.S. export controls were eased and agricultural 


credits were extended. By I960, President Lyndon Johnson was 
urging increased economic exchanges to "build bridges" to East 
European countries, (pp. 6-7) 


With the advent of the Xixon Presidency, the exploration of means 
toward detente accelerated. One means of correcting recurring balance- 
of-payments deficits was expanded trade with the Communist coun- 
tries to increase exports, production, and employment. A Presidential 
Commission in 1971 proposed that: "Within the bounds set by stra- 
tegic considerations, the United States should attempt to expand its 
trade with Communist countries." Export restrictions and tariffs 
should be eased and multilateral trade arrangements explored for 
this purpose, (p. 7) 

By the close of 1971 the pace of events quickened. The Peterson 
Report in December noted that the countries of the Communist 
world were trading more extensively with the West and urged a new 
U.S. approach to Communist trade in order to improve the trade 
prospects of the United States and to open the way for Communist 
countries to join the world trading and monetary community, (p. 8) 
In November 1971 Secretary of Commerce Stans went to Moscow 
to discuss trade matters: he was followed in April 1972 by Secretary 
of Agriculture Butz. These missions encouraged expectations of a 
substantial increase in U.S. -Soviet trade. Then in May 1972 came 
the Summit Meeting at which a Joint Commercial Commission was 
created to negotiate an overall trade agreement (including reciprocal 
most-favored-nation or MFX provision), arrangements for reciprocal 
availability of credit and facilities to promote trade, and an arbitra- 
tion arrangement to resolve trade disputes. By this time also, the 
Soviet authorities appeared disposed to press for early resolution of 
the issues that had obstructed trade between the two countries. Thus: 

On July 8, 1972, an agreement was reached providing credit through the 
Commodity Credit Corporation for Soviet purchases of American grain. A mari- 
time agreement was concluded on October 14, 1972, which removed several 
barriers to commercial shipping between the two countries. On October 18, 1972, 
a commercial agreement and a settlement of the Soviet L'md-Lease debt were 
signed. The commercial agreement projected a tripling of U.S.-Soviet trade 
within a 3-year period and provided a number of regulatory measures. The 
lend-lease settlement arranged a repavment schedule for the Soviet World War II 
debt to the United States, (p. 10) 

Although the discussions of the series of agreements projected 
optimistic consequences for future trade between the two countries, 
the significant technological lag of the U.S.S.R. in other areas than 
military and space offered less reason for these expectations. Soviet 
economic relations with the West rested mainly on technology trans- 
fers to the relatively backward Soviet industries, paid for b} T exports 
of raw materials. This structure of trade was unlikely to be quickly 
altered by the new agreements. 

U.S. Involvement 

Assessment of the implications for the United States of the trade 
agreements with the Soviet Union must consider both costs and 
benefits, problems as well as opportunities, and arrangements to 
fulfill the expectations raised by the agreements. 


It is generally assumed that trade is a means of encouraging more 
amicable and stable relations among nations. U.S. interest in Soviet 
trade has tended to reach beyond this generality: 

Although somewhat inconsistent in application, a policy of reward-penalty 
appeared to be followed by the United States, apparently with three objectives: 

(1) To encourage detente by reducing weapons development, lowering 
force levels, and moderating crisis management; 

(2) To encourage detente through moderation and reform of the Soviet 
regime's domestic policies, including religious tolerance, economic reform, 
freedom of expression, and the right to emigrate; 

(3) To encourage polycentrism in the Communist world, detente in the 
foreign policies of the individual Communist countries other than the U.S.S.R., 
and moderation in their domestic policies, (p. 12) 

U.S. interest in the effects of expanded trade and detente with the 
Soviets raises ambiguities in at least four areas: As to whether the 
U.S.S.R. exerts a moderating influence on world tensions or helps 
foment dissensions; as to whether Soviet priorities need to shift to 
meeting consumer requirements or to remain fixed on strategic mili- 
tary weapons; as to whether Soviet internal controls are easing to 
encourage modernization and professionalism or tightening over civil 
liberties, emigration, and access to foreign media; and as to increased 
or decreased independence of satellite countries. 

On the commercial side, the question persists as to how good a 
customer the U.S.S.R. can be. One view, offered in the study, is that 
"increasing U.S. sales in agribusiness facilities, petroleum and natural 
gas equipment, computer s} T stems, and a variety of other high- 
technology lines may be an effective wedge into the Soviet market; 
once begun, these sales tend to accelerate over time", (p. 44) This 
principle was extended in the discussion to apply general^ to advanced 
industrial S3^stems, management-control-communications systems, 
mass production machinery building, agribusiness as both a system 
and a series of technologies, and tourist systems. The hypothesis is 
offered that requirements for imports in these areas "appear to 
represent a pattern of technical and managerial relatedness that 
would limit the ability of Soviet leaders to take short-term advantages, 
borrow technology, and then withdraw from continued U.S. -Soviet 
economic relations in particular lines." (pp. 45-46) 


Again from the U.S. point of view, there are major barriers to the 
proposed trade expansion. One is the unfamiliarity of U.S. business- 
men with Soviet foreign trade techniques. Corporate rights are some- 
what imprecisely defined. "One feature of Soviet state trading to 
which Western businessmen object is the necessity of dealing with 
Soviet foreign trade enterprises." There is no direct contact with 
Soviet producers, consumers, and distributors, (p. 63) There is also 
a tendency for Soviet traders to "insist on barter trade, tied trans- 
actions, and other clumsy arrangements." Other barriers are the 
limited Soviet export capability, the doubtful adaptability of Soviet 
trade institutions to large-scale economic cooperation, and U.S. 
resistance to exports with possible "national security" implications, 
(p. 65) 

The report concluded that further trade negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, to ease the indicated barriers, 


(ailed for a considerable mobilization of U.S. talent. "In order to link 
the broadest security and diplomatic interests with the commercial 
arrangements, the involvement of high-level policymakers is es- 
sential." Also indispensable are "specialists on the Soviet Union, 
foreign trade specialists, and private businessmen" to provide technical 
advice. In short: 

The long-term process of negotiation, its specialized character, and the broad 
national interests inherent in U.S. -Soviet relations require a permanent working 
blend of experienced people with the following characteristics: 

a. Top politicians from both executive and legislative branches, authorized 
to speak for the White House and Congress as a whole; 

b. Government trade specialists from the Departments of Commerce, 
Treasury, State, and other agencies ; 

c. Specialists on Soviet political-economic affairs from governmental or 
academic positions ; and 

d. Representatives of private business and banking, (p. 77) 

Bole of Congress 

The Hardt-Holliday report pointed out that, "Congress neces- 
sarily will be involved in certain aspects of U.S. -Soviet economic re- 
lations in the future." For example, "Congressional approval is re- 
quired for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union", (p. 11) 
Congressional action would also be required to expand the credit 
resources of the Export-Import Bank (p. 58) and would be desirable 
to monitor the various easements in regulation by the administration 
to facilitate the enlarging pattern of U.S. -Soviet trade. 

Although several reports (p. 10) urged the necessity of a "major 
and direct role of Congress in (Soviet) trade negotiations," no effort 
was made to involve the Congress in the trade discussions with the 
Soviets and no enabling legislation was enacted to facilitate the 
trade agreement. Only after the fact was the Congress asked to extend 
MFN status to the U.S.S.R. (see especially pp. 48-59) 

It appears that a considerably expanded congressional role will be 
necessary in the future to enable the exercise of constitutional re- 
sponsibilities of the legislative branch in the conduct of U.S. -Soviet 
commercial relations. In addition to the actions indicated above, the 
Congress will presumably be asked for other pieces of implementing 
legislation, including appropriations; it will have the continuing re- 
sponsibility for legislative oversight ; it will be continuously concerned 
with the impact on U.S. programs, interests, and economic conditions 
of trade with the Soviets (grain transactions being an example of this 
concern) ; and it will be concerned with the broader impact of the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade and technology transactions and agreements on 
U.S. foreign policy in general. 

Accordingly, the Hardt-Holliday report suggested that, "it would 
be particularly beneficial to include Members of Congress in the 
commercial negotiations"; and that "very careful official and public 
scrutiny of each step in the progress of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com- 
mercial Commission discussions would appear to be in order for both 
the executive and legislative branches." 

Congressional involvement [said the report] would permit a broader representa- 
tion of U.S. public opinion and facilitate passage of legislative measures needed 
to improve U.S. -Soviet commercial relations. Without continuous involvement 
of the Congress and private interests, it could be difficult to have an informed 
debate on important issues. The establishment of a special congressional committee 
or subcommittee to deal with East-West trade, roughly paralleling the Jackson 


subcommittee on SALT, might be appropriate. The creation of the Jackson sub- 
committee gave evidence of congressional interest, involvement, and authority. 
Direct congressional involvement would seem especially desirable in view of 
the complex, significant, and long-term nature of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial 
Commission deliberations. Such involvement on a continuing basis could facilitate 
effective treatment of issues concerning statutorj' authority, such as most- 
favored-nation agreements, and in general those in which congressional interest 
is high, for example, export-import credits. (Hardt-Holliday Report, pp. 77-78) 


Unlike the other five cases in the study of Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy, the present case took place only a short time 
ago. Accordingly, it would be premature to attempt a factual descrip- 
tion of its consequences. An assessment of possible and probable 
future outcomes is offered in the section to follow, drawn from the 
Hardt-Holliday study of 1973, and a reassessment by Dr. Hardt in 
1975 follows thereafter. The legislative consequences that flowed 
from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreements are summarized by Dr. 
Hardt, in 1975, as follows: Congress passed the Trade Act of 1974 
(Public Law 93-618) and the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 
1974 (Public Law 93-646) at the close of the 93d Congress. Earlier, 
the Export Administration Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-500) 
were passed in October 1974 dealing with export controls. They were 
signed by the President on January 3 and 4 respectively. The Jackson- 
Vanik amendment to the Trade Act conditioned the extension of 
MFX status to the Soviet Union on liberalization of Soviet emigration 
policies. Both laws placed a ceiling of $300 million on credits from the 
Eximbank to the Soviet Union during the 4 years of the new law. 


The Hardt-Holliday study concludes that: "The policies followed 
by the United States and the Soviet Union will greatly influence the 
probabilities of alternative outcomes." More specifically, adoption 
by the Soviets of a consumer-oriented policy would divert resources 
and policy emphasis from a military buildup. On the U.S. side, the 
Soviet policy of grain purchases would encourage extension of the 
interdependent relationship between the two superpowers into other 
economic linkages. Inasmuch as Soviet policy objectives are "especially 
crucial to such a projection," certainty is lacking as to which of different 
alternate courses — or what compromise among them — the Soviet 
leadership will adopt, (p. 78) 

As the report observed: 

The changes that have already been made seem likely to strengthen trade ties 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, but many obstacles to com- 
pletely normalized economic relations remain. The long-run growth of Soviet- 
American economic relations will depend in large part on the continuation of the 
liberalization process, (p. 65) 

A matrix might be drawn up of possible outcomes and their effects, 
for the United States and the Soviet Union, of; (a) exports from the 
United States to the Soviet Union; (b) exports from the U.S.S.R. to 
the United States; (c) technology transfers from the United States to 
the Soviets; (d) economic changes in the United States as a conse- 
quence of the trade pacts; (e) economic changes in the U.S.S.R.; 
(f) political consequences for the United States; and (g) political 
consequences for the U.S.S.R. For some cells in the matrix there are 
fairly high probabilities; for others the forecasts are contingent on 


political developments and policy decisions. However, a few con- 
jectures on parts of the matrix are offered as follows: 


Although starting at a low level, with the exception of imports of 
grain, the U.S. -Soviet trade prospects are judged likely to grow at a 
substantial rate. 

Current projections indicate a substantial increase in U.S. -Soviet economic 
exchanges. Improved economic relations are officially considered to be part of a 
pattern of changing U.S. -Soviet relations in many areas. The trade agree- 
ment, along with the summit agreements on strategic arms limitations and 
other matters, links national security considerations, economic relations, tech- 
nology policy, and the conduct of diplomacy between the two major powers. 
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev 
both postulate that the changes occurring in U.S. -Soviet relations will influence 
the stability of the international community for some years to come. (p. 3) 

Traditional Soviet exports have included fur skins, nickel, palla- 
dium, platinum, chrome ore, crude oil and petroleum products, coal 
and coke, cotton, wood and wood products, diamonds, inorganic 
chemicals, and nonferrous metals. Expansion of U.S. imports of 
Soviet products subject to tariffs are dependent on MFN status for 
the U.S.S.R. While the structure of Soviet exports is heavily biased 
toward raw materials, foodstuff, and semimanufactures, Soviet 
officials have indicated a desire to expand their export portfolio into 
machinery and equipment, more intensively technological in char- 
acter. These include: 

Machinery and mechanical equipment. — Forging and pressing equipment; 
rolling equipment; mining machinery; power equipment — hydraulic and steam 
turbines; machinery for food preparation; Textile machines; printing equipment; 
road-building machinery; and parts of machines — antifriction bearings. 

Electrical machinery and equipment. — Generators; transformers; radio receivers 
and components; and electronics components. 

Transportation equipment. — Aircraft — supersonic airplanes, helicopters; motor- 
cycles; seagoing freighters — tankers, dry cargo; seagoing passenger ships — 
hydrofoils; and tractors. 

M iscellaneous equipment. — Measuring instruments — optical, meteorological, 
et cetera; medical equipment; tools, watches and components; cameras, photo- 
graphic accessories; and movie projectors and accessories, (p. 36) 

More broadly, Soviet dollar earnings were considered in the report 
as likely to come from the following sources : 

(1) Increased Soviet exports of raw materials, such as energy sources and 
metals, and industrial goods; 

(2) Gold sales; 

(3) Nontrade income, such as tourism and shipping; 

(4) Multilateral relations, such as balancing a trade deficit with the United 
States by a trade surplus with Japan; 

(5) Cooperative ventures; and 

(6) Credits (only a short-term consideration, as eventual repayment is required, 
plus interest), (p. 33) 

In assessing the prospects for Soviet export trade to the United 
States the report noted a number of significant variables: (a) Soviet 
willingness to shift exports of oil and gas from other markets, including 
domestic and Comecon, to the United States, (b) trade credits avail- 
able to the U.S.S.R. from the Export-Import Bank, the Commodity 
Credit Corporation, and private sources, (c) U.S. willingness to extend 
most-favored-nation status to the U.S.S.R., and (d) Soviet ability 
to mobilize production of items for Western markets, (p. 41) 


Apart from emergency demands for grain to make good the short- 
fall of Soviet harvests, Soviet representatives appear most interested 
in imports in which the United States has a degree of technological 
leadership, such as: 

(1) Large-scale petroleum and natural gas extraction, transmission, and dis- 
tribution systems, including special permafrost problems and oil recovery sys- 

(2) Management control systems utilizing computer facilities; 

(3) Mass production machinery output, such as of trucks and cars; 

(4) Animal husbandry as characterized by U.S. agricultural business; and 

(5) Tourist systems including hotels, packaged tours, and transport. 

Each of these technological areas requires large-scale financing, consortium 
operations, and marketing systems. The experience of U.S. multinational cor- 
porations might lend itself to industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union, (p. 31) 

However, the report concluded that the volume of Soviet exports 
to the United States is unlikely to reach a large share of either U.S. 
trade or GNP. The U.S. advantages as likely to center on such specifics 
as imports of oil and gas and exports of feed, cereal grains, and com- 
puters and other high technology products. 


The report strongly suggested that the thawing of the Soviets 
toward trade relations with the United States is attributable to an 
"apparent reordering of Soviet priorities," in favor of "technological 
change and an improvement in the availability of desirable consumer 
goods to the Soviet workers and peasants." The extent of this re- 
ordering "turns in large part on how much of the Soviet output 
goes to defense and on the volume of Soviet trade with other nations." 
The question is whether military priorities will be sustained along 
with the increased emphasis in other areas, or be superseded by 
nonmilitary economic activity. Even the prospect of a change in 
priorities gives rise to some hope of a relaxation of the arms race. 

... if the Soviet Union should reorder its priorities and permit more foreign 
decisionmaking involvement in domestic cooperative ventures, significant long-run 
benefits of a predominantly political nature might accrue to the United States 
such as: (a) the potential reduction of the Soviet threat to our security from 
reordered Soviet priorities; (b) a degree of Soviet acceptance of the international 
system, implied by the U.S.S.R.'s permitting domestic involvement of foreign 
corporations as partners; and (c) political advantages inherent in increasing 
international commercial and financial intercourse. Overall, such political gains 
might far outweigh the relatively modest economic returns, (pp. 74-75) 

The report identified three political costs to the United States 
that warrant attention : 

1. The risks involved in the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a supplier of 
important raw materials. Reliance on the Soviet Union as a source for Vitally 
needed energy resources appears to be a particularly risky undertaking. 

2. Contributions to the Soviet fund of technical knowledge that could be 
translated into security programs or which could result in the release of resources 
for military programs. 

3. Potential leverage to the Soviet Union that could result from Soviet control 
over U.S. investments and personnel — a possible source of economic blackmail, 
or an economic hostage system. 

There were also three possible political benefits: 

1. Soviet reliance on the United States as a source of supply and expertise. 
Soviet dependence on U.S. agricultural products and advanced technology, for 
example, is a potential source of U.S. political leverage. 


2. Encouragement to the Soviet Union to reorder priorities between military 
and civilian programs. Expanded commercial relations may serve as an economic 
reinforcement of the arms control and other agreements between the two countries. 

3. Encouragement of domestic change in the Soviet Union. The presence of 
many American citizens in the Soviet Union with some decisionmaking power 
and ;i wider exchange of ideas may in the long run contribute to a moderation of 
the Soviet political control system and command cconomj*. (p. 73) 


On balance, the political risks to the United States were larger and 
longer range; the economic gains to the Soviet Union were surer and 
earlier. In particular, the transfers of U.S. technology to the U.S.S.R. 
might yield only long-term political and diplomatic benefits to the 
United States. 

Still, the report offered two summary assessments of a hopeful 
character for U.S. -U.S.S.R. diplomatic relations. The first involved 
internal Soviet policy. 

Three options for economic change open to the Soviet leadership are, in order 
of probability: (1) a reduction of the priority for new strategic weapons systems; 
(2) a cutback in military manpower; and (3) a withdrawal of party control and 
involvement in the economy so as to permit improved efficiency through economic 
reform. All are issues which will be influenced by both the international situation 
and domestic political considerations. A downward revision in the priority for 
further military weapons buildup, for example, is likely only if the economic 
rationale is persuasive and the domestic political and international climate are 
favorable, (p. 29) 

The second assessment, while warning of the hazards of the situa- 
tion, suggested that there could be important benefits in the promotion 
of closer Soviet economic relations with the United States and the 
rest of the non-Communist world. 

In summary, expanded economic relations which facilitate massive technology 
transfer from the United States to the U.S.S.R. may create new, potentially 
dangerous dimensions in U.S. diplomacy. On the other hand there is at least a 
possibility that the process of integrating the centrally planned Soviet economy 
into the market economy of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist 
world might unleash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in 
turn, contribute to international interdependence and stability, (p. 73) 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

This case was revisited by one of the authors (Dr. John P. Hardt) 
in 1975 to ascertain what relevant changes in outlook had occurred 
in the intervening 2 years. His reappraisal, and a list of questions 
posed in the original study and in the 1975 review, conclude this 


U.S. trade with the Communist world has grown rapidly in the 1970s. 
While it is still small in comparison with overall U.S. foreign trade, 
considerable significance has been attached to East-West trade because 
of the prospects for future growth and, more importantly, because of 
the linkage of commercial ties with East-West political relations. 
Congressional consideration of important legislation relating to East- 
West trade has been influenced b}^ increased interest in the U.S. 
business community in trade with the East, continued efforts by the 
administration to achieve detente with the Soviet Union and China, 
and controversy about certain aspects of Soviet foreign domestic 

Following the passage of important new legislation in 1974-75, 
it is clear that the Congress has reassigned itself a continuing role in 
trade, Government finance, and export control. The executive depart- 
ment must now make detailed reports to the Congress on the bases 
for its actions and, in many specific instances, receive explicit con- 
gressional approval. In other cases, prenotification of Congress permits 
nullification of executive action by Congress. 


One of the major aims of the policy of East-West detente pursued by 
the Nixon-Ford administrations has been a rapid expansion of commer- 
cial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, People's 
Republic of China, and the countries of Eastern Europe. East-West 
commercial ties have been deliberately promoted by the past and cur- 
rent administrations and the governments of the non-Communist 
world as a means of easing international tensions. Trade promotion 
in the East has been more related to perceived economic need. The 
linkage of commercial relations to political goals in U.S. policy toward 
the East is not new: precedents were set by President Kennedy's 
approval of large-scale sales of wheat to the Soviet Union in 1963 and 
later by President Johnson's policy of building bridges to the Com- 
munist world. However, neither of the earlier more limited attempts 
succeeded either in achieving a major expansion of U.S. trade with 
the East or attaining significant political gains. 

In 1970, U.S. trade with Communist countries was at a very low 
level: Trade turnover totaled $580 million. From 1971-73, trade ex- 
panded rapidly, and in 1973 was $3.07 billion. Most of this trade was 
with the Soviet Union ($1.4 billion) and the People's Republic of 
China ($750 million). The expansion in 1974 was modest, to $3.3 
billion, the major portions with the U.S.S.R. ($961 million) and the 
People's Republic of China ($935 million). Although relative increases 
were significant and most projections for 1980 suggest a substantially 
higher level, the aggregate trade's impact on U.S. balance of payments 
and domestic income and employment is likely to be modest. However, 
with a $3 billion global deficit in balance of payments for 1974, East- 
West trade provided a $1.2 billion surplus. Some sectors of the U.S. 
economy, such as producers of heavy or extractive equipment, com- 
puters, agricultural goods, automotive machinery, and tourist services 
are likely to receive considerable benefit. Whereas exports to Com- 
munist countries may be a major factor in some export sales, they will 
probably remain a small share of total U.S. output. 


Various U.S. legal restrictions have constituted an important reason 
for the past low level of U.S. trade with Communist countries. Three 
of the most important restrictions — denial of most-favored-nation 
status (MFN), restrictions on U.S. Government credits, and export 
controls — were reviewed by the 93d Congress. The importance of 
MFN and Government credits (particularly Export-Import Bank 
credit) lies in the difficulty that Communist countries have in paying 
for their imports from the West. For example, the United States had 
a balance-of-trade surplus in its East- West trade of $1.9 billion in 


1973 and $1.2 billion surplus in 1974. Denial of MFN contributes to 
this imbalance because higher tariffs tend to drive up the prices of 
Communist countries' exports and thus reduce their ability to sell in 
the U.S. market. Restrictions on Government credits have denied 
some Communist countries access to a facility which continues to play 
an important role in financing U.S. foreign trade — 'the U.S. Export- 
Import Bank. The impact of denial of MFN and credits on trade varies 
from country to country. Some suggest the major impact on the 
U.S.S.R. currently is political. Export controls prevent the export of 
certain kinds of goods and technology which are considered to have 
military applications. In the past, such controls have been applied 
particularly to the kinds of goods which Communist countries are 
most interested in importing from the West. 


In recent years, several attempts have been made to liberalize the 
legal framework for East-West trade. Although only Poland and 
Yugoslavia at present receive MFN treatment, there have been 
proposals to extend it to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China, and several East European countries. Those countries had been 
barred from receiving MFN bv section 231 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1861). The Trade Act of 1974 
(Public Law 93-618), enacted on January 3, 1975, provided that 
MFN status might be extended to the Soviet Union and other non- 
market economy countries. The continued availability of MFN 
status, once granted, was to be based on a congressional assess- 
ment of the Eastern countries' adherence to standards of free emigra- 
tion, as stated in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the act and 
related written exchanges between Senator Henry Jackson and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In January 1975 the Soviet 
Union, when offered MFN as the operative condition for bringing 
the October 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial agreement into force, 
refused to accept the conditions. The refusal brought into question 
Soviet willingness to continue payments on its Lend-Lease debt. The 
Soviets had agreed to make three payments totaling $48 million (the 
third payment of $12 million was due and paid in July 1975). They 
agreed to make further payments through July 1, 2001 (total repay- 
ment would be $722 million) on the condition that the Soviet Union 
was granted MFN treatment. Although the Soviet Union made its 
rejection of the Jackson-Vanik amendment clear, other controlled 
economies, such as Romania's, have moved toward further trade 
normalization and MFN acceptance. In April 1975, the Executive 
provided MFN to Romania, contingent on subsequent congressional 

Government credits were also tied through the provisions of the 
Jackson-Vanik amendments to the trade bill. The new legislation, 
the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-646), 
also singled out the Soviet Union for special constraints on the level 
of credits and the use to which credits were to be put: limit of $300 
million in 4 years, with a mechanism for congressional approval for 
more credits based on a detailed national interest determination; 
strict limits on energy-related activities to research, development, 
and exploration; and, even therein, limits on each project of $25 


million per project and total of $40 million over 4 year?, without 
congressional approval for more. The export-import facilities remain 
available to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland. 

The export control authority has been extended and modified by 
the Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1975 (enacted 
August 5, 1974, as Public Law 93-365) and the Export Administra- 
tion Amendments of 1974 (enacted October 29, 1974, as Public Law 
93-372). These two pieces of legislation continued the narrower 
definition of national security to defense-related products and proc- 
esses rather than including industrial potential, as had been the case 
in the law before the Export Administration Act of 1969 (Public 
Law 91-184). However, in the legislation of the 93d Congress an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to enhance the role of the Secretary 
of Defense in the determination of defense-related goods and processes. 
Concern was also specifically expressed about the export of products 
of short supply (e.g., energy, food, or feed-related products). 

The net effect of the restrictive congressional legislation of the 
93d Congress and the Soviet deferment or nullification of the com- 
merical agreement has been reappraisal of East-West trade on all 
sides. A new agreement between the Congress and the executive 
department and a new understanding between the Soviet Lnion 
and the United States may result prior to or during the oft-postponed 
summit between Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford in Washington. 

Any redefinition is, however, likely to retain a reasserted and ex- 
panded congressional role and voice on tariff, credit, and export 
policy of the United States in East-West trade. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

Should the United States grant trade benefits to governments 
which pursue hostile foreign policies and repressive domestic policies? 

Will increased L T .S. trade with Communist countries help to bring 
favorable change in their policies? 

Will exports of U.S. technology, often assisted by low-cost Govern- 
ment credits, assist the economic and military development of Com- 
munist countries? 

Will the United States receive significant economic benefits from 
East-West trade? 

Should the L T nited States make exceptions to its general long-run 
policy of advocating unrestricted international trade? 

Is there a danger that the United States might become dependent 
on Communist countries for important raw material supplies? 

What effects are increased economic exchanges, especially in tech- 
nology-intensive products, likely to have on U.S. foreign policy goals 
and on LT.S. national security? 

What technological contributions will U.S. -Soviet commercial 
exchanges make to American industry? 

What risks will these exchanges pose to specific U.S. industries 
and industrial corporations? 

Does the Soviet leadership perceive as yet the need for serious 
changes in internal planning and management to rationalize produc- 
tion to satisfy market needs? At what point will the leadership see 
the cost of not changing as greater than the cost of change? 


Does the sale of U.S. high technology products to the Soviet Union 
encourage or discourage Soviet military preparedness? 

Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods 
of commitment than was the case in the past? 

Does the trade agreement represent a part of a new pattern of 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States? 

Does the agreement presage a new relationship between the Soviet 
economy and the non-Communist world economic system? 

How can economic exchanges with the Soviet Union, particularly 
those involving technology transfers, be used to further U.S. foreign 

What changes are needed in negotiating procedures and commercial 
institutions to insure that the United States maximizes its political 
and economic benefits? 

In light of past grain sales, the question is important as to how 
good a market the Soviet Union really is for U.S. exports and how 
the United States may have to change its marketing procedures to 
deal effectively with the East. 

And also: how good an investment for the United States is Soviet 
exploitation of petroleum, natural gas, or other raw materials? 

68 196-7G 8 

IV. Six Substantive Issues Which Further Illustrate the 


The remarks introducing section III apply to this section as well. 
The format governing the commentaries to follow differs only slightly 
from that used in summarizing the six cases just presented: 

Statement of the issue 

Importance of the issue 

How the issue developed 

U.S. involvement 

Role of Congress 

Status of the issue 

Prospects and options 

Author's reassessment in 1975/1976 

Some illustrative questions 


Statement of the Issue 

This initial study 104 was designed to provide an overview of the 
subject, and at the same time to express a common theme for the 
series. Thus : 

The focus of this chapter is on technology. It is intended: To delineate the 
important ways in which technology influences diplomacy; to show technological 
change as a process producing effects that diplomats must deal with; and to raise 
questions as to whether and how governments can make purposeful, constructive 
use of these processes to further diplomatic objectives. 105 

The theme was stated in universal terms, but an assumption of the 
study series was — and remains — that the United States could further 
its interests and its position in the world by systematically and 
judiciously exploiting its technological skills and resources. Six years 
and 12 studies later, however, the project director and associate 
director find themselves impressed not so much by the opportunities 
(though these are many and great) as by the dimensions of the 
obstacles to their realization, and by the lack of appreciation even in 
the United States itself of both the opportunities and the obstacles. 
In the world at large, irresponsible expressions of nationalism and 
independence oppose the working out of acceptable accommodation 
wHh the imperatives of technology-induced interdependence. There 
is evidently a dearth of national and world leadership that sufficiently 
comprehends and takes determined steps to direct the dynamics of 
technological change. Also largely lacking are concepts and machinery 
of mid-range and long-range planning for both U.S. and global growth 
and development which take appropriate account of the likely im- 

'« U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Evolution of International Technology, a 
study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on 
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Re- 
search Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government 
Printing Office, December 1970, 70 p. 

105 Ibid., p. 1. 



pacts of further technological advances. The rising dangers of drift, 
drag, and decay threaten everywhere. 

But times of uncertainty and flux are not new in history, and despair 
has never been an answer to human problems. An important part of 
the answer to the problems of civilization today lies in better under- 
standing of the changes being wrought in the world by technology and 
in efforts to direct these changes. The present study, and the Science, 
Technology, and American Diplomacy series as a whole, represent 
an attempt to contribute to such understanding. 

Importance of the Issue 

The influence of technology in human affairs is pervasive and 
profound. As Vietnam reminds us, technology may not be the decisive 
force in resolving a given issue in some particular situation, but its 
cumulative impact on people's lives all over the world is nonetheless 
powerful, and growing. Its growth is so dynamic, indeed, that some 
critics would arrest it altogether if they could, professedly to save 
the world from mind-boggling excesses of human inventiveness. 
Other more optimistic analysts, noting that for the first time in history 
it is technically possible — given the will, and effective planning and 
organization — to eradicate famine, epidemic disease, and other 
impediments to the physical well-being of the world's peoples, argue 
for actively controlling and directing technology to make it serve 
the greatest good of the greatest number. 

Whatever the point of view, technology will increasingly be a force 
to reckon with. The responsibility for reckoning with it, while in part 
diffused among such extranational instrumentalities as multinational 
corporations and agencies of the United Nations, is mainly vested in 
sovereign nations, which may or may not rise to the challenge. Diplo- 
macy is the instrument in dealings among sovereign nations. It is 
therefore important that the association between technology and 
diplomacy, which in the past has tended to be formal, limited, and 
contrived, become increasingly close, continuous, and comfortable. 

How the Issue Developed 

This study has for its subject the full range of applications of 
technology to human affairs. It explores the history of how these 
applications have proliferated since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution and in a more intensive way since World War II. 

Technology, as used in the study series, is a comprehensive term 
"covering a wide variety of scientific and technical activities and 
products. In its simplest usage, it merely signifies 'tools.' At the other 
extreme, it conveys the broad meaning of 'how man works.' " 106 In 
the context of planned activity it "signifies the systematic, purposeful 
application of knowledge to modify an environment toward pre- 
determined goals." 107 

Foreshadowing the more detailed treatment of the interrelationships 
of technology and diplomacy 4)2 years later in the last of the 12 studies, 
Science and Technology in the Department oj State: Bringing Technical 
Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations, this early study spoke 
of "Technology as the Underpinning of Diplomacy": 

109 Ibid., p. 2. 

107 Huddle, The Mekong Project, p. 1 (footnote). See also Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department 
of State, Introduction, pp. 1-10. 


The profound influence that technological change has had in the past, and 
promises to have for the future, implies the need for a strong crops of diplomats 
trained to anticipate and prepare for the direct and indirect impacts of technology 
on diplomatic concerns . . . " 108 

Diplomacy, the study continued, deals with problems between 
sovereign nations and with the common concerns of members of the 
world community of nations. "The objective of diplomacy is to re- 
concile or resolve issues and establish agreements to advance the 
national interest in a constantly changing world. Changes within the 
jurisdiction of each member of the world community alter its relations 
with others. No source of change is more potent than an alteration 
in a nation's technological condition." 

It produces changes of many kinds at many levels of impacts and interactions: 
military, commercial, cultural, political, and scientific; these changes involve 
many agencies of government, the academic world, private business, and the 
public at large. Familiarity with technology, and with the nature of its impacts, 
is thus an indispensable tool of the diplomat. Moreover, the skill with which a 
nation manages and advances its own technology contributes to the status of its 
diplomats, and to the options with which they can negotiate. In both senses, 
national technology confers diplomatic power. 109 


But the point can be made even more strongly: ". . . technology 
is a primary source of national power and diplomatic influence." uo 
(Emphasis added.) 

The story of how technology has progressively affected human 
civilization is too long, and too familiar, to be retold here. The reader 
interested in detail is referred to The Evolution of International Tech- 
nology or — since even this is a highly abbreviated account — to the 
definitive treatment contained in the five-volume work, A History oj 
Technology. 111 The following account is limited to a few reminders of 
the history of the past century: 

"Early in the industrial revolution, a race began for both overseas markets 
for manufactured goods and supplies of needed raw materials. In this race the 
process was one of commercial penetration, followed by military enforcement 
of commercial rights." m 

From the close of the Napoleonic Wars to the latter part of the 19th 
century, England was technologically and industrially the dominant 
nation of the world. Between 1870 and 1895, Germany surpassed 
England and assumed world technological leadership. "On the eve of 
World War I, Germany's energy showed itself in many ways: in 
ambitious plans for a railroad line to the Middle East, construction 
of a modern war fleet, development of African colonies, and the 
prospect of hegemony over the European continent. When the war 
broke out, Germany's superior technology very nearly enabled her to 
overmatch the combination of England, France, Italy, and Russia." m 

So strong was the emphasis in German education on technological 
skills and innovation that even after defeat in 1918, followed by two 
decades of social upheavals, inflation, political instability, and finally 
"a dictatorship too erratic in its concepts to exploit systematically the 

10 8 Huddle. The Evolution of International Technology, p. 1. 
io» Ibid., p. 2. 
no Ibid., p. 9. 

"I Charles Singer, E. J. Holmvard, A. R. Hall, and Trevor I. Williams, eds., A History of Technology, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, 4011 pages, 240 plates. 
n J Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, p. 10. 
i" Ibid., pp. 10-11. 


undoubted talents of its people in science and technology," m German 
technological prow ess w as still evident in the V-2 ballistic rockets, one 
of the major achievements in World War II. 

In the main, though, the United States assumed world technological 
leadership from the close of World War I. From then on, and especially 
after World War II, the development of international technology 
centered so heavily on the United States that it seems appropriate to 
consider its further progress in the section on U.S. Involvement, below. 
However, some general observations about the growing impact of 
technology on human affairs, gleaned from the study, may be noted 
first : 



Five of the dimensions which characterize the role of technology 
today are especially noteworthy: its accelerated pace, the size to which 
its applications may attain, the formidable complexity of some of its 
more advanced systems, its flourishing variety, and the range and 
pervasiveness of its impacts. 

The pace is everywhere evident in technologically advanced coun- 
tries: witness, for example, in the United States today, the use by 
school children of the pocket computer, a device which did not even 
exist (at least in marketable form) a decade ago. The accelerated 
pace of technological innovation and change poses problems for 
diplomacy. It "increases the rate at which international issues, 
problems, and opportunities arise. It confronts the diplomat with an 
ever-lengthening agenda, the need for a deeper understanding of the 
processes of change, and the requirement for a great increase in the 
orderly flow of exact information concerning its ingredients." Ilfi 

As to size. "Although historical achievements in technology have 
sometimes approached heroic proportions (the Pyramids, Roman 
roads, the Great Wall of China, and the Panama Canal, for example), 
the size and cost of some of the modern technological systems is quite 
unprecedented. Most notable are those in the field of military hard- 
ware, such as . . . the Polaris system, and nuclear test detection sys- 
tems. Others include spacecraft like the Apollo series, global com- 
munications networks, air traffic control systems, a global weather 
forecasting network, the Interstate Highway System, electric power 
grids, and the complexes of multipurpose dams on the Tennessee and 
other major rivers." 116 Large technological projects of an inherently 
international character, observes the study, impose added burdens on 
the diplomat. Problems and benefits must be shared among many 
nations; acceptance of roles of participation must be negotiated; new 
mechanisms of diplomacy are required. An illustration from the mid- 
nineteenth century — one which may seem small-scale today, but which 
was ambitious enough for the time — is found in the difficult and 
frustrating, though ultimately successful, efforts of diplomats and 
scientists from 12 nations to work out an international quarantine 
convention, as described in The Politics of Global Health. 117 Numerous 

"< Ibid., p. u. 

"5 Ihid., p. 3. 

•" Ibid., pp. 3-4. 

117 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Politics of Global Health, a study in the 
series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National 
Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Freeman H. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing 
Office, May 1971, 79 pages, (committee print.) pp. 7-8. 


current examples involving problems of larger scale (both tech- 
nologically and diplomatically) could be cited: e.g., in the area of 
international agreements on the use of earth satellites for television 
broadcasting or for earth resources surveys. 

The most recent step in the centuries-old, but rapidly accelerating, 
progression from simple manual tools to systems of great complexity 
has been the introduction of computers into large systems to automate 
the making of routine decisions in their management. "These systems 
have now become so complicated in design and function that even to 
build them has come to require elaborate systems of planning and con- 
trol, and these have also required the assistance of computers." u8 
This complexity too adds to the problems and opportunities of 

On the one hand, complexities of systems design present formidable obstacle- to 
quick understanding of these large enterprises. On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that the disciplines and orderly methodologies they require can make a 
direct contribution to the processes of diplomatic analysis and problem solving. 119 

By way of example, complex systems like air transportation and 
satellite communications "can serve both to help and hinder the work 
of the diplomat: While information can now be transmitted virtually 
instantaneous!}-, to facilitate long-range bargaining, the time available 
for decisionmaking has decreased. The traditional conduct of secret. 
official diplomacy tends to be frustrated by radio and television 
propaganda and b} 7 educational, cultural, and scientific exchange-. 
Swift transit of trouble-shooting negotiators to points of tension by 
air transport or for consultation with national leaders is counteracted 
by the ability of troublemakers and dissident groups to use these 
same means of travel." 12 ° 

The variety of technological innovations to which the individual 
citizen is now exposed "seems to have increased hy orders of magni- 
tude in the past quarter-century. . . . The innovative trend is 
indicated by the automation and productivity of agriculture and 
industry; the great variety of consumer goods in the home; . . . the 
introduction of computers into banks, brokerage houses, ticket 
offices, the management of credit cards, and other services; . . . and 
the great range of different vehicles in service in the air, on the high- 
ways, and in shops, airports, heavy construction projects, and urban 
areas." And here again there is an added burden on diplomacy: 
"Assigning priorities among a growing array of salient developments 
becomes increasingly difficult as a problem of formulating and imple- 
menting foreign policy." m 

The range and 'pervasiveness oi impacts of onrushing technology 
are evidenced in many ways. Historical concepts of war, including the 
Von Clausewitz doctrine of war as a continuation of diplomacy by 
other means, have been overtaken b}' atomic weapons and their long- 
range delivery systems. "Industrial productivity, supported by tech- 
nological innovations, has risen so greatly in relation to hours of work 
that a 'postindustrial' condition can be foreseen in which standards of 
living will no longer be limited by the length of the workweek." The 
future adequacy of mineral and fuel supplies is increasingly threatened 
as production and consumption continue to rise. Impacts of escalating 
generation of power on environmental quality are a source of growing 

118 Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, p. 4. 

»» Ibid. 

120 Ibid., p. 42. 

12' Ibid., p. 5. 


public and professional anxiety. Imperfections in technology are more 
and more coming under attack, as in the cases of air and water pollu- 
tion, noise, radiation, thermal effects, solid waste, and accumulations 
of toxic materials. Problems of information overload confront tech- 
nologists in fields of medicine, of properties of materials, and of scientific 
discoveries generally. With continued global growth in both the uses 
and the adverse side effects of technology in prospect, the leading 
technological nations — of which the United States is the foremost — 
are increasingly confronted with awkward diplomatic problems. 

U.S. Involvement 

Many factors — geographic, historical, sociological, and economic — 
contributed to the emergence of the United States as the technologi- 
cally most dynamic Nation of the world: 

An unpeopled continent with rich natural resources and temperate climate was 
settled by immigrants who tended to be self-selected for initiative [and] inde- 
pendence. ... A chronic labor shortage automatically placed value on labor- 
saving devices and machinery. These combined to sustain rapid progress in 
technological innovation toward high manpower productivity and swift economic 

Foremost among the new Nation's needs were roads, canals, and a postal 
system, all of which the early Government undertook to provide. Later, the 
railroad and telegraph were eagerly seized upon to link up throughout all parts 
of the Nation the flow of goods and information. 

The American Civil War had a profound effect on technology. For the first 
time, ". . . the technological resources of a whole Nation were ultimately mobil- 
ized to overwhelm an opponent. There was mass production of weapons and 
ammunition, of uniforms and boots; canned food was supplied to armies trans- 
ported for the first time by rail." 122 

Thereafter came great industrial growth, characterized by the 
expansion of the railroad network throughout the United States, 
heavy output of steel, the mass production of lighter engineering 
products (agricultural equipment, the typewriter, the sewing machine, 
and the bicycle), and radical improvements in the metalworking 
machine tool — which (to quote Walt W. Rostow) : 

. . . comes as close to being a correct symbol for the second phase of industrial 
growth as the railway is for the first. And, by the 1890s, electricity, chemical, and 
automobile industries, which were to play an extremely important part in the third 
phase, were commercially in being, the first two rooted in new and expanding 
fields of science and technology. 123 

The opening of the 20th century was marked by two important 
new trends which heightened the intensity of U.S. exploitation of 
industrial technology-. One was the appearance of the large industrial 
laborator} T ; the other was the rapid spread, by the Taylor Societies, 
of the doctrine of "scientific management." The great industrial 
laboratories made products better and scientific management made 
them lower in cost. 

"World War II dramatized the importance of science for military 
power, but as a practical matter it was technology that proved itself 
of importance": 

Trained American scientists, with an impressive supplement of refugee and 
British scientists, were able to turn themselves into technologists to serve a 
great national and international purpose. In 1945, when the scientists called 
attention to the opportunities of the "endless frontier" of science, and urged its 
public support, they based their claim on the proposition that investment in 

1M r>id., p. 12. 
'» Ibid., p. 12. 

research and education in the sciences would automatically reward society — 
would stimulate innovation, and develop opportunities for an expanding econ- 
omy — in addition to its having military implications. When their appeal was 
heeded, beginning about 1950, a veritable explosion, scientific and technological, 
took place. 124 


By 1970 the United States, combining a high-consumption economy 
with a heavy emphasis on scientific innovation, had built a techno- 
logical structure that included the following principal elements: 

A large number of very large, efficient, highly productive, geographically 
extended business enterprises with families of satellite suppliers of materials, 
components, and specialized services, comprising complex, interconnected, 
production-distribution-service enterprises; separation of business ownership 
from business management; and a great increase in policy, planning, and admin- 
istrative staff in the management of enterprises of all kinds. 125 

The two decades following the outbreak of the Korean War were a 
period of great ferment, with intensive U.S. efforts in both military 
and nonmilitary research and development. In his book about Amer- 
ican technological dominance, The American Challenge (1968), French 
writer J. J. Servan-Schreiber observes that from the launching of the 
first Sputnik (October 1957) : 

American power has made an unprecedented leap forward. It has undergone a 
violent and productive internal revolution. Technological innovation has now 
become the basic objective of economic policy. In America today the government 
official, the industrial manager, the economics professor, the engineer, and the 
scientist have joined forces to develop coordinated techniques for integrating 
factors of production. These techniques have stimulated what amounts to a 
permanent industrial revolution. 125 

But accompanying the "leap forward" were some fumbling back- 
ward and sideways steps, at least in the area of technological inputs 
into American diplomacy. With the outstanding exceptions of the 
highly successful Marshall Plan to restore European industry after 
World War II and the U.S. role in the emergence of a new Japan, 
and except also for the technological coup of the Berlin airlift, U.S. 
employment of technology as an instrument of foreign polic}" enjoyed 
limited success. The Korean War, and the Vietnamese conflict later 
on, demonstrated "the serious, painful, and frustrating limitations of 
technology in waging a limited war against a highly organized and 
resourceful, if technologically unsophisticated, adversary." 127 The 
Soviet Union achieved brilliant if temporary diplomatic advantages 
with its unexpectedly fast development of fission and then fusion 
weapons, and with the launching of Sputnik I. Subsequent world 
admiration * for U.S. space achievements "was tempered by reserva- 
tions over U.S. inability to solve such domestic problems as pollution, 
crime, and highway accidents . . ." 128 Some constructive interna- 
tional applications of U.S. technology proved to have awkward side 
effects: for example, the insecticide DDT played an important part 
in malarial control but came to be recognized as ecologically un- 
desirable. Various nations, both developed and developing, became 
concerned over the "brain drain" to the United States. (See Issue 

'-'« Ibid., p. 13. 
™ Ibid. 
i2« Ibid., p. 14. 
i2' Ibid., p. 16. 
i-'s ibid., p. 17. 


Five for an analysis of this problem.) The territorial sovereignty con- 
cept in international law and the issue of ownership of the ocean 
floor came increasingly into question; the United States often did not 
succeed in developing diplomatic solutions to protect its own interests 
and that of its nationals in this critical sphere, or alternatively to 
reach harmonious international understandings in the interests of all. 
(See Case Five.) 

The rise of the multinational corporation, gaining impetus from 
"the opportunity seized by American entrepreneurs to exploit U.S. 
computer and electronic technologies in European markets," 12y 
created complex policy problems for the U.S. Government and raised 
questions as to proper relationships and degrees of control. Even the 
innovative "Green Revolution," which seemed to buy time for the 
search for solutions to the ultimate human problem of balancing 
food and population (see Issue Three), proved to have its special 
technological problems and political dangers. ''Thus, by the close of 
1970, it was evident that U.S. technology had not been an unqualified 
success in furthering either U.S. foreign policy objectives or the 
aspirations of the world at large": 

The undoubted promise of technology had not achieved fulfillment. It was 
not clear why. Was it because technologists were unable to produce unflawed 
innovations? Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies 
for global effects? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplo- 
mats to achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product? Where did — 
and do — the weaknesses lie? 130 

The outstanding development in technologically based diplomacy 
in the 5-year period since December 1970 has been the setback suffered 
by the oil-dependent nations at the hands of the oil producers — a 
setback which compounded a major world economic recession already 
underway. As of December 1975, the foregoing questions seem more 
insistent than ever. 

Role of Congress 

As a broad tour d'horizon, the study of The Evolution of Inter- 
national Technology does not address the legislative aspect in the 
United States, except to acknowledge in passing that, "The political 
role of the farmer and the response of the Congress to the needs of 
the farmer appear to have been affected by the technological revolu- 
tion in agriculture. . . . Much of the legislation between 1800 and 
1900 had a rural or agricultural bias, including the Northwest Ordi- 
nance, creation of the Department of Agriculture, the land grant 
colleges, the Homestead Act, railroad land grants and subsidies, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and sustained support for agri- 
cultural research." m 

For the sake of perspective, however, it should be noted that Con- 
gress has played a significant part in giving shape and direction to 
the technological leadership exercised by the United States since 
World War II. The Marshall Plan, technical assistance to developing 
nations, establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and subse- 
quent support of European nuclear power activities, the space pro- 
gram (including the creation of related organizational structures in 
the executive branch and in the Congress itself) in response to the 
challenge of Sputnik I, the development of the Polaris system— these 

»» ibid. 

»» Ibid. 

■ ibid., p. 32. 


are only a few of the American undertakings combining technology 
and diplomacy in which Congress has been involved, and in some of 
which it has at times played the leading U.S. role. It is not the purpose 
here to catalog such congressional involvements; a number of them 
are explored in some detail in the other studies of the Science, Tech- 
nolog}^, and American Diplomacy series. 

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 

Some of the main points made in the study, as of December 1970, 
under the heading of "The Emerging Policy Issues of International 
Technology," deal with effects of technology as the dominant factor 
of change that has shaped the modern world; these are shown to be 
both beneficial and injurious. The point has been made that tech- 
nology is the most obvious avenue to national strength and inter- 
national influence. "Technology has also been shown to be a potent 
force, linking the world together by many threads. Technology itself 
has an evident propensity to 'go global'." 132 

The United States, by virtue of tremendous vigor and public 
expenditure in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, enjoys a com- 
manding technological lead among the nations of the world. As 
Herman Pollack has said: "The attraction generated by this pre- 
eminence among the nations of the world, especially those in the 
process of development, is perhaps one of the lesser understood but 
more pervasively powerful forces at work in international relation- 
ships today." 133 

But will the United States adopt wise and imaginative policies 
to turn its technological tour de force into permanent gains for 
humanity? — "The emerging question posed by the onrush of tech- 
nology, and its effect on the relations among the countries of the world, 
is whether this potent factor of change and national power is to operate 
in a random way, or whether it is possible, and desirable, to devise 
a national strategy to guide and direct it, to stimulate innovation in 
some directions, and possibly to slow and inhibit innovation in 
others." m 

In the July 1970 issue of Science, Prof. Robert Gilpin of Princeton 
identified three major interrelated economic consequences of modern 
technology: increased interdependence among national economies, 
the growing role of technological innovation in economic growth and 
competition, and the rapid spread of multinational corporations, 
primarily dominated by American capital. He suggested that a "new 
international economy" was developing under the stimulus of tech- 
nolog}', and that there were three alternative national strategies in 
response to^the development: (1) "to support scientific and tech- 
nological development across the broadest front possible"; (2) scien- 
tific and technological specialization; and (3) the importation of 
foreign technology. 

The United States and the Soviet Union [wrote Gilpin] have followed the 
first strategy; Sweden, Great Britain, and a number of other countries have 
followed the second; while Japan and West Germany have, in general, followed 
the third. Although the U.S. strategy has been relatively successful, particularly 

"J Ibid., p. 65. 
»' Ibid. 

134 Ibid. 


in fields of high technology like space and the computer, it has begun to show 
defects, and, in Gilpin's opinion, "the direction of America's technological strategy 
will become an increasingly important political issue." 13s 

Gilpin argued that, first of all, "even America docs not have the 
economic and technical resources to support all projects of impor- 
tance; it too must choose. Second, a high proportion of the limited 
resources has gone into military and military-related projects, while 
pressing social and economic ideas o^ the society have been neglected. 
Third, the devastiiig consequence of technological advance tor 
the environment has suddenly emerged as a major national 
concern. . . ." 136 

Accordingly, the study su<rg<Ms, "thought might be given ... 'to 
the formulation of a more explicit technological strategy designed to 
increase the social return of its immense investment in science and 
technology and to minimize its negative environmental effects.' Gilpin 
concludes with a prediction that"' : 

... To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological 
considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek 
their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry 
has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands 
play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's 
technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international 
pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems. 137 

The study observes that the great efforts of the United States in 
science and technology — since 1940, at least — were inspired by external 
events. The Manhattan Project was initiated out of fear that Nazi 
Germam r might achieve nuclear weapons first. Work on the H-bomb 
was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the 
Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic-missile submarine was a response 
to the Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race 
was an effort to catch up with and pass the Soviets in a strategically 
and psychologically important area in which they had assumed a lead. 
"The great technological programs supported by the United States 
are still in militaty, atomic, and space developments, and all are 
motivated by events outside the United States or else support for 
them wanes." 138 

Indeed, it is no secret that many U.S. domestic programs owe a 
substantial measure of their support to the circumstance that they 
can be tied to the coattails of programs related to military security. 
Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard declares that national defense 
is too often used as justification for doing what is needed simply for 
the good of American society. For example: 

We backed into Federal support of higher education while stoutly insisting 
that we were only buying necessary military research results. We entered upon 
school curriculum reform, long overdue, on the grounds that it was needed to 
make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts. We 
launched a gigantic interstate highway program on the grounds that it was needed 
for national defense. We fostered the study of international affairs and the 
development of foreign area research on the grounds that a great power needed 
this knowledge to maintain its power position. 139 

>» Ibid., p. 66. 
is* Ibid. 

117 /',;,/. 

138 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
* Ibid., p. 67. 


It seems paradoxical, concludes the study, that the United States — 
best equipped to apply science and technology to the solution of the 
world's problems, and credited with the highest development of 
managerial skills — "has been reluctant to devise and implement a 
positive technological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no 
lack of opportunities: earth resources satellites, ocean and ocean floor 
development, urban improvement, recovery of resources from all 
forms of waste, the Oak Ridge proposal for large agricultural-industrial- 
nuclear complexes, and many more." 140 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

Technology is perhaps the most powerful of all forces for change 
in the modern world. It measures the qualification of nations for 
leadership in the community of nations. It affords a means for the 
achievement of a nation's domestic and foreign goals. It is a principal 
substance of modern diplomacy. A nation's diplomatic voice is often 
heard in proportion to the nation's excellence in science and tech- 
nology, and in its competence to use these for national and inter- 
national purposes. 

In this chronologically first substantive study of the Science, Tech- 
nology, and American Diplomacy series, the research drew mainly on 
historical sources. Most of the eleven studies that followed it provided 
evidence that the theme and findings of this study were altogether 
valid. The impact of the energy crisis, the demands by developing 
countries for technical assistance, and the directions recently taken by 
bilateral and multilateral programs, are some additional contemporary 
evidences of their validity. 

The emphasis of the study was on the roles and impacts of tech- 
nology on the world scene. Attention might usefully have been given 
also to the ranges of problems created by these developments for 
U.S. and foreign diplomats and for the U.S. Congress. The study 
demonstrated b^ond cavil the diplomatic significance of technology. 
But the relevance of the study would have been more incisive if the 
diplomatic issues related to main technological trends had been ex- 
plicitly stated. This was done in later studies in the series with nar- 
rower scope, and most strongly of all in the concluding substantive 
study, Science and Technology in the Department of State. 

There are two aspects to the question of legislative relevance: 
the actual relevance of the subject of international technology for the 
Congress, and its perceived relevance as demonstrated by congressional 
action. The variety of problems of diplomacy with substantial tech- 
nological content is large, and growing. Accordingly, the subject is 
increasingly more relevant for the Congress. However, the complexity 
of the problems presented, and the want of means for rendering them 
coherent and manageable, stand in the way of congressional action. 

At the outset of the project the decision was made, as to its scope, 
to encompass both science and technology in their relation to diplo- 
macy. It soon became evident that science and technology had different 
kinds of impacts on diplomacy. In starting out with an examination 
of the technological impacts on diplomacy, we saw that these were 
direct and powerful; moreover, we observed also that the main im- 
pacts of science on diplomacy tended to be indirect — through the 

no Ibid. 


medium of technology that grew out of the science. It also became 
evident that in the early efforts to relate science and technology 
programatically to diplomacy the emphasis was on science and the 
leadership was provided by the scientific community. Science had the 
prestige and the intellectual attractions. However, with the passage 
of time it has become apparent that functionally technology has the 
greater direct impact and requires more attention of diplomatic 
analysts. Now there are some 1 persons who even contend that science 
should not be separated from technology in the diplomatic environ- 
ment lest science drop out of the orbit. 

The study emphasized the changes in the effects of technology on 
U.S. diplomacy over the past several decades. These changes were in 
terms of pace, size, complexity, variety or scope, and range and per- 
vasiveness of impacts. In more general terms: 

A nation that consciously and dynamically lays the groundwork for tech- 
nological advance, encourages technological skills, rewards innovation, and 
systematically increases the variety, depth, sophistication, and universality of 
its technology, is in a stronger bargaining position than a nation that does not. 
Technology increases the range of [diplomatic] options. . . . 

Technology was seen to be a "primary source of national power 
and diplomatic influence," but at the same time the quest for such 
power and influence led to the internationalization of technology. 

... As each technology evolved it became internationalized, its substance 
became the subject of international conversations, its effects extended beyond 
national boundaries, and [the study foresaw as an ultimate outcome] the evolution 
of a global system incorporating or resolving the technology. 

Recent examples of this process are to be found in the production, 
distribution, and use of energy fuels and industrial materials. At the 
third Henniker Conference on National Materials Policy a major 
theme to emerge was that modern nations are "condemned to 

Three trends were observed in the global sweep of technology: 
(1) The important wa} T s in which evolving technologies added to the 
problems and issues confronting the diplomat (as was made abundantly 
evident later in the study Science and Technology in the Department of 
State) ; (2) the ways in which technology tended to draw nations 
together in international enterprises (as demonstrated in the studies 
of world food/population balance, global health, the Mekong project, 
and commercial uses of atomic energy, for example); and (3) the 
emergence of many positive values and serious dangers of technology 
that were of concern to man}^ nations (and here the evidence is over- 
whelming : SALT talks, the Stockholm conference on the environment, 
the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on materials, various 
meetings on food and population, energy and so on). These trends 
evidence a growing need for explicit plans to manage technology to 
produce global results compatible with U.S. foreign policy. (Although 
on this last point the need was abundant^ documented throughout 
the series, and especially in Science and Technology in the Department 
of State, the performance and the institutional provisions to meet the 
need were, in general, not considered adequate.) 


An interesting contemporary example of both the importance and 
the ambivalence of technological impact on diplomacy is the reception 
by the "Third World" of the U.S. plan for earth resources satellite 
surveys. These were recognized as beneficial in the discovery and 
inventorying of resources but denounced as an invasion of sovereignty 
and a means by which rich nations would be enabled to plunder the 
minerals of the poor countries. 

One conclusion of considerable importance was neglected in this 
study: that the kinds of impacts of a given technology and the rate 
at which they occur are susceptible of analysis leading to prediction. 
The study of diplomatic consequences of a technology is accordingly 
a vital activity. The impacts are reasonably foreseeable, and the 
necessary diplomatic responses can likewise be defined in advance 
with careful study. But they seldom are. With the benefit of hindsight, 
this neglected area of diplomatic planning was later discussed in 

Science and Technology in the Department of State. 

The purpose of this initial study was to define and explore the 
universe of technology as related to diplomacy. The principal issue 
it raised that might have taken legislative form concerned the relative 
utility for U.S. diplomacy of bilateral versus multilateral programs. 
This issue runs as a theme throughout many of the subsequent studies. 
However, the question persists and the need for its examination as a 
policy issue is greater than ever. The space program is the subject of 
some 250 bilateral agreements. Bilateral science agreements number 
another 50 or so. Atomic energ}^ bilaterals are continuing to pro- 
liferate. Precisely how these are coordinated for foreign policy pur- 
poses, and how they relate to multilateral objectives and programs, 
is a continuing perplexity. 

Both for the 1970s and for the rest of the present century, the issue 
of global management of technology is likely to remain a foremost 
concern of U.S. diplomacy. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

What are the U.S. diplomatic goals that are served, or contravened, 
by the international spread of technology and its impacts? 

How do U.S. diplomatic goals that involve technology relate to 
those of other nations? 

What mechanisms or institutions are there, or might there be, to 
reconcile U.S. and foreign diplomatic goals respecting technology? 

How is U.S. diplomatic planning conducted with reference to the 
uses and concerns of technology? 

What is the present balance in the U.S. Government's effort as 
between maintenance of deterrent force and emphasis on technological 
programs serving constructive peaceful purposes? What balances of 
this sort are observable in other nations? Could the uses of peaceful 
technology be further extended for diplomatic purposes? 

What domestic developments in technology might be encouraged in 
support of U.S. diplomatic goals? 

How far into the future is it possible to project analyses of tech- 
nological change, and with what degree of probability? 

How does technological analysis compare with economic analysis 
and political analysis as to predictive power? 



Statement of the Issue 

For more than a century the health of the peoples of the world 
has been a subject of international concern and action, enlisting 
the combined efforts of diplomacy and science. However, public 
awareness and public investment have not been commensurate with 
the health benefits of global action. The author, Dr. Freeman II. 
Quimby, puts the central question in his introduction to the study: 
Why has a matter so important to all mankind — human health and 
disease prevention — not become a more effective, comprehensive, 
and dynamic focus of international cooperation? m 

Importance of the Issue 

Disease is international; it moves freely across political boundaries. 
Preventive medicine, also inherently international, requires con- 
tinuing vigilance and international cooperation on the part of scien- 
tists, diplomats, national and local political leaders, and the public. 
Pockets of infectious and communicable disease exist all over the 
world, in less developed countries and even in those most advanced. 
Under conditions of social disruption, floods, hurricanes, and other 
natural disasters, these cells of infection can burst forth as world 
epidemics. Conversely, by a relatively modest investment in each 
case, they can be eradicated or controlled. Yet, half of the world's 
people have no access to health care at all; millions die each year of 
readily preventable sicknesses. There is even some retrogression as 
the effects of urban blight strike the slum poor in the midst of affluence. 
Against this dismal picture of underachievement must be seen a great 
and growing array of unused and underused technical capabilities 
for controlling disease and building health. The issue is how to, 
advance world health through programs utilizing these capabilities 
supported by the combined efforts of diplomats, scientists, and the 

In the context of the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 
study series, the issue is illustrative in several special ways : 

(1) It demonstrates that general acceptance of the importance of an 
issue, and of the desirability of taking measures to cope with it, does 
not insure full implementation of appropriate measures. The problem 
differs in intensity from that of the brain drain, 143 in which a persistent 
issue that lacked comparable popular appeal and dynamism surfaced 
from time to time only to drop out of sight again, still unresolved. 
The issue of global health, affecting the lives and well-being of people 
everj^where, commands continuing support from the world's govern- 
ments. This support, however, does not extend beyond halfway or 
palliative measures to stout and forceful programs and toward rational 
goals of achievable global health. 

141 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Politics of Global Health, a study in the 
series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National 
Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Freeman" II. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1971, 79 pages. (Committee print.) 

»« Ibid., p. 1. 

143 For a full treatment of this subject, see: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Brain 
Brain: A Study of the Pfrsisteyit Issue of International Scientific Mobility, in the series Science. Technology, 
and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
Developments by Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Foreign Affairs Divi- 
sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1974, 272 p. (.Committee print.) 


(2) The issue also provides instructive examples of progress attribut- 
able to the teaming of scientists and diplomats in extended negotia- 
tions. When the French Government convened the first international 
quarantine congress in 1851, each of the 12 participating nations was 
represented by a medical doctor and a diplomatist. Delegates were 
left free to vote individually. Although in voting the two groups 
tended to cancel each other out, with resultant tensions and frustra- 
tions, the diplomats and doctors were at last able to agree to 137 
articles on international sanitary regulations. The pattern of one 
diplomat and one doctor from each country continued during 10 
international sanitary conferences which followed between 1851 and 
the end of the century. 

(3) The same example illustrates another point : the essentiality of 
sustained application of diplomacy among countries as well as in 
relations between scientists and diplomats. The pairing arrangement 
would probably have been fruitless if not held to doggedly until the 
job was done; failure might have discouraged further efforts for years 
to follow. Adoption of the first international rules required 48 plenary 
sessions and 6 months of work. What is more important, for the first 
time diplomats and doctors from leading nations had met in earnest 
to discuss common global disease problems. (It was the diplomats 
rather than the scientists in this instance, in contrast to that of the 
International Geophysical Year, 144 which made the undertaking a 
success. The scientific community of the time was divided between the 
sanitarians and the quarantinists. Today, both views are recognized 
as separately inadequate but complementary elements of a compre- 
hensive approach to the problem. Arguments over rival scientific 
theories consumed most of the time of the conference, but the French 
diplomatic representative who chaired it continued to seek workable 
solutions, and the diplomats as a group appeared to have had instruc- 
tions not to yield to either of the extreme scientific positions. The 
result was successful compromise.) 

How the Issue Developed 

Historically, cycles of pestilence were accepted as a fact of life. 
There was a series of disease invasions of Europe beginning with the 
Christian era, running on through the fall of Rome, and climaxing 
in the black death of the 14th century. (They did not end there : the 
influenza epidemic of 191S-19 took 20 million lives.) In time, the 
attitude of acceptance yielded to an active search for causes and 


Preventive medicine began, at least in England, with public demand 
for corrective measures against recurring epidemics based on the 
observed association between polluted water and disease. Its first 
phase, including some aspects of sanitary engineering and public 
hygiene, was marked by legislative acts like the Great Reform 
bill of 1832, the Metropolis Water Act of 1852, and the Public Health 
Act of 1875. 

»< See: U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the International 
Geophysical Year, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcom- 
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Biillis, Analyst in Science and 
Technology, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, 1973, &i p. (Committee 


The scientific or experimental phase of preventive medicine — the 
era of bacteriology — overlapped and followed the sanitation move- 
ment. It provided the technical foundation on which sanitary water 
and sewage disposal practices are still based, as well as for coping with 
those infectious diseases which can be controlled or eradicated by 

Though all nations benefit from the health of their own citizens 
and those of other nations, and health measures are generally accepted 
throughout the world, present levels of international cooperation in 
public health were not easily achieved and remain hard to sustain or 
extend. In the early deliberations (1850-1900) the paucity and uncer- 
tain authority of scientific knowledge left much room for debate 
and for the convenient alignment of medical science with national 
interest. Thus, the German members of the International Sanitary 
Council of Constantinople made decisions of little consequence to 
disease but calculated to expand the political dominance of Germany 
or to weaken British commercial dominance; British physicians, 
even with French scientists ridiculing their logic, supported British 
shipping interests by downgrading the importance of quarantine 
restrictions; Turkey reportedly paid little attention to sanitary rules, 
holding that the whole system was a tool of imperialist power politics 
rather than one designed to protect Europe from invasions of 
epidemics. 145 


It is to the credit of diplomacy that under these circumstances 
nations persisted in developing constructive plans and international 
rules for controlling the spread of disease. It was a long step forward 
when the French Government convened the first International 
Quarantine Congress in 1851. Successive congresses were held in 
Constantinople in 1866, Vienna in 1874, Washington in 1881, Rome 
in 1885, and Venice in 1892. Three other agreements dealing with 
cholera which followed in 1893, 1894, and 1897 were later combined 
in a single International Sanitary Convention in 1903. In 1909, as a 
result of a 1907 meeting in Rome of 12 nations including the United 
States, a permanent International Office of Public Hygiene was set 
up in Paris. It continued to function through both World War I and 
World War II, after which it was absorbed into the World Health 
Organization (WHO), created in 1946. 

The first full-fledged international health organization, in the 
sense of one which carried out sanitary policing action, was the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), established in Mexico City in 
1902. Further strengthened in 1924 when 24 nations of the Americas 
ratified the Pan American Sanitary Code, the Bureau provided for 
regional cooperation in public health which went beyond existing 
European practices. Now known as the Pan American Health Organi- 
zation or PAHO, it still exists as an autonomous international health 
organization for the Americas; it serves additionally as the WHO 
regional office. It brought extensive experience in the control of disease 
to the process of designing the new WHO. It also played a strong role 
in the adoption of a decentralized structure for WHO, which (with 

Ui Many similar examples could be cited. In 1898, for example, German provincial inspections for trich- 
inosis were designed as much to keep out American pork as to protect local populations. (See Huddle, 
j Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 52.) 

68-196—76 9 


its six regional offices) is unique among the specialized agencies of the 
United Nations. 

There was another major development in international health 
organization before World War II. The League of Nations set up an 
International Epidemic Commission in 1920; this was succeeded by a 
health organization in 1923. The latter was a success despite feeble 
financial support from member governments (it had substantial 
assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation) ; it soon outstripped the 
Paris office in both importance and influence. 

The League of Nations Health Organization expanded to a new 
order of magnitude both the pattern of large-scale cooperative effort 
through international organizations in general and the dissemination 
of public health knowledge and skills in particular. It stimulated 
quarantine reform and quelled numerous epidemics; sought to 
standardize serums and vaccines; set up epidemiological centers in 
Geneva, Singapore, and Melbourne; established international study 
tours, lectureships, and a public health library; published monographs; 
placed its experts at the disposal of governments; and brought together 
public health officials from many countries to coordinate their efforts. 
Thus, when the World Health Organization was born, it began not 
as a revolutionary experiment in public health but as the sophisticated 
heir to the work of the League Health Organization and its 


The World Health Organization was formed in July 1946 within 
the terms of the United Nations Charter. (The United States, which 
had not belonged to the League of Nations or its Health Organization, 
became a member of WHO in June 1948.) The WHO constitution 
cites a single objective: "The attainment by all peoples of the highest 
possible level of health." Health is defined by WHO as "... a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity." 

The WHO constitution specifies 22 functions for the organization, 
ranging from the broad mandate to "act as the directing and co- 
ordinating authority on international health work" through "assist 
governments, upon request, in strengthening health services," "estab- 
lish and maintain such administrative and technical services as may 
be required, including epidemiological and statistical services," 
"promote and conduct research in the field of health," and "assist in 
developing an informed public opinion among all peoples on matters 
of health," to "take all necessary action to attain the objective of the 

These high aims and the need to resume work interrupted by the 
war, as well as to deal with conditions caused by it, gave WHO an 
early momentum. It has since grown into an international operation 
of considerable size and significance. At the time of this study (1971), 
its regular budget, funded by assessed contributions from member 
governments, had risen from an initial $5 million to $73 million — 
that of WHO and PAHO together to above $100 million. (The latter 
figure had grown to more than S150 million by 1975.) It had (and 
still has) regional offices and committees in Copenhagen, Alexandria, 


Brazzaville, Manila, New Delhi, and Washington, in addition to its 
headquarters in Geneva. It had a total staff on the order of 4,500 — 
about a fourth at headquarters, the remainder at regional and zone 
offices and in 131 (now 145) member countries. It maintained hundreds 
of laboratories and reference centers or collaborating institutes all 
over the world, had formal working relationships with some 82 major 
international government and nongovernment organizations in the 
health field, and was supported by numerous advisory panels and 
expert committees in virtually every health or health-related subject 
area. It initiated annually thousands of research grants and training 
fellowships. It administered the international health regulations 
adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1969, and under the regula- 
tions operated a global intelligence network on the principal epidemic 
diseases of the world. Finally, it was a major publisher of biomedical 
literature: Its monographs and technical reports often represented, 
in effect, a world consensus of experts in various health subject areas. 
(All of these activities are expanding.) 


Despite this impressive growth, WHO today is far from translating 
into global accomplishment such principles, enunciated in its con- 
stitution, as "The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attain- 
ment of peace and security. ..." and "unequal development in 
different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease 
... is a common danger." The failure to meet the implications of 
these declarations has been generally attributed to budgetary realities. 
Even if the major nations fully appreciated the diplomatic potential 
of public health and modern medicine as a vehicle of international good 
will, it is not likely that they would approve a budget or a philosophy 
which would look to the World Health Organization for the solution 
of all global health problems. With a budget less than one-tenth 
that of the New York City Health Department, 146 WHO concentrates 
its resources on advisory and coordinating activities and on major 
disease control and eradication programs. Undeniably, a greater 
degree of U.S. involvement and contribution of funds in excess of 
its annual assessment would improve the rate of success in the control 
of malaria, cholera, and other infectious diseases, but the monetary 
exchange rate is currently a greater problem for WHO than is the 
U.S. attitude toward international organizations. 

Larger U.S. and other member commitments to WHO would indeed 
make it possible for improved followup on its projects and programs; 
disease eradication or control programs could be intensified and 
studies of health care systems and of health manpower coordination 
could be expanded. 

But WHO was not intended to be a world medical society- to provide 
global health services to developed and developing countries. Its 
services and technical assistance are rendered in response to specific 
requests from member governments. It is the demand and the legiti- 
mate need for technical assistance, and the ability- of the requesting 

IM Kevin Cahill. The Untapped Resource: Medicine and Diplomacy. Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 
1971: p. 7. 


country to use it, which should largely determine the size of WHO's 
budget. Dr. Quimby's study suggested that WHO's budgetary re- 
straints necessitated the setting of a few high-priority programs, and 
that there would still be numerous countries in desperate need of 
advice and assistance because of degrading health conditions. 

A further perspective on WHO's failure to realize its full potential 
may be found in the author's concluding comment: 

Public health on a worldwide scale has yet to command the attention of govern- 
ments which a global perspective of health would appear to require. The nature 
of the work is undramatic; the subject offers little in the way of political capital 
as do so many other medical topics. Disciplinary development and professional 
status for public health and preventive medicine are low compared with those of 
modern diagnostic and curative medicine in the United States and other de- 
veloped countries. The public and its elected representatives may not be aware of 
the miracles which have been achieved in the field of preventive" medicine; it was 
these, rather than the glamorous surgical and pharmaceutical inventions of 
recent vintage, which so dramatically changed the life expectancy of man. The 
world was made a relatively safe place in which to live and travel many years ago 
by the application of what now appear to be rather simple biological, medical, 
and engineering facts. Indeed, the techniques of preventive medicine have been 
so successful in developed lands that neither crisis nor controversy worthy of 
intensive political attention has emerged in recent years. 

In the less-developed lands, the power to improve human health at least cost 
still lies in the application of proven technology in the public health and sanitation 
field. Curative medicine in the poor countries has as much appeal as it does in 
advanced countries with large populations of people with various forms of degen- 
erative disease, but there are lacking the medicines, the doctors, and the places 
in which to apply the cures. In many of these developing areas, the services of 
sanitary engineer, hydrologist, or geologist are more essential to permanent 
health gains than is the increased availability of doctors and clinics. Plant geneti- 
cists and agrarian reform, together with culturally adapted population policies, 
will contribute more at this time to a revolution in the health of some of the 
•economically depressed countries than will the importation of modern technology. 147 

U.S. Involvement 

The United States has played an active, if not necessarily a leading, 
part in many of the international health initiatives of the 19th and 20th 
centuries. U.S. financial support of the World Health Organization 
since its inception has been steady, and has far exceeded that of any 
other country. (The U.S. assessment ranged from about $6 million 
or 31.7 percent of the WHO assessed budget of about $20 million in 
1961 to roughly $23.65 million or 30.87 percent of the WHO total 
assessed budget of more than $73 million in 1971. In 1975 the U.S. 
assessment for WHO was $30.15 million, or 25.64 percent of the WHO 
total assessed budget of $115.4 million.) On the other hand, U.S. 
support from the beginning has been less than all-out; the United 
States has rarely voted for approval of the WHO budget, and in recent 
years has worked with the other major contributing states to reduce it. 
The United States has a respectable record of faithful payment of its 
WHO assessments and good performance in voluntary contributions 
to international health activities in general. Nevertheless, restraining 
factors over and above normal budgetary prudence appear to have 
been well entrenched. 

i« Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, p. 73. 



For example, the 2-year deiay of the United States in ratifying the 
constitution of WHO seems to have been motivated by both medical- 
political and national-political considerations, including fears that 
WHO would become involved in such questions as health insurance 
and socialized medicine in an international context rather than the 
problems of preventive medicine on an international scale. Another 
factor making for confusion of goals at the outset may have been 
that the American leaders involved in the planning of WHO were 
more likely to have been specialists in preventive medicine or public 
health than experts in curative medicine with individual patient 
orientation. They were supported by diplomats whose thinking was 
conditioned by the past dominance of public health (preventive medi- 
cine) over private health (curative medicine) philosophies in most of 
the countries of the world. It is the curative medicine school of thought 
that has dominated the power structure of American medical practice, 
and that is the more vocal and organized in exerting pressures on the 
decison making processes of the U.S. Government. Another pervasive 
factor has been the U.S. preference for bilateral programs, over which 
it could exercise more direct control, as against multilateral activities, 
which many U.S. leaders have tended to regard as inefficient if not 

Since World War II the United States has conducted a wide rang© 
of bilateral programs in the international health field, some with 
further multilateral ties and some independent. The major U.S. 
Government departments supporting programs of research, technical 
assistance, or economic aid in health and related subjects overseas 
have been the Departments of State, HEW, and Defense. 


The two principal organizations in the Department of State with 
responsibilities for international health affairs are the Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs (10) and the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID). The former administers the U.S. con- 
tributions to international and Inter- American organizations — mainly 
WHO and PAHO — and to certain special programs; they are dis- 
cussed further below under Role of Congress. AID administers the 
bulk of U.S. bilateral technical and economic assistance, including 
health and sanitation projects, and makes voluntary contributions to 
multilateral organizations like the United Nations Development 
Program. One of the largest health programs supported by AID has 
involved community water supply development and management of 
sewerage and waste disposal systems to lessen the danger of diseases 
caused by pollution. By 1971 AID had established unique guidelines 
and machinery for both operations and research in international 
health work, such as the control and eradication of epidemic and 
endemic diseases. Although funds available for such operations had 
been decreasing year by year, there was a turnabout in 1972; by 1975 


AID had a budget of about $90 million for international health, o] 
which nearly a third consisted of funds for capital investments ir 
sanitary sewerage and water supply. Earlier limitations of AID a= 
an organization serving U.S. interests in international health were lack 
of staff in the medical field and its practice of concentrating assistance 
in relatively few countries. In the fiscal year 1969, 87 percent of AID'; 
assistance to individual countries went to only 15 nations. Today 
however, AID provides health assistance to 30 nations and cooperates 
actively with WHO — not only with its Geneva headquarters but with 
its various regional offices. Indeed, the multilateral programs of WHC 
and the bilateral programs of AID are now the mainstay of global 
health activities involving the United States. Both programs are 
increasing in total funds and in scope. Furthermore, coordinatior 
between WHO and AID is today much greater than in the past 
Each knows what the other is doing, and programs are coordinated 


The Public Health Service (PHS) in the Department of Health 
Education, and Welfare is the primary U.S. Government resource 
in both national and international health. It is the official technica 
liaison with WHO and PAHO. Its chief medical officer played a majoi 
role in the drafting of the WHO's constitution and has usually served 
as head of the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly. PHS 
prepares the U.S. technical position papers for the assembly and pro- 
vides or assists in providing experts for the WHO advisory committees 

Many of HEW's laboratories and institutes serve as WHO reference 
centers or collaborating research institutes. There are many such cen- 
ters and institutes in the United States; several of them are located 
in the PHS National Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Ga. 
which is part of WHO's worldwide epidemiological intelligence net- 
work. Besides playing a prominent role in international health or- 
ganizations, HEW participates actively in U.S. bilateral health and 
sanitation programs. 

The National Institutes of Health of the Public Health Service 
(NIH) no longer maintains overseas offices in U.S. Embassies ir 
Paris, Rio de Janeiro. Tokyo, or New Delhi. It continues, however 
to support research laboratories in the Panama Canal Zone (the 
Middle America Research Unit and the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory) 
Puerto Rico (Laboratory of Perinatal Diseases), and Guam (Epidemi- 
ology and Genetics Centers). NIH also administers the Pakistar 
Cholera Research Laboratory for SEATO, funded under a bilatera 
agreement between AID and the Government of Bangladesh. 

HEW's international health activities, like those of all Federa 
agencies except AID, have been in decline in recent years. The 
activities and budgets of WHO and PAHO, on the other hand, have 
expanded somewhat each year. Despite U.S. resistance to increasing 
assessment, the United States has continued to meet its treat} 
commitments to these international organizations and to facilitate 
certain of their efforts through special voluntary contributions. 


The Department of Defense (DOD) plays a special part in the inter- 
national health field. Military medicine has long been the backbone 


of tropical and preventive medicine. The improvement in military 
medical organization from the Civil War on, the ability of the services 
to attract competent researchers and practitioners, and the mobility 
of the Armed Forces, have made it possible for military medicine to 
contribute to the remarkable progress of American medicine as a 
whole and especially to the solution of global health problems. Ameri- 
can military medicine has produced one of the best medical libraries 
in the world, and among the medical disciplines it ranks high in the 
fields of pathology and epidemiology. DOD supports a substantial 
amount of research in foreign countries and maintains four overseas 
offices in developed nations, mainly for research and development 
liaison purposes. Experienced observers have noted that with the 
end of colonial administrations and their health services in many of 
the less-developed countries U.S. military medicine has helped to fill 
the gap, especially by providing a pattern for American industry to 

With the decline in teaching of tropical medicine in U.S. medical 
schools a physician must look either to military service or to experience 
in one of the international health programs to learn how to deal with 
malaria and other endemic tropical diseases. 

Despite all this U.S. activity in the international health field, what 
seems to stand out in overview is a reluctance to become any more 
involved than is required by the tacit dictates of conscience, humani- 
tarian impulse, and characteristic American pragmatism. Forthright 
considerations of moral leadership, on the one hand, or of political 
gains to be had in pressing U.S. technical and economic advantages, on 
the other, do not appear to have been consequential factors. 

Role of Congress 

Early congressional actions with respect to WHO were not enthusias- 
tic. Congress was slow to ratify the WHO constitution and then 
arbitrarily set the annual U.S. contribution at $1.9 million, meanwhile 
appropriating tens of millions for short-term bilateral health aid. In 
general, extensive hearings records examined during the preparation 
of this study showed a strong congressional preference for bilateral 
programs. Three major studies of aid and development, available at 
the time, were of little use in focusing the attention of Congre-s on the 
extent to which poor health impedes the social and economic progress 
of mankind, or in presenting a realistic and balanced picture of both 
the problems facing international organization- like WHO and the 
great potential of adequately supported health organization^ for 
providing cost-effective solutions to many of these problems. These 
three studies were : 

One: The 400-page Pearson Report of September 15, 1969 (report 
of the Commission on International Development set up by World 
Bank President Robert S. McXamara), which dismissed international 
health problems in two pages but conveyed the impression of sweeping 
advances and credited WHO with achievements that that Agency 
would not itself claim — prompting the New England Journal oj Medi- 
cine to comment: "The cursory and grossly inaccurate treatment 
afforded health is representative of current economic thought." 

Two: The Jackson Report of September 30, 1969 ("A Study of the 
Capacity of the United Nations Development System," published by 
the United Nations), which appeared to deemphasize WHO in favor 
of a reorganized U.N. development program as the focal point of 


funds, coordination, review, and decision in technical assistance for 
country-centered health programs, and — even though such an ap- 
proach could not have been put into practice for several years — sug- 
gested to U.N. member governments that they could stabilize the 
WHO budget at the level already achieved. 

Three: The Peterson Report of March 4, 1970 (Report to the 
President from the Task Force on International Development), which 
proposed to rely on multilateral organizations like WHO in place of 
AID, but included no specific recommendation that AID funds for 
health and sanitation be transferred to WHO. Indeed, it did not even 
mention WHO directly, and rarely mentioned health. 



Nor does the method by which the executive branch presents its 
budget justification for the U.S. share of funding support for WHO and 
PAHO provide Congress with a clear and emphatic picture of the 
needs of these organizations in relation to potential for accomplish- 
ment. This justification is submitted to the House and Senate Appro- 
priations Committees (the respective Subcommittees on State, Justice, 
Commerce, and the Judiciary) as part of a total package that includes 
the United Nations and its nine specialized agencies — of which WHO 
is one; the package also includes PAHO and five other inter- American 
organizations, NATO and 6 other regional organizations, and 15 
miscellaneous bodies. Related hearings records typically do not deal 
with the nature and merit of the substantive work of agencies like 
WHO and PAHO; attention is largely focused on budgets and balance 
of payments. The prevailing view seems to be that the United States 
is overassessed and overcommitted to ever-increasing organizational 
budgets; assessments for multilateral enterprises are seen as one more 
form of foreign aid. Not only has international health not been spared 
from rising congressional concern about costs, lack of control over 
budgets, and the need to restrict the outflow of American dollars: 
on the contrary, international health organizations — as modest as 
their demands are in comparison with nuclear power and weapons 
donations, and in relation to possible returns — have often been singled 
out for budgetary discussion in both Senate and House appropriations 


Congressional frugality with respect to multilateral health programs 
would seem to reflect in large part a communications gap — that is, a 
lack of understanding of how much international health activities 
have accomplished and also how much remains to be done that cannot 
effectively be done through bilateral measures — and the absence of a 
sense of urgency. Symptomatic of the latter was the failure of a bill 
(H.R. 12453, the International Health Act of 1966) aimed at the 
shortage of manpower trained for international health activities and 
at raising the low level of U.S. participation in the WHO staff. The 
bill was supported by the HEW Secretary, the Surgeon General, the 
American Public Health Association, the Association of American 


Medical Colleges, and the American Medical Association. During 
hearings on the bill in February 1966, there was excellent dialog 
among the members of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce and the expert witnesses. WHO and PAHO were mentioned 
repeatedly during the hearings, as was the fact that international 
health problems require a different kind of instruction from that 
available in the typical American medical school. It was pointed out 
that there were only three medical schools in the United States with 
associated schools of public health. In spite of these endorsements 
and the acknowledged need to correct a defect in American medical 
education, the legislation was not passed, failing to get out of the 
Rules Committee. This inaction may be attributable to the low 
priority attached to the measure, inasmuch as no opposition was 
recorded. No subsequent legislation has been introduced specifically 
for the training of international health specialists. However, because 
of demand, several new schools or departments of public health have 
been established in American medical schools, without specific Federal 

Status of the Issue 

WHO has accomplished much in spite of lackluster moral support 
and indifferent understanding on the part of the United States as its 
major financial contributor. That it has done so must be attributed 
in large degree not only to the inherently constructive nature of health 
services — although this character may have insured WHO's survival, 
it does not account for its signal success — but rather to the sustained 
diplomatic skill and perseverance of its leadership. 

Able leadership has been evident in WHO from the beginning. 
Whereas the drafters of the WHO constitution gave it powers over 
functions which governments normally reserve to themselves, the 
authority of WHO has never been fully exercised by its administra- 
tors. Prudent men have used both commonsense and caution in apply- 
ing the constitutional provisions. As a result, WHO has been able to 
function effectively even in the presence of unresolved political 
problems. It has refused to deal with some problems because they 
were predominantly political, but worked out solutions to others — 
where necessary to organizational progress — by avoiding legalistic 
debates and pursuing a pragmatic and realistic course. Thus U.S. 
insistence upon reservations as conditions of acceptance of the WHO 
constitution was ignored as an obstacle, even though there was no 
provision in the WHO constitution for reservations: the Assembly 
accepted the United States with full rights and refused to permit such 
conditions on membership to become an issue for the future. Then, in 
1949 and 1950, when nine Communist member countries withdrew 
over alleged failure of WHO to execute agreed programs, the break 
was viewed as temporary. Withdrawing members were asked to re- 
consider, and by preparing the way for a settlement of assessments 
in arrears, WHO brought about their return after a few years. 118 

>*-' A still more difficult situation involved the handling of Arab and Israel differences within the WHO 
framework. The solution was to establish two subcommittees of the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Com- 
-8 ibcommittee B for Israel, Subcommittee A for the other Stares in the region. The subcommittees 
meet but the Regional Committee as such does not. In that way. until recently, the politicizntion of WHO 
on the Arab-Israeli issue was avoided. (It has now occurred— perhaps following the lead of UNESCO, but 
rather in the nature of a routine annual event insofar as WHO is concerned— in the form of a resolution 
against Israel for not improving the lot of the refugees, et. cetera.) 


WHO has relied less on regulations and more on the authority of 
international biomedical consensus. This course has proven politically 
wise in many instances, and an effective strategy: to report conclu- 
sions of the world's health experts and to leave implementation to 
member governments. 

Prospects and Options 

WHO's power resides largely in the high regard in which it is held 
among the scientific and public health specialists of the world and its 
acceptance as the highest forum of world medical opinion. Its limita- 
tions lie mainly in budge tary constraints which reflect lack of priority 
standing with governments and the general public. Public health on 
a worldwide scale has yet to command the attention which its potential 
for further progress would warrant. The nature of the work is undra- 
matic; in the United States and other developed countries, disciplinary 
development and professional status for public health and preventive 
medicine are low compared with those of modern diagnostic and 
curative medicine; and the public and its elected representatives are 
apparently not aware of the miracles which have been achieved in 
the field of preventive medicine (although the recently publicized 
example of the People's Republic of China may be working some 
change in this field). However, there has been an interesting recent 
development in this area: a 3-day symposium on preventive medicine 
held at NIH during the summer of 1975. 


Recent trends in international health activities reflects a move- 
ment from bilateral to multilateral programs such as those of WHO, 
PAHO, and UNDP. The Peterson Report, among other studies, 
recommended this approach. The United States has the resources, 
the systems skills, and the biomedical technology for greatly assisting 
WHO to realize its full potential. For this to happen would require 
stronger support than is now evident and more visibility at policy 
levels of the Departments of State and HEW, in the Congress, and — 
ultimately — among the U.S. public at large. 

The foregoing assessment suggests the desirability of a national 
debate on the issue of global health and its interrelationship with 
national health. Such a debate, involving medical and other scientific 
and technological, political, and economic circles, would have as its 
principal aim the education of the American public on a matter of 
fundamental human concern. The instrument for leading such a 
debate and educational initiative could appropriately be a committee 
of the Congress, or perhaps two or three committees in conjunction — 
one concerned primarily with international relations, another with 
health, and a third with science and technology. 

The study of The Politics of Global Health suggests additional needs. 
In the annual congressional scrutiny of proposed budgets for inter- 
national health activities, cost-benefit aspects have not been suffi- 
ciently examined — probably because of the great range and com- 
plexity of the subject matter. A qualified research institution could 
be enlisted to make a thorough study of the relationship between the 


actual costs and the direct and indirect benefits of international 
health programs. Examples are at hand of some successful surveys 
in specific connections: e.g., the control of poliomyelitis in the 
U.S.S.R., and the reduction of infant mortality in Yugoslavia. Such 
a survey should take account not only of past and present experience 
but also of potential benefits in relation to costs. For example, arrange- 
ments for global medical surveillance and early warning of the danger- 
ous spread of disease, together with reliable health statistics, have 
hardly scratched the surface. The United States would benefit from 
a WHO evaluation of the various systems of health care now in opera- 
tion around the world; from a set of WHO standards on electronic 
medical diagnostic equipment, water and air pollution, and methods 
in the treatment of alcoholics and heroin addicts; and from such 
other internationally established standards as WHO-FAO (Food 
and Agriculture Organization) criteria governing the permissible 
amounts of heavy metals in foods. Other types of studies for which 
the United States does not have sufficient affected population samples, 
but from which much of value to U.S. medical research and the 
American people could be learned, include studies of the effect of 
severe malnutrition on earl}' development and learning and perhaps 
of certain types of cancer and heart disease. 



It might also be appropriate to consider shifting the main burden 
of budgetary justification for WHO, PAHO, and other international 
health activities from the Department of State to DHEW. With 
appropriate State Department coordination but without present 
constraints on the presentation of substantive accomplishments and 
needs resulting from the simultaneous consideration of funding for all 
international organization activities in all fields, DHEW might be 
expected to serve as a more effective focal point for the technical 
documentation, planning, review, and analysis of issues in connection 
with U.S. participation in WHO, PAHO, and certain bilateral bio- 
medical programs. Underlying this proposal is the reasoning that the 
expansion of national public health interests to global dimensions 
requires not only conventional diplomacy: It calls also for worldwide 
experience with science, medicine, and public health as political 
systems themselves and for experts in the subject matter. To the 
increasing extent that a worldwide approach is taken to the problems 
of human health, it will be necessary for knowledge to be shared and 
exchanged by those who through training and practice are equipped 
to work with it. 

The problems and potential of the State Department for managing 
U.S. relationships with international activities in general are examined 
later, in Issue Six. It has been a thesis of the present study that it would 
be beneficial for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
to be brought more into the forefront of policy formulation and 
review, and budget presentation, with respect to U.S. support of 
international health programs. (See, however, the author's postscript 
to this comment, immediately following.) 


Author's Reassessment in 1975 

No changes have occurred in the past 4 years which would modify 
the conclusions of the study, except in some matters of detail. Author 
Freeman H. Quimby comments (July 1975) as follows: 

(a) Because science and medicine have an international 
character of their own, it seemed to make sense that DHEW 
justify before Congress the U.S. funding of international health 
organizations. However, in recent years domestic problems have 
so preoccupied DHEW, NTH, and AMA (American Medical 
Association) that their attention to international concerns has 
been minimal. Today it would be prudent to consider additional 
options for a new organizational spokesman for health concerns, 
as suggested in the Peterson Report, or a combination of services 
from the National Academy of Sciences Foreign Office and 
Institute of Medicine. 

(b) The diplomatic potential for the worldwide improvement 
of human health lies primarily in preventive medicine and in 
related socioeconomic factors. The relatively high level of medical 
technology in the developed countries is not a primary contributor 
to this potential, though it may have its uses as a diplomatic 
tool in dealing with the ruling elites of the less developed nations. 
Diplomatic efforts should be aimed at providing technologies 
to benefit the health of whole populations, thereby also sub- 
stantially promoting development. (As indicated in The Politics 
of Glooal Health, a correlation study of a broad spectrum of social 
and economic indicators in 115 countries showed that health 
variables tended to be the most highly correlated with all other 
measures of progress.) 149 There is no doubt as to how this factor 
operates, and most international public health experts, sociol- 
ogists, and economists understand it. In simple terms, good health 
equates with social economic, and personal development. 

(c) The role of WHO in the administration of programs for 
the control and eradiction of disease is the same as it was 4 
years ago. The importance of that role, however, has been under- 
lined by subsequent events: The growing competition for food 
and energy resources, heightened perception of environmental 
problems and the need for controlling them, and further pressures 
for the advances in family planning. The essentially international 
character of these problems, along with those of health, becomes 
increasingly clear, as does the fact of interaction among many 
of them ; a global perspective is essential to their management 
and ultimate solution. 

(d) The 1971 study suggested that the Congress may not have 
grasped the significant relationship of international health to 
national health. Since then, other international problems have 
framed priority in Congress over those in the health field ; except 
in connection with food reserves, congressional attention is per- 
haps even less focused on international health than it was 4 
years ago. 

«« Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, p. 67. 



(e) It is more effective to think and plan globally for the health 
component in the quality of life than it is to make bilateral 
agreements with other powers to undertake research of interest 
to them in a certain disease, when in fact, large regions if not the 
whole world are affected by the disease. Several such bilateral 
agreements in effect today will probably accomplish less than if 
the same money were spent on regional centers involving the 
participation of many nations, developed and less developed. 
The WPIO cancer center in Lyons, France, is a highly effective 
example ; there is an urgent need for other multinational centers 
focusing on specific diseases. 

(f) It was pointed out in the study that evidence did not 
support the idea that medical assistance should be withheld from 
less developed countries on the ground that it will merely exac- 
erbate the population problem, but rather — at least in long-range 
terms — the reverse. In most explicit terms, the study suggested, 
and quoted authorities who contended, that good health facili- 
tated population control. However, the theory of the relationship 
of the population growth to improvement in public health 
measures, combined with rising standards of living, is not well 
developed. 150 This is a subject deserving of intensive investigation 
by Congress and additional research efforts in support of such 
investigation. (See also Issue Three.) 

(g) As a result of politically motivated decisions by UNESCO, 
some Western nations are withholding funds and some scholars 
are boycotting UNESCO-sponsored meetings. It is too early to 
determine whether or not such pro- Arab, Communist, and Third 
World trends will continue in UNESCO. The question, of course, 
is whether WHO will experience a similar awkwardness and 
require adjustments beyond those which it has already satisfac- 
torily negotiated in response to similar influences in its Eastern 
Mediterranean Region. The answer is, probably not; WHO is 
organized in such a way that combinations of bloc votes in its 
World Health Assembly have less influence over crucial WHO 
decisions than do the decisions of its more powerful 24-man 
Executive Board. On the Board, professional representatives of 
at least four major powers wield strong technical influence over 
WHO's major assistance programs. It is important to preserve 
this arrangement if the United Nations itself should become less 
effective and future development should leave WHO to go it alone. 

(h) In summary, it seems reasonable today to reach conclusions 
similar to those in the original analysis : 

^ That multinational cooperation in WHO and PAHO will con- 
tinue to contribute effectively to the technical and organizational 
health needs of the world, of regions, and of the participating 
member countries. 

< Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, pp. 67-68; 


That the massive prestige and universal respect commanded 
by WHO justifies a greater involvement of the U.S. Government 
and American health experts in supporting and shaping the WHO 
programs for those global health problems which do not lend 
themselves to typical bilateral aid. 

That a U.S. role of positive promotion of WHO should be 
viewed as beneficial if not, indeed, essential to the success of 
that agency's rational attack on world health problems, with 
commensurate benefits to U.S. national health. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

The study of The Politics of Global Health po^es a variety of questions 
for congressional consideration. The following are some examples : 

Would it be desirable, and realistic, for the United States to assume 
a more positive and supportive role in the field of global health as a 
means of strengthening its overall diplomatic posture? 

If so, what steps should Congress take: 

(a) To inform itself more fully about needs and opportunities? 

(b) To persuade the American public of the appropriateness of 
such a move? 

What can be learned from public health preventive medicine and 
health care programs of the People's Republic of China? 

Could the United States effectively promote regional health activi- 
ties as a low-profile way of contributing to "technological end runs" 
in areas of military conflict, such as the Middle East, or of lesser 
political confrontation, as in sections of Africa? Should it seek to do 

How should U.S. programs in the international health field be 
coordinated? What should be the respective roles of the Department 
of State and the mission-oriented agencies? 

How effective is the monitoring of the World Health Organization 
by U.S. agencies? How well do they report on WHO's budgetary needs 
and the importance cf WHO's activities to the United States? Do 
the White House, the Science and Technology Policy Office (STPO), 
and/or the State Department take an active interest and play a 
constructive role in this connection? Who should account to Congress 
and the U.S. public regarding U.S. support of ongoing and projected 
WHO activities? Is a new institutional mechanism needed? 

Should there be more intensive efforts to inform the public through 
the press of the existence of the World Health Organization and its 
objectives and achievements? For example, WH(T fully expects its 
goal of eradicating smallpox from the Earth to be achieved by July 
1976. (This, will be the first time in all history that man has succeeded 
in eliminating globally a human disease.) 


In a world shrunk by television, electronic commtmications, and air 
transport, the tragedy of famine is increasingly everyone's concern. 
Although technologies of food production and population control are 

M U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Beyond Maithut: The Food/People Equation, 
in the series Science. Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on Nations} 
Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Allan S. Nanes. Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress. 1971, p. 69. iCommittee print.) 


sufficiently advanced that the age-old problem of feeding the world '3 
people is technically solvable, famine still occurs. Food and people are 
unevenly distributed over the globe. The undertaking in the study 
by Dr. Allan S. Nanes is to explore the reasons why the technical 
balancing of the food/population equation, although feasible, remains 

Since about 1950 the United States has maintained a substantial 
program of aid to developing countries. Two main elements of this 
program have been the strengthening of institutions and measures of 
enhancing food production and public health. Although agricultural 
productivity has risen, the death rate has declined and populations 
have increased so that despite the efforts of the developing countries, 
with U.S. aid, to improve their food/population positions, the effect 
is that of being on a treadmill — or worse. The impact of inflation and 
the raising of petroleum prices by- OPEC has intensified the plight of 
many developing countries. As the problem is summed up by Robert S. 
McNamara, president of the World Bank: 

. . . Roughly half the population — in the developing world — are neither con- 
tributing significantly to economic growth nor sharing equitably in its benefits. 
These are the poor. Within most developing societies, they form a huge group at 
the lower end of the income spectrums, receiving only a fraction of what the 
middle- and upper-income groups do. 

Some 900 million of these individuals subsist on incomes of less than $75 a year 
in an environment of squalor, hunger, and hopelessness. They are the absolute 
poor, living in situations so deprived as to be below any rational definition of 
human decency. Absolute poverty is a condition of life so limited by illiteracy, 
malnutrition, disease, high infant-mortality, and low life-expectancy as to deny 
its victims the very potential of the genes with which they are born. In effect, 
it is life at the margin of existence. 152 

As these vast deprived populations struggle for sustenance, the 
technology of the developed world has enabled it to produce large 
surpluses of food, and to elect by conscious choice the kind of lifestyle 
it will adopt. The division of the world into rich and poor nations is 
increasingly a source of bitter resentment at international forums 
where the subjects of environment, energy, materials, food, and popu- 
lation are discussed with animus and frustration by spokesmen for a 
majority of the world's sovereign states. 

It is in tins context, in which diplomacy, technology, and human 
institutions are closely intertwined, that the study Beyond Malthus 
attempts to define the issue of the food/population equation, its 
importance, and its significance for future American foreign policy. 

Statement of the Issue 

The implication of the food/population equation is that mankind 
must somehow contrive to produce enough but not too much food 
to feed the world's population, while providing incentives and means 
for the world's population to hold itself within reasonable bounds. 
Beyond this dual task is the further task of assuring the development 
of a system of distribution of food to meet human needs, and a political 
and economic structure to assure stability of the whole process. 

152 Robert S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Washington, Sept. 1, 1975, p. 13. 


The complexity of the task of evening out the global inequities in 
food supply and the unbalances in the food/population balance is 
described by Dr. Nanes in the following passage : 

The problem of achieving a relatively stable balance between food resources 
and population in the less developed countries is one of enormous complexity. 
It has biological and medical aspects relating to the development and employment 
of safe and effective methods of contraception. It involves decisions about basic 
economic questions such as the allotment of resources, manpower needs, the 
use of incentives, and the establishment of channels of distribution. It calls for 
the modification of cultural and social values that have existed, in some cases, 
for millennia. It affects the internal politics of the developing countries, and adds 
to the strains on their relatively weak administrative machinery. It tests the ef- 
fectiveness of communications techniques and training methods. It requires the 
development of irrigation systems, intensive use of fertilizers, and in the view of 
many experts the development of new crops even more responsive to fertilizers; 
this in turn involves research in plant genetics. The depredation of food supplies 
by animal and insect pests must be brought under control. Improved food pres- 
ervation techniques need to be developed. Disease, which cuts down the caloric 
efficiency of ingested foods, must be fought, so that ill health does not diminish 
the supply of manpower during a planting season, or cause the loss of a crop. 
In many instances a market economy must be developed where none existed 

What needs to be done is virtually endless, and it is all interconnected. This 
interconnection of very many diverse elements is characteristic of the entire 
modernization process in the underdeveloped countries, and the solution of the 
food/population equation is simply a specialized model of that process. 153 

Undoubtedly the central problem is the construction of political 
and administrative arrangements to bring to bear the available 
technologies that can overcome the physical difficulties in the global 
food/population unbalance. Fortunately, genetic developments in food 
grains (the so-called " Green Revolution") and a number of innovative 
technologies to effect population control have come into being within 
the present generation. "As matters now stand there is at least a 
chance that development aid, abetted by a skillful and flexible diplo- 
macy and working in conjunction with science and technology . . . 
could help to bring about a reasonable equilibrium between population 
and food resources in the so-called Third World." 164 

Importance of the Issue 

The issue should be restated in order to highlight its importance. 
As Nanes puts it: 

Rapidly advancing technology shows promise of enlarging world supplies of 
food to meet completely the needs of the world's burgeoning population. Tech- 
nology has also demonstrated that it can be used to slow the rate of human 
reproduction. On a global basis, mankind need no longer be the inevitable victim 
of a postulated Malthusian law that condemns some fraction of the total number 
to starvation or semi-starvation. The question now becomes one of skill in human 
management: Can man so order himself and his institutions of government and 
administration, that he can make use of the food and population technologies he 
has been permitted to discover? 15S 

The moral aspect of upwards of a billion human beings on the 
threshold of starvation scarcely needs stressing. However, in a de- 
veloping country the adverse consequences of an insufficiency of 
proper nutrition constitute a chain reaction that perpetuates the 
underdeveloped state of the nation. Calorie deficiencies are measured 

"» Nanes, Beyond Malthus, pp. 11-12. 
im Ibid., p. 12. 
»« Ibid., p. 87. 


in reduced output of work. Deficiencies of the eight amino acids col- 
lectively designated as "protein" cause physical and mental retarda- 
tion, a disease called "kwashiorkor," and vulnerability to many 
normally minor disorders. Thus, the poorer the diet, the higher the 
incidence of disease, and with it the more difficult the developing 
country's task in seeking to provide its people with an adequate diet; 
and as diet-deficient children become adults, the fewer of them will 
ultimately be qualified to carry out the more sophisticated tasks of 
economic development. 

The population side of the equation is no less important. The 
world's population is increasing faster than at any time in previous 
history. Moreover, increases are highest in the underdeveloped coun- 
tries. "Thus, while the current rate of population growth in North 
America is 1.2 percent, in Western Europe 0.6 percent, and in the 
U.S.S.R. 1 percent, in Africa it is 2.7 percent, in Asia 2.3 percent, and 
in Latin America 2.9 percent." 156 The significance of these rates of 
population growth in relation to food supply and economic develop- 
ment is of commanding importance. As the author points out: 

There are many reasons to consider the need for national and global efforts to 
stem the rate of population increase. Population density affects the ability of 
human societies to preserve the quality of life, to make available adequate re- 
sources to sustain life, to maintain order, to govern, to insure the security of the 
individual from crime, to maintain the security of nations from tension or even 
insurrection, I and to reduce the possibility of international conflicts. Population 
numbers and rate of increase have a profound bearing on all of these. 157 

Political unrest is a recurrent theme. Thus: 

All phases of development are retarded as long as population eats into economic 
growth. Investment is held back or channeled into unproductive areas. Job oppor- 
tunities are not created, and unemployment or underemployment spreads. Social 
misery continues unchecked, and populations — rural and urban — become increas- 
ingly susceptible to appeals to violence. 158 

And again: 

Population pressure in one country (for example East Pakistan) cannot help 
exerting pressure on its neighbors (for example India). Population differences 
make bad neighbors, just as affluence and poverty make bad neighbors. This 
dilemma must be resolved cooperatively if it is to be resolved at all. It will be 
solved either rationally by agreement among nations and an orderly process of 
implementation; or it is likely to be resolved irrationally by war, disease, and 
social disorder within and among nations. 159 

How the Issue Developed 

The seriously disproportionate growth of population in relation 
to agricultural productivity in the developing countries today presents 
a different picture from that of 19th century Europe or the United 
States in undergoing their transformations into modern industrialized 
nations. Abundant fertile and well-watered land in a congenial climate 
solved the U.S. food problem, further aided by systematic resort to 
advancing farm technology and capital. Western Europe combined 
advanced agricultural technology with imports of food, paid for with 
exports from industry. Japan combined the European practice with 
extensive resort to food from the ocean. In all three cases, the fortunate 

im Ibid., p. 54; 
i* 7 Ibid., p. 92. 
»« Ibid., p. 96. 
im Ibid., p. 93. 

-196—76 10 


physical and technological conditions combined with organizational 
and educational strengths to assure a self-reliant and well-nourished 

It is tempting to attribute the food/population unbalance in develop- 
ing countries today to a lag in technology. Unquestionably, Nanes 
concedes, it is a factor. However, a more notable deficiency — 

... is the general deficiency in knowledge of the complex factors involved. 
The processes of population growth are not understood. The statistics of food 
and population are poor. Even the techniques for disseminating improved tech- 
nology are faulty. Under these conditions, the negotiation of positive diplomatic 
arrangements and the task of planning programs to achieve the goal of food/ 
population balance tend to be unsystematic and episodic. 180 

The theme of the inadequacy of data on food and population runs 
throughout the paper. Data are needed for diagnosis of the problems, 
formulation of policy, design of ameliorative programs, and setting 
of practicable long-range goals. Associated with the lack of data for 
these purposes are two other deficiencies: (1) insufficient understand- 
ing of the cultural djmamics of each individual society, including its 
readiness to accept or adapt particular technologies of food production 
or population control ; and (2) the low level of education. 

It would seem to be essential that the base of education be strengthened in 
all countries so that their peoples can understand the reality of the problem, and 
to assure that the best available technology bearing on the food/people equation 
is everywhere available and in the hands of people competent to use it. 191 

U.S. Involvement 

Recognition in the United States of the need of the developing 
countries for enhanced agricultural technology came early. From 
the outset of foreign aid programs after World War II their content 
was extensively technological. Their scope encompassed improvements 
in fertilizer practice, genetic strains, irrigation, farm mechanization, 
food preservation and storage, and marketing systems. However, 
defects in the programs were frequent: in the appropriateness of 
particular technologies to the cultures of various of the developing 
countries, in the willingness and ability of the aided peoples to use 
the transplanted technologies, and in the basic data required for 
planning and programing to introduce improved practices. 

Awareness of the population side of the food/people equation as 
an appropriate target for U.S. policy lagged nearly a decade behind 
the attention to the factor of food. Thus, in 1959, President Eisen- 
hower declared that, "This Government has not, and will not as long 
as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that 
has to do with this problem of birth control. That is not our business." 
At that time, Nanes observes, the "population explosion" had not at- 
tracted general awareness. However, by 1965, Mr. Eisenhower had 
reversed his stand "when he came out in favor of measures authoriz- 
ing the Government to cope effectively with the need to slow down 
and then stabilize the world's population growth." 162 

i«o Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
«» Ibid., p. 94. 
"2 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 



On both sides of the food/people equation, U.S. diplomacy has a 
concern related to world peace and stability. Accordingly, the report 
Suggests, ". . . It would seem to be advantageous for U.S. long- 
range policy to search out and exploit every available opportunity to 
establish a solid and scientific, factual base of information about 
this equation for individual nations, for the regions of the world, and 
worldwide." m 

In relating diplomacy and national policy to the food/people equa- 
tion, it is important to recognize that the United States has a profound 
long-range interest in the achievement of balance, but has a powerful 
influence on only the food side of the equation. As the world's largest 
producer of food, and possessing the most advanced technology of 
"agribusiness," the United States is in a strong position to export 
both food and food technology. Leverage on the other term of the 
equation was for long limited to the capability of exporting technology 
and managerial skill — without, however, any certainty that either of 
these intellectual exports would be compatible with the cultures and 
political structures of the nations facing the severest population pres- 
sures. The possibility that the United States might use the leverage 
of food surpluses in a compelling way to motivate population policy 
decisions was not considered. Even the provision of U.S. assistance 
to voluntary population control programs was not a factor before the 
mid-1960s. Legislation in 1966 authorized the use of U.S. -owned or 
U.S. -controlled foreign currencies to assist voluntary family planning 
programs in countries requesting such assistance. Then, the "Foreign 
Aid Act of 1967 not only put the stamp of approval on U.S. assistance 
to family planning programs in the LDCs; it also earmarked funds, 
for the first time, for this specific purpose. The amount so designated 
in 1967 was $35 million. Thereafter the amount was to increase 
annuaiTy." In 1968 the legislation renewing Public Law 480 (Public 
Law 90-436) also earmarked funds for population-related programs. 164 

It is possible to foresee a time in the future at which demands for 
food exports from the United States wtII far outstrip the Nation's 
capacity to deliver. At such a time, what policies will govern the 
allocation of food to the needy? Will relevant priorities include best 
effort on the part of claimants to expand their own production of 
food, or to stabilize their own populations? 

Role of Congress 

In 1954 the Congress moved in a major way into the problem of 
global food supply with passage of the Agricultural Trade and 
Developmental Act of 1954, better known as "Public Law 480." 
This act established the policy of Congress "to make maximum effi- 
cient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance of the 
foreign policy of the United States." Although the main emphasis of 
the program established under this act was the liquidation of surpluses, 

>m Ibid., pp. 93-04. 
!«< Ibid., pp. 74-75. 


the resultant food aid was massive. Between 1954 and 1967, exports 
of Public Law 480 agricultural products amounted to $17.2 billion; 
recipients were 116 countries with half the world's population. How- 
ever, during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 
defects in the program became apparent. In particular, the flow of 
of U.S. foodstuffs enabled foreign governments to evade the making of 
hard decisions on agricultural development, internal reforms, and 
population matters. As recorded by Dr. Nanes, the response of 
Congress was to redirect the thrust of the program to motivate 
needed reforms: 

In 1966, Public Law 480 underwent a major overhaul; the program of food 
assistance was tied directly to the efforts of the developing countries to limit their 
population growth. These changes can be found in the Food for Peace Act, Public 
Law 89-808. In the first place, the entire rationale of the law was changed. Instead 
of a device to dispose of U.S. agricultural supluses, the new law advances a 
program to combat hunger and malnutrition and assist economic development, 
particularly in those countries that do the most to help themselves. In line with 
this program, the President is directed, in negotiating and carrying out agree- 
ments for the sale of agricultural commodities, whether for dollar credits or 
foreign currencies, to take account of the efforts of the other countries to meet 
their problems of food production and population growth. In the Foreign Assis- 
tance Act of 1968 one of the purposes for which agreements concerning the use of 
foreign currencies can be made is that of ". t : activities, where participation is 
voluntary, related to problems of population growth. : .- . Not less than five 
(5) percentum of the total sales proceeds received each year shall, if requested 
by the foreign country, be used for voluntary programs to control population 
growth." (Emphasis added.) That same law also contained a provision stipulating, 
as one of the self-help criteria the developing country must meet in order for the 
President to agree to the sale of agricultural commodities, the criterion of 
"carrying out voluntary programs to control population growth." This is stronger 
language than that which would merely take account of LDC efforts at self help. 165 

Concern continues, however, "lest unchecked population growth 
lead not only to starvation in the LDCs, but to the wreckage of 
international development as well." In Dr. Nanes' opinion, "It seems 
likely that the Congress will continue to monitor events in the field 
of population with a view to the possible passage of legislation to 
make U.S. policy in this area more effective." 166 

Status of the Issue in 1971 

The distinction between cases and issues in the separate studies of 
Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy is that the cases repre- 
sent discrete events with some sort of terminus while issues are by 
nature continuing and inconclusive. The summation of the study of 
the issue of the food/people equation conforms with this distinction: 

The final result of the international campaign to bring food and population into 
balance in the LDCs — in such a way that economic development can go forward, 
and an acceptable level of human welfare can be achieved and sustained — cannot 
be foreseen. Certainly the challenge is as difficult as any ever faced by man; it 
calls for the careful management of a complex interaction of scientific knowledge, 
diplomacy, and social engineering. At the beginning of the decade of the 1970s, the 
issue is very much in doubt. In the years ahead, the extent and character of the 
U.S. effort can have a crucial effect for good or ill. 197 

By 1971 it had become evident that the problem of balancing the 
food/people equation was not fundamentally a technological one. 
It was true that further applications of science were needed, and 

»« Ibid., p. 38. 
»» Ibid., p. 84. 
»« Ibid., p. 96. 


efforts were underway to provide them. But, with respect to food 
supply the genetic developments of the Green Revolution presaged 
a large increase in the production of feed grains. More intensive use 
of fertilizers offered opportunities of further major gains. Also of 
importance was the application of well-established technologies of 
food preservation, storage, and protection against depredations of 
pests. With respect to population stabilization, the evidence of the 
developed countries suffices to demonstrate that sharp increases in 
numbers are not an inevitable consequence of rising affluence but 
rather the reverse. However, the primary factor missing in the de- 
veloping countries is the complex of institutions and organizational 
arrangements to create the social, cultural, economic, educational, 
and other modifications in human behavior and relationships that 
collectively result in the motivation of a population to relate its 
numbers to its resources. In 1971 the rate of population increase was 
steepest in the countries least able to sustain it. While the United 
States was exerting increasing pressure on these countries to develop 
an institutional capability to stabilize the food/people equation, the 
traditional emphasis of the United States on freedom of individual 
choice, combined with respect for cultural and religious values, tended 
to negate official pressures for dealing constructively with the popu- 
lation side of the equation. By itself, the encouragement of food 
production in the developing countries, supplemented by U.S. exports^ 
was no adequate answer. 

food/people equation as index op development 

The status of the food/people equation is an excellent index of 
development. But development must deal with a far larger scope of 
programs than food production and population stabilization. To 
achieve the necessary level of progress, including the equation discussed 
here, requires strengthened organization of political forms, improved 
educational and public health institutions, more comprehensive and 
timely gathering of statistical data, systems of technology transfer 
(as for example the highly successful U.S. system of agricultural 
county agents), rail and highway transport, and other elements of 
technological infrastructure. 

Prospects and Options Suggested by the Study 

A number of policy issues that might merit congressional attention 
can be drawn from the study. Others, coming out of the 4 years of 
experience since the study was first issued, amplify but do not alter 
the general thrust of the report. 

bilateral versus multilateral approach 

The study divided its attention between two kinds of approaches to 
the food/people equation: one was the U.S. bilateral approach in 
which food was used directly as aid and indirectly as a motivation for 
population control by the aided country; the other was the efforts of 
the United Nations and associated U.N. institutions, chiefly the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank, to deal with 
the problem on a global basis. Neither approach has scored marked 
success and even diagnosis of the problem lacks specificity. The fault 
appears to lie more in the field of the social sciences and their applica- 
tion than in the field of technology. 


It is contended by some analysts that a stronger support of the U.N.. 
effort might have been more rewarding than the U.S. practice of 
emphasizing bilateral aid. This is possible, of course. Multilateral aid 
was shown in the study to have a number of particular advantages in 
this field, as also in the field of global health. Some of these advantages 
are identified by Dr. Nanes as follows : 

The inherent advantage of multilateral over bilateral assistance is that the 
diplomatic profile of the donor is lowered. Motives of the donors are under less 
suspicion. Another presumed advantage is that recipients may be more likely to 
contribute substantively to the planning of general programs. If they are in- 
volved in the planning, they are more positively committed to the implementation 
of plans. Burdens of cost can be more widely distributed. Results can be better 
analyzed on the basis of international comparisons. Contributions to a genuinely 
global program can be expected to come earlier from those nations which are 
initially recipients. Some forms of assistance practically demand a global 
approach. 168 

However, Dr. Nanes also warns that the multilateral approach is 
not without its present defects: 

The asserted advantages of the multilateral approach to world agriculture 
should not obscure the evident weaknesses of present institutions to accomplish 
purposes generally sought. Some of the weakensses attributed to the U.N. com- 
plex have included: Uncertain funding, varied quality of technical personnel, 
wavering political support, confused lines of functional organization, want of 
firmness in management, and absence of accepted overall authority. The desira- 
bility of a clearer mandate for specific global chores to be implemented by this 
system, and a general overhaul and strengthening, would appear to warrant early 
legislative and diplomatic consideration. 168 

One major example of multilateral aid is the program of the World 
Bank under the leadership of President McNamara. This institution 
has identified five principal "roadblocks" to enhanced agricultural 
productivity in poor regions (paraphrase) : 

1. Where poor farmers are struggling to subsist on semiarid 
or marginal land, there is a critical need for new agricultural 
technologies tailored to these conditions. 

2. Another roadblock is government-imposed pricing and sub- 
sidy policies to provide cheap food to the cities at the expense 
of reduced incentive to rural areas to expand agricultural 

3. The small farmer is almost always discriminated against by 
public institutions, which tend to favor the larger and more 
prosperous producers in terms of access to public credit, research, 
water allocations, and scarce supplies of petroleum, pesticides, 
and fertilizer. 

4. There is a scarcity of trained technicians to implement 
complex Tural operations. 

5. Finally, all of us have a great deal more to learn about the 
motivational patterns and behavioral responses of the poor in 
shifting from traditional subsistence agriculture to cash-crop 
production. 170 

"« Ibid., p. 90. 
>»» Ibid., p. 91. 
»'° McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors (op. cit.), pp. 16-18. 



There is irony in the fact that one of the most successful technologies 
to increase agricultural productivity — the genetic achievements re- 
ferred to as the "Green Revolution" — has created many socioeconomic 
problems by its very success. As Dr. Nanes explains: 

Broadly speaking, the problems set in train by the Green Revolution fall into 
two categories: (1) Those appearing within the LDCs themselves, as a result of 
the political, social, and economic effects of the new technology; and (2) the 
consequences for the developed nations of the world of the appearance of the new 
abundance of staple food commodities. The actions taken in response call for three 
sets of organizational entities: (1) institutions and organizational arrangements 
within the LDC itself to smooth the path and ease the dislocations of the Green 
Revolution; (2) bilateral arrangements, such as between the United States and 
an LDC; and (3) international or multilateral agreements and systems to provide 
global stability, unify international purposes, and ease international conflicts 
arising out of the changed patterns of trade. 

The prospective abundance threatens to generate several kinds of problems 
within the LDCs. Gains in food production may be poorly distributed from one 
district to another, as between East and West Pakistan. They may benefit the 
wealthier farmers while leaving the poor farmers even less well off. Both of these 
effects generate tensions within a country. The already evident flight from the 
farms to the cities is likely to intensify, with unemployment increasing in both 
poor rural areas and cities. All of these effects call for mediation and corrective 
action by the LDC governments, and in some cases for hard decisions on the part 
of political leaders. If the alternative is between governmental overthrow and 
outside assistance, it would seem to be important for the United States and its 
diplomats to know what form such assistance should appropriately take. It 
would seem also to be important to know in which countries such outside assistance 
would be likely to be effective, and where it would be merely support for a losing 
cause. Among the kinds of support that have been mentioned are: Improved 
credit resources more widely available at regional and local banking levels; more 
widespread and longer education of the population; encouragement of the use of 
labor intensive farm equipment; assistance to small farmers in the exploitation 
of the new genetic forms of grain; increased opportunities for rural industry; 
improved arrangements for storing surplus grains and preventing losses to pests; 
better arrangements and facilities for the marketing of agricultural products; and 
above all, a strong administration of government, equipped with adequate taxing 
power and management skills to distribute equitably the costs and gains of the 
Green Revolution m 


Applied sociology is certainly important in meeting the challenge 
of the food/people equation. Its relevance to the task of raising agri- 
cultural productivity is stressed by Mr. McNamara. However, its 
importance for the other term of the equation — •the stabilizing of 
populations — is even greater. On this point Dr. Nanes writes: 

If the food/population problem in the developing countries is to be brought 
under control, there must be strong motivation for couples to limit the number 
of their children. Mere expressions of general interest in the idea of fertility 
control will not suffice. For example, surveys have been made which suggest 
that 70 percent of the women interviewed were interested in controlling the size 
of their families, but experience indicates that this does not mean that all of 
these women will use family planning services if they are made available. Pre- 
sumably the same applies to men. In any event, there is little information oa 
incentives and inducements for birth control in the LDCs, particularly where 
strong motivation is necessary to overcome cultural barriers to contraception. 

171 Nanes, Beyond Malthus, pp. 88-89. 


Among other behavioral matters in which additional data would be helpful 
are the following: the sociopsychological aspects of male-female interaction; 
socioeconomic factors affecting human behavior relative to marriage, fertility, and 
migration; and social processes leading to cultural change. Human behavior is, 
after all, the most critical factor in maintaining a balance between population 
and available f o«d resources, and indeed in the whole development process. 172 

For the United States alone, or under bilateral arrangements, to 
embark on studies of this sort would seem less appropriate than for 
this country to give vigorous encouragement to their pursuit by 
agencies of the United Nations. The reasons given above by Dr. 
Nanes for the virtues of multilateral programs appear almost uniquely 
applicable to this area. On the other hand, U.S. skills in agricultural 
technology might well be suited to transfer under bilateral arrange- 
ments. The technology appropriate to the U.S. climate, soils, economy, 
and other factors might not generally be suited to developing countries. 
But U.S. research methods and the remarkably successful U.S. 
methods of transfering technology from the research station to the 
individual farmer could be widely useful abroad. 173 

Author's Reassessment in 1975 

The main theme of the study is the interrelationships among food 
supply, population growth, and the entire process of development. 
Subsidiary themes concern food requirements and the technology of 
food production, the technology of birth limitation, and the problem 
of motivating people in the developing countries to adopt available 
birth control techniques. The study is further concerned with the 
organizational concepts, plans, programs, and international arrange- 
ments designed to operate on these variables. The enormous human 
complexity of the food/population problem — social, cultural, economic, 
religious, administrative, political, diplomatic — is suggested as an 
overlying theme. 


These themes seem unquestionably as relevant today as at the 
time the study was written. The importance of the food problem has 
been pointed up again in recent months by the famine in the Sahel 
and elsewhere, and by the World Food Conference, proposed by the 
United States and held in Rome in November 1974. Population 
growth continues essentially unabated, while a key effort to control 
such growth, namely, the program in India, appears to have failed. 
The solution of the food/population dilemma remains crucial if the 
poverty of the underdeveloped countries is to be substantially 

In this connection it may be noted that there has been some change 
in the philosophy of development, with a number of experts now con- 
tending that first priority should go to the upgrading of agriculture, 
not only for the purpose of increasing the indigenous food supply, but 
also as a means of providing employment. It is suggested that the 
latter objective be achieved by the use of labor-intensive, rather than 

™ Ibid., p. 11. 

"3 On this point see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, Agriculture Research 
and Development: Background Papers, prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology 
and the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. September 1975, 
pp. 25-26. (Committee print.) 


capital-intensive, methods. (In other words, the most modern tech- 
niques may not necessarily be the most applicable, as far as the less 
developed countries are concerned.) 

If the study were to be rewritten today there would be no change in 
its emphasis in any significant way. Few changes appear to have oc- 
curred in the subject covered except that, as noted above, the food 
problem has become even more critical. Parts of the sections on the 
technology of the problem, particularly the technology of birth control, 
might need revision in light of the latest research. 

'the study is as important to congressional concerns as when it was 
written, and perhaps even more so. Recent famines, the World Food 
Conference, and the earlier World Population Conference in Bucharest 
have highlighted the problems of food and population once again. 
U.S. food export policy appears to have become a more important 
political issue than it was during the period when the study was in 

The study seems as relevant now to the project series as at the time 
it was written. Certainly the relationship of food supply to population 
is one that is markedly affected by the state of technology in each of 
these fields. It is equally certain that the food/population problem 
is at the forefront of the concerns of world diplomacy. Consequently 
the study can still serve as a highly appropriate vehicle for exploring 
the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy. 


Among the more significant observations of the study were the 
following: (a) The food 'population problem cannot be separated 
from the total process of development — development is a seamless 
web. (b) The growth of world population is outpacing food production; 
and available techniques have not been applied sufficiently to achieve 
increased production and more efficient marketing of agricultural 
produce on the one hand, or slow down the rate of population increase 
on the other, (c) The achievement of a global balance of food and 
population will require improvements in political, economic, social, 
and diplomatic organization and management, (d) The devising of 
programs to deal with both sides of the food/population balance is 
a matter of great urgency, (e) If economic development becomes a 
kind of treadmill, with gains in development nullified by gains in 
population, the United States will have spent many billions of dollars 
to no lasting purpose. In such a case U.S. foreign aid is likely to be 
terminated, and the task of U.S. diplomacy in the underdeveloped 
world is likely to become far more difficult than it already is. (f) A 
solution of the food/population issue, while not guaranteeing the 
success of U.S. and other development assistance programs, will 
presumably permit the assignment of additional resources to other 
phases of development now receiving less attention, (g) The problem 
of the food/people equation is so complex that its solution is bound to 
be piecemeal and incremental, and to contain a fair amount of trial 
and error, (h) Regardless of the total cost of coping with the rapid 
increase in world population, it is important that every success be as 
visible as possible. If expenditures for family planning and population 
control activities show no results, it is unlikely that support for this 
type of activity can be sustained with Congress and the public. 


These same points would still be stressed in such a study today. 
The emphasis would probably be essentially the same, although 
some space might be given to the arguments and counterarguments of 
those who say that there is enough arable land to support a far 
lager population than now inhabits the globe. 


The study pointed out that Congress had recognized the problem 
of controlling population growth as early as 1963, and that Congress 
was equally responsible with the executive branch for assigning the 
highest priority under the U.S. Foreign Aid Program to family planning 
and population activities. Given current conditions, a similar assess- 
ment of priorities would appear in order. The study also pointed 
out that it would be advantageous for the United States to search 
out and exploit every available opportunity to establish a solid, 
scientific, factual base of information about the food/population 
equation, for individual nations, for the regions of the world, and for 
the world as a whole. The study pointed out certain fundamental 
weaknesses in the data on food and population, and since those 
weaknesses have not, apparently, been remedied, Congress should 
still be interested in ways to strengthen the basic stock of information 
about these subjects. In addition, recent shortfalls in production, 
combined with natural disasters, have produced several instances of 
famine, thereby thrusting the question of food export policy to the 
front rank of congressional concerns. 

In general, the study identified problems for the Congress that still 
exist. The complexity of the problem area was emphasized, as was 
its central position in the entire process of development. The crucial 
role of technology with respect to both food production and the limita- 
tion of family size was highlighted. The study also identified the 
problems remaining in agricultural production as a result of the 
Green Revolution, and raised the issue of U.S. foreign agricultural 
policy in relation to the less-developed countries. The social and 
psychological barriers to the effective use of present technology in 
the field of birth control were emphasized, as was the extreme sen- 
sitivity of the issue as a matter of bilateral diplomacy. It was sug- 
gested that in this field a more hopeful route might lie through 
multilateral action. 

The foregoing observations could serve to stimulate thinking in 
Congress should legislation in the food/population area be under 
consideration. The questions to which they might give rise are as 
valid now as they were when the study was in preparation. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

What factors are relevant in determining the optimum population 
numbers on a global basis? If infinitely continued growth is physically 
impossible, should circumstances be allowed to determine the point 
at which growth should stop? Or, should the determination be made 
as a result of a conscious policy decision? By what criteria should 
such a decision be made? Are the criteria the same for all countries 
and for all time? Who should decide? How is the decision to be given 
practical effect? What are the implications of these questions for 
U.S. diplomacy and long-range diplomatic planning? 


What is the comparative cost/benefit advantage of multilateral 
versus bilateral programs in dealing with the food/people equation in 
•developing countries? 

What are the implications for future U.S. diplomacy of the increased 
reliance of developing countries on U.S. food supplies? How is this 
reliance to be reconciled with U.S. commitments to supply grain to the 
U.S.S.R., a large part of which is designed to facilitate Soviet produc- 
tion of meat for internal consumption? 

How long will the extensive conversion of grain into meat remain 
an acceptable practice for the United States or any other country, 
in view of the emerging necessity for conservation of foodstuffs? 

What improvements might be achieved, and to what end, in U.S. 
relations with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, the World Bank, the United Nations Fund for Population 
Activities, and the United Nations Population Commission? 

How can U.S. expertise in agricultural R. & D. methodologies and 
technology transfer be effectively made available to developing 

Might food surplus countries act cooperatively to ease food short- 
ages elsewhere? Would it be feasible to balance food supply and 
demand within geographic regions? 

Could a situation arise in which world food needs so exceeded the 
available supply that the leading surplus countries, perhaps in con- 
junction with the United Nations, were obliged by circumstance to 
resort to the triage procedure in allocating food to needy countries? 

How long will present maldistribution practices continue, and what 
populations are likely to be exposed to widespread starvation mean- 

Is there currently enough food to feed the world's population? 
Are shortages the result of failures in production, or distribution? 

If world population continues to increase at the present rate, and 
assuming no further technological breakthroughs in agriculture, is 
there likely to be a breakdown on a massive scale of the world's 
ability to feed itself, and if so, when might such a breakdown be 
expected to occur? 

What is the best general estimate of the impact of the Green Revolu- 
tion on the less-developed countries? Should additional inputs of mod- 
ern technology be made available to the agriculture of those countries, 
and if so, in what sectors? How should it be disseminated? 

Should the United States continue to give priority in its aid pro- 
grams to family planning assistance? Would such programs be more 
effective if transferred to multilateral sponsorship? 


U.S. Government arrangements for sending nongovernmental 
technical m personnel abroad to study, conduct research, attend meet- 
ings, or lecture have been initiated at intervals over the past three 

«* U.8. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. UJ5. SeknUtU Abroad: Art Examination of 
Afajor Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange, a study in the series on Science. Technology, and 
American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- 
ments by Genevieve .T. Knezo. analyst in science and technology. Science Policy Research Division, Con- 
gressional Research Service, Librarv of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C, 
April 1974. 163 pages. (Committee print.) 

175 As used in this commentary, the word "technical" generally encompasses science and technology. 


decades. A number of these arrangements were made in the immediate 
post-World War II period; some were established as a response to the 
launching of Sputnik in October 1957; but most are of more recent 
origin "reflecting current trends toward relaxation of international 
tensions and broader understanding of the benefits to science and 
society of cooperative international science." 176 Today, the Govern- 
ment "maintains a vast array of programs with varying origins and 
purposes. Americans are sent abroad for information exchange and 
the advancement of scientific knowledge; to meet goals of prestige; to 
support the development of a science infrastructure in the developing 
countries; and to meet the terms of bilateral and multilateral agree- 
ments for cooperation — agreements which serve both science and 
foreign policy goals. Scientific and technical exchanges are the largest 
part of U.S. -sponsored exchange programs." m 

The general assumption of the study is that international scientific 
exchanges are beneficial. The emphasis on critical analysis of the 
ongoing programs and identification of weaknesses and flaws in their 
execution should not obscure their merits. A few examples of these 
positive values might include — 

Providing a basis for comparison of United States and foreign 
science ; 

Enabling the tapping of small pools of high competence in 
specialized fields of science abroad, sometimes surpassing the 
levels of U.S. achievement; 

Supporting the international bridging function of science; 
Extending the reach of U.S. science; 

Training future candidates for posts as U.S. scientific and 
technological attaches; 

Familiarizing young scientists with the reality of the world 
scientific community; 

Providing a future basis for a two-way transfer of technology; 

More generally, broadening the technical and cultural experi- 
ence of the participants. 
It is evident that international scientific exchanges contain these 
potential benefits. The intent of the study was to suggest ways in which 
these benefits might be more positively sought, and to indicate that 
program designs require a solid foundation of factual information for 
their evaluation and improvement. 

Statement of the Issue 

Administrative inadequacies in most of these programs make it 
difficult to evaluate their effectiveness and accomplishments. In 
general, they suffer from inadequate direction, coordination, and 
review. Both direction and review are hampered by lack of a clearly 
denned U.S. Government set of international science policies. Instead, 
the State Department issues detailed, somewhat random lists of 
political, security, economic, scientific and technological, and humani- 
tarian objectives for U.S. international science and technology pro- 
grams. Little attention is given to determining priorities systematically 
or even to relating the programs to the objectives outlined by the 

"« Knezo, U.S. Scientists Abroad, p. 1. 
i" Ibid., p. 150. 


State Department. 178 Review, including congressional oversight, is 
further inhibited by a paucity of evaluative data — "most of these 
programs do not incorporate effective provisions for continuous 
collection, analysis, and dissemination to the public of data required 
to evaluate the" contributions of the program to the advancement of 
the sciences or to promotion of cooperative international scientific 
activities." 179 

A number of factors militate against coordinated program planning. One of 
these is that U.S. international science programs and policies have not been fully 
recognized as part of either foreign policy or science policy. A second is that while 
each program has a number of overlapping purposes, each is carried out under its 
own statutory authority and is reported to different congressional committees. 
A third is that some bilateral agreements provide for funding and program com- 
mitments which are rarely brought to the attention of Congress until they are a 
fait accompli. 

A fourth consideration which must minimize expectations of effective coordi- 
nation is the unsuccessful history of actual attempts to provide this function. Two 
agencies have had responsibility in the past for coordinating, on a government- 
wide basis, international science policies and exchange policies. These are the 
International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology and 
the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of 
State. 180 

An account of the unsuccessful coordination efforts is given later in 
this commentary. 

But it is the problem of basic policies that should probably warrant 
greatest congressional attention. Along with exchange programs serv- 
ing the legitimate interests of detente, development, and science for the 
sake of science, is the United States placing enough emphasis on 
sending abroad persons qualified and alerted to identify and assess 
trends in both high and low technology 151 from which U.S. industry 
and research laboratories could benefit? Do the exchange programs 
treat technology transfer as a two-way street? Is the ratio of applied 
to basic scientists in the programs commensurate with this purpose? 
How systematic is the search, in different technical fields, for oppor- 
tunities for significant transfers to as well as from the United States? 
In reviewing and considering relative priorities for the overall U.S. 
program of sending technical personnel abroad, are U.S. policymakers 
giving thought to the appropriate balance among the disciplines, not 
for the present day but in terms of what will be needed in the United 
States 10 and 20 years in the future? In examining the three principal 
U.S. exchange programs and considering problems of direction, 
coordination, and review, this study also sets the stage for examining 
such broader policy questions as these. 

Importance of the Issue 

Weaknesses in administration and evaluation of exchange programs 
described in this study are symptomatic of a more important problem: 
a corresponding gap in U.S. international science policy and policy 
machinery. The programs are nominally governed by a collection of 
stated goals, but the goals sometimes conflict and do not add up to 
a coherent policy (and in any case are not systematically adhered to). 
Mechanisms and procedures for coordinated direction are lacking 

™ Ih'd. 

in Ibid., p. 151. 

>m Ibid., pp. 153-154. 

•« See the essay on this subject which follows for an explanation of these terms. 


in the executive branch; reporting procedures are inadequate for 
review and evaluation; further obstacles to effective review exist in 
the complexity and variety of the programs and the manner of their 
administration in the executive branch, and in Congress in the fact 
that the programs relate to a number of different committee 

Analysis of any governmental program area calls for attention to- 
such questions as: What are these programs for? What are they 
accomplishing? But what gives the present issue special importance 
is that it tends to raise the more fundamental questions: What, 
in the large, are (or should be) U.S. purposes in today's world? How 
should the U.S. Government organize itself to seek answers to this 
question, and to take action accordingly? 

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 

As both this study and that on the Brain Drain (Issue Five) bring 
out, since antiquity scientists have been traveling to other countries to- 
study and to teach — often under the sponsorship of governments. 
However, the official educational exchange programs of the United 
States are of recent origin. Before World War II they were small 
and confined largely to Latin America. During the war, educational 
and cultural exchange programs were replaced by informational 
and propaganda efforts. The immediate postwar period saw U.S. 
exchange and assistance activities characterized by mixed education al r 
cultural, and informational aims. Such activities on a large scale be- 
came part of the 1945 occupation programs in Germany, Austria, 
and Japan. Beginning in 1947, technical assistance under the Marshall 
Plan had important educational and scientific aspects. The Point 
IV Program, initiated in 1950, was designed to provide American 
technical expertise to the developing countries. 182 

Since the late 1940s there has been an unprecedented expansion of 
activities involving international communication and movement by 
U.S. specialists, particularly in technical fields. At the private non- 
governmental level, scientists exchange information through the 
printed word, through channels increasingly provided by multina- 
tional corporations, and through personal visits and correspondence. 
Some Government programs send U.S. technical specialists abroad 
on official missions designed to obtain or disseminate information in 
support of national defense and security objectives or the maintenance 
of U.S. installations abroad. Other official programs give substance to 
humanitarian objectives of U.S. foreign policy in such areas as de- 
velopment aid and disaster relief. Still others promote internationally 
sponsored cooperative research efforts. In all, they involve the move- 
ment abroad of thousands of U.S. personnel and the expenditure of 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually. 183 

Many of those millions, and some hundreds of the persons, are 
involved in U.S. Government programs which support the activities 
in foreign countries of nongovernmental scientist and technologists. 

•8* See Chapter Four— "The Point IV Program: Technological Transfer as the Basis of Aid to Developing- 
Countries"— in: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Technical Information for 
Congress, prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development by Genevieve J. Knezo, 
Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Apr. 25, 1969 (revised Apr. 15, 1971), pp. 61-96. 

183 A survey conducted in 1969 by HEW at the request of Congress found that 31 agencies of the Govern- 
ment were administering 159 programs for two-way exchanges of scholars or for other foreign or international 
education activities. These programs were authorized by 42 legislative acts and cost "somewhere between- 
$400 and $800 million annually." (Knezo, Scientists Abroad, p. 17.) 


The question of what role such programs do or should play as instru- 
ments of U.S. foreign policy and how they can best be managed 
represents a continuing issue. For purposes of manageability, the 
study focuses on the programs of three agencies, and mainly on the 
time period 1960-70. 


The three agencies are the Department of State, the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Academy of Sciences- 
National Research Council (NAS-NRC). The State Department is 
responsible for the Senior Fulbright-Hays Program. This program 
has been funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 
(CU) and administered by the Committee on the International 
Exchange of Persons (CIEP) of the Conference Board of Associated 
Research Councils, National Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with 
binational commissions in host countries. It seeks to promote educa- 
tional exchange and cultural understanding as objectives of U.S. 
foreign policy; the concerns of science are secondary to the objectives 
of cooperation. 

The National Science Foundation administers four sets of exchange 
programs: (1) bilateral science agreements with the countries of 
Europe, Latin America, and Asia; (2) programs supporting interna- 
tional travel and meetings of technical personnel; (3) National and 
Special Research Programs (major research efforts, often interdis- 
ciplinary, of very broad scope or relating to specific geographic areas 
and requiring extensive international and U.S. domestic coordination) ; 
and (4) awards tenable abroad under NSF's research and educational 
support programs. The NSF programs, designed originally to strengthen 
the Nation's domestic science base, have been broadened to include 
initiation and support of foreign and international science and tech- 
nology. They emphasize science for science's sake. 

The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council 
programs implement bilateral inter-Academy agreements for scientific 

1 cooperation which are part of Cultural Relations Agreements signed 

i by the United States with the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and also support 

i activities of the NAS-NRC-affiliated Committee on Scholarly Com- 
munication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC). The 
Soviet and East European exchange programs are funded by the NSF 
Office of International Programs and administered by the Section on 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the Commission on Inter- 
national Relations, NAS-NRC. These activities represent an attempt 
to establish fruitful scientific exchanges between States separated by 

; wide differences in ideology. 

i These three major program areas are representative of U.S. 
Government-sponsored activities for nongovernmental technical 
personnel abroad; they are the largest, oldest, and most publicized 
of such program areas, and have wide geographical distribution. 
Scientists Abroad describes each of the program areas in some detail. 18 * 

"< See the following sections of the study: II. The Fulbright-Hays Program for Senior-Level Exchanges 

I (pp. 17-43); III. National Science Foundation Programs for Americans Abroad (pp. 41-109); and IV. United 

States and Soviet-Eastern European Inter-Academy Scientific Exchanges (pp. 110-142). The study also- 

I contains a brief section on developing relations with the PRC: V. Scientific Exchanges with the People's 

! Republic of China (pp. 142-148). 


Taking each in turn, this commentary will provide only such further 
description as seems essential to a general understanding of program 
goals, scope, activities, and management. The main purpose here is 
to highlight policy and administrative gaps or problems, as identified 
by the author of the study and as they may shed light on the inter- 
action of science, technology, and American diplomacy. As indicated 
earlier in this commentary, the undeniable advantages of foreign 
exchanges of scientific personnel should not be dismissed; rather the 
purpose of the study was to suggest ways in which they could be 
maximized. The further point implicit in the study is that U.S. 
skills in organization and management have been insufficiently 
exploited in this area, and that a part of the task of U.S. diplomacy 
might be to correct this deficiency. 


"The Nation's first large-scale legislative program for international 
educational and cultural exchange began in 1946 when Senator 
William Fulbright sponsored an amendment to the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944 to authorize a mutual exchange of scholars with 22 coun- 
tries, financed by foreign countries derived from the role of surplus 
U.S. war materials abroad": 

The Fulbright program differed significantly from previous overseas scholarship 
activities. These factors continue to characterize it today. 

First: The program was conceived so as to minimize involvement with prop- 
agenda and cultural imperialism and to insure bilateral cooperation, by, (a) 
requiring that the United States and each participating country sign formal 
exchange agreements to authorize the program, and (b) by establishing binational 
foundations or commissions, composed equally of U.S. citizens (including the 
U.S. Ambassador) and foreign nationals, who would assist in local program selec- 
tion and administration. 

Second : Architects of the program sought to establish an administrative frame- 
work neither too dependent nor too independent of foreign policy by, (a) Placing 
overall administrative responsibility for the program in the Department of 
State; but also by (b) establishing a Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) charged 
with selecting all participants and with general supervision of the program. 

Responsibility for administration and execution of the program was given to 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) in the Department of 
State, which also administers other U.S. exchange-of -persons programs. CU, 
acting under broad policy outlines set by the Board provides administrative staff 
and secretariat for the program, negotiates agreements covering educational inter- 
change with foreign governments, maintains liaison with U.S. embassies and 
consulates overseas, and in Washington cooperates with other U.S. Government 
and private agencies on particular aspects of the program. 185 

According to one historian of this era: "The Fulbright program . ! ! 
fitted perfectly the spirit of the times. International-minded academic 
and civic groups saw in it an appealing and practical means to promote 
world understanding." 186 

The program is not a massive one. The total number of lecturers 
and research scholars involved, in all geographic areas, was 1,229 in 
1967-68, a peak year. Of the 1,229, 355 were in natural and applied 
sciences, 309 in social sciences. The cost of the entire program in 
1967-68 was $33,722,523. 

us Ibid., p. 20. 

us Ibid. The quotation is from The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
by Philip H. Coombs. 


After its first few years of operation the Fulbright program came 
under increasing criticism. Some felt that it was too limited — limited 
to academic exchanges, to countries where the United States happened 
to own "excess foreign currencies," to payment of transportation costs 
of foreign students coming to the United States but not the costs of 
supporting them here, and so on. Other critics, including Members 
of Congress responding to the growing intensity of the cold war, wanted 
either to abolish the program or to link it more closely to U.S. informa- 
tion and propaganda activities. (Action taken after congressional 
debate on the aims of the program is mentioned in the following section 
on the Role of Congress.) 

Lack of Evaluation Procedures a Program Weakness 

A weakness of the program throughout its history has been a lack 
of adequate evaluation procedures. As a consequence, not enough 
attention has been given to systematic improvement of planning and 
programing. The author comments 187 that the need to assess the effec- 
tiveness of the program has been pointed out repeatedly. According 
to the program's first advisory commission in 1961: "We still know 
too little about the processes of communication between cultures, 
of attitude formation, of educational development in relation to other 
aspects of national development." The successor advisory group, 
the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, has repeatedly called for development of a research 
capability in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. For 
example, in its seventh annual report, A Multitude of Counselors (1970) , 
the Commission reiterated its recommendations: ". . . We believe 
that the development of a social science research capability in the 
Bureau is a functional and urgent management requirement. . . . 
Institutionalizing the evaluation and research function . . . would 
give it the staying power which 'contracting out' lacks. It would 
also provide the daily evaluation and research continuity which 
operators of the program cannot themselves provide." 188 

Because of this shortcoming, the scientific exchanges which con- 
stitute more than half of the Fulbright-Hays program 189 apparently 
have not been evaluated in depth by agencies administering the 
program : 

As a result, there are almost no appropriate measures of the impacts of scientific 
exchanges, that is, accomplishments of grantees with respect to both the advance 
of science and the promotion of scientific and political cooperation between the 
United States and the Fulbright-Hays host country. [The] little information that 
is available consists of unpublished reports prepared by the CIEP and annual 
reports prepared for the Congress by the Advisory Commission on International 
Educational and Cultural Affairs. 190 

Nevertheless, the Commission has been sufficiently persuaded of the 
program's effectiveness to describe it as ". . . tremendously successful 
and ... an important and significant element of American foreign 
relations" (sixth annual report to the Congress, 1969). The Commis- 

m Ibid., p. 26, footnote 59. 

i« Ibid. 

i« So known since passage of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (Public Law 87-256) 
in September 1961. See further reference to the act in the section below on the Role of Congress. 

1M Knezo, op. cit., p. 27. (The CIEP is now called the Council for International Exchange of Scholars and 
is part of the N AS Commission on Human Resources.) 



sion also expressed concern over cuts which the program had suffered 
in recent years as part of a general retrenchment occasioned by- 
budget and balance-of-payments problems. 

The author concludes her treatment of the Fulbright-Hays program 
with some questions: 

Would the quality and effectiveness of scientific participation in the program 
be improved if: (1) A. science advisory apparatus were established in the Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs or in the Committee on the Exchange of 
Persons to provide for better coordination between the requirements of scientific 
scholarship and diplomatic objectives? (2) the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs undertook more comprehensive information gathering on the program, 
and sponsored more research and evaluation to improve program operations r 
continuity, and long-range in-country planning? and (3) field responsibilities were 
shifted from the cultural affairs officer to an official more familiar with the require- 
ments of educational and scientific exchange, such as an educational officer or 
science attache? m 

Further, in reference to the related problem of attracting qualified 
and needed personnel in certain technical fields to serve overseas, 
especially in the less developed countries — she asks : 

In view of the difficulties encountered in finding scientific and technical per- 
sonnel to serve in the developing countries, would the objectives of the Fulbright- 
Hays program in these areas be better served if special inducements were made to 
obtain qualified personnel willing to serve in technical assistance capacities; or if 
foreign government expectations for technical assistance were satisfied through 
other U.S. Government programs? 192 


Most of the Nation's programs for sending U.S. nongovernmental 
scientists abroad are supported by the National Science Foundation 
and administered either directly by the Foundation or by the National 
Academy of Sciences with NSF funds. These programs have grown 
in both number and importance since the Foundation was established 
in 1950; they are responsible for sending more senior nongovernmental 
scientific and technical personnel abroad than any other U.S. pro- 
grams. (In the fiscal year 1970, for example, 886 recipients of NSF 
travel awards carried out activities in 75 countries for a total of 3.214 
workdays; State Department programs sent 293 nongovernmental 
scientists and technicians to 64 countries for a total of 1,781 workdays. | 
NSF obligations for international scientific activities totaled about 
$118 million in the fiscal year 1974; no cost breakout for programs 
which send nongovernmental technical personnel abroad is available 
but most NSF international activities involve exchanges. 

The purposes of NSF overseas programs are as diverse as their 
geographic distribution is widespread. 

Some programs support the accumulation of information to advance American 
science, or science for its own merits; some promote educational advancement of 
American and foreign scholars; some facilitate international cooperative research 
programs; and some serve political objectives through bilateral scientific com- 
munication. These programs are increasing in number and importance, with 
respect to U.S. commitments for both science and foreign affairs. 19 * 

161 Ibid., p. 43. 

193 This section focuses mainly on the section entitled, "Conclusions: Some Illustrative Questions ot 
Policy" at the end of the 66 pace treatment of the subject in the basic study. The reader is referred to the- 
latter (pp. 44-1091 for details of the varied NSF exchange programs themselves. 

im Knezo, op. cit., p. 107. 


Congress did not give the Foundation explicit authority to carry 
out foreign and international scientific activities for their own merits 
until 1968. Therefore most NSF programs were justified in terms of 
their contribution to U.S. domestic science. Foreign exchange activi- 
ties are scattered throughout NSF divisions; the Foundation estab- 
lished an Office for Foreign and International Science! in 1955, but that 
office even today has ^relatively little responsibility for overseas 
science programs. These circumstances probably account for the 
seeming absence of clear-cut Foundation policies and internal pro- 
cedures providing for coordinated administration of the international 

Fragmentation of XSF activities and lack of adequate reporting 
procedures make difficult the evaluation of Foundation program-. 
Apparently out of deference to scholarly sensitivities; the Foundation 
has not required grantees in most programs to report on their inter- 
national or foreign activities or to make -Higge-tions for improving the 
programs. ''Only in fiscal year 1970 did the Foundation begin to attempt. 
to collect data, and then only in perfunctory fashion, on overseas 
activities undertaken with XSF funds." 195 These factors have, 

. . . kept the Foundation from defining and developing a role as a lead U.S. 
agency in support of international science and scientific exchange activities. While 
a number of these programs very probably have advanced the cause of inter- 
national science and international politics, there is little information on their 
achievements or impacts. The absence of both data and a mechanism to plan 
programs on a Foundation-wide basis undermines NSF's responsibility for deter- 
mining program priorities in both the short- and long-range future. Systematic 
determination of priorities, both within and among programs, seems to be required 
since the programs are both increasing and becoming more significant as tools of 
foreign policy. 196 

An additional problem is that a number of NSF programs suffer 
from poor participation rates by U.S. scientists. U.S. scientific partici- 
pation is circumscribed by language barriers and sometimes by 
insufficient scientific challenge. "It is conceivable that XSF could 
design programs which would satisfy more easily criteria for U.S. 
scientific participation and for country planning needed to develop 
the science infrastructure for developing countries. For example, the 
Foundation might insist on better evaluation of the experiences of 
the programs it supports, better reporting, improved in-house evalua- 
tion of reports and of program accomplishments and problems, and 
more attention to requirements for effective performance." 197 

The author concludes the section on the Foundation's exchange 
programs with some comments and questions which have been partly 
overtaken by events but appear to remain essentially valid: 

. . . the Foundation's responsibilities for foreign and international science 
were expanded under terms of President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1, 
which took effect on July 1, 1973. This action transfer- to NSF some Executive 
Office functions for determining of domestic and foreign science policies and for 
interagency coordination. It also designates the Foundation's Director as the 
President's Science Adviser and personal representative for foreign scientific 
affairs. It is an open question whether the Foundation's organization for foreign 
and international science can meet the needs imposed by these expanded re- 

'" Ibid., p. 108. 
i" Ibid. 
»- Ibid. 


Other specific questions might be asked: 

Should the Foundation enlarge its overseas science staff? 

Should the Foundation evaluate the merits of delegating to the NAS increasing 
responsibilities in international science? 

Should the Foundation improve in-house reporting requirements and coordina- 
tion of foreign and international activities? 

Should the Foundation reestablish the International Science Advisory Com- 

Should the Foundation require more systematic evaluation of its far-flung 
support activities, especially in examining apparent inadequacies of some bilateral 
technology-assistance programs? 

Should the Foundation provide for more systematic coordination with the 
activities of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, 
Department of State (now the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ- 
mental and Scientific Affairs)? 198 


"The NAS-NRC exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries 
of Eastern Europe illustrate a unique dimension of programs which 
support nongovernmental scientists abroad. . . ." 193 These politi- 
cally sensitive programs call for high-caliber nongovernmental 
scientific participation in planning and execution. 

Before 1959, Americans were not permitted to participate in any 
scientific activities in the Soviet Union. Even today all Government- 
funded exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union are 
conducted under formal, rigidly enforced, official treaties and quid 
pro quo exchange agreements. The first of these was signed in 1959 
between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States and 
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.; it has been renewed every 
2 years since and now takes the form of an annex to the biennially 
renewed Cultural Relations Treaty between the two countries. The 
inter-Academy agreements specify reciprocity in numbers, subjects, 
and duration of exchanges. 

The inter-Academy agreement of 1959 provided for a small 2-year 
program. Subsequent agreements have gradually expanded the 
scientific exchange. As the then NAS Foreign Secretary, Dr. Harrison 
Brown, described the program in the May 1971 Hearing- of the 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics (published as.4 General 
Review oj International Cooperation in Science and Space) : 

The inter- Academj 1 - exchange commenced with provision for 44 scientists of 
each country to visit the other for a total of 70 months over a period of 2 years, 
an extremely modest beginning which stressed short visits of 1 month. In 1962, 
when the program was renegotiated, the NAS took the initiative to adjust the 
balance away from the short survey visits in the direction of the longer research 
visits, for which Americans at least took their families along to participate in the 
new experience. In 1962 a new pattern was established which has continued more 
or less up to the present: 30 lecture-survey visits of 1 month; 26 research visits 
totalling 160 months for the biennium, with more emphasis placed on the longer 
research visits. 200 

The 1970-71 inter-Ac ademy agreement made provision for the two 
Governments to facilitate exchanges of professors to lecture in the 
natural, technical, and social sciences and the humanities. The 
1972-73 agreement expanded the permissible volume of exchange 

»« Ibid., p. 109. 
in Ibid., p. 4. 
M« Ibid., p. 119; 


to 190 man-months on each side. Terms of the latter agreement may- 
be summarized as follows: 

1. Number and duration of exchanges. — a. Exchanges of 12 prominent scientists, 
at least half of them to be members of the respective Academy, for periods up to 
1 month to lecture, conduct seminars, or familiarize themselves with scientific 

b. Exchanges of a maximum of 14 scientists from each country, for 1 month 
visits for the familiarization with research; 

C. Exchanges of a maximum of 3o scientists, with total visits not to exceed 190 
man-months, to conduct scientific research or to pursue advanced study; visits 
to last from 3-10 months; 

2. Nomination and selection. — Nominees to be approved by both Academies. 
Scientists are evaluated on education, professional employment, scientific spe- 
cialization, publications, location of proposed visit, knowledge of foreign language, 
and title of lectures; 

3. Additional exchanges. — Which permit revisions of the agreed upon terms as 
well as provision for visits for scientific conferences; 

4. Program review. — Both Academies are to exchange small delegations each year 
to review the inter- Academy exchange program "at the policy level;" 

5. Financing and administrative arrangements. — The sending Academy is to 
provide round trip transportation and salaries for its scientists; the receiving 
Academy to provide in-country transportation costs, living quarters, medical ex- 
penses, special allowances, and reimbursement for research equipment expense.^. 201 

As the figures indicate, the inter-Academy program is a modest one. 
The total number of American scientists visiting the Soviet Union 
between 1959 and 1970 under the agreements was 224, for a total time 
of 666 months; corresponding figures for Soviet scientists visiting the 
United States were 234 and 696 months. The average cost of a visit 
by a U.S. scientist was $7,300. 

Inter-Academy scientific exchange programs with East European 
countries are carried out, in general, not through formal intergovern- 
mental agreements but under memoranda of understanding between 
national academies. This statement applies to agreements with 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia (all concluded in 1966), and 
Bulgaria (concluded in 1970). An Academy-to-Academy exchange 
agreement with Romania was arranged in 1964 on the basis of an 
intergovernmental exchange of notes. 

The program of inter-Academy exchanges with East European 
countries has been very small, totaling, for the 5-year period 1966-70, 
only 106 East European scientists visiting the United States (33 
from Czechoslovakia, 44 from Poland, 45 from Romania, and 19 from 
Yugoslavia) and 147 U.S. scientists visiting Eastern Europe. 

Despite the need for close attention to the details of arrangements 
in the scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union and East European 
countries occasioned by the political context, there is lacking in these 
programs — as in the Fulbright and NSF exchanges — the kind of 
information in depth which would permit assessment of experiences, 
problems, and achievements: 

Evaluation is . . . hampered by the absence of reliable and public information 
on annual activities. The NSF, which funds these programs, is under statutory 
obligation to report annually to the Congress in authorization and appropriations 
hearings and also in annual reports of grants awarded. However, the Foundation 
gives superficial details of the Soviet and Eastern European exchanges; gross 
financial data; and some descriptive material citing especially meritorious activi- 
ties. It has not made a systematic attempt to provide the Congress with a detailed 
summary uf activities and problems culled from materials available from the 
National Academy of Sciences. 202 

»' Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
»» Ibid., pp. 115-116. 


The Academy is a quasi-public scientific advisory group chartered 
by Congress to provide advice to the Government on matters involv- 
ing science, technology, research, and development. It is not subject 
to annual authorization and appropriations oversight. It does prepare 
annual reports for Congress, but these are generally published several 
years after the fact. 

Role of Congress 

Post-World War II scientific exchange programs have attracted 
sustained congressional interest and frequent legislative activity, but 
have not been attended by oversight and evaluation efforts of real 
depth and persistence. 

Some of the important dates in that history are the following: 


1946 — Adoption of the aforementioned Fulbright amendment to the 
Surplus Property Act of 1944, authorizing an exchange of scholars to 
be financed by foreign currencies derived from the sale of surplus war 
materials abroad. 

1948 — Passage, after long and heated debate on the relationship 
of educational exchange to foreign policy, of the U.S. Information 
and Education (Smith -Mundt) Act, Public Law 80-402. 208 The 
provisions of this act reflected a desire to maintain a relative inde- 
pendence of educational and cultural affairs from foreign policy. The 
foreign policy purpose was served by establishing an information 
service separate from educational activities. The latter, under the 
Fulbright program, were strengthened by: 

(1) authorizing some educational exchange in countries other than those whose 
governments had signed educational exchange agreements; 

(2) enabling Fulbright scholars to receive some supplementary dollar support; 

(3) requiring the State Department to use private organizations wherever 
possible in carrying out the operations and objectives of the program; 

(4) authorizing the inclusion of technical assistance activities under the concept 
of educational interchange of persons, knowledge, and skills authorized by the 
program; and 

(5) further expanding the concept of educational exchange by authorizing the 
Secretary of State to support the exchange of educational materials, and to extend 
grants to American-sponsored schools, libraries, private universities, and other 
organizations to further the aims of the educational and cultural exchange pro- 

The act also created the Presidentially appointed U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Educational Exchange to appraise the effectiveness of 
the exchange program semiannually and recommend legislative 

1954 — Adoption of an amendment (Public Law 83-480) to the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, author- 
izing U.S. -owned foreign currencies from any source, including the 
sale of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad, to finance educational 
exchange. The amendment was proposed by Senator Fulbright when 
the earlier source of funds — sales of surplus war materiel — began to 
dry up. 

"1961 — Passage of the Fulbright-Hays act (Mutual Educational and 
Cultural Exchange Act, Public Law 87-256). This was the original 

203 ibid., p. 21. 


Authorizing legislation for present educational and cultural exchange 
programs. It had wide support in the Congress and was adopted in the 
House 378 to 32, in the Senate 79 to 5. Among other things, the 
Fulbright-Hays act: 

— made financial arrangements more flexible to support long-range bina- 
tional planning and financing by permitting reservation of foreign currencies 
in advance, dollar financing, interagency transfer of funds for programs, and 
the extension of support to individuals as well as to institutions; 

— authorized private sector evaluation research on educational and 
cultural exchange; 

— expanded the program to include U.S. and foreign participation in 
international educational and scientific meetings and created additional 
centers of technical and cultural interchange, such as the East- West Center 
in Hawaii; and 

— refined and strengthened binational program planning and the role of 
private advisory groups in administering the program. 204 


1950 — Establishment of the NSF by the National Science Founda- 
tion Act of 1950; NSF given limited authority for international 
science activities, but only to support U.S. domestic science. 

1958 — NSF authority to foster interchange of information among 
U.S. and foreign scientists broadened by passage of the National 
Defense Education Act of 1958. 

1959 — NSF enabling legislation amended to read "international 
science activities" instead of the more limited "international science 
research activities." 

Mid-1960s — Congress "gave critical attention to further expansion 
of the agency's mandate. Three areas received major concern: social 
science research, applied research, and international science." 205 

1968 — Legislation proposed by Science, Research, and Development 
Subcommittee Chairman Emilio Q. Daddario enacted, expanding the 
Foundation's mandate to "initiate and support specific scientific 
activities in connection with matters relating to international coopera- 
tion," on their own merits and not just in relation to domestic science. 
The NSF amendments of 1968 also expanded the jurisdiction of the 
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development to authorize 
appropriations for the NSF. 

1971 — NSF requested by House Committee on Science and Astro- 
nautics to furnish Congress with a line item budget. In response, 
NSF began to use a consistent format for reporting international 
science activities. 


The area of congressional oversight responsibility includes the 
National Science Foundation but only indirectly, through the NSF, 
that of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. 
Apart from references to the wide-ranging hearings of the House 
Committee on Science and Astronautics in May 1971 on A General 
Renew of International Cooperation in Science and Space, mention 
in the study of congressional interest in the inter-Academy exchanges 

20* Ibid., p. 23. 
«• Ibid., p. 47; 


is limited to references to NSF authorization and appropriations 
actions and to a footnote (page 111) on the 1972 accord with the 
U.S.S.R. The accord had been reviewed by the Subcommittee on 
International Science and Space of the House Committee on Science 
and Astronautics in hearings on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agree- 
ments and in a subcommittee report on the same subject (August 

It is noted repeatedly throughout the study that the three major 
exchange programs are deficient in arrangements for program analysis, 
evaluation of effectiveness, and related factual reporting. As the 
author observes of one of the three : 

Throughout its history the Fulbright-Hays program has lacked both appro- 
priate data collection and evaluation procedures; consequently there has been 
insufficient attention to systematic improvement of planning and program 
operations. Scientific exchanges constituting more than half of the Fulbright-Hays 
program, apparently have not received indepth evaluation by agencies administer- 
ing the program. 206 

With the exception of a detailed review that Congress made of 
exchange programs when it was considering the Fulbright-Hays 
legislation in 1961, congressional consideration of these programs has 
been limited essentially to annual Appropriations Committee review 
of the State Department's mutual educational and cultural exchange 
program. A search of congressional hearings and literature for the 
period 1960-70 yielded nothing which focused especially on the 
Fulbright-Hays program. 207 

Status oj the Issue; Prospects and Options 

A second major problem in the administration of exchange programs, 
along with reporting and evaluation, is that of coordinated program 
planning. It was noted earlier that two agencies have had some 
responsibility for trying to coordinate the U.S. Government's inter- 
national science policies and programs: the International Committee 
of the Federal Council for Science and Technology (IC, FCST — 
subsequently transferred to the aegis of the Department of State), 
and the Bureau of International and Scientific Affairs (SCI) , Depart- 
ment of State 208 (now the Bureau of Oceans and International Envi- 
ronmental and Scientific Affairs — OES). 

The author comments that although no in-depth evaluation of 
SCI and its work is available, "Several critiques indicate that because 
of political and organizational constraints, SCI has been less than 
effective in coordinating U.S. science policies abroad." 209 According 

»« Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
w? Ibid., p. 26, footnote 58. 

208 The point being made by the author of the present study is reinforced by the observation in a later 
(Tune 1975) study in this series, Science and Technology in the Department of State, that "... pending 
action on the Presidential science policy system, the current situation is that aspects of international science 
and technology policy, in the upper reaches of policymaking: are spread among: 

— The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; 
—The State Department Policy Planning Staff; 
—The immediate staff of the Secretary of State; 

— The National Security Council, and the Under Secretaries Committee; 
—The Director of NSF and the Science and Technology Planning Office; and 
— Council on International Economic Policy. 
Precisely how policy initiatives can evolve out of this rather complex congeries of high level institutions is 
not clear." (U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations. Science and Technology in the. 
Department of State, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Huddle, senior specialist in 
science and technology. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., June 1975, 180 pp. (Committee print.) p. 174. 
n» Knezo, op. cit., p. 154. 


to one widely traveled U.S. scientist, Roger Revelle, the cause of 
this shortcoming is that the Department of State is constrained from 
taking the initiative in designing policies for science and technology, 
Revelle states that, "one reason for this deficiency may be a feeling 
among the leaders of the Department that the changes brought about 
by [scientific] developments will be slow to take effect and can be 
[managed] as they emerge by conventional diplomatic means." Another 
critic, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
"faults the Bureau with concern for minor tasks and deferring respon- 
sibility for guiding major international scientific and technological 
policies and programs to the White House. . . ." 210 


FCST, composed of representatives of all relevant Government 
agencies, was established in 1959 ". . . to promote closer cooperation 
among Federal agencies, ... to improve planning and management in 
science and technology, and to advise and assist the President regard- 
ing Federal programs affecting more than one agency. The Inter- 
national Committee of the FCST was created, also in 1959, to recom- 
mend "measures to promote and enhance U.S. participation in and 
support for international scientific activities compatible with our 
foreign policy." 2U The Committee made several abortive attempts to 
improve and coordinate governmental activities relating to foreign and 
international exchanges. For example, in 1961, at the request of 
Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky, it undertook a 
review of the international scientific activities of all Federal agencies 
which resulted in a report, International Scientific and Technological 
Activities, which called on the NSF to provide better information on 
exchange activities. The Foundation never responded to the recom- 
mendation. In 1968 the IC, FCST, prepared, in collaboration with 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, a set of guidelines 
which contained the recommendation that "each agency concerned 
provide the IC, FCST, with an annual report on its exchange programs 
and the steps which are consistent with these Guidelines." 212 The 
agencies failed to respond and the effort was dropped. 

The IC, FCST, made another attempt beginning in 1970 to catalog 
U.S. Government relationships in international science and tech- 
nology. The committee requested agencies to supply it with: 

(a) Brief description of agency's international scientific programs and projects; 

(b) Their relation to past size during the 1960s and to the vigor, need and 
demand for programs; 

(c) . . . Missed opportunities which might have been developed under more 
favorable circumstances ; 

(d) Legislative authorities and restrictions within which programs-projects are 
carried forward ; 

(e) The agency [view of the] programs' utility. Identification of specific instances 
in which the cooperative programs with other nations have resulted in savings of 
time or money or in other direct benefits to the U.S.; and 

(f) Observations which may serve to clarifj^ the data given. 213 

J1 ° Thid., p. 154. 

211 Thid., p. 155. 

212 Ibid., p. 158. 
»3 Ibid., p. 159. 


The review was never completed. According to the IC, FCST, 
"preparation of the report has posed far more difficulties than had 
been foreseen. Among the difficulties . . . [was] the lack of compara- 
bility between the submissions of various agencies. . . ." 

At the beginning of this commentary on Scientists Abroad it was 
suggested that an even more important problem than those of the 
direction, coordination, and evaluation of technical exchange pro- 
grams might be the antecedent problem of providing a coherent policy 
context. An example of such a context with respect to U.S. scientific 
programs in Europe is provided by Victor Basiuk, writing in 1972 : 

Present American scientific and technological policy ... is largely ad hoc and 
unfocused. There is concentration on individual countries and programs, on tar- 
gets of opportunity. But there is no overall view which would take into consider- 
ation the nature and requirements of upcoming technologies, especially their 
large scale and high cost. As a result, the United States has been drifting in the 
direction of bilateral cooperation with European nations. . . . This course is not 
adequate. To meet the requirements of the large-scale technology of the future 
and of the immense costs associated with it, Western Europe must develop a large 
market and cohesive internal institution. Compartmentalized bilateral relation- 
ships between the United States and individual Western European nations bypass 
this objective. 214 

Basiuk concludes that the absence of multilateral cooperative- 
scientific relationships with Europe imperils transatlantic security: 

If Washington does not soon develop a concerted science and technology policy, 
it is foreclosing options for the late 1970s and early 1980s in a way that almost 
guarantees insecurity in Europe. The enormous complexity of the task is no- 
excuse for not addressing it. Small-scale, bilateral cooperation may postpone 
the peril, but it cannot in the end avert it. 215 

In a statement to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics 
in January 1971, Chairman Daddario of the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development addressed the same theme, but more 
broadly : 

... It has become evident that the concept of sovereignty and the traditional 
means of conducting relations between nations are no longer sufficient. The reason 
for this is that technology has largely changed the world, and in doing so it has 
rendered the old framework very vulnerable. Today, we are witnessing an in- 
creasingly rapid compression of both time and space. . . . This has led to the con- 
temporary paradox wherebj^ the human race is simultaneously becoming more 
unified and more fragmented. We now seem to have a dichotomy on our hands — 
either lasting cooperation or complete political dissolution — the potential for 
either being greater than in any previous period in human history. 216 

Daddario suggested that the development of individual national 
science policies is no longer enough to meet today's foreign policy 
and — a consensus must be reached on developing integrated policies 
for a technologically interdependent world : 

. . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater 
consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being 
and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational 
effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanism? 
Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the 
priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term localized prob- 
lems and long-term global problems? 217 

»" Ibid., p. 181. 

2>s Ibid., p. 162. 
"6 Ibid. 
*" Ibid. 


Author's Reassessment as of January 1976 

Author Genevieve J. Knezo adds the following comments on her 
Examination oj Major Programs jor Nongovernmental Scientific Ex- 

— That exchange programs are becoming: an increasingly impor- 
tant tool of U.S. foreign policy is evidenced by the recent prolifera- 
tion of bilateral scientific and technical agreements signed by the 
United States. Most of these provide almost exclusively for 
exchange. These developments foreshadow the future importance 
of related considerations: an enhanced desire by other nations to 
share in the benefits of U.S. scientific and technical excellence, an 
ever-accelerating requirement for the United States to recognize 
and share in the technical knowledge and breakthroughs of its 
technologically advanced neighbors, and the enlargement of the 
scope and objectives of foreign policy to include consideration of 
more substantive scientific and technical issues. 


— It seems abundantly clear from the study that if exchange 
programs are to meet more effectively the requirements of a 
world increasingly dependent upon science and technology, better 
direction, review, and coordination of exchange programs will be 
needed. Attention is also drawn in the study to the need to 
consider the merits of a multilateral alternative for some pro- 
grams. It was also noted that complementing agencies do not 
always tell the Congress about many of the deficiencies of these 

— The issue of the need for better formulation and coordination 
of foreign policy with a scientific and technical content was raised 
in the National Academy of Sciences study, Science and Technology 
in Presidential Policymaking, pp. 43-45. 21s The authors of the 
report recommended a strong role for the proposed Presidential 
Council for Science and Technology in ". . . areas of foreign 
policy strongly affected by scientific and technical considerations." 

— The number of science and technology agreements with other 
nations is increasing. Legislative interest in overseeing these 
agreements and their content similarly is increasing. See: "Joint 
Commissions with Foreign Countries," statement of the Hon. 
Lee H. Hamilton, Congressional Record, January 23, 1975: 

— Rep. Zablocki has proposed creation of a Joint Committee 
on National Security to reassert the legislative role and respon- 
sibility in the conduct of foreign policy. (See Congressional Record, 
January 14, 1975: H39-H40.) 

— Several issues which were raised in the study are now being 
considered by the agencies involved. These include: 

— the pros and cons of USIA field administration and over- 
sight, as contrasted with educational affairs officer oversight, 

21S National Academv of Sciences, Scienceand Technology in Presidential Policymaking: A Proposal. Report 
of the Ad noc Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, D.C.. June 1074. -V, pp. (This study was 
prepared in part for use by Congress in its consideration of reestablishing an executive branch scieno ad- 
visory office.) 


of field operations of the Fulbright-IIays program. A study is 
being done by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter- 
national Educational and Cultural Affairs. 210 

; — two separate studies in areas which warrant review for 
scientific and technical educational exchange programs, 
commissioned by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs: (1) "An investigation of the consequences of inter- 
national educational exchange," and (2) "Mental Health in 
international educational exchanges: a study of coping 
behavior in a cultural environment." 220 

— the merits of team exchanges and multilateral vehicles 
for exchange for the Fulbright-Hays program. Efforts are 
now underway by the Board of Foreign Scholarships to 
examine this issue. 
— I believe in retrospect that the report gave a valid and 
balanced perspective to the exchanges. However, if time had 
permitted, I should have attempted a more detailed analysis of 
the impacts of the programs or their contributions to the advance- 
ment of science and technology. Also, I should like to have 
assessed the quality of technical information transferred in 
relation to the level of development of the science and technology 
infrastructure of a recipient country. An attempt might also have 
been made to assess these programs in light of the origins, pur- 
poses, and activities of programs which send governmental staff 
scientists abroad under exchange programs or bilateral or multi- 
lateral agreements. 

— There seems to be little attention in Congress now to review- 
ing and improving federally funded nongovernmental scientific 
and technical exchange programs. In the course of implementing 
new budget review and oversight responsibilities Congress might 
give more attention to this topic. The General Accounting Office 
and the House Committee on Science and Technology have 
recently conducted oversight reviews of the objectives and con- 
tent of Soviet-American cooperative agreements, including those 
for science and technology. 221 

Some Illustrative Questions 

The author has posed many questions in the study itself; some have 
been incorporated in the preceding text of this commentary. Others 
follow : 

In the currently emerging science policy structure at the national 
level is adequate provision being made for coordinated planning and 
direction of exchange programs in relation to foreign policy goals and 
priorities? For follow-through of evaluation efforts, with reporting of 
findings to the President and Congress? 

2'« The study was described by W. E. Weld, Jr., staff director, in a letter to the author of Mar. 3, 1975. 

220 These studies are described" in "Measuring the impact of academic exchange," FAR Horizons, v. 7, 
no. 2, Spring 1974: 5-7. , „ „ . M 

22 ' The resulting GAO report is: U.S. General Accounting Office. A Progress Report on I nited States-Sonet 
Union Cooverative Programs. A report to Congress, Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1975. 
98 p. The House Committee review is summarized in: U.S. Conzress. House. Committee on Science and 
Technology. Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Background 
Materials on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements in Science and Technology. ReDort prepared by Claire 
Riley Geier, of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
94th 'Congress, First session, December 1975. Washington, D.C, U.S. Government Printing Office, 19io. 
93. p. 


Is the emphasis in U.S. programs for exchange of technical person- 
nel too exclusively bilateral? Should multilateral alternatives be pur- 
sued? Through what channels: in existing international and regional 
organizations, ad hoc groupings of countries with related interests, or a 
new international mechanism established for Che purpose? 

In its examination of the three major exchange programs the study 
frequcntly touches on the theme that, "If they are to meet more effec- 
tively requirements of a world increasingly dependent on science and 
technology, and especially if they are to help significantly in recon- 
ciling the often incompatible requirements of science and diplomacy, 
better direction, coordination and review will be needed." 222 What, in 
the light of failures to date, will it take to meet this need? How can it 
be met without resort to massive bureaucratic methods? 

How incompatible, in face, are the requirements of science and di- 
plomacy? Can competent scientists and technologists serve forthright 
national purposes — assuming that they do not become involved in the 
immediacies of international politics — without compromising scientific 
integrity? Is the answer to this question partly a matter of the world 
view of the President and his key science advisers, and of the profes- 
sional qualifications of the latter? 

Is it perhaps the diplomats, with their predilection for seat-of-the- 
pants decisionmaking and their traditional aversion to research, 
rather than the scientists and technologists, with their disciplined ac- 
ceptance of the systems approach and meticulous documentation, who 
are responsible for persistent failures in reporting, review, and evalua- 
tion? In developing reporting and evaluation systems for the various 
exchange programs, would it he useful to seek the recommendations 
of teams of representative scientists and technologists on ways to 
exploit (a) the disciplined habits of scientists and technologists, (b) 
the organizational know-how of most technologists, and (c) the sensi- 
tivity as to political non-involvement of many scientists? 

One observer with outstanding qualifications for judging the success 
or failure of scientific exchanges — Dr. Harrison Brown, longtime 
Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences who retired 
from that post in 1974 — has said of the U.S. -Soviet exchanges: 

... As a result of contacts between Soviet scientists and American scientists 
there have been some rather extraordinary foreign policy changes. I have seen 
attitudes of the scientists of one country change enormously as a result of these 
contacts. I have seen people come to the United States who had preconceived 
concepts . . . which were dramatically changed during their visit. I would say 
that if it had not been for these contacts we would not today have a Test Ban 
Treaty . . . nor would we be as far along the path toward the eventual signing 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty; nor would we have the SALT talks. . . , 223 

Are broad evaluations like this by knowledgeable persons perhaps 
more nformative than elaborate built-in systems of detailed reporting 
and analysis? If systematically conducted, could they substitute for 
the latter? Would a combination of the two evaluation methods be 
preferable to reliance on either one alone? 

How important is it that the American public be informed about the 
various exchange programs — their purposes, scope, problems, and 
accomplishments? Should the executive branch make more of an 

m Knew, Scientists Abroad, p. 149. 
»» Ibid., p. 139. 


effort to disseminate information about them (presumably in the form 
of human interest stories as well as statistics) ? Should Congress on a 
continuous or periodic basis publicize the programs and call attention 
to their role in furthering U.S. foreign policy goals? 


Statement of the Issue 

December 1975 : "The loss of domestic intellectuals and academically 
trained individuals is becoming a serious problem for a number of 
African governments. Despite the often catastrophic shortage of 
skilled personnel in their homelands, a large number of African 
students studying at West European and American countries choose 
to remain abroad after graduation. 

"The number of Nigerian university graduates who have remained 
in the United States, for example, is estimated at 8,000. ..." 225 

Items like this have been common in the world press during the 
past decade. They illustrate a problem which has been critical for 
many of the less-developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Latin America, 
and — most of all — Asia. Paradoxically, however, that problem has 
virtually been dropped from the agenda of the governments of the 
developed countries gaining the skilled personnel; in those countries 
(though not in the losing countries) it has almost lost official and 
political visibility. The issue has both substantive and procedural 
importance. The substantive factor may be stated about as follows: 
The "have" countries attract educated talent away from the "have- 
not" countries, thereby hampering the development process of the 
latter and tending to offset the development aid which the latter 
receive from them. The procedural might be put in question form: 
How is it possible for a problem or issue which exists, and which has 
been the subject of emotional debates in major and minor world 
forums (the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, the British Parlia- 
ment, the parliamentary organs of dozens of other developed and 
developing countries), to drop out of sight before any significant 
remedial action has been taken? What is missing in the arrangements 
by which responsible governments of powerful countries recognize 
problems, keep them under study, and when they are sufficiently 
understood, take corrective action? Why do the developed countries 
permit problems with important consequences for foreign policy and 
international relations to be ignored? 

Importance of the Issue 

The brain drain problem "has special relevance for the modern 
scientific- technological age . . . [Situated] at the juncture of science, 
technology, and American diplomacy, [it] reveals and is symptomatic 
of a deeper and far more serious problem: that of this Nation's rela- 
tions with the LDCs and its foreign policy stand respecting the larger 

224 U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Brain Drain. A Study of the Persistent Issue of 
International Scientific Mobility," in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy; prepared 
for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Joseph G^Whelan, 
senior specialist in international affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C, U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1974, 272 pases. (Committee print.) 

225 Peter Seidlitz, "The African Brain Drain," Swiss Review of World Affairs, December 1975, p. 11. 


issue of international development as related to U.S. economic health 
and national security": 226 

Brain drain is a symptom of underdevelopment; solutions lie largely in the 
realm of international development: the most essential mechanism is nation- 
building through science and technology. As a foreign policy problem, therefore, 
brain drain raises the basic question of this Nation's stance toward international 

Brain drain is essentially a foreign policy problem of low visibility; but even so, 
it is a testing ground for the vitality of a policy of much larger significance, namely, 
the Nation's commitment to development. Solutions for brain drain may be the 
primary responsibility of the LDCs, particularly the task of institution-building 
and establishing an infrastructure of science and technology as the basis for 
modernization, but solutions can neither be devised nor development goals 
achieved without assistance from the advanced countries like the United States. 221 

In parallel with the American humanitarian tradition of helping 
others to help themselves, it is necessary to comprehend — the author 
continues — that political realism alone requires a continuing U.S. 
commitment to development: 

It would seem beyond dispute that the LDCs, long the cockpit of international 
tension and conflict in which the United States has not been able to stand aside 
bninvolved, hold the potentialities for even deeper and more dangerous involve- 
ment. War in South and Southeast Asia, recurring crises in the Middle East, 
famine and tribal strife in Africa, are only recent illustrations of the problems that 
have been shaking the foundations of this volatile, troubled Third World. Eco- 
nomic development, it is argued, offers perhaps the best prospects for peace and 
stability. Thus the increasingly compelling requirements of political interdepend- 
ence bind all nations, advanced and underdeveloped, in a common search for 
peace through economic development. 

American dependence on mineral resources largely under the control of the 
LDCs, as development specialists are quick to indicate, points to a new vulner- 
ability for the United States. Awareness of this problem comes at the height of the 
current energy crisis and suggests what may be a scenario for things to come with 
growing cartelization of world mineral resources and growing consciousness of in- 
creased leverage among the LDCs to be used against the advanced industrial 
nations. Reasons of self-interest appear to warrant a reappraisal of the Nation's 
posture towards the LDCs and the affirmation of a polic.y of interdependence. 228 

To summarize: ". . . in the judgment of students of development and 
brain drain, one of the major challenges to mankind remains the chal- 
lenge of finding ways to put the LDCs on a course leading to a self- 
reinforcing upward spiral of social and economic progress." The im- 
portance of the brain drain issue is that resolving it for any given LDC 
or group of LDCs would be one of the critical ways of putting the 
countries concerned on such a course — and to that extent contributing 
to the ultimate diplomatic goal of "a world in balance, with social and 
■economic opportunity within the grasp of all inhabitants and a sense 
of hope in all nations." 229 

How the Issue Developed 

The international migration of talent is not a new historical phe- 
nomenon. 230 Of primary concern in the context of the Science, Tech- 
nology, and American Diplomacy study series, however, is its current 
manifestation as the "brain drain" from countries in need of educated 
talent (the less developed countries, or LDCs) to those already rich 
in stich talent — especially the United States. 

"» Wtielan, Brain Drain, p. 268. 

227 Ibid., p. 270. 

«« Ibid., pp. 270-271. 

'» 7ft id., p. 272. 

530 For an account of the migrations of talent from ancient times until the recent past, including their role 
•in the spread of science and technology throughout the ages and in the development of Colonial America, 
■see ibid., "Brain Drain In Historical Perspective," pp. 18-30. 


As a contemporary international problem, the study observes, the 
brain drain phenomenon "has its roots in the profound changes in the 
political structure of international relations that have been brought 
about as a consequence of World War II. These changes were to have 
a marked bearing on patterns of migration in the postwar era." 231 


Human mobility has been a salient characteristic of this new era. 
Much of it was in the form of forced migrations. "Programs of repa- 
triation or settlement of those dislocated by World War II, and pop- 
ulation transfers resulting from the creation of newly independent 
states or the outbreak of wars, involved millions of people": 

Migrations on this vast scale tended to overshadow the normal free movement 
of peoples. The turbulence of the era is seen in the statistics. After World War 
II, 18,000,000 people were uprooted by the partition of India and Pakistan; West 
Germany accepted 12,000,000 refugees dislocated during the war; Japan resettled 
6,300,000; South Korea absorbed 4,000,000 and Hong Kong 1,300,000. In Israel, 
1,000,000 Jews found refuge in a new homeland, while more than 1,000,000 
Palestinian Arabs fled the country. Ultimately, the International Refugee Orga- 
nization and Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration settled 
1,300,000 refugees overseas. These statistics do not include the movement of 
people in the Soviet and Chinese areas, but even this limited survey produces a 
total of 45,000,000 forced emigrants. Thus in one decade the number of people 
compelled to move across frontiers was equal to the entire movement of free 
emigrants across the Atlantic in the century ending in 1913. 232 

These forced migrations were followed by accelerating flows of free 
emigrants, smaller in number and different in kind. Conditioning and 
characterizing the free emigration were an evolving internationalism, 
the process of decolonization, and the reordering of priorities in U.S. 
immigration by establishment of the criterion of quality rather than 

This new internationalism, the author observes, was characterized 
in the political sphere partly by the establishment of the United 
Nations and its affiliated organizations which gave organizational 
structure to world politics, and partly by the growing tendency of 
peoples everywhere to think and act in a global context which made 
migration less formidable psychologically. 

In the economic sphere, the trend toward closer integration of the 
world economy has a direct effect on the migration of talent. The 
market for educated professional people has become increasingly 
international as a result of such developments as the reduction of 
barriers to international trade, increasing integration of national 
capital markets of the advanced countries into a world capital market, 
the growth of direct foreign investment in modern technology from 
country to country, and the modernization of traditional class- and 
status-oriented societies. 

"Contributing to the integration of the world economy which pro- 
duced this special effect on emigration are two main forces in the mod- 
ern world . . . : the worldwide spread of the Industrial Revolution, and 
the movement of advanced Western societies into the post-industrial 
era. Both forces have created special needs, particularly a need for 

"i Ibid., p. 31. 
»« Ibid. 


talent." Affecting this need have been such post-World War II 
phenomena as: 

— The great upsurge in world education, augmenting substantially the 
talent market ; 

— The movement, internally as well as externally, towards urban and 
metropolitan centers which industrialization has fed. . . . 

reaching improvements in transportation and communications, 
facilitating mobility and making information on job opportunities readily 

— The standardization of professional training, easing lateral movement 
across national boundaries; and 

— Official encouragement of preference provisions, work permits, and other 
provisions in state-regulated immigration laws designed to attract talent 
from this new world market. 233 


The process of decolonization has, by ironic mischance, had nega- 
tive consequences for the brain drain problem. In its most serious 
manifestations, the problem largely involves emigration from the 
former colonial areas of Asia and Africa. 

By virtue of the former colonial-imperial link the emigrant moves into what he 
believes to be familiar circles. This familiarity eases the burden of transition 
between two essentially different cultures. The imperial tradition may also en- 
gender a belief that by migrating to the imperial center, the former colonial is 
moving up into a superior and more exciting culture. The attraction is often so 
alluring that the former colonial remains, to the loss of his developing native 
country. 234 

This form of brain drain arises out of what tend to be self-defeating 
contradictions in policies of the erstwhile imperial powers and other 
advantaged countries which seek to assist the development process in 
the disadvantaged former colonies through programs of foreign aid. 
Such efforts, the study notes, are often offset by the movement of 
"human capital" in the opposite direction. 

Concern for this problem has increased with a growing awareness that develop- 
ment cannot be effectively stimulated simply by the flow of money to the LDCs 
and that an equally vital role must be played by local people with skills and ex- 
pertise to carry out development programs. The United States become involved 
in this problem in that former colonials immigrate to the United States 
through the former imperial centers in Europe: they come directly from their na- 
tive country; and the United States has been a long time advocate and practi- 
tioner of foreign aid as a means of development. . . . 

What makes this matter particularly important for international relations 
today is that the LDCs constitute a vast configuration of political power: they have 
a voice; and they make known their complaints. No longer are they willing to 
remain silent while their interests are being ignored. 235 


The effects of the reordering of immigration priorities on the brain 
drain problem, especially in relation to the LDCs, have been far- 
reaching. New criteria of quality and selectivity invited emigration of 
the professionals, the intellectuals, and the technically skilled. Along 
with the lowering of racial restrictions in the economically advanced 
countries, these new criteria had a special appeal for the LDCs. 

»a Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
*m Ibid., p. 33. 
w Ibid., p. 34. 

OS-190— 70 12 


"Paradox'cally, attempts to right an injustice of discriminatory quota 
systems created a new and unintended problem : a powerful incentive 
was now given to the professionals in the LDCs to emigrate and thus 
deprive their developing countries of much needed professional 

A survey of professional emigration from Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey showed 
that 50 percent of all their scientists trained abroad did not return home. Another 
showed that Argentina lost 5,000 engineers through emigration in recent years. 
And 58 percent of those emigrating from the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) 
were scientists; 70 percent held Ph. D. degrees. 236 

The most serious professional manpower drain is represented by 
nonreturning students: 

According to a United Nations manpower report, the number of foreign students 
studying in advanced countries has shown a "steep annual increase." In 1967, it 
said, 100,262 foreign students were enrolled in American institutions of higher 
learning; an estimated 70 percent were from the LDCs. According to estimates by 
Prof. Robert Myers of the University of Chicago, described by Dr. John C. 
Shearer, Director, Manpower Research and Training Center at Oklahoma State 
University, as the "best overall measures of the foreign student brain drain," the 
overall nonreturn rate is between 15 and 25 percent rather than the semiofficial 8 
to 10 percent frequently quoted. Leakage among nonreturning doctoral students 
has ranged from a high of 90 percent for Taiwan to a low of 14 percent 
for Pakistan. 237 

Another aspect of the shift in immigration criteria was competition 
among the developed countries for professional and skilled manpower. 
This competition was especially keen in the medical, engineering, and 
scientific professions. As Canada's Minister of Manpower and Im- 
migration put it: "The high cost of training professional and skilled 
people ... is a measure of the benefit derived [by] Canada. . . . 
Other countries are in competition with us for immigrants." 238 

Still another effect of the change in criteria has been to make skilled 
manpower more mobile and unskilled manpower less so. 

In the international debates of the mid-1960s, the United States and 
its economic policies and practices were singled out as a main cause of 
brain drain from the developing countries. However, the author com- 
ments, later studies revealed new evidence suggesting what Ambas- 
sador Nuri Eren of Turkey has called "universal culpability" — 

All the great industrial powers of the West were shown to have been acting as 
centers of attraction for scientists, engineers, [and] doctors . . . not only the 
United States but Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. In 
vanning degrees these countries were the principal gainers in the brain drain, 
while such LDCs as India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Philippine Islands, Taiwan, 
Korea, Colombia, and Argentina were prominent losers. Thus the LDCs paid 
part of the price for manjDower benefits accrued to the expanding industrial 
societies of the- world. 239 

U.S. Involvement 

More than any other country, the United States is a magnet foi 
migrating scientists, engineers, physicians, and other professionals. 
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University, a student of brain 
drain and of the impact of technology on human affairs, has observed 
that "America's professional attraction for the global scientific elite 
is without historic precedent in either scale or scope." 240 

23« Ibid., p. 35. 
2" Ibid. 
238 ibid., p. 36. 
2" Ibid., p. 37. 
2" Ibid., p. 49. 



Two main trends arc discernible in the incomplete but still revealing 
statistics of post-World War II immigration into the United States: a 
large and rapid increase in the immigration of scientists, engineers, 
and physicians in general, and an especially steep rise in the immigra- 
tion of technical workers in the same categories from the LDCs. In 
1947, only about 2,400 natural scientists, engineers, physicians, and 
surgeons came as immigrants to the United States: not more than 
400 — about a sixth — were from LDCs. By 1968 the numbers were up 
t) about 25,300 and 13,200— more than half — respectively. According 
to data compiled by Gregory Henderson of the United Nations Insti- 
tute lor Training and Research (UNITAR), 241 the immigration of 
engineers, scienti>ts, and medical personnel from Taiwan rose from 
47' in 1956 to 1,321 in 1967; in the case of India, from 100 to 1,415; 
and in that of the Philippines, from 90 to 1,066. 

A third trend is a relatively greater increase in immigration of per- 
sonnel in the same categories from the LDCs of Asia as compared with 
those of Africa and Latin America. More than half of the 7,500 
immigrant scientists and engineers of 1970 had last resided in Asia — 
2,900 of these were from India. Data compiled by the U.S. Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization Service and analyzed by the National Science 
Foundation 242 give the following comparative figures for the fiscal year 
1972, by country or region of birth (for each area, the first figure 
represents scientists and engineers together, the second physicians 
and surgeons) : Europe plus Canada — 1,887 and 757; Latin America — 
756 and 523; Middle East— 556 and 683; Africa— -433 and 259; and 
Asia— 7,599 and 4,875. 


A fourth trend is the large and growing percentage of physicians and 
surgeons within this group of talented immigrants — with emphasis, 
again, on the LDCs as source. While in recent years there has been 
some leveling off in immigration of scientists and engineers — partly 
because of a decline in the aerospace industry but largely, it would ap- 
pear, from a 1972 revision of regulations by the Department of Labor 
to require certification for employment of scientists and engineer im- 
migrant candidates — there has been a contrasting steady increase in 
the influx of foreign medical graduates (FMGs). According to Foreign 
Medical Graduates of the United States, 1970, a study of the American 
Medical Association, 243 FMGs have played an "important role" in 
meeting the chronically unfilled U.S. demand for doctors. As of Decem- 
ber 31, 1970, there were 57,217 FMGs in the AMA's registry of physi- 
cians in the United States, representing 17.1 percent of the total physi- 
cian population of 334,028. This figure does not include 6,174 gradu- 
ates of Canadian medical schools. It does count 5,972 Americans who, 
failing to gain admission to the highly competitive medical schools of 
the United States, went abroad for training; however, this number is 
more than offset by an estimated 10,000 or more FMGs practicing in 
the United States but not included in the AMA registry. 

-x> /tod., pp. 49-56.. 

|M> Ibid., p. 69.. . 
=« Ibid., pp. 73-75. 



The LDCs of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are heavily repre- 
sented in the AMA statistics on FMGs for 1970. Africa is credited with 
1,126 (2 percent), Latin America with 9,929 (17.4 percent), and Asia 
with 21,002 (36.7 percent). Altogether the LDCs account for an FMG 
population of 32,157 of the total of 57,217, or 56.1 percent, as com- 
pared with Europe's 24,756, or 43.3 percent. 244 High on the list are the 
following LDCs: Philippines, with 7,352 FMGs in the United States; 
India, with 3,957; South Korea, 2,095; Mexico, 1,831; Iran, 1,631; and 
Thailand, 1,098. 

The growing prominence of FMGs in American medicine is further 
illustrated b}^ the fact that, as of 1971-72, one of every six M.D.s 
practicing in the United States was an FMG (or one of every five, if 
FMGs from Canada are included) ; more foreign plrysicians were ad- 
mitted to the United States in 1971 (10,540) than were graduated from 
American medical schools (8,974) ; there was one FMG to every two 
graduates of American medical schools serving on hospital staffs "in 
approved graduate educational positions"; 245 about one-half of the 
candidates for State licensing examinations were FMGs (in some 
States, as many as three-quarters). Of almost 20,000 FMGs in gradu- 
ate educational positions in American hospitals and universities in 
1970-71, about 3,000 were interns, 13,000 were residents, and 3,000 
were serving in other traditional training positions. 

The existence of this situation has led to criticism of the United 
States. "Such criticism, much of which comes from within the country, 
illustrates both the magnitude and seriousness of the problem for 
domestic medical manpower concerns 246 and more important, for the 
purposes of this study, for its foreign policy implications." 247 For 
example, in an article on "The Migratory Flow of Doctors to and 
from the United States" in Medical Care for January-February 1971, 
Dr. Irene Butter of the University of Michigan School of Public 
Health wrote: "A permanent loss of doctors from the poorest to the 
richest nations is the most disturbing aspect of the medical brain 
drain." As reported by the Department of State in Proceedings of 
Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 
1966, Dr. G. Halsey Hunt, Executive Director of the Educational 
Council for FMGs, stated : "It is a depressing and humbling experience 
for an American doctor to visit a medical school in one of the unindus- 
trialized countries of Asia, to have his host open the conversation with 
a bland statement, 'You people in the United States and your hospitals 
couldn't get along without our doctors' — and to realize . . . this is a 
fact. ... It ill becomes us to depend indefinitely on other countries 
for the production of medical manpower to provide services to Ameri- 
can patients." 248 


But setting aside questions of equity or the long-term foreign policy 
interests of the United States, the influx of FMGs poses a domestic 
problem. It does so by threatening U.S. medical standards and limiting 
the opportunities for aspiring Americans to study medicine. The 

Mt Oceania accounted for 404 (0.7 percent). 

"5 Whelan, Brain Drain, p. 79. 

M8 Concerns over domestic impact focus mainly on the question of medical standards and on the apparent 
effect of a substantial annual influx of FMGs in holding back expansion of U.S. medical schools. (Further 
discussion of these aspects follows.) 

i« Whelan, Brain Drain, p. 73. 

«• Ibia\, p. 74. 


quality of medical education in the LDCs from which most FMGs 
have come in recent years is considerably inferior to that of U.S. 
medical schools. FMGs as a group achieve much lower scores on 
medical practice qualifying examinations than do graduates of U.S. 
schools, and FMGs who pass the examinations tend to do so margin- 
ally. Not all FMGs succeed in getting licenses to practice in the 
United States, but many thousands do and others find employment 
(in mental hospitals, psychiatric wards in prisons, and institutions 
for the mentally retarded, for example) without full credentials. By 
their sheer numbers they have made it less necessary for American 
medical schools, in order to meet the growing demand for doctors in 
the United States, to expand their facilities to accommodate more 
American premedical students. 249 Thus many of the latter who meet 
the entrance requirements are turned away each year, while thousands 
of FMGs with inferior training enter the medical profession in the 
United States. 


The general problem of the brain drain became an international 
issue in the mid-1960s. In 1966, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Educational and Cultural Affairs Charles Frankel called it "one of the 
steady, trying, troublesome diplomatic issues" with which the U.S. 
Government was confronted, and added that many countries regularly 
raised the brain drain issue with the United States. 250 Another observer 
notes that: 

In the United Nations, delegates from the LDCs accused the West of trans- 

• ferring its exploitative urges from physical to human resources. On one occasion 

j the representative from Dahome} T called it an "odious bleeding" of Africa, a 

continuation of the slave trade. The General Assembly, where the presence of the 

LDCs is most forcefully felt, passed a resolution acknowledging the seriousness 

I of the problem and expressing grave concern. 

In 1966, the Iranian Minister in charge of Cultural Affairs at Iran's Embassy 
in "Washington complained to American foreign student advisers about the 
drainoff of Iranian students (some 60 percent) studying in the United States. 
"Our government," he wrote, "is now thoroughly alarmed at the very high 
casualty rate of these skilled young people and is pressing us to take effective 
coun termeasures. ' ' 

So concerned has the Indian Government become about the loss of its doctors 
thac it has taken administrative action to discourage emigration. . . . 251 

The volume of complaints about brain drain received by the State 
Department from LDC governments has grown in recent years. In 
September 1973 an observer commented that a sign that the problem 
Iras becoming increasingly serious was "the pressure put on our 
State Department by about 80 countries which have asked that we 
send students skilled in essential fields back home when their programs 
are over, 252 and not encourage them to study sophisticated subjects, 
such as psychiatry, for which there is not yet a need where they come 
from." In February 1974 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Education 

1,9 During the period 1962-1971, the number of FMGs entering the United States was almost as great as 
the number of students graduated from American medical schools: 75,63'.» as compared with 77,867. (For a 
detailed discussion of the FMG problem, see ibid., pp. 173-201.) 

**> Ibid., p. 259. 

«' Ibid. 

«2 One of the complications attending the return of students to their native countries, as the study points 
■out, is that the LDCs often do not have employment opportunities for educated specialists. 


and Cultural Affairs Alan Reich acknowledged publicly that "at times 
this problem creates embarrassment for the U.S. Government." 253 

It was suggested at the outset of this commentary that the brain 
drain problem lacked sufficient visibility in developed countries to 
prompt official action by these major beneficiaries of the brain drain. 
However, it is evident from what has just been said that, insofar as 
the United States is concerned, there is a continuing official awareness 
of the problem at the State Department level. 254 Why, then, is remedial 
action not taken? Wiry, for example, is the United States literally 
dependent on foreign medical graduates as a substantial part of its 
perennial medical manpower supply? 


It is not enough to say in reply that, as in the case of most foreign 
policy problems, the brain drain problem is complex and there are 
no easy answers. It would seem reasonable to suppose that options 
must be open to the United States for at least ameliorating the 
problem and helping to direct the international migration of talent in 
more constructive ways. 

Some options will be considered later in this ccmmentary. For the 
moment, it must be conceded that the problem is indeed complex, 
especially for a country like the United States, committed to the 
principle of freedom. There is a close linkage between that principle 
and human mobility. "One of the salient features of migrations as 
a historical phenomenon is the frequency with which exceptional 
people . . . possessed of above average talents, strength, and 
courage . . . had 'the heart to brave new worlds.' 255 . . . Robert C. 
Cook, a longtime student of demography, gave this succinct explana- 
tion of the historical process of migrating intellectuals: 'Lots of bright 
people come from Ozark Junction — and the brighter they are the 
faster they come.' " 256 Is the United States to make agreements with 
developing countries which result in repatriation of a promising- 
mathematician or nuclear physicist because the parent country needs 
sanitary engineers? Moreover, "... a specialist on cancer research 
from a small developing country who seeks intellectual contacts and 
research facilities available in a larger advanced nation in order to 
satisf3 r his professional ambitions may be making a greater contribu- 
tion to his nation than if he remained home. 'The results of his works,' 
writes Frankel, 'flow outward and benefit his country as well as the 
country where he works.' " 257 

A further difficulty facing the United States with respect to the 
brain drain problem lies in the extent to which principle and advantage 
are interwoven. The only massive migration of talent away from the 
United States (occurring, ironically, when it was a developing country) 
was that of Loyalists at the time of the Revolution — estimates have 
placed their number as high as 100,000. Otherwise this Nation has 
been the beneficiary. As Assistant Secretary of State Frankel — 

2 « Ibid., p. 260. 

254 Especially (the author comments) in AID. 

255 The phrase is that of Walter Adams, a student of the subject and editor of a book, The Brain Drain 
(New York, Macmillan, 1968, 273 pp.) 

™ Ibid., p. 29. 
257 ibid., p. 14. 


principal administration spokesman on the brain drain issue when it 
was receiving the most attention in the mid-1960s — stated in an 
official "Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and 
Skills" held in October 1966: "If there had been no brain drain in the 
past, we wouldn't be here, and this country wouldn't be what it is 
today." 2 '" 

But there is a difference between enrichment of American scientific 
and technical resources in nuclear research as a result of emigration 
from a malevolently ascendant Germany under Hitler, or in the aero- 
space field due to postwar transfers of talent from a defeated Germany, 
and the expansion of resources in private medicine in the United 
States at the expense of the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. To cite Frankel once again — this time in testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968 — 

. . . the "brain drain" is an important problem because it raises, in the most 
dramatic form, the question of the kind of world in which the United States wants 
to live a generation, or even a half generation from now. Over the long run we 
cannot stand the burden of a world in which most people and most countries will 
have inadequate intellectual resources and leadership of their own, and will have 
to lean on us and one or two other giants for their own well-being. This is why 
the brain drain is an important matter, and why it behooves us to seek affirmative 
measures to alleviate it. 259 

Bole of Congress 26 ° 

Through its constitutional powers to legislate immigration laws, 
Congress is the principal instrumentality for managing the inflow 
of manpower into the United States. Congressional interest in the 
brain drain issue over the past decade has reflected concern over 
international as well as domestic aspects. This concern was relatively 
intense in the period 1966-6S, and resulted in hearings and studies 
by the House Government Operations Committee and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. "Since then, Congressional interest has progres- 
sively diminished to the point where today it is largely limited to 
isolated concern for the internal aspects of the FMG inflow." 

A bill introduced by Senator Mondale in October 1966 (S. 3905, the 
"International Brain Drain Act") was referred to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee; apparently no further action was taken. In 
1967 the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Nat- 
uralization held and published extensive hearings on International 
Migration of Talent and Skills. Concurrently, the House Government 
Operations Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs under- 
took a study in some depth entitled, The Brain Drain into the United 
States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians. In 1968 the House 
subcommittee held extensive hearings on The Brain Drain of Scientists, 
Engineers, and Physicians from the Developing Countries to the United 
States. The House and Senate publications provided valuable insights 
into the problems and have been frequently cited in other writings on 
the brain drain. 

However, nothing came of these congressional efforts. As of the 
date of the study (September 1974), overall congressional interest in 
the issue of the brain drain would have to be characterized as slight. 

«s Whclan, Brain Drain, p. 27. 

»» Ibid., pp. 252-253. 

S6 ° Most of this section is a condensation of a section in the basic study entitled "Congressional Involvement 
in the Brain Drain Issue"— ibid., pp. 234-236. The concluding part on foreign medical graduates (FMGs) 
is based on a discussion of "Congressional and Administrative Views on FMGs," pp. 196-200. 


Possibly one reason for the decline in concern is that the United States 
has been acquiring rather than losing "brains." "But a more decisive 
reason is that the issue itself is set in the context of a paradox: the 
Nation is committed to the principle of liberalized immigration 
policies and to the principle of international education exchange; 
both would conflict with any administrative policies that could be 
designed to reverse the flow of emigrating professionals." 

In the one brain drain sector which has attracted recent congres- 
sional attention — that of the Foreign Medical Graduates — there have 
been differences in view between concerned congressional spokesmen 
and the Administration. The latter: 

. . . sees the utilization of FMGs as an expedient for coping with the Nation's 
pressing medical demands. Thus, as Secretary Weinberger told the House 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Public Health and Environ- 
ment in March 1973, "I don't think in and of itself [that] is necessarily a bad 

However, Rep. William R. Roy (D-Kans.), a physician, faculty member of 
the Kansas University Medical Center, prominent leader in the Kansas Medical 
Society, and member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of 
Sciences, disputed this evalution, saying, "Maj^ I suggest to you it is a bad 
thing," and for these reasons: "No. 1, we have young men and women — probably 
twice to three times as many — who cannot get in medical schools, who the medical 
schools admit are qualified; and that No. 2, we are stealing these physicians 
from other nations around the world who need them desperately." Dr. Roy 
asked: "Now will you explain to me why it is not a bad thing when we license 
over 12,000 foreign physicians?" 261 

Concern in the House of Representatives over the inadequacies 
of the Nation's health services and particularly over the growing 
prominence of FMGs was expressed in a bill which Congressman 
Roy introduced in April 1974: H.R. 14357, the National Health 
Services Manpower Act of 1974. The bill included proposals that 
would increase national manpower resources in the health services, 
reduce the number of postgraduate trainee positions available to 
FMGs and thus limit their inflow, improve the distribution of health 
services, and increase Federal Government support for health training 
programs. On the Senate side, in June 1974 Senator Jacob Javits 
sharply criticized the administration's position on the use of FMGs 
to alleviate the doctor shortage. Senator Javits pointed to the insuf- 
ficient number of medical schools and inadequate Federal Govern- 
ment support for "desperately needed medical, dental, nursing, and 
other health profession schools." 262 Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
followed with a comprehensive critique of the administration's 
health manpower policies. The focus of this congressional concern, 
however, was on the domestic impact of the FMG problem rather 
than its foreign policy implications. 

Status of the Issue 

The author of the study presents some "tentative generalizations" 
on brain drain as a contemporary international problem: 

1. A changing world environment occurring over the past three decades has 
created unique political and economic conditions for brain drain to flourish as a 
contemporary international phenomenon. 

2. The political aspects of the brain drain problem are rooted in this changing 
world environment, specifically, in the processes of decolonization that has 
produced a "Third World" of independent states in Asia and America. 

2«' Ibid., p. 106-197. 
2M Ibid., p. 198. 


3. The economic aspects <>f the problem derive from the nature of an evolving 

and globalizing industrial revolution with parallel developments in the world 
of science and technology. This dual phenomenon has created an expanding world 
economy, stimulated the universalization of knowledge, and generated a com- 
petition of needs and demands, priorities and g< ah between the advanced in- 
dustrial societies and the LDCs: the former seek expanding mai kets and resources, 
human and material, for enlarging their industrial systems . the latter seek develop- 
ment and modernization of their undeveloped or developing countries Qn< 
primary objects of the competition is to secure trained professional manpower 
needed by both. 

4. By reordering immigration priorities to stress quality over quantity and by 
enlarging incentives, the advanced industrial societies have been able to draw- 
heavily on the LDCs for their professional manpower requirements, seei 

to tin- detriment of the latter. 

.">. In this competition for trained manpower [the] advanced industrial societies 
hear "universal culpability" for brain drain from the LDCs. ihe data suggest 
that the United States, long the mecca of world immigration, has been a prime 
beneficiary; though the number of immigrant scientists and engineers has de- 
clined in 1972, the inflow of foreign physicians and surgeons continues on a steady 
upward trend. 263 

There appears to be little awareness among the American, people — 
or even in most quarters of the U.S. Government — -of the significance 
of a brain drain to the United States from the LDCs. Yet, though 
largely hidden, the problem is a durable one that poses the question: 
What, is the true attitude of the United States toward the developing 
countries and the development process? "For brain drain and devel- 
opment are principles in contradiction: one cannot have it both 
ways — an LLC cannot develop without an educated elite." - 04 The 
contradiction is heightened by the inability of the United States — 
despite the pervasive current atmosphere of disenchantment with 
foreign commitments other than those with clearly perceived benefits 
to national security, and specifically despite a declining interest in 
foreign aid and international development — to escape involvement 
with the LDCs. These countries have the greatest concentration of 
the world's population and natural resources: they provide the indus- 
trially advanced states with both materials and markets; and, not 
least important in the restless world of 1976, they include most of the 
international trouble spots, actual or potential. 265 

The principal stages in solving or ameliorating a problem are (1) 
discovering that it exists; (2) perceiving what impacts it has or is 
likely to have, and assessing their significance; (3) analyzing its 
causes and deciding on remedial measures that would be feasible and 
worth the cost; and (4) carrying out those measures. In these terms, 
the brain drain problem as of the time when the study was published 
had yet to reach stage (1) for most Government officials and citizens 
in the United States; a relatively small number of officials and spe- 
cialists had made some partial headway into stage (2), and a few 
even into stage (3); but virtually no headway at all had been made in 
stage (4). 

'.. pp. s:-88. 

*" Ibid., p. 241. 

•« Cf. the following statement by Russell W. Peterson, chairman of the Council on Environmental Qual- 
ity, in i Washington Pout article (September 4. 1975) on "World Population: A Forgotten Crisis": "Today, 
about 70 pt rccnt of the world's population lives in the developing countries. At present rates of growth, that 
proportion will, within 35 years, grow to 82 percent. That rate of expansion, if unchecked, threatens unpre- 
dictable daneer for all nations. When one considers the growing interdependence among the nations, the 
hew po'itic* o r inequality in which developing countries charge that our abundance has been achieved at 
their expense, and the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry around the world, it becomes clear that no 
nation can escape the consequences of failure to moderate the world's population growth." 


In summary: 

A mood of withdrawal from extended — possibly overextended — foreign policy 
commitments seems to have enveloped the Nation in the post-Vietnam era. 
Reinforced by other powerful forces, termed isolationist by some observers, this 
mood has had the effect of restricting foreign policy initiatives and inducing a 
cautious attitude among lawmakers toward reaffirming traditional but far-reaching 
foreign policy commitments. Apathy and indifference toward economic develop- 
ment (and also immigration) is reflected in the attitude and posture of the admin- 
istration; and thus far in the 1970s the Congress, preoccupied with other pressing 
matters such as the energy and constitutional crises, has seemed unaware that a 
problem exists. 286 

Prospects and Options 

At the outset of this commentary the question was raised as to how 
a problem with important consequences for foreign policy and inter- 
national relations — a problem, in this case, involving the interaction 
of science, technology, and foreign relations — could drop out of sight 
unresolved. The answer to this question is a composite one, and parts 
of it are suggested by common sense and common experience. 


There are fashions in policy issues and political or diplomatic prob- 
lems, as in virtually all human affairs — 'including village vandalism 
and international terrorism. Even the great issues are lost from view 
at times as attention is distracted to more urgent and exciting, if less 
important, themes or events. 267 When the issue or problem is of some- 
what lesser magnitude than the population explosion, or the nuclear 
threat, or any of half a dozen other matters pertaining more or less 
directly to the ultimate question of human survival, it has that much 
less claim on center stage. Yet it may have an important, if undramatic, 
bearing on one of those more vital matters — including the ability of 
peoples to live together harmoniously in a world of growing pressures 
of interdependence. Taking action to solve or alleviate these under- 
lying problems may be a useful and perhaps essential contribution to 
the establishment of interdependent relationships that in turn make 
the larger and more dangerous issues less intractable. This indirect 
approach ma}^, at first sight, appear unsuited to that side of the 
American character reflected in the World War II slogan of the U.S. 
Army Air Corps: "The difficult we do immediately; the impossible 
takes a little longer." But the slogan is ironically at variance with the 
disciplined systems approach required to build and operate a fighter 
plane (not to mention a space ship). Moreover, for all the alleged 
impatience of Americans to get things done yesterday if not sooner, 
the American genius in organization and technology — which depends 
in both areas on the step-bA r -step systems approach — suggests that it 
is at least a disciplined and sustainable impatience, when problems 
are expressed in engineering terms. 

Can a diplomatic problem be dealt with in such terms? In many 
cases the answer is: Yes — with at least some success, and perhaps 
considerable. Human affairs may be complicated by nonrational fac- 
tors, some of them respected and cherished, which would not fit into a 

28« Whelan, Brain Drain, p. 271 

™ In the article referred to in footnote 265. Russell W. Peterson writes that "... e year after the 
World Population Conference in Bucharest, population, the world's most pressing problem, is its for- 
gotten crisis." 


purely rational systems process, but many of the problems confronting 
•diplomacy (increasingly many, as technology plays more and more of 
a part) are largely amenable to rational management. 

Although it concerns the sociology of science and technology, rather 
than science and technology as such, the brain drain problem appears 
to be one of these. The study presents persuasive evidence that it is 
indeed a problem, though largely unperceived, and one worth solving 
or at least mitigating. Its causes, which the study describes in some 
detail, 268 may be summarized as a combination of "push" and "pull" 
factors. The latter are what attract talented immigrants to one or 
another developed country, and especially the United States: eco- 
nomic gain, intellectual and cultural stimulus, demand for their 
services in challenging work, and so on. The former are all the circum- 
stances which make a talented and educated emigrant from an under- 
developed country reluctant to return home: lack of adequate pay, 
work facilities, and professional challenge; cultural prejudice against 
innovation; political repression . . . and many more. 


The study also contains a detailed discussion of remedies, 269 prefaced 
by the observation that: 

Virtually every commentary and analysis on brain drain presents a set of 
remedies, some exceedingly detailed and programmatic, as in the works by 
UNITAR, Gregory Henderson, Dr. Adams, Dr. Niland, the authors of the 
CI.MT study, the various official materials published by the State Department 
and the Congress; and others generalized and suggestive. There is an under- 
standable sameness about the remedies. The problem is universal; the ingredients 
are fairly uniform; and while remedies may vary from case to case, certain prin- 
ciples apply generally. 270 

These remedies fall broadly into the following categories: 

(a) diminishing the "push" factors through economic develop- 
ment of the LDCs; creating scientific 'technological infrastructures 
within the same countries; building professional manpower 
resources; establishing an educational base in science and tech- 
nology; encouraging basic research as well as technological appli- 
cations; improving communications among professionals, and 
building linkages among government, academic, and economic 
sectors; developing the scientific spirit; establishing regional 
"centers of excellence" — pooled science and technology resources; 

(b) at the same time, reducing the "pull" factors. The "pull" 
factors are less easy to define and generally less central to the 
problem, but a clear-cut exception exists in the medical brain 
drain: "A decade ago when the problem was far less acute than 
it is today, American students of brain drain and development 
specialists strongly urged the United States to expand its medical 
school facilities, and to train a sufficient number of doctors to 
meet present and future manpower demands (the shortage is 
generally placed at about 50,000 doctors). These two actions 
should go far toward ending American dependence on FMGs from 
the LDCs." 271 

«« See Whelan, Brain Drain, pp. 8&-126. 
«' See ibid., pp. 208-220. 
«• Ibid., p. 208. 
™ Ibid., p. 225. 


Diminishing the "push" factors through the development process 
is obviously not a simple matter. The dimensions of the task are Mich 
as to require substantial assistance from the United States and other 
developed countries. In this context, the brain drain problem becomes 
secondary, though contributing and symptomatic; the primary object 
is development itself. 


What assistance can be expected of the United States at a time 
when interest in foreign aid and development are at a low ebb? The 
study concludes with the thought that : 

In the face of many perplexing ambiguities and conflicting trends, perhaps the 
most that can be expected at the present juncture in U.S. foreign policy is that 
brain drain and the larger problem of international development be placed on the 
agenda of matters to be attended to when the Nation has recovered its balance, 
slowed its retreat from international involvement, and is prepared to resume a 
larger, and some would say a more creative, role in world affairs. This course, 
requiring a vision of the future and a reassessment of this Nation's place in it. 
would seem to be unavoidable, one dictated by self-interest, not a matter of moral 
conscience or mere national preference. 273 

There are some modest options which might be considered, however, 
while the Nation is making that reassessment. One which would 
involve assisting the United Nations to establish a country -by- 
country inventory of trained manpower resources, and a registry of 
qualified specialists willing to go where they are needed, is suggested 
in the essay on Independence versus Interdependence later in this 
concluding study. Another, for which the groundwork has been 
partly done, might involve a vigorous attack on the problem of U.S. 
medical education resources — primarily for domestic reasons, but 
also to reduce the medical brain drain. Again, the National Science 
Foundation (which has a continuing interest in the brain drain 
problem in particular and international science activities and rela- 
tionships in general) might be asked to outline a broad program 
whereby U.S. governmental, academic, research laboratory, industrial. 
and other institutions and individuals might cooperate in (a) defining 
country -by-country needs of LDCs for scientific and technological 
infrastructure, (b) exploring the need for regional "centers of excel- 
lence"; 273 (c) advising at both country and regional levels in the 
establishment of phased short- and long-range development programs 
and (d) advising and assisting in the establishment of related statistical 
information systems, data banks, and information exchange pro- 
cedures. In shaping and coordinating such a program, the Founda- 
tion — or perhaps alternatively the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare — might also call on appropriate U.N. agencies to under- 
take related initiatives with U.S. funding and collaborative assistance. 
In the medical field, as suggested elsewhere in this study, the World 
Health Organization would seem an attractive possibility. 

*•' Ibid., p. 272. 

J:s For a discussion of "centers of excellence"— regional bases in which several countries pool funds and 
resources to carry on scientific research and develop research skills suited to the needs of the area, but beyond 
the means of any one country — see ibid., pp. 217-219. 


Author's Reassessmerit as of January 1976 

Following are 9ome retrospective comments by Dr. Whelan: 

The brain drain is as real a diplomatic problem for the United 
States today as it was in the mid-1960s, even if less visible. In the past 
year or so there has developed a renewed congressional perception of 
the reality of the problem. This perception is evidenced in the firsl 
instance in a growing awareness of interdependence and its importance 
for U.S. foreign policy. "It took the oil embargo to shake us up and 
make us aware of this interdependency." Another aspect is growing 
congressional concern over the dome-tic impact of the medical brain 
drain.- 74 

In this new era of interdependence [notes Whelan], international development 
holds a central place. International development means modernization; moderniza- 
tion means the application of science and technology. A new requirement is thus 
imposed upon the United States and the other advanced nations: To perceive the 
interrelationship in coping with the problems of international development. 
The brain drain problem enters the picture at this point, since skilled manpower 
la one of the many key requirements for development. 

It has become especially evident in the past year or two that 
relationships between the developed countries and the LDC- are 
undergoing a real and substantial permanent change. "The old 
attitudes ami assumptions of the West have lost their force; we < an 
no longer exploit the LD(s as we have done since the beginning of 
the expansion of Europe in the loth century." "Brain drain" 1- a 
form of exploitation, not perceived as such in the United State-, but 
resented in most of the LDCs. The remedy may be found in "salvation 
by interdependence." Here the United States has the advantage of 
the values of its civilization. As never before. Whelan observes, this 
country can provide the saving grace for many of the world's problems : 
i.e.. a saving grace resulting from judicious application of U.S. re- 
sources in science and technology. 

U.S. interests in the LDCs, apart from purely humanitarian 
concern, derive from a need for global stability and for access to 
material resources that are important to us and vital to many of our 
Western allies. U.S. policy has been to seek peace and stability in the 
Third World as a way of heading off great-power confrontations. The 
LDCs constitute the most unstable area in the world. They have been 
a souice of unending conflict, crisis, and tension involving the United 
States directly and sometimes indirectly. During the years 1945-67, 
80 conflicts occurred in the Third World. Since 1967, major wars 
have erupted between India and Pakistan and in Nigeria, the Middle 
East, and Southeast Asia. The current conflict in Angola threatens 
I r.S -Soviet detente. The United States has been deeply involved in 
LDC troubles. One reason for instability in the LDCs is underdevelop- 
ment and poverty, aggravated by crises in energy and food, and the 
effects of world inflation. And, to repeat, one reason for underdevelop- 
ment is the brain drain. 

174 In its consideration of the revision and extension of programs of Federal support for the education of 
health manpower, the 94th Congress has addressed the issue of the increasing reliance of the United States 
on graduates of foreign medical schools to provide health services in this country, and the concomitant loss 
of a vital health care resource to the native countries of these graduates. In July 1975 the House passed 
legislation (H.R. 5546) which contains provisions proposing to control the numbers of graduates of foreign 
medical schools who may enter this countrv. Other bills containing provisions relating to foreign medical 
graduates (S. 989, S. 991, S. 992, and S. 1357) are currently pending in the Senate. 


Some Illustrative Questions 

The central question which the problem of the brain drain poses 
for the United States is: What institutional arrangements wil] most 
effectively insure that significant foreign policy problems involving 
science and technology are not displaced from the agenda of official 
concerns but, rather, are actively addressed with the best resources 
available to the United States, through timely and proportionate 

Should these arrangements (i.e., for identifying and tracking 
problems or potential problems, assessing both their possible impacts 
and the kinds of effort required to cope with them, and alerting the 
appropriate action agencies or recommending new ones) focus on the 
interface of science, technology, and American diplomacy, or alter- 
natively on the full range of foreign policy issues? If the latter, would 
there be a tendency — following traditional patterns of policy issue 
identification and decisionmaking — to overlook or slight the tech- 
nological component? If the former, would there be a danger of think- 
ing too exclusively in technical and rational terms and losing sight of 
the larger picture with its blend of rational and nonrational elements? 

What implications do the answers to these questions have for 
both long- and short-range foreign policy planning mechanisms and 
staffing in the executive branch: (a) at the Presidential level, (b) in 
the State Department; and (c) in the various mission agencies — all 
in relationship to each other? What for the Congress? 

To accomplish U.S. foreign policy purposes in an increasingly inter- 
dependent (even though sometimes hostile) world, it seems essential 
that the good will which America has traditionally projected and 
evoked among the peoples of the world be refurbished and built upon. 
This good will — whether existing, or lost but recoverable, or poten- 
tial — might be regarded as a third resource, along with technological 
and managerial skills, that America could summon in unique degree. 
Would it be useful to look to some U.S. institution, such as the Depart- 
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare or the National Science 
Foundation, to identify areas in which U.S. foreign policy initiatives 
building on these three resources might yield a high return in helping 
the poor nations of the world solve their development problems, for a 
relatively small expenditure of American money and effort? One such 
area, as mentioned in discussion of Issue Two (The Politics oj Global 
Health) might be that of public health. Would countiy-by-country or 
regional assistance in solving problems of brain drain from the LDCs 
represent another such area? Would it be constructive for the United 
States to make diplomatic representations to regional organizations 
such as the Organization of African Unity, expressing willingness to 
help in the planning and establishment of regional and national science 
and technology infrastructures, with provision for balanced programs 
of higher education? 

Should the United States assist in setting up regional "centers of 
excellence" of in strengthening those already in existence? 

How can the United States best help to foster two-way communica- 
tion between the developed countries and the LDCs to collect, analyze, 
and disseminate information about the migration of talent in relation 
to the development process? Is UNITAR the logical center for informa- 
tion collection and exchange on this subject? Should the United States 
establish a center for information and research on the subject, inde- 
pendently of (or in conjunction with) the United Nations? 


To benefit both domestic and foreign policy what steps should 
Congress take to deal with the medical brain drain from the LDCs to 
the United States? 

Are there steps which the Congress might take, for symbolic as well 
as practical reasons, to signal its concern over the problems of the 
developing countries and its interest in fostering the development 
process? For instance, might Congress endow an independently ad- 
ministered center for the long-range study of development problems, 
with provision for a substantial number of visiting fellowships for 
LDC students and administrators concerned with development? 

In accordance with the principle that those institutions which will 
benefit should help bring about a stable world and the peaceful solution 
of problems generated by technology and change, should multinational 
corporations be required, induced, or encouraged to contribute to an 
international development fund? By what means? What concessions, 
if any, should be asked of LDCs in which the corporations operate in 
return for substantial contributions to such a fund? How and under 
what auspices should the fund be administered? 

What, in general, arc some of the ways in which the U.S. Govern- 
ment might form a constructive partnership with U.S. business and 
industry in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy goals relating to the 
development process? How can some of the great reservoirs of techno- 
logical and managerial resources, skills, and inventiveness of U.S. 
private enterprise be tapped for work on development problems, 
including the brain drain? 


This is the most recent of the series of 12 studies of the interaction of 
Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy which began with pub- 
lication in December 1970 of The Evolution oj International Tech- 
nology. The latter was designed to bring to the general subject some 
historical perspective and a current overview. In each of the interven- 
ing 10 studies a particular episode or continuing issue was examined 
both for its intrinsic and separate interest and to shed light on the gen- 
eral theme. 

The present study is similarly intended to perform this dual func- 
tion. It differs from the preceding studies, however, in that its subject 
is an operational expression of the theme of interaction among Science, 
Technology, and American Diplomacy. The preceding studies make 
abundantly clear that the interaction must be managed, insofar as it is 
within human ability to manage it. Failure to contiol and direct it in- 
volves risk of great damage to the public interest, both national and in- 
i ternational, as well as loss of substantial positive benefit. In the U.S. 
j Government, the locus for managing the interaction (apart from the 
' President and his immediate staff) is the Department of State. Other 
1 agencies have operational responsibilities in the area of diplomacy, 
but the State Department is responsible for coordinating their actions 
\ in consonance with U.S. foreign policy. 

\ »" U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Sc'ence and Technology in the Departmen ' 
J of State, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcom- 
mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, Senior Sped 1st in 
i Science and Technology, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,. 
Washington, D.C, June 1975, 180 pp. (Committee print.) 


But how clearly is that responsibility defined, and how fully pro- 
vided for in terms of competent staffs and appropriate authority? How 
broadly and effectively is it exercised? To what extent does the State 
Department in fact assume the focal role in this consequential area? To 
what extent is the State Department in fact the locus of decisionmaking 
and coordinated implementation of the widely varied activities in- 
volving Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy exemplified 
by the subjects of the preceding studies? Answers to these and related 
questions were sought in this focal study of the series. 

Statement of the Issue 

The study puts it simply, perhaps understating the case: "... a 
succession of Secretaries of State and their subordinates [have periodi- 
cally asserted] the importance of science and technology for diplomacy. 
The roster of problems, issues, and instances that can be collected from 
such statements is impressive. But the effort to marshal the Depart- 
ment's resources to deal with this arra}^ of business does not seem com- 
mensurate with the demand." 276 

The State Department, then, has not failed to recognize, and has at 
least paid lip service to, its responsibilities for relating science and 
technology to diplomacy — 

. . . The attempt was made, but circumstances and competing demands on 
departmental resources stood in the way. Some specific projects and programs 
did peter out, others never got off the ground. Thus the need for a scientific and 
technological competence, spread throughout the Department of State, is great 
and increasing; what appears to be required is not some vast shake-up but a 
carefully managed, gradual, but steady growth in technical sophistication, a 
heightened visibility of technological content of diplomacy throughout. This 
appreciation should encompass both the positive and negative impacts of technol- 
ogy on diplomacy, and be perceived in both the regional and functional bureaus. 
There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S. techno- 
logical developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the potential 
contributions to U.S. diplomacy for foreseeable future technological develop- 
ments. 277 

The heart of science and technology, the study further notes, is 
invention and change. The problem is to make this process serve — 
and in a subordinate sense, be served by — the conduct of U.S. di- 
plomacy. To do both requires increased creativeness and receptivity 
to innovation. More specifically, "the rate of technological change 
and its impacts on the diplomatic environment call for a strengthened 
ability of the functional bureaus to perceive and interpret these 
changes and impacts, around the world, and for an increased alertness 
to the predictive power of technology analysis and forecasting." 278 

But this is more easily said than done. The problem is elusive. 
Prof. Edgar S. Kobinson points out that it is rooted in a psychological 
attitude that is widespread in America, among the general public 
as well as among State Department officialdom: 

. . . while the public is quite aware of technology's omnipresence, it does not 
view technology as the progenitor of insoluble problems. Even as intractable a 
menace as thermonuclear weapons appears to have begotten the boon of detente 
and precluded the eruptions of a cataclysmic war. Liabilities cease to be dis-; 
tinguishable from assets. 

2 " Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 93. 
*" Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
™ Ibid., p. 125. 


Inasmuch as technological problems which resist ready resolution tend to lurk 
rather than loom and, as the example of the auto testifies, often make deferred 
rather than early debuts, the alarm is seldom sounded before the crisis [reaches a] 
climax. There is no evidence that the psychology residing [in the State Depart- 
ment] departs the norm. Secondly, where "State" is concerned, there seems to 
be a concerted psychology which treats science and technology more as incidental 
or adjunctive to diplomacy than as frequently a decisive factor. . . . 

Not even the oil situation has overpowered the regnant myth that technological 
traumas of international magnitude are basically political. . . . [Diplomats] seem 
not as yet to have begun to apprehend the extent to which the techno-tail wags 
the diplo-dog. 

Robinson concludes that any restructuring of the State Department 
to accommodate science and technology will be superficial without a 
fundamental change in this entrenched attitude: science and tech- 
nology have been, as he expresses it, "ushered into discreet quarantine 
in a nursery soothingly tagged 'The Bureau of Oceans and Inter- 
national Environmental and Scientific Affairs.' " 279 

Importance oj the Issue 

It is a matter of stark reality that success in managing the inter- 
action among science, technology, and diplomacy may spell the 
difference between peace and war. "The conduct of diplomacy involves 
a balancing of competition and cooperation, of competing national 
aspirations and shared international concerns. To the extent that the 
balance tilts toward international cooperation the prospect is one of 
peace; a tilt in the other direction leads to the prospect of tension 
and conflict." 2S0 Although, as the study notes, this statement is an 
oversimplification of a complex process — competition in many areas 
of human activity, like trade, athletics, and even scientific or other 
scholarly achievement, implies a larger context of cooperation and 
agreed rules of the game among competitors — it remains essentially 

It is common knowledge today, a generation after the first unleash- 
ing of nuclear power, that effective international control of nuclear 
technology in its peaceful as well as its military applications may be 
central to human survival. But the impacts of science and technology 
are not limited to the growing business of avoiding holocaust; they 
extend pervasively and often constructively into many areas of every- 
day experience. The study lists a few of the functions or fields in 
which they have begun to affect people in all parts of the world and 
have brought about many changes in relationships among States: 

— Instant communication and visual reports at great distances; 
— Unlimited recording and rapid manipulation of data; 
— Photographic surveys of the total area of the Earth ; 

: : : 

— Global weather prediction; 

— Cheap synthetic substitutes for many cash crops; 

— Chemicals and drugs with global social and environmental impacts; and 

— Massive and rapid air transportation. 281 

,n Ed?ar S. Robinson, Professor of Government, American University, to Franklin P. Huddle, July 25, 
1975: "Notes on Science and Technology in the Department of State." 
"•Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 2. 
»» Ibid., p. 1. 



Anyone who is reasonably well informed in public affairs and familiar 
with the machinen^ and processes of government, including specifically 
the State Department, will recognize the enormous difficulty of relat- 
ing these and other contemporary technological developments to 
national interests, both domestic and diplomatic. Nevertheless, failure 
to relate national policy to such developments — and where possible 
to anticipate where they are tending and to direct them into construc- 
tive channels — would represent a surrender to technology as an 
uncontrolled force. One result of such surrender could well be the 
erosion and ultimate disappearance of social and political democracy 
in those countries where they now prevail; another would probably 
be a further deterioriation in the quality of life for all peoples every- 
where, beyond what may be due to already foreseeable factors, most 
of them related to growing population pressures. 

In short, there would appear to be no more important issue of 
foreign policy for governments to cope with than the behavior of 
international technology. If this is the case, there is no more important 
issue confronting the State Department. 

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 

Preceding studies in this series have dealt with the evolution of 
international technology in general, and the circumstances of a variety 
of special instances of it, as they affected the United States. This 
section will not attempt to tell the story of how U.S. diplomac}^ hae 
responded historically to the growing influences of science and tech- 
nology, but will give some attention to related developments involving 
the State Department since 1950. 282 


Under the influence of men like Franklin and Jefferson, science am 
technology were closely interrelated with American diplomacy ii 
the early years of the Republic. After the Presidency of John Quinc\ 
Adams, however, "interaction of diplomats — and Government official- 
generally — with science and technology appears to have diminished 
In the main, the modern concern of the Department of State witl 
science and technology dates from the close of World War II. It wa: 
from here in 1946 that the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was drafted 
proposing a diplomatic initiative to bring the newly developed tech 
nology of atomic energy under international control." 283 

Other positive factors besides atomic energy compelled the atten 
tion of international diplomacy, and in the United States that of thJ 
State Department, to the importance of science and technology 
Among these -factors were the creation of such U.N. -affiliated inter 
national institutions as the World Health Organization, the Foo» 
and Agricultural Organization, and the United Nations Educational 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the impulse t 
restore the global network of scientific societies, disrupted by wai 
early recognition of the need to mobilize technology to repair wd 
damage, restore the economies of devastated countries of Europe, an* 
assist in the development of poor countries eveprywhere; and the expeo 
tation, nourished by awareness of the many important contribution 

» 2 Readers seeking a more detailed historical perspective are referred to pages 11-71 of Science and Tec 
nology in the Department of State (op. cit.) 
»» Ibid., p. 11 


of science and technology to the war effort, of a great impetus in 
industrial technology following the close of the war — an expectation 
which was to bo fulfilled. "Less evident, but still consequential, was 
the concept that national excellence in science and technology was a 
form of demonstration of national power and world influence." 284 


The first comprehensive effort to assess the importance of science 
and technology to U.S. diplomacy was that of the 1950 Berkner 
Report. Apparently in response to ideas generated by the Hoover 
Commission's 194S-49 study of the organization of the executive 
branch for the conduct of foreign affairs — a study which in itself did 
not address the role of the State Department in this field — the Secre- 
tary of State in October 1949 appointed Lloyd V. Berkner as Special 
Consultant to advise him on responsibilities and functions of the De- 
partment in formulating and implementing international aspects of 
national science policy, and related organization and staffing. Under 
Berkner's guidance, a Departmental Steering Committee on Interna- 
national Science Policy conducted a study culminating in a report 
which "for more than a decade prescribed the organizational framework 
and philosophic concept of science and technology in the Department 
of State" — 

. . . The durable effect of this report was beneficial in a number of ways: 

(1) It emphasized the importance of science for diplomacy. 

(2) It identified important functions of a scientific apparatus as a component 
of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus. 

(3) It prescribed the necessary interaction of overseas scientific attaches with a 
strong backstopping unit at home. 

(4) It addressed the need for coordination of the State scientific office with other 
agencies with scientific functions. 

(5) It called attention to the importance of the U.S. nongovernmental scientific 
community for the Department of State — and vice versa. 

On the other hand, the report had a number of adverse consequences: 

(1) The array of proposed functions for science attaches was unrealistically 
wide in scope, without establishing priorities of emphasis. 

(2) The important distinction between science as somewhat international 
and technology as more closely related to national policy and objectives, was 
neglected; similarly the heavy emphasis on science and the interchange of scientific 
information obscured the larger importance of technology for diplomacy and of 
the role of technological analysis as an input to foreign policy formulation. 

(3) No assessment was presented of potential scientific and technological 
interests of the Department of State in the geographic and economic bureaus, in 
State Intelligence and Research, in the in-house educational activities of the 
Department, and especially in the Policy Planning Staff. 

(4) The relationship of the proposed new scientific organization to the White 
House and the National Security Council was not discussed. 285 


The Berkner Keport resulted in the establishment of the State 
Department post of Science Adviser and Special Assistant. This new 
office had barely had time to define its role, hire a staff, and begin 
to function, however, when it was overtaken by a departmental 
retrenchment. By 1956 the State Department science organization 
had dwindled to a caretaker Foreign Service Officer and two 

** Ibid., p. !2. 
» Ibid., p. 23. 


Then, in October 1957, came Sputnik. In January 1958, at the sug- 
gestion of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. (Special Assistant to the President 
for Science and Technology), Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
reestablished the departmental post. Naming it ''Science Adviser to 
the Department of State," he appointed to the post Dr. Wallace R. 
Brode, president of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science and a member of the National Academy of Sciences. 


But the science and technology function in the State Department 
-continued to have its ups and downs. It did so partly through initial 
lack, at the Secretary of State level, of sufficient interest in or under- 
standing of the diplomatic role of science and technology, partly through 
lack of leadership skilled in the ways of both science and bureaucracy, 
and partly (or perhaps most of all) because of the great range of subject 
matter, complexity of relationships, and unfamiliarity throughout the 
State Department with the concepts and implications of science and 
technology as integral to diplomacy. Despite the sympathetic inter- 
est of recent Secretaries of State, the function still lacks clear identity, 
influence, and prospects. Some of the highlights of the period from 1960 
to the present (January 1976) are as follows: 

— In a speech delivered in December 1960 and reproduced in 
Science January 6, 1961, James R. Killian, Jr., made an appeal for 
a strong science program in the Department of State. (This was 
one of many representations by eminent scientists, before and 
since, on behalf of strengthening the science and technology 
compoDent of American diplomacy.) 

— In March 1962, in response to an inquiry from Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk to Presidential Science Adviser Jerome B. 
Wiesner, the report of a "Science and Foreign Affairs Panel" of 
the President's Science Advisor}^ Committee (PSAC) was sub- 
mitted to the Department of State and essentially implemented. 
The thrust of the recommendations was that the status of the 
office should be elevated, the scientific functions emphasized, 
and the related functions of space and atomic energy consoli- 
dated within it. University of Wisconsin Physics Professor 
Ragnar Rollef son was named to succeed Dr. W T alter G. Whitman, 
MIT chemical engineering department head who had followed; 
Dr. Brode; the title of the position was changed to "Director ofl 
Scientific Affairs." The principal functions of the Director would 
be to: 

a. Participate actively in general foreign policy development, ensui" 
ing that appropriate consideration is given to scientific and technologi 
cal factors. 

b. Advise and assist the Secretary of State and other Departmen 
officers in reaching decisions on matters having scientific and tech 
nological implications. 

c. Participate in policy planning for and provide guidance to U.S: 
international science activities. 

d. Work with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, re 
gional bureaus, and other appropriate elements in formulating polio 
and planning programs for scientific exchange. 

e. Recommend activities to further U.S. foreign policy objectives ij 
the field of science and technology. 

f. Provide guidance to the science attaches developed in collabori: 
tion with other Department elements, particularly the regional bureau- 


g. Serve as the point of coordination within the Department and 
between the Department and other organizations, governmental and 
non-governmental, on matters concerned with science and technology, 
including the non-military uses of atomic energy and outer space. 

h. Represent the Department on appropriate interdepartmental 
committees. 88 ® 

— Rollefson, who continued the work of his predecessors in 
providing a bridge to the scientific community, was succeeded 
for a brief period on an acting basis in 1964 by his deputy, Dr. 
Edwin M. J. Kretzman, a career Foreign Service Officer who had 
been a political science professor at Brown University. Kretzman 
was credited with several innovations, including the introduction 
of a science course at the Foreign Service Institute and the orga- 
nization of a series of "science luncheons" of the Secretary of 

— In December 1964 Kretzman retired and was replaced, again 
on an acting basis, by another Foreign Service Officer, Herman 
Pollack. For several years thereafter the search continued for an 
"outstanding" scientist to take the post, but even though the 
"Office" was made a "Bureau" in April 1965, and its Director 
declared "equivalent" to an Assistant Secretary, there were no 


Until Pollack, a nonscientist, took charge, the Office of Science 
Adviser (under whatever name) had been only marginally effective. 
In September 1966 Professor Eugene Skolnikoff of MIT assessed the 
effectiveness of the office as one of "poor performance." The func- 
tions of the office, he said, were at three levels: participation in 
policymaking, handling operational responsibilities, and bridging 
from State to the science community. The latter two were inescapable 
and time-consuming but easy; the first was "broadest, hardest, and 
most important": 

... It was the key job. It meant that the office should be not only on call but 
prepared to take the initiative "when opportunities are seen for using science 
and technology to advance political objectives." It should be highly selective in 
the issues it studied. It could tap the reservoir of expertise in the "outside" 
science community. The Science Officer needed the rank of Assistant Secretary, 
more importantly such leadership qualities as "scientific stature," skill in tech- 
nology forecasting relative to foreign policy, a competence for representing the 
State Department's interest in domestic scientific and technological developments, 
and "concern for the general ability of Foreign Service officers to deal with the 
day-to-day interactions between science, technology, and foreign policy." 287 

Pollack proved an imaginative and flexible administrator who was 
able to win the respect of the scientific community even while it was 
deploring State's inability to recruit a bona fide scientist to the post. 
Having served in an acting capacity for two and a half years, he was 
confirmed in the position (by this time styled "Director of International 
Scientific and Technological Affairs") in July 1967. He held it for 
another 7 years until his retirement in August 1974. 

During these years the office expanded in personnel, increased in effectiveness 
and impact, and somewhat bettered its acceptance by other elements of the 
Department. However, while it undertook many experiments in bringing science 
understanding into the Department there were few unqualified successes. It was 
never adequately manned to perform both operational and staff policy functions. 

»« Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
«' Ibid., p. 30. 


It became overloaded with operational chores and tended to neglect other com- 
mitments. The differing intellectual demands of science policy and technology 
policy, and the differing administrative requirements of science programs and 
technological programs, made it difficult to allocate effort to deal with these four 
functions in a balanced way. Still, these are criticisms of a dynamically evolving 
function in a Department and an administrative environment that tended to 
xesist change and new directions of growth. 283 

The office of which Pollack assumed charge as Director (SCI) was 
moderately staffed : it consisted of 32 persons in Washington (including 
both officer and secretarial personnel), plus 22 scientific attaches or 
deputies. By the beginning of 1975 the Washington staff had grown 
to 98. The SCI budget had increased from $558,430 in the fiscal year 
1965 to $2,439,400 in the fiscal year 1975. 

Growth on that scale could hardly be called impressive in light of 
the extensive list of tasks for which SCI had become responsible by 
1974. 289 The Bureau's performance fell far short of exercising the full 
leadership and coordinating potential of the State Department in the 
areas of scientific and technological support of U.S. diplomacy and of 
international science and technology. Nevertheless, it reflected sub- 
stantial gains in recognition and acceptance within the State Depart- 
ment and the U.S. Government generally of the science and tech- 
nology dimensions of American diplomacy. 


state; creation of oes 

An added burden was imposed on SCI when the President, early 
in 1973, dissolved the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and the 
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and transferred 
responsibility for the functions of the President's Science Adviser — 
including management of the Federal Council for Science and Tech- 
nology (FCST) — to Dr. Guyford Stever, Director of the National 
Science Foundation. Dr. Stever in turn transferred from FCST to 
State the jurisdiction over the FCST International Committee, 
which was chaired by Pollack and staffed by SCI. With the termina- 
tion of PSAC and its International Panel, and with the move of the 
International Committee of FCST to SCI, the committee in effect 
inherited both planning and operational coordinating functions, but 
without interagency and Executive Office support. Tins was the 
status of the Interagency Committee on International Science and 
Technology when, in October 1974, the personnel and function of 
SCI and of two other offices 29 ° were transferred to a new Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), 
headed by 'an Assistant Secretary. 

Chosen to serve as first head of the newly created Bureau was 
Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission. Upon confirmation, Dr. Ray took office January 30, 1975: 

. . . Her appointment was greeted by Science magazine as a challenge to her 
"bureaucratic skills" as well as a test of the interest of the Secretary of State 
and his senior associates in "upgrading science in the State Department and . . 
making it an effective ingredient in foreign relations." 

M3 Ibid., p. 34. 

m» See ibid., pp. 42-44, for such a list, broken down under the following headings: Contributions to Policy 
Planning, Relations with Other Countries, Coordination of U.S. Technical Mission Agencies, Management 
and Dissemination of Technical Information, Facilitating the Work of Scientists, Increasing "Technical 
Literacy" in the Department of State, and Administrative Chores. 

'so The Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Coordinator of Ocean Affairs, 
and the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population Matters. 


There were obvious questions as to the extent of support that the new bureau 
would receive from the Secretary of State, the relationships to be established 
with other bureaus of the Department, and the rapport with the National Science 
Foundation, its National and International Division, and the new Science and 
Technology Policy Office, among other interested agencies. 

Internally, the new Assistant Secretary would also have the opportunity to 
chart a number of new courses. . . . 281 

But Dr. Ray was not — at least in her own estimate — given that 
opportunity. On June 19, 1975, she submitted her resignation to 
Secretary Kissinger, regretting unfulfillment of her hope that her 
Bureau would play a significant role in the formation of the De- 
partment's science policy and in "the provision of information upon 
which to base policy in those areas of technology specifically assigned 
to the OES Bureau by Congress." In a letter of the following day to 
President Ford, she asserted that "Under present Departmental pro- 
cedures, the Bureau can do little but acquiesce in the policies set by 
others, and attempt to implement its broad responsibilities with 
little authority and few resources." 292 

Bole oj Congress 

The observation was made in 1964 that "it was Congress and not 
the State Department or the White House that first saw the broad 
implications of science's penetration into all segments of foreign 
policy." 293 


This early congressional awareness took the form of a study planned 
by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1958 
and contracted to Stanford Research Institute in January 1959. The 
SRI report, completed in July 1959, was entitled "Possible Non- 
military Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on 
Foreign Policy Problems of the United States." It presented three 
main conclusions: (1) the progress of science and technology will do 
more to create or intensify problems that must engage the attention 
of foreign policy planners than to solve or ameliorate such problems 
"unless deliberate policy measures are taken"; (2) "the security and 
well-being of the United States call for a reappraisal of present 
allocations of scientific and technological effort with a view to directing 
more effort toward nonmilitary foreign policy challenges"; and (3) 
foreign policy planning from a broad perspective, making use of the 
best scientific assistance, "will be a critical requirement in the years 
ahead." 294 

In November 1962 the House Committee on Science and Astro- 
nautics(now Science and Technology) , in a brief staff study, proposed 
that the committee periodically review the coordination of national 
scientific and technological policies and programs with respect to 
cost, adequacy, effectiveness, and such questions as: 

Kl Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 46. 

2M The two letters are reproduced in full below, following the section headed Some Illustrative Questions. 

293 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 126. The quotation is from a book by 
Donald W. Cox, Am erica's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power (New York, Chilton Books, 1964) , 
p. 8. 

"♦ Ibid., p. 126. 


How can the United States best incorporate scientific and technological factors 
in making its national decisions, including foreign policy? 

Under what circumstances does international scientific and technological 
cooperation serve the national interest? 

What factors favor international cooperation in science and technology? 

What factors hinder such cooperation? 

How can the United States best use its scientific and technological resources in 
support of its national decisions, including its foreign policy? 2M 

Thereafter, the present study notes, congressional interest in the 
scientific and technological aspects of foreign policy "appears to have 
followed, in approximate order of emphasis, four sets of considera- 
tions, as follows:" 

1. The strengthening of the science office and other elements in the Department 
of State to deal with all these matters; 

2. Broad reviews of global trends in social, economic, military, and technical 
development as background for more specific legislative initiatives; 

3. National science and technology policy, with international aspects as an 
essential element; and 

4. Specific international issues with substantial scientific or technological 
content. 29B 

The study examines congressional concerns under all of these 
headings. It notes that while Congress has followed closely the many 
reorganizations of the Department of State since World War II in 
related reports and studies, it has chosen in the main not to prescribe 
organizational forms and procedures but has relied on the State 
Department to accomplish its own modernization. A notable excep- 
tion was the congressional action in 1973 to create the new position 
of Assistant Secretary of State heading a new Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs: 297 

. . . This action apparentty had the threefold purpose of (a) requiring intensified 
attention to the diplomatic importance of the oceans and the environment in a 
technological setting, (b) consolidating in one organization a number of diplo- 
matic functions with a substantial technical content, and (c) providing statutory 
emphasis to the State Department science office as a legitimate copartner with 
the ranking regional and functional Assistant Secretaries in the policymaking 
hierarchy of the Department. In its new form, OES today presents one organization 
that covers oceans, environment, nonmilitary atomic energj^, population matters, 
bilateral science agreements, technology, and basic science generally. Welding 
these elements into a coherent pattern seems to present a formidable as well as 
important task. It is likely to be one that will take time and effort. 298 


Of the many hearings, reports, and staff studies which testify to the 
growing congressional interest since World War II in scientific and 
technological trends affecting U.S. foreign policy, the study cites 
several notable examples. One was an investigation begun in 1969 
by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments into the relationships between 
national strategy and science. The emphasis of this investigation 
was heavily on the technology of weaponry and its diplomatic con- 
sequences. However, the concluding witness, Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, broadened the scope of 
the discussion with his statement that "Another set of questions 
relevant to national security concerns the role technological change 

«s Ibid., pp. 128-9. 

«• Ibid., p. 129. 

»" For details of this move, see ibid., pp. 45-48. 

»« Ibid., p. 129. 


plays in the relationship between ourselves and others. How do 
technological developments help to strengthen the ties with others 
in the free world? How do these developments divide?" 2 " 

A further set of hearings by the same subcommittee in 1972 ad- 
dressed the broader scope of "National Security Policy and the Chang- 
ing World Power Alignment." Although these hearings ranged widely 
over strategic, military, economic, foreign aid and development, 
sociological, and other considerations, the theme of technological 
impacts was never far from center stage. 



A 10-year sequence of studies on science and technology policy by 
the House Committee on Science and Astronautics (now Science and 
Technology) culminated in 1975 in a legislative proposal for a national 
policy — with explicit attention given to the diplomatic aspects of the 
policy — and for implementing institutions. The sequence began with 
two contract studies by the National Academy of Sciences: Basic 
Research and National Goals, completed in March 1965, and Applied 
Science and Technological Progress, submitted in May 1967. The sub- 
ject of the first study became the theme of the seventh annual meeting 
of the committee's Advisory Panel on Science and Technology in 
jknuary 1966. Speakers at this 3-day seminar, including Vice President 
Hubert H. Humphrey and Lord Snow of the United Kingdom 
Ministry of Technology, strongly emphasized the international 
aspects of science and technology. In January 1967 the Panel took 
up the theme of Government, Science, and International Policy. Again 
in 1968 the theme of the Panel was international: Applied Science 
and the World Economy. In 1970, when the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development addressed the question of National 
Science Policy in an extensive set of hearings at which witnesses 
called attention to the international aspects of U.S. science policy, 
the strongest statement on the subject was in a letter from Charles A. 
Lindbergh, who wrote that "the survival or the breakdown of our 
western civilization is likely to depend on how intelligently we apply 
its science and technology to our human environment within the 
next decade. . . . No previous civilization has had either our knowl- 
edge or our tools. It seems to me that in this fact we have remaining 
some hope that we can avoid following the path of breakdown that 
history suggests is inevitable for every civilization." 300 

At the 1971 Panel meeting on International Science Policy, former 
Congressman (and subsequently Office of Technology Assessment 
Executive Director) Emilio Q. Daddario called attention to the co- 
herence of the science panels around a "central question" which he 
defined as "how science can best be employed for the benefit of all 
mankind." He suggested, as a mechanism needed to "integrate more 
completely our own national science activities with those of other 
nations," a series of regional science policy committees which could 
"develop more fully the multilateral approach to scientific coopera- 

Ibid., p. 131; 
Rid., pp. 134-135. 


tion." However, a necessary first step was the formulation of national 
science policy. 301 Another speaker, former NASA Administrator James 
E. Webb, cited the committee print which served as the prospectus 
for the present study series, 302 and commented that "just as this 
[House Science and Astronautics] committee is reaching out for a 
better understanding of the international opportunities inherent in 
science, so is the Committee on Foreign Affairs reaching out to better 
understand the implications of science for diplomacy." 303 


The most recent development in the House Science and Technology 
Committee's 10-year sequence was a series of hearings in 1973 and 
1974 on Federal Policy, Plans, and Organization for Science and 
Technology. These hearings led to introduction of a national science 
policy bill (H.R. 4461) on March 6, 1975, and to two subsequent 
revised versions by the same sponsors: H.R. 9058 (July 30, 1975) and 
H.R. 10230 (October 20, 1975.) 304 Once again, witnesses spoke of the 
need for attention to international science and technology. For 
example, Dr. Roger Revelle, president of the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, maintained that "scientific and 
technical information must be one component in the broader context 
of policymaking in the field of international affairs." 305 

A significant feature of the resulting Public Law 94-282 (The National 
Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 
1976) is the articulation, in title I, of an explicit and detailed con- 
ceptual framework for the Nation's pursuit of science and technology. 
In essence, the title proposes as the finding of Congress that "the 
general welfare, the security, the economic health and stability of the 
Nation, the conservation and efficient utilization of its natural and 
human resources, and the effective functioning of government and 
society require vigorous, perceptive support and employment of science 
and technology in achieving natural objectives." Goals of that policy 
include "fostering leadership in the quest for international peace and 
progress toward human freedom, dignity, and well-being by enlarging 
the contributions of American scientists and engineers to the knowledge 
of man and his universe, by making discoveries of basic science 
widely available at home and abroad, and by utilizing technology in 
support of United States national and foreign policy goals." Further, 
one of the six policy principles in the bill has direct foreign policy 
implications : 

(3) The conduct of science and technology operations so as to serve domestic 
needs while promoting foreign policy objectives. 

so' Ibid., p. 135. 

s°2 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age, an 
introduction to the study series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: prepared for the Sub- 
committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Huddle, Legislative 
Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1970, 28 pages. 
(Committee print.) 

sw Huddle, Scknce and Technology in the Department of State, p. 136. 

so* H.R . 10230, "National Science and Technology Policy and Organization Act of 1975," was introduced 
by Committee Chairman Olin E. Teague and cosponsored by Ranking Minority Member Charles A. 
Mosher. The House passed H.R. 10230, as amended, on November 6, 1975, and sent it to the Senate, where 
it was jointly referred to the Labor and Public Welfare, Commerce, and Aeronautical and Space Science 
Committees. On February 4, 1976, the Senate passed H.R. 10230 after amending it to incorporate the sub- 
stance of S. 32, which had meanwhile been jointly reported by the three committees. The bill was sent to 
conference on February 26; a conference report was filed April 26 and agreed to shortly thereafter by both 
Houses. The measure was sent to the President and signed into law May 11, 1976, as Public Law 94-282, the 
National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976. 

W5 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 137. 



Space does not permit a recounting here of all the evidences of 
congressional concern with the interactions of science, technology, and 
foreign policy that are dealt with in the basic study. 306 However, 
mention should be made of the Commission on the Organization of the 
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Created on the initia- 
tive of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and representing 
both Houses of Congress and the President, the Commission was 
charged with undertaking studies that would enable it to ". . . submit 
findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for 
the formulation and execution of the Nation's foreign policy." 307 This 
was a very large task, and it is perhaps not surprising that the Report 
which the Commission rendered in June 1975 fell short of the clear 
and definitive statement of needed reforms sought by its sponsors. 
In any case, the Commission did include among its focal subjects of 
study the scientific and technological aspects of foreign policy. 308 


The present study's section on "Congressional Concern with Science 
in the Department of State" concludes with consideration of a "con- 
gressional policy planning staff." The basis for this suggestion is that, 

The cultural and organizational situation in the Department of State with 
respect to science and technology presents the Congress with two related problems. 
One is the need of Congress for information and analysis. The Congress, speaking 
broadly, needs to know what is going on in order to decide what to instruct the 
executive branch to do about it. The interactions of science and technology with 
diplomacy are demonstrably of commanding importance. But the Congress is 
faced with difficulties in securing information and analyses in this field because 
of the persistent cultural lag in technical literacy and a lack of organizational 
coherence and discipline of the Department, which is after all the main source 
of diplomatic information for Congress. The second problem is how to strengthen 
the resources of the Department of State to collect, analyze, and report to the 
Congress on the technical aspects of diplomacy. Recent events suggest that 
reform is already underway. But it is also possible that further congressional 
encouragement might be found necessary. As time goes on, it is to be hoped, the 
departmental deficiencies will be corrected. 

But pending such correction and even after, it would seem desirable for the 
Congress to strengthen its own arrangements for information analysis and filter, 
and option identification and evaluation. 309 

Similarities between the legislative and executive branches in the 
approach to foreign policy problems — the study continues — include 
(1) the fact that the structure and staffing of congressional committees 
has tended to compartmentalize problems in the same way that they 
are divided up in the Department of State ; (2) both diplomatic and 
domestic political realities "... compel priority attention to short- 
range problems and issues, while tending to defer attention to longer 
term trends, problems, and opportunities"; (3) there is a tendency in 
both diplomatic and political institutions — and in both legislative and 
executive policymaking areas — toward a high degree of personal 
mobility and a correspondingly short "institutional memory." Ac- 
cordingl} r , the study concludes, 

«« See ibid., pp. 126-144 ("Congressional Concern with Science in the Department of State"). 

w Ibid., p. 110. 

sos Salient findings of the "Murphy Commission" (so named after its Chairman, former Ambassador 
Robert D. Murphy) are discussed in the essay on planning which follows later in this chapter. See pp. 

808 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 142. 


... it seems reasonable that the many recommendations which have been made 
for a strong and technologically sophisticated policy planning staff in the Depart- 
ment of State might be allowed to suggest a corresponding need in the congres- 
sional environment. Such a mechanism or institution, capable of assessing prospec- 
tive future trends at a reasonable confidence level, might help the Congress to 
design preventive actions in advance of crises. Examples of the kinds of services 
that might useful^ be performed within such an institution might be: 

— Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with congressional 
intent in the area of scientific and technological impacts on foreign policy 
and international relations — and vice versa; 

— Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic environ- 
ment as changes occur in response to the global spread of technological 
innovation ; 

— Assessing the secondary impacts and interrelationships of "international" 
technological issues; 

— Examining the adequacy of U.S. "international" institutions in the 
face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting from the global 
spread of technological innovation; 

— Structuring and making coherent the array of foreign policy interactions 
with science and technology; and 

— Maintaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an extended insti- 
tutional memory, and an assistance cadre for major studies for "interna- 
tional" committees concerned with S&T questions, S&T committees con- 
cerned with foreign policy questions, and committees monitoring major tech- 
nological missions with significant international implications. 310 

Status oi the Issue 

Appraisal of the status of State Department efforts toward effective 
integration of science, technology, and diplomacy would appear to 
require mention of the following considerations (not all of which have 
been dealt with in the foregoing pages, though all are treated in the 
study itself or elsewhere in the stud} 1- series) : 


Although the importance of science and technology (especially the 
latter) to diplomacy has been recognized at top levels of the Depart- 
ment, and institutional provision has been made for furthering the 
success of integration, that process has not made significant headway 
among the various bureaus and in the Foreign Service generally. 
The Department of State and the Foreign Service appear to "focus 
attention on, and extend preferment to, generalist officers in the polit- 
ical officer ranks, and to a lesser extent to those in the administrative, 
economic, and consular ranks. Those specializing in technical and 
science policy fields receive less encouragement to enter or opportunity 
to advance. The cause of this personnel emphasis is suggested by a 
study b}* a panel of the United Nations Association (UNA) [of the 
United States] in 1973. In this report, the general problem was 
characterized as follows: 

The United States Government [like American society as a whole] is increasingly 
part of an interdependent world, but its organization and procedures still reflect 
earlier, simpler times when nation states could on most matters safely deal with 
each other at arms length and through career foreign services. In today's world, 
international relations are of necessity pervasive, technical, continuous, and 
intimately involved with domestic issues, and this requires new styles and new 
systems of governmental organization and process, which reh* far more than in 
the past on a wide range of professional participation in policymaking. 

»"> Ibid., p. 143. 


Compared to the resources lavished on management improvement in a single 
large multinational corporation, those being devoted to the far more important 
and difficult problems of improving the organization of the government in a 
multinational setting are pitiful. 311 


A generation after the need for long-range foreign policy planning 
in relation to national goals was recognized, and provision made for 
it within the State Department structure, there are still no effective 
mechanisms and procedures whereby State can "anticipate the need 
for, and . . . initiate, action — especially future-oriented action — in 
these fields [of science and technology], rather than responding to 
foreign pressures." 312 In the words of the aforementioned United 
Nations Association panel report, "the Department of State, as 
currently oriented, organized, staffed, and operated, represents some- 
thing of an anachronism in terms of ability to respond to today's 
global problems. . . . The new and highly complex demands of a 
technologically oriented international society, with its new set of 
economic interdependencies and need for shared responsibility in keep- 
ing the peace, have simply overtaken the Department's traditional 
decisionmaking structure." 313 


The State Department has never had, and is not yet in striking 
distance of having, a substantial capability for putting American 
technological and managerial genius to work in the service of American 
diplomacy. This lack, however, would appear to be not so much a 
failure of the State Department per se as of American political leader- 
ship generally, in the legislative branch as well as the executive, and 
of American business and industrial leadership as well. There would 
appear to be a great untapped potential for beneficial accommoda- 
tion between U.S. Government and U.S. business in the interests of 
U.S. diplomacy — and also, on an "everybody wins" basis rather than 
a "zero-sum" basis, the interests of the world at large. With an 
historic tendency for government and academia to be ranged sus- 
piciousl}' on one side, and business and industry equally suspiciously 
on the other, the impetus, the leadership, and the institutions for 
exploring this potential have been not enough in evidence. As the 
starting point, a philosophy of accommodation, including appropriate 
checks and balances, would seem to be needed; this could be the 
product of a national debate involving preparation of executive 
branch policy or position papers, holding of congressional hearings, 
and use of the media by academic, corporate, and other private 
interests. Such a debate might be launched on the initiative of the 
administration, a congressional committee (or two or more commit- 
tees acting in concert), or a public-interest group of citizens. 

»» Ibid., p. 151. 
»» Ibid., p. 3. 
»>' Ibid., p. 151. 


Prospects and Options 

The last section of the study (XI. Summa^ and Concluding Obser- 
vations) begins with the observation that the years immediately 
ahead "look like a time of opportunity in an environment in flux." 

New decisions are pending as to the relationship between the science bureau 
and other bureaus of the Department, as to the future missions and structure 
of overseas science staffs, and as to the design of the President's policymaking 
organization in the field of scientific and technological diplomacy. 314 

There seems to be a promising climate for teamwork among OES, 
the Policy Planning Staff, and the staff of the National Security 
Council (the study continues, as of June 1975), and a possibility of 
congressional action to establish a new science policy institution in the 
Executive Office ; such an institution would present the new Science 
Bureau in State with further problems, but also further opportunities. 
Among the opportunities apart from what might arise out of re- 
lationships with a revitalized White House organization for science 
and technology could be that involving the improvement of "technical 
literacy" in the Foreign Service; "the creation of further science 
units in the functional bureaus of the Department, manned and 
equipped to cooperate with the science bureau in the formulation of 
diplomatic policy and the initiation of new science- and technology- 
based programs toward U.S. foreign policy objectives"; 315 the estab- 
lishment of priorities in dealing with the array of issues already on 
hand, while allowing for analysis and evaluation of prospective issues; 
most important, perhaps — and certainly most difficult — development 
of a comprehensive normative framework of national goals to govern 
the setting of priorities. But the redefining of goals in a democratic 
society cannot be the work of government alone. Within the United 
States this process, involving examination of values and basic assump- 
tions and sorting out of the important and lasting from the expendable, 
could be initiated by the State Department, or the WTiite House, or 
the Congress, and must involve all of these. But it could not be 
accomplished by any or all of them without the participation of the 
American people. The process would call for a national debate in 
which the question of public versus (or in conjunction with) private 
enterprise, raised above, would represent one important element. In 
such a debate the most important single question to be addressed — 
and repeatedly reexamined — would probably be: How can American 
leadership best be exerted in a world of growing interdependence 
without sacrifice of what Americans hold as fundamental political 
and human values? 

Author's Reassessment in January 1976 

Although barely half a year has elapsed since publication of Science 
and Technology in the Department of State, many events have con- 
firmed the importance of its thesis and suggested the indicated gap in 
institutional arrangements in shaping U.S. technological-diplomatic 

The frustrations expressed by the incumbent Assistant Secretary of 
State for OES upon her resignation may well have been occasioned in 
part by the low esteem of the subject in the Department. 

H* Ibid., p. 166. 
"5 Ibid. 


The Murphy Commission's final report tended to confirm the 
findings of the CRS study, by proposing that "science" (i.e., tech- 
nology) be elevated to concern at the level of Under Secretary of 
State. However, by recommending separation of the offices of Assist- 
ant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of 
State, the Commission may have called for a diminishing of recogni- 
tion by the White House of the importance of nonmilitary technology 
for diplomacy and (in its broader sense) national security. 

In his welcoming speech to the Foreign Service Officer Class, June 27, 
1975, Secretary Kissinger spoke of the widening scope of foreign rela- 
tions, the need for acceptance by the Congress and the public of the 
Nation's course of foreign policy actions, the need for a "more anatyti- 
cal, more strategic approach to the issues of foreign policy," and the 
need to allocate resources to priority objectives. 316 

Conflicts between executive and legislative foreign policy became 
evident in 1975 as the Congress interposed its views on Soviet trade 
relationships by linking them to Soviet policy on the emigration of 
.Tews, took a policy stand on the use of U.S. weapons by Turkey in 
Cyprus, and forebade U.S. intervention in Angola. Apart from any 
question as to the rightness of these positions, they forcefully dram- 
atized the importance of Secretary Kissinger's observation that, 
"Today the Congress has a decisive role to play in the formulation 
and execution of our foreign policy. . . ." 317 

Kissinger's 19 proposals to u.n. general assembly 

Possibly the most important event in technological diplomacy in 
1975 was the address delivered September 1 before the Seventh 
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, by Ambas- 
sador Moynihan for Secretaiy Kissinger, on "Global Consensus and 
Economic Development." An analysis of that address provides an 
excellent recapitulation of the importance of technological diplomacy 
in toda}''s world, and the need to develop institutions, policies, and 
programs based on the new reality of the world of nations. Said 
Kissinger : 

The reality is that the world economy is a single global system of trade and 
monetary relations on which hinges the development of all our economies. The 
advanced nations have an interest in the growth of markets and production in 
the developing world; with equal conviction we state that the developing coun- 
tries have a stake in the markets, technological innovation, and capital invest- 
ment of the industrial countries. 

To meet this changed global condition the Secretary proposed a 
strategy consisting of five sets of international actions. These might 
be summarized as follows : 

1. International cooperation to stabilize the global economy of 
supply and demand. 

2. Accelerated growth through technological innovation and 
investment capital. 

3. More widely shared trading opportunities. 

4. Improved terms of trade in key commodities, especially 

"• "Strengthening the Department of State," address by Secretary Kissinger, Department of State 
Newsletter, no. 1SS2 (July 1975), pp. 2-3. 
Ml Ibid., p. 2. 


5. Concerted efforts to aid the least developed countries. 
In furtherance of these five strategic elements the Secretary offered 
a long list of proposed initiatives. These included: 

1. Creation in the International Monetary Fund of a new 
development security fund to stabilize overall export earnings. 

2. Expansion of the resources of the World Bank's International 
Finance Corporation to support private enterprises in developing 

3. Creation of an International Investment Trust to attract 
investment capital for development insured against major losses. 

4. Assistance to developing countries to raise investment capital 
through direct borrowing in capital markets. 

5. Improved access of developing countries to credit resources 
in developed countries. 

6. Creation of an International Energy Institute to resolve 
issues between producers and consumers and advance energy 

7. Expansion of international agricultural research centers 
into a worldwide network for development of agricultural (mainly 
food) technology. 

8. Creation of an organization to coordinate and finance nonfood 
agricultural productivity and competitiveness. 

9. Creation of an International Industrialization Institute to 
sponsor and conduct research on industrial technology. 

10. Creation of an International Center for the Exchange of 
Technological Information. 

11. Expansion of U.S. bilateral support of industrial technology. 

12. Establishment of standards of conduct in the control and 
operation of multinational corporations. 

13. Elimination of barriers to trade by multilateral trade 
agreements including extension of general tariff preferences and 
other easements to developing countries. 

14. Creation of an international network of buffer stocks in 
key commodities with associated institutions to stabilize prices 
for these commodities. 

15. Funding support for a major new international effort to 
expand raw material resources in developing countries. 

16. A variety of forms of assistance (emergency relief funds, 
low cost loans, and food aid to least developed countries). 

17. Reduction of losses after harvest from inadequate use of 
technologies of storage, transport, and pest control. 

18. A major expansion in World Health Organization programs 
of integrated deliver}?- of health services at the community level. 

19. Improvement of the United Nations system including 
rationalization of assistance programs, leadership in U.N. 
Secretariat for development, streamlining of the Economic and 
Social Council, better consultative procedures, and independent 
evaluation of program implementation. 


The question presented by this impressive shopping list of initiatives 
offered by the Secretary of State to restore rationality and order to 
the "global system" concerns the ability of the U.S. diplomatic 


apparatus to maintain forward impetus on 19 complex programs, 
many of them involving; technological as well as economic and in- 
stitutional innovations. Can the Department present these program- 
effectively to the Congress to obtain the requisite funding support? 
Can it obtain public support? Can it coordinate the necessary partici- 
pation by the long list of mission departments and agencies? Can it 
keep track of all the bilateral programs involved? Can it assure 
adequate U.S. voice and staffing in U.X. institutions? 

And, from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, can the Congress 
equip itself with the staff expertise to maintain oversight of the 
prospective array of new responsibilities proposed bv the Secretary of 

Many, indeed most, of the initiatives presented to the General 
Assembly in the September 1 address find echoes in the 12 case and 
issue studies of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. How- 
ever, the studies also record the shortfalls in past efforts to achieve these 
objectives. The Secretary's address has served a useful purpose in 
gathering together a comprehensive roster of global strategies for 
world betterment. It has also provided a measure of the enormous 
future task facing U.S. technological diplomacy. 


There are indications of a deepening concern within the Department 
of State both as to its own responsibilities in science and technology 
and as to the need for a strengthened organizational structure to 
exercise these responsibilities. One important indication of this concern 
was the creation in January of a task force under the leadership of 
Dr. T. Keith Glennan, formerly Commissioner of AEC and Adminis- 
trator of NASA. This task force, organized at the request, January 0, 
of Under Secretary Charles W. Robinson, intends to consult widely 
among Government, industry, and academic people concerned with 
the science-technology-diplomacy interface. Dr. Glennan has been 
asked to report in early autumn of 1976 on departmental options for 
such matters as: 

— The extent and nature of the contributions of science and 
technology to U.S. diplomatic objectives, and past strengths and 
weaknesses in this area; 

— The nature, problems, and opportunities, and program 
priorities in technological developments of substantial impact on 
U.S. foreign affairs; and 

— The organization, management responsibilities, internal re- 
lations, and external relations of the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 
As projected, the study appears to differ substantially from that 
performed by Lloyd Berkner in 1950. The experience of the inter- 
vening quarter-century has occasioned a shift in emphasis from science 
to technology, and from peripheral concern to central programatic 
planning and action. 

Some Illustrative Questions 

Long-range foreign policy planning is a complex and difficult under- 
taking involving infinite arrangements of variables in time (past, 
present, and future) and space (today, the world; tomorrow, the uni- 

6S-196— 76 14 


verse?) Many scholars and policymakers nave accordingl}- concluded 
that it cannot be done successfully, especially in a democracy. Others, 
though more sympathetic in principle, have urged that not too much 
be expected of long-range national planning efforts, and that they be 
■conducted with flexibility and restraint. As Roger Hilsman observes 
in To Move a Nation: 

The making of foreign policy is a groping effort at understanding the nature of 
the evolving world around us. It is a painful sorting out of our own goals and pur- 
poses. It is a tentative, incremental experimentation with various means for achiev- 
ing these purposes. It is an unremitting argument and debate among various con- 
stituencies about all of these questions and an attempt to build a consensus on how 
the United States as the United States should decide on these questions and what 
action it should take. And none of these several activities is the kind that will yield 
to organizational or institutional gimmicks. 318 

Why, then, talk about "long-range planning machinery and proce- 
dures," if attempts to institutionalize the complete policy planning 
process are likely to fail? What is to be gained by halfway, or perhaps 
less than halfway, measures? Hasn't the United States done well 
enough, all these years, without a comprehensive national planning 
system? And isn't the attempt to establish one likely to lead to greater 
trouble and even danger than just meeting developments as they arise? 
The answer to this last question is that all the evidence points the 
other way. Survival itself may well be at stake — or, after all, has the 
danger been exaggerated? 

The question is worth repeating in another way. There are two 
schools of thought with respect to policy formulation. One emphasizes 
experience in problem-sol ving ; not getting cluttered with details; the 
attitude that every problem is different: elaborate efforts to project 
what may be ahead are unrealistic, and it is better to focus on each 
problem or issue ad hoc; the bringing in of experts to explain the 
essentials of the problem; and the governing idea that, to begin with, 
it is impossible to foresee or even assess all consequences. The other 
school emphasizes comprehensive data-gathering; analysis of indica- 
tors of trends; forecasting and analysis of emerging issues; preparation 
of positive statements; constructing taxonomies of problems; applica- 
tion of the systems approach to policy design; and the attempt to 
foresee the consequences of alternative courses of action or reaction — 
avoiding surprises by looking ahead. On the surface, the methodical 
approach of the second school, which parallels what has long and 
effectively been done in American industry, would seem superior — but 
is it? Can it be applied successfully on the grand scale, in the governance 
of human affairs taken all together? 

What kinds of foreign policy issues involve science and technology? 
Are there any that do not? What kind of technical expertise would 
help improve State Department policy planning and decisionmaking? 
What are the options as to arrangements for tapping such expertise? 
How important is the availability of a multidisciplinaiy team that is 
experienced enough in bureaucratic ways to be effective but brings a 
fresh perspective? Should it be built into the system (with periodic 
rotation), or called in as needed? 

The study, discussing the issue of generalists versus specialists, 319 
puts this question more specifically. "The issue is manj'-sided: what 
specialties are most needed? Can they be recruited and trained up to 

318 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 90. 
an Ibid., pp. 8-9. 


the necessary level? Should promotions be arbitrarily given equally 
as between specialists and generalists? Might specialists be brought 
into the Service at appropriate levels as needed, on a temporary 
basis? Is it fair to specialists to convert them into generalists in 
order for them to merit progress up the promotion ladder? Can the 
Foreign Service Officer be both?" 

It has been observed that foreign policy planning is unlikely to 
succeed because those in power do not believe in it. Are human 
motivations the main sticking point? Could a dynamic President who 
had concluded that systematic long-range foreign policy planning was 
necessary gain congressional and public acceptance of it? What safe- 
guard against abuses of Executive power might be needed in institu- 
tionalizing long-range planning? How might public debate on foreign 
policy issues, and public participation in policy formulation regarding 
them, best be arranged? Should Congress encourage the institutional- 
ization of systematic, long-range foreign policy planning? If not, why 
not? If so, what arrangements should Congress make for carrying out 
its dual role of supporter and critic of the system? Does the above- 
cited suggestion regarding a congressional policy planning staff have 
merit in this connection? 

The report which followed the 1972 Hearing-Symposium on 
National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment 
made the following proposals: 

. . . that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and other appropriate committees of the Congress should: 

(1) Hold annual hearings on the foreign policy reports to the Congress of the 
President and the Secretary of State as well as on the foreign policj- implications 
of the economic report to the President and the President's message on the state 
of the world. 

(2) Establish machinery and procedures for systematically and periodically 
assessing the long-term foreign policy goals and programs of the United States; 
for example, by the creation of a high-level advisory panel composed of public 
officials and private persons, and/or by systematic and periodic review through 
congressional hearings. 

(3) Hold hearings and/or establish advisory panels which would: 

(a) develop criteria to determine more clearly what constitute the vital 
security interests of the United States ; 

(b) establish guidelines to determine what commitments must be based 
on treaties and what role executive agreements can and should play; 

(c) set criteria to guide the conduct of foreign policy in such traditional 
fields as the protection of American citizens, property, and investment 
abroad; freedom of the seas, and access to markets and sources of raw 
materials ; 

(d) examine the decisionmaking process in foreign affairs, particularly 
the roles of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council as 
well as the potential roles of the Cabinet and other executive agencies con- 
cerned with domestic affairs; 

(e) examine the extent to which social science research can be more effec- 
tively utilized in guiding the formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward 
the other nations and cultures of the world; 

(f) conduct periodic reviews of the security, political, and economic impli- 
cations of U.S. foreign bases, including the sharing of bases and costs with 
our allies. 

(4) Request the Office of Management and Budget to prepare foreign expendi- 
ture budgets in terms of balance of payment implications. 

(5) Enact legislation to require the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelli- 
gence staffs of other executive departments and agencies to report their relevant 
studies and intelligence assessments to appropriate congressional committees in 
executive session and to qualified staff members. 


(6) Hold hearings on the various efforts of all government agencies and depart- 
ments involved in the development of programs dealing with the protection of 
the international environment and natural resources. 

(7) Encourage by every means possible public discussion of foreign policy 
questions. 320 

A& extensive as these recommendations were, one of the witnesses — 
Professor Robert A. Scalapino of the University of California at 
Berkeley, suggested the need for still further congressional inquiry 
and action. In his prepared statement he said: 

No current body, however, exists which by virtue of its structure and personnel- 
can address itself systematically and regularly to the most fundamental issuer 
concerning foreign policy objectives and strategy in such a fashion as to involve 
the Congress and the public as well as the national administration. In my opinion, 
it is time to give this matter the most serious consideration. 321 

Is there indeed a need for new congressional machinery, procedures, 
and actions as indicated by these proposals? Would a new Joint Com- 
mittee on National Security, as proposed by the Murphy Commission, 
be an effective instrument for stimulating, accomplishing, or support- 
ing the purposes reflected in the proposals — or, as some believe, would 
it merely "add to the confusion"? If the Joint Committee formula 
should be adopted, should the scope of the committee be broadened 
to cover long-range foreign polic}^ planning in general? What, for that 
matter, do the words "national security" really encompass? Should 
there be a special arrangement for long-range assessment support of 
such a committee by the Office of Technology Asses? ment? For policy 
analysis support by the Congressional Research Service? Would it 
not need at least a modest policy analysis staff of its own? 

The study points out 322 that a large effort is already being invested 
in the congressional review of broad policy matters involving the' 
interaction of science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. "The value 
of these reviews seems compelling, but the limitations of member time 
and staff resources may prevent wider use of them. Among the possi- 
bilities to enlarge or increase the scope or frequency of such overviews 
might be the following:" 

— Enlist the Foreign Service Institute to manage occasional seminars and 
prepare reports on them; 

— Arrange briefings by selected members of the Policy Planning Staff; 

— Contract studies on subjects of continuing interest to the committees, 
acting individually or jointly; 

— Construct a library of policy studies of enduring value for joint use by 
the two committees; 

— Publish sets of invited papers with staff or CRS commentary; 

— Have CRS conduct an annual seminar series on foreign policy issues; 

— Make more use of the scientific attaches as policy information sources, 
aside from home leave, through invited reports and special studies to meet 
committee needs. 322 

Viewed as part of an incremental approach and not necessarily as 
a substitute for a more comprehensive system of foreign policy plan- 
ning, which of these suggestions has merit? 

Finally — by way of recapitulation — what are the salient questions 
from the standpoint of harmonizing future U.S. purposes and goals 

mo Ibid., pp. 132 and 133j 
»» Ibid., p. 133. 
»» Ibid., p. 142. 


with those of the other peoples of the world? In general terms, the 
study sums them up as follows: 

Where in the U.S. Government is there an institution charged with responsi- 
bility for surveying on a continuing basis the totality of trends and . . . conse- 
quences for U.S. diplomacy that grow out of world technological change? Where 
are these findings translated into requirements upon U.S. diplomacy? What 
kinds of expertise are needed for such surveys and for the definition of the diplo- 
matic requirements? How complete is the set of U.S. institutions needed to collect, 
analyze, and structure the information to build into a data base for survey- 
ing future technological trends and their consequences for U.S. diplomacy? 
Where are innovative strategies to be sought, conceived, and studied? How does 
the world system of basic science communities relate to U.S. diplomacy? What 
major technological trends and needs of diplomatic consequence are already 
evident and how are they interrelated? What congressional options are available 
to strengthen the legislative role in this sphere? 323 

Appendix — Letter of Resignation From Assistant Secretary Dixy Lee 
Ray to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger (June 19, 1975), and 
Letter of Comment, With Attachment, to the President (June 20, 

Department of State, 
Oceaxs and International Environmental 

axd Scientific Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., June 19, 1975. 
Hon. Henrt A. Kissinger, 
Secretary of Stale. 

Dear Mr. Secretary: After five months as Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, I am hereby sub- 
mitting my resignation. 

For some time I had hoped that my office and the Bureau I head would plaj' a 
significant role in the formulation of the Department's science policy and in the 
provision of information upon which to base policy in those areas of technology 
specifically assigned to the OES Bureau by Congress. 

Unfortunatelj', that desirable condition has not been fulfilled. Many of the 
areas for which OES has statutory responsibility are, in fact, being pursued in 
other bureaus and offices. 

I sincerely hope that the Department seriously re-examines its administrative 
procedures with a view toward permitting its Bureaus to function efficiently. 

Dixy Lee Ray, 
Assistant Secretary. 

Department of State, 
Oceaxs axd Ixterxatioxal Enyiroxmextal 

axd Scientific Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1975. 
The President, 
The White House. 

Dear Mr. Presidext: In my letter of resignation to Secretary Kissinger, I 
made brief reference to the circumstances within the Department of State that 
thwart those of us who are responsible for information and advice on the policies 
that guide United States international programs in science and technology from 
exercising our proper role. Public Law 93-126, passed by the Congress in October, 
1973, mandates a policy role for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ- 
mental and Scientific Affairs. Under present Departmental procedures, the 
Bureau can do little but acquiesce in the policies set by others, and attempt to 
implement its broad responsibilities with little authority and few resources. 

Similar kinds of problems plague our Nation's domestic science policy. 

Although steps may be underway to improve the present situation — e.g., the 
establishment of a Science Advisory Office in the White House, as you have 
proposed — I am deeply concerned that the imperative to use existing knowledge 
and proven technology for vigorous attack on today's problems is not fully 
recognized nor appreciated at the highest levels of government. 

w Rid., p. 145. 


Of course technology must be used wisely and with proper regard for both 
economic and environmental consequences. An energetic research and develop- 
mental program on problems that are not yet solved must be pursued both bv 
government directly and by government providing the climate — financial, 
intellectual and practical — to marshal the great talent and human resources of 
this land. That pitifully little is being done is nowhere so clearly evident as in the- 
area of energy resources and technology. 

On January 16 of this year, thirty-two of our Nation's most outstanding 
scientists — including eleven Nobel Laureates — made a public statement on 
energy policy. It is a significant and disturbing document — significant because 
it is a thoughtful and sober expression of concern for the future of our country 
made by a group of our most knowledgeable citizens and disturbing because 
it has been virtually ignored by the leaders of government. The scientists" state- 
ment, a copy of which is attached, says, in part : 

"We . . . believe that the Republic is in the most serious situation since World 
War II. Today's energy crisis is not a matter of just a few years but of decades. 
It is the new and predominant fact of life in industrialized societies. 

''The high price of oil which we must now import in order to keep Americans at 
their jobs threatens our economic structure ..." 

The importance of secure supplies of economically priced energy (fuels and 
electricity) cannot be overemphasized. Although energy provides the power for 
all manufacturing, business, commerce, transportation, and distribution of 
essential goods (all this means jobs and whether there is employment or unem- 
ployment), the great energy debate focuses, ironically on gasoline for the family 
automobile. Although we are, correctly, dedicated to a clean and healthy environ- 
ment, the means to accomplish this laudable purpose requires more, nor 
energy. Our alternatives are severely limited. We have no choice other than to 
practice conservation on a scale not yet imagined. This will take dedication and 
will require that the leaders of government set an example in energy saving 
measures. But conservation alone cannot recover or maintain the strength of our 
economy. Our need for reliance on solid fuels — coal and uranium — is real and 
must be recognized. 

It is now 18 months since my report to President Nixon, ''The Nation's Energy 
Future," was submitted. Many of the recommendations, especially the long-term 
research and development proposals that are painless and non-controversial are 
being implemented at glacial speed. But other programs, aimed at carefully 
planned, step-by-step conversion to heavier reliance on solid fuel-, languish or 
are submitted to stultifying and interminable feasibility studies. The innovative 
Pioneer Synthetic Fuels Program, proposed in cooperation with private enter- 
prise, has yet to receive serious consideration. 

Our country is drifting. We seem neither to have the will to conserve energy 
nor the courage to map out a national program that will free us from the bondage 
of too great a reliance on imported energy whose price and security of supply we 
are powerless to influence. Painful decisions are needed for there are no 
solutions that will please everyone. 

In the three years I have served in the Federal Government, I have done my 
best to face up to whatever problems have emerged and to resolve them in an 
open and honest manner. Thank you for your appointment and the opportunity 
to serve. I leave with no regrets. 

Dixy Lee Ray. 

Attachment: News release by scientists. 

scientists' statement ox energy policy 

Washington, D.C., Jan. 16, 1975. — We, as scientists and citizens of the L "nited 
States, believe that the Republic is in the most serious situation since World War 
II. Today's energy crisis is not a matter of just a few years but of decades. It is the 
new and predominant fact of life in industrialized societies. 

The high price of oil which we must now import in order to keep Americans at 
their jobs threatens our economic structure — indeed, that of the Western world. 
Energy is the lifeblood of all modern societies and they are currently held hostage 
by a price structure that they are powerless to influence. 

In the next three to five years conservation is essentially the only energy option. 
We can and we must use "energy and existing energy sources more intelligently. 
But there must also be long range realistic plans and we deplore the fact that they 
are developing so slowly. We also deplore the fact that the public is given unrealis- 
tic assurances that there are easy solutions. There are many interesting proposals 


for alternative energy sources which deserve vigorous research effort, but none of 
them is likely to contribute significantly to our energy supply in this century. 

Conservation, while urgently necessary and highly desirable, also has its price. 
One man's conservation may be another man's loss of job. Conservation, the first 
time around, can trim off fat, but the second time will cut deeply. 

When we search for domestic energy sources to substitute for imported oil, we 
must look at the whole picture. If we look at each possible energy source sepa- 
rately, we can easily find fault with each of them, and rule out each one. Clearly, 
this would mean the end of our civilization as we know it. 

Our domestic oil reserves are running down and the deficit can only partially be 
replaced by the new sources in Alaska; we must, in addition, permit offshore ex- 
ploration. Natural gas is in a similar critical condition; in the last seven years new 
discoveries have run far below our level of gas consumption. Only with strong 
measures could we hope to reverse this trend. 

We shall have to make much greater use of solid fuels. Here coal and uranium 
are the most important options. This represents a profound change in the character 
of the American fuel economy. The nation has truly great reserves of these solid 
fuels in the earth. Our economically recoverable coal reserves are estimated to be 
250 billion tons and exceed the energy of the world's total oil reserves. Our known 
uranium ores potentially equal the energy of 6,000 billion tons of coal; lower grade 
ore promises even more abundance. 

The U.S. choice is not coal or uranium; we need both. Coal is irreplaceable as 
the basis of new synthetic fuels to replace oil and natural gas. 

However, we see the primary use of solid fuels, especially of uranium, as a 
source of electricity. Uranium power, the culmination of basic discoveries in 
physics, is an engineered reality generating electricity today. Nuclear power has 
its critics, but we believe they lack perspective as to the feasibility of non-nuclear 
power sources and the gravity of the fuel crisis. 

All energy release involves risks and nuclear power is certainly no exception. 
The safety of civilian nuclear power has been under public surveillance without 
parallel in the history of technology. As in any new technology there is a learning 
period. Contrary to the scare publicity given to some mistakes that have occurred, 
no appreciable amount of radioactive material has escaped from any commercial 
U.S. power reactor. We have confidence that technical ingenuity and care in oper- 
ation can continue to improve the safety in all phases of the nuclear power pro- 
gram, including the difficult areas of transportation and nuclear waste disposal. 
The separation of the Atomic Energy Commission into the Energy Research and 
Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission provides 
added reassurance for realistic management of potential risks and benefits. On any 
scale the benefits of a clean, inexpensive, and inexhaustible domestic fuel far 
outweigh the possible risks. 

We can see no reasonable alternative to an increased use of nuclear power to 
satisfy our energy needs. 

Many of us have worked for a long time on energy problems and therefore we 
feel the responsibility to speak out. The energy famine that threatens will require 
many sacrifices on the part of the American people, but these will be reduced if 
we marshal the huge scientific and technical resources of our country to improve 
the use of known energy sources. 

Signed by: 

Hans Bethe x — Organizing Chairman; Cornell University Laboratorj- of Nuclear 

Luis Alvarez ' — Lawrence Radiation Laborato^, Berkeley, Calif. 

Peter Auer — Laboratory of Plasma Studies, Cornell University. 

William 0. Baker — President, Bell Telephone Laboratories. 

John Bardeen > — Department of Physics, University of Illinois. 

Robert F. Bacher — Department of Physics, California Institute of Technology. 

Felix Bloch • — Department of Physics, Stanford University. 

Norris E. Bradbury — Former Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. 

Harold Brown — President, California Institute of Technology. 

Richard H. Chamberlain — Chairman, Department of Radiology, University 
of Pennsylvania. 

Cyril L. Comar — Chairman, Department of Physical Biology, Cornell 

Arthur Kantrowitz — AVCO-Everett Research Laboratory. 

Ralph E. Lapp — Energy Consultant, Alexandria, Va. 

Joshua Lederberg 2 — Department of Genetics, Stanford University. 

Willard F. Libby 3 — Department of Chemistry, University of California, Los 

See footnotes on next page. 


Franklin A. Long — Center for Science, Technology and Society, Cornell 

Edwin M. McMillan 3 — Director, Lawrence Radiation Laboratorv, Berkeley, 

Kenneth S. Pitzer — Dept. of Chemistry, University of Calif., Berkeley, Calif. 

Edward M. Purcell ■ — Dept. of Physics, Harvard University. 

1. 1. Rabi ' — Professor of Physics. Emeritus, Columbia University. 

Norman Rasmussen — Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, Mass. Institute of Tech- 

Roger Revelle — Director, Harvard Center for Population Studies. 

Glenn T. Seaborg 3 — Associate Director, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories. 

Frederick Seitz — President, Rockefeller University. 

Edward Teller — Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, Calif. 

James A. Van Allen — Chairman, Department of Physics, University of Iowa. 

Warren Weaver — Mathematician. New Milford, Conn. 

Alvin Weinberg — Former Director, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 

Victor F. Weisskopf — Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 

Edward Wenk, Jr. — Director, Program in Social Management Technology, 
University of Washington. 

Eugene Wigner J — Professor of Theoretical Physics. Princeton University. 

Richard Wilson — Department of Physics, Harvard University. 

1 Nobel Prize in Physics 

J Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine 

* Nobel Prize in Chemistry 

Explanatory Xote ox the Essays to Follow 

In the preceding two sections of this final chapter of the study 
series, each of 12 studies concerned with major cases or issues was 
examined to see what light it might individually shed on the 
general theme of the interaction of science, technology, and 
American diplomacy. The intent of the next 6 sections is to 
look at the 12 studies collectively from the perspectives of each 
of 6 particular aspects of the general theme — or what might be 
called 6 operational issues, dealing mainly with means, as con- 
trasted with the broad policy issues (or issue areas), dealing with 
ends, on which the 12 studies are focused. The expectation is 
that tins examination will yield a heightened appreciation of the 
complexities and significance of the general theme as well as 
sharpened perspectives on some of its more salient policy, opera- 
tional, and legislative implications. 

The terms are relative: what is an operational issue in one 
context becomes a policy issue in another. The distinction between 
the 12 studies as centered on policy issues and the 6 particular 
aspects as involving operational issues (the latter may also be 
thought of as dimensions of the former) is made as a somewhat 
arbitrary but convenient device. The operational issues them- 
selves are also posed somewhat arbitrarily as either-or alterna- 
tives. In reality, most diplomatic situations are resolved 
somewhere in the spectrum of compromise. The six essays which 
follow deal with real situations and they confirm that the policy- 
maker is seldom limited to a choice between the opposing 
alternatives in their pure forms. That this is so in itself will be 
news to no one, but the analysis may perhaps yield some useful 
insights as to ways in which it is so. 

The operational issues which serve as subjects of the six essays 
are these: 

Initiative versus Reactive Foreign Policy 
Bilateral versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships 
High-Technology Diplomacy versus Low-Teclmolog}* 

Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions 
in International Technology 

Independence versus Interdependence 
Long-Range and Short-Range Planning 


V. Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy 

The foreign policy of every nation is constructed with reference to 
the external world. At one extreme, the policy is designed to respond 
to external pressures and events in order to protect the nation's in- 
terests and security. At the other extreme the nation deliberately 
forces events and creates situations to motivate other nations into 
modes of behavior supportive of its interests and security, or otherwise 
designs creative actions to shape the external world conditions in 
ways beneficial to the nation's foreign policy. An example of the first 
would be President Kennedy's response to the placing of missile 
bases on Cuban territory. An example of the second would be Presi- 
dent Kennedy's offer to the Soviet Union to join forces in the attempt 
to land a man on the moon. 

Statement of the Hypothesis 

The hypothesis of this essay is that there are inherent advantages to 
a nation pursuing an initiative foreign policy, and inherent disadvan- 
tages in a policy of reacting to external forces of change. It is contended 
that during its history the United States has moved somewhat from 
the initiative to the reactive mode. The consequences seem to include 
the following generalities : 

The diplomatic effort is increased while the progress toward diplo- 
matic goals is diminished; 

Control of future diplomatic relationships passes from the United 
States to other national states; 

Elements of U.S. power are spread too thinly over many concurrent 
programs ; 

Resources are reserved unused in anticipation of the need to react 
to external forces of change that do not eventuate; 

The pattern of diplomatic stance is made impossibly complex and 
incoherent and actions become contradictory and inconsistent; and 

Relationships with other national states tend to be alienated in 
unintended ways by ad hoc responses. 

It is further to be noted that the initiative mode lends itself to 
long-range coherent planning and stable relationships while the reac- 
tive mode usually involves hasty moving from crisis to crisis with 
insufficient attention to ultimate consequences or emerging trends in 
world relationships. 

Defining the Initiative j Reactive Issue 

In the real world the case of a reactive or initiative mode seldom 
if ever occurs in the pure form. External changes and forces will always 
need to be taken into account, so that the reactive element is almost 
alwaA'S present. Conversely every reaction to external pressures has 
elements of initiative — the search for options yielding best resolutions 
to external challenges. Sometimes initiative is matched by equally 
forceful counter-initiative, as was the case when President Truman 
responded to the sealing of Berlin corridors with the dramatic Berlin 




Perhaps the decisive element that distinguishes the initiative from 
the reactive mode is that the reactive mode is defensive, and seeks to 
reduce the adverse consequences of outside forces; conversely, the 
initiative mode seeks to apply a strategy of pressures to create a 
favorable set of external relationships. The reactive mode requires 
analysis of the pressures, and ways of responding to them. The 
initiative mode requires definition of diplomatic goals in terms of 
desired external relationships or conditions and then proceeds to 
formulate policies and design actions to produce them at minimum 
cost and risk. The line of distinction between initiation and reaction 
is often unclear, but in practice the range of diplomatic options is 
likely to be wider with the first than with the second. At the same 
time the scope and depth of analysis also must be greater. From the 
point of view of timing, also, the initiative mode requires longer range 
future pi aiming and analysis, while the reactive mode tends to wait 
for the event. It is not practicable to prepare in advance to respond 
to all possible diplomatic initiatives taken by other nations, nor indeed 
to anticipate all the variations and subtleties against which responses 
will need to be framed as any one single initiative unfolds. However, 
it is possible that the number of responses required will be lessened 
if a nation successfully pursues the initiative mode. 

The range of events, political developments, institutional evolution, 
and massive technological and economic trends that form the matrix 
of externalities with which diplomacy must deal is so great that — 
according to one body of opinion — planning for the long-term future 
is unrealistic. But it is also pos>ible that the quest for short-term 
solutions in the reactive mode can lead by degrees to a situation for 
which the only outcome is catastrophic. Such a progression is recorded, 
for example, in Barbara Tuchman's Guns of August. 32 * 


Thus it can be contended that attention to the long-range conse- 
quences of national policy for either the initiative or the reactive mode 
is essential for security and national well-being. However, the kinds 
of questions to be asked in framing a bread national strategy would 
seem to include: 

— Does the reactive mode characteristically require a larger 
use of intellectual resources on a shorter (i.e., more urgent) time 
scale than is required to design and execute initiatives? 

— Can initiatives be so effectively applied that the nation 
applying them retains a commanding and constructive leadership 
role in its relations with other nations? 

— Does the reactive mode tend to cause a nation's strategic 
planners of foreign policy to become bogged down with detail and 
the endless shredding out of alternative responses to foreign 
initiatives : 

— in circumstances of great urgency ("crises")? 
— in less urgent but equally important questions of national 

— in actions by other nations that require extensive 
interpretive analysis? 

«J« Barbara Tuchman, Guns of Augiitt, New York, MacniiUan, 1962: 511 p. 


— in the appearance of technologies of clearly global reach 
requiring analysis as to their meaning for diplomacy? 

— in the assessment of minor shifts in the world power 

Attention in the Literature to the Initiative and Reactive Modes of 

Various assertions have been made, some of them cited later on in 
this essay, of the desirability of "taking the initiative" in diplomacy. 
It is also frequently observed that the diplomatic mode of the United 
States tends to be reactive rather than initiative. 

It is observable that nations pass through "activist" periods in 
their relations with neighbor states. For example, France under 
Louis XI and XIV, and under Napoleon; Germany under Frederick 
the Great, under Bismarck's Chancellorship, under Kaiser Wilhelm 
and Adolph Hitler; England under Elizabeth I and Victoria; and 
the United States at various times, most notably before 1850, and 
after 1940. 

The factors that impel some nations to be more activist than others, 
or to be more diplomatic aX\y aggressive at some periods than at 
others, do not appear to have been definitively identified. Are they a 
product of especially dynamic leadership? Popular motivation? 
Styles of child-rearing? The educational S3~stem? Political structure? 
Central organization? Are there differences in one or another of these 
factors which create instability that a more (or less) coherent, and 
more dynamic, state is tempted to exploit? To what extent do science 
and technology motivate national diplomatic activism and to what 
extent do they provide the tools to give force to its directions? 

Indeed, measurement of the activist versus the reactive mode of 
diplomatic conduct seems virtually impossible except in terms of the 
broad canvas of historical perspective. One difficulty in measurement 
has already been mentioned : that the two modes in practice overlap. 
That is, an initiative can be reactive in its origin; a reactive mode 
can result from a completed initiative, or one which at any stage 
has provoked a response; and a reaction can be so positively innovative 
and powerful in its impact as to interrupt the continuity of diplomacy 
and thus appear to be a fresh initiative. 

Discussion of Initiative and Reactive Modes in Earlier Parts of the Study 
Special attention was not addressed to this question in the opening 
chapter that provided the prospectus for the entire study of Science, 
Technology, and American Diplomacy. It was not recognized at the 
outset as a major or significant dimension of diplomatic style. Hew- 
ever, as the work progressed, its significance became increasingly 
evident. Granting that diplomacy can never be wholly geared to 
either mode, the question still needs to be answered as to what propor- 
tion of actions in foreign policy are imdertaken in response to external 
pressures (oil embargo, Sputnik, missiles to Cuba, etc.) and what pro- 
portion are seen to have been directly aimed toward achievement of 
U.S. foreign policy objectives without previous compelling foreign 
pressures (United Nations, establishment of World Bank, President 
Kennedy's proposal for joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Moon mission, etc.). 

Direct references to this question in the six cases and six issues 
making up the study series and recapitulated in this summary are 
sparse. Nevertheless, the few which occur are significant. They add 


up to a conclusion as to the desirability of increased lcng-range plan- 
ning, statements of more explicit and comprehensive diplcmatic goals, 
and the design of a more coherent and constructive course of initiative 
action toward these goals in which various reactions to external forces 
can be assessed for long-range consistency. 

case one: the baruch plax 

The case chronicles the failure of a technological-diplomatic initia- 
tive undertaken by the United States immediately following World 
War II. What was at stake was the long-range security not only of 
the United wStates but of the world at large. The alternative ultimately 
chosen (by default, not by design) was the expenditure of trillions cf 
dollars on nuclear arms and delivery systems and an uneasy truce 
among the "superpowers." while one by one other nations— China, 
France, and India, with others in the wing; — added themselves to 
the "Nuclear Club." The effect was an enormously costly and insecure 
peace which has been styled the "balance of terror." 

The extreme secrecy in which the Manhattan District carried out 
its mission left no opportunity for advance study of the need for the 
postwar options to control the new technology. Those engaged in the 
project itself were too preoccupied with the technology per se to engage 
in profound thought about consequences, beyond reaching agreement 
that the weapon must somehow be kept under control — preferably 
international. State Department executives charged with formulating 
U.S. diplomacy remained in total ignorance of the project. 

However, when in the summer of 1945 the secret was out and the 
war ended, the confusions of postwar demobilization, upheaval in 
China, restoration in Europe, and Soviet reversion to hostility and 
aloofness combined to overtax the planning capabilities of U.S. diplo- 
macy. Insufficient manpower was spared to think through the problem 
of what to do about the atom. It was treated as just one more problem, 
rather than as the paramount question of the age. And the Soviet 
tendency to minimize its importance was also unhelpful. 

Even today it is still not evident exactly what kind of initiative the 
United States might have taken to obviate the disastrous consequences 
of the new nuclear capability. The Soviet motivation to delay while 
independently developing its own bomb was strong. Still, in view of 
the predictably enormous costs and hazards of failure, it is hard to 
comprehend in retrospect why the achievement of nuclear control at 
this early stage did not motivate a much more vigorous and persistent 
effort than it did. Perhaps a key to the puzzle may be found in the 
words of a leading scientist, writing in the late 1940s: ". . . we have 
done military planning of actual campaigns in time of war exceedingly 
well, and we have done military planning of broad nature in time of 
peace exceedingly badly. 325 (His solution, in essence, was the adoption 
of an interdisciplinary approach in which the Nation's best minds 
would be brought continuously to bear in the planning process.) 
Many observers of the American character have commented on the 
combination of temperamental impatience and ideological distaste 
which Americans have traditionally exhibited toward the planning 
process at the national level, except under crisis conditions. 

325 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arwt and Free Men, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1949, p. 252. 


Denied advance knowledge of the new weapon, the Department of 
State was in no position to evolve its own diplomatic strategy. Even 
had the knowledge been vouchsafed to its leaders, the technical skills 
of the Department would scarcely have been equal to the task of 
foretelling the directions and rate of change in military technology 
that would result. And, indeed, even had they seen these clearly, and 
planned well for the arms control negotiations to follow the war, it is 
still doubtful that the Department, as constituted, could have led the 
United States or other nations into a stable agreement for the control 
of the new weapon. It would, it appears, have taken more effective and 
purposeful governmental machinery for resolving global security prob- 
lems of such high magnitude, charged with sparing no effort and yield- 
ing to no obstacles in working out step-by-step solutions, than then 
existed — or than exists today. It can be argued that for lack of such 
machinery and such resolve, (1) a crucial early initiative failed, (2) 
no decisive action was taken to replace the failed initiative, and (3) a 
pattern of escalation was established, and still prevails. 

case two: commercial nuclear power IN EUROPE 

The effort to bring the atomic technology under practical control 
was renewed during President Eisenhower's first term of office. In 
his Atoms for Peace address to the U.N. General Assembly, Decem- 
ber 8, 1953, the President foresaw nuclear proliferation and its attend- 
ant dangers. The alternative he proposed was an initiative to commit 
increasing quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful, energy- 
producing applications. The United States would lead the way. 

Success in this endeavor was mixed. The spread of peaceful nuclear 
technology was undoubtedly speeded and some fissionable material 
was diverted from weaponry. But an abundance of fissionable material 
was reserved to trigger the ever-growing stockpiles of thermonuclear 
(fusion) warheads. Meanwhile, the plutonium produced as a byproduct 
of fission power reactors grew from a nuisance to a real danger: it 
could become a weapon in the hands of a nation with modest technical 
capabilities, or conceivably even in the hands of a terrorist 

It is not evident whether the extent of safeguards necessary to 
maintain control over byproduct plutonium would have been accept- 
able as a concomitant of nuclear sharing. Yet the combination of 
policies — each plausible in itself — to share the peaceful atom, en- 
courage its exploitation by private enterprise, aid less-advanced 
nations in its use, and introduce the theme of healthy competition into 
the use of the technology, have produced a mixture of benefits and 
hazards that seem likely to grow side by side. 

Again, it is not evident that more profound study of this diplomatic 
initiative could have held down the costs or enhanced the benefits. 
The momentum of Presidential policy might have been too strong for 
intervention by any policy planning group. Nor can it be said that the 
world would necessarily have been a safer place had the President not 
taken the Atoms for Peace initiative. 

Nevertheless, it is at least possible that such study, backed by a 
combined Presidential and congressional determination inspired by 
recognition of the growing magnitude of the problem, could have led 
at this second likely moment in history to effective international 


agreements for controlling the hazards of proliferation while expanding 
the benefits of peaceful uses. Here too, as in the case of the Baruch 
Plan initiative, there was lacking appropriate governmental machin- 
ery for bringing political leaders and technical experts together for a 
JMBtained dialog and thorough investigation of the problem. 3 - 6 

case three: the political legacy of the international 
geophysical year 

This study deals with a nongovernmental science initiative. The 
author suggests that this initiative led "substantially" 10 the success- 
ful negotiation of three important treaties, and provided a possible 
model for wider cooperation among nations as well as a succession of 
follow-on scientific endeavors of a multilateral or global character. He 

Perhaps an even more persuasive testament to that power is to be found not 
in the symbolic, formal language and protocol of treaties but in the quickened 
pace and broadened scope of the many international meetings to exchange both 
basic knowledge and technological know-how which can trace their origins to 
the IGY example. It was 50 years between the First Polar Year and the Second, 
and 25 years from that to the IGY. Today hardly a year goes by without one or 
more major conferences addressed to phenomena and problems of the environ- 
ment, the oceans, energy, or new aspects of mankind's relationships with regard 
to outer space. To say that the IGY was responsible for these developments to 
advance the human condition would be gross overstatement, since the phe- 
nomena and problems themselves are ultimately responsible simply by their 
existence. But human perception of them was furthered by the IGY; international 
good will in collaborating to explore them was fostered by it; and it seems quite 
possible that the IGY conferred on political leaders of most of the world's nations 
an enlarged appreciation of the potential of constructive international collabora- 
tion for solving political, as well as scientific and technological, problems. 327 

Reference might appropriately be made here to the National Acad- 
emy of Sciences, where the IGY had its inception. In a later study, 
Science and Technology in the Department of State, there were a num- 
ber of references to the potentially useful role of the Academy in 
support of the Department of State. For example, Dean Harvey 
Brooks of Harvard is quoted as suggesting that it would be "desirable 
if State could provide the Commission [on International Relations, of 
the Academy] with some relatively unencumbered funds in order that 
it could explore and develop new initiatives in the international science 
and technology area, rather than merely respond to Government re- 
quests in a problem-solving mode." 32S 

m There was, to be sure, the rather elaborate machinery of the National Security Council as developed 
under President Eisenhower. However, as a study of that period put it, "there is a . . . serious weakness in 
the NSC staff machinery: the absence of any staff element which is concerned exclusively with long-range 
planning from a national perspective. The concerns of the immediate future are enoueh to keep the NSC 
Planning Board fully occupied. Board members are backstopped by a system of Board Assistants and 
departmental staffs— the State Department's representative, for example, is Director of the Department's 
Policy Planning Staff with a strength of ten or eleven personnel — but here again there is a . . . preoccu- 
pation with current and pending developments. Though long-range planning was the original function for 
which the Policy Planning Staff was established under George Kennan, this apparently came to be re- 
garded as an insupportable luxurv in terms of the urgencv of issues and the scarcitv of highly qualified man- 
power. - ' ( Warren R. Johnston, A Xational Plan for the Long Haul. Army War College. 1955, pp. 39-40.) As 
noted at the beginning of this essav, the initiative inode requires longer-range planning and analysis than the 

U7 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Affr.irs, The Political Legacy of the International C;eo- 
phy$ical Year, a study in the series on Science. Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis. Science Policy 
Research Division, Congressional Research Science, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off.. 1073: 62. 

■■ U.S. Congress. House, Committee on International Relations, Science and Technology in the Department 
ofStaic, a studv in the series on Science, Technoloev. and American Diplomacv prepared for the Subcom- 
mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Huddle, Senior Specialist in Science 
and Technologv, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1975: 175 (footnote 2821. 


The interest of the Department of State in the IGY was minimal — 
perhaps in recognition of the fact that the scientific community delib- 
erately preferred to do its own planning and to avoid an} 7 stigma of 
nationalistic innovation. Nevertheless, the scientists gratefully ac- 
cepted assistance in travel arrangements of U.S. nationals abroad and 
foreign visitors to the United States. The question remains as to what 
further contributions to U.S. diplomatic goals, and more generally to 
global peace and amity, might result from activities of the world's 
scientific community, and what encouragement by the Department 
would increase such contributions. It would be of interest in the so- 
called "Pug wash" conferences of scientists studying global security 
and welfare, the "Club of Rome" studies of world resources and popu- 
lation problems, and various international conferences of scientists 
and technologists in particular disciplines. Some participants, notably 
those from Communist countries, have their expenses paid by their 
governments. Should possible roles of the Department of State in sup- 
porting any of these international private activities of scientists and 
technologists be examined? On the other hand, the attitude of the De- 
partment toward such nongovernmental study groups of scientists has 
tended to be protective and overcautious. What assurance might the 
Department require before adopting a more positive and constructive 
stance toward these activities? 


The thrust of this case is an assessment of the failure of an attempted 
initiative by President Johnson in a speech of April 7, 1965, offering 
to substitute regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin — with 
substantial U.S. funding — for continued conflict. 

A possible conclusion suggested in the study was that the fatal fault 
in the scheme lay not in its substance but in its timing. Said the study: 

Manifestly, the contribution of the Mekong Project to an easing of the Viet- 
namese conflict has not been significant or even measurable. The determined 
nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict has remained obdurately 
aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a prospective ultimate 
victory. Notably also, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia adopted a not dissimilar 
stance, apparently fearing that any U.S. -led or sponsored regional aid scheme 
might entail dangerous compromises and reduced freedom of self-determination. 
Accordingly, as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of cooperation in a 
regional development scheme does not present a convincing opportunity. 329 

It was interesting to speculate, the study went on to say, "on what 
different course events in Southeast Asia might have followed had the 
Johnson offer been made at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 
that partitioned Vietnam." 

The uncertainties surrounding this kind of initiative are obvious, 
and seem to warrant further investigation. It was, said the study, 
"sheer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development of the 
Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus for peaceful 
economic progress, served as an educational process, and established 
a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted region. However, the 
question seems legitimate as to whether the consequences of a slowly 
and deliberately encouraged regional development — region by region — 

' 2S U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems 
of Regionalism, a studv in the series on Science. Technology, and American Dipiomacy prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Sciontific Developments by Franklin P. Huddle, Science 
Policy Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972: 66. 


in lagging parts of the world might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives 
in the long run." 33 ° Accordingly, the possibility that "the concept 
might serve as an instrument of long-range diplomacy seems worth 
further examination and putting to the test." 331 

Some of the points made in the study tend to support this concept. 
One is the remarkable forbearance, for a long time, of Communist 
insurgents in their non-interference with the progress of the Mekong 
program. Another is the way in which nationals of the different Ripar- 
ian States were able to talk and work together in Bangkok, making 
policy and plans even when some of their governments had broken 
off diplomatic relations with each other. A third point is the extraor- 
dinary durability of the project itself, which survived wave after 
wave of political and military upheavals, emerging larger and stronger 
each time. A fourth point is a psychological effect that many observers 
have remarked: an attitude of cooperation on the part of the partic- 
ipants that has been styled the "Spirit of the Mekong." 

It is possible that, in an unobtrusive and apolitical way, other such 
regional multistate projects could be initiated in troubled areas of the 
world like the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, North Africa, 
the Sahel, Rhodesia and the neighboring states, and regions of Central 
and South America. Investment of capital is an essential ingredient, 
but there are others of importance: skill in planning, participation 
and cooperation of nationals from states with long histories of suspicion 
and dissonance, technological skills, and so on. Nor would it be neces- 
sary for the United States in taking such initiatives to assure a domi- 
nant role and high profile. The gains could be twofold: in an increased 
confidence and willingness to cooperate in the region, and the tangible 
rewards of technological development of resources and commerce. 

case five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 

Perhaps the principal lesson of this case study in reference to the 
initiative/ reactive question — one which applies both internationally 
and domestically — is that there may be severe limitations on initiative 
when there are many interested parties with conflicting views. This 
study explains the slow progress toward a U.S. position in these words : 
''National honor, national security, sovereignty, and territorial claims 
all combine to intensify feelings and delay the building of a 
consensu^" 332 

Another lesson to be drawn from the study is that the huge stakes 
involved require that sooner or later a generally acceptable resolution 
of the issue of the rights to the ocean floor must be found. The ques- 
tion is whether it will be arrived at by diplomatic processes, by 
economic accretion, or by force of arms. It would be fortunate for 
the world's nations if a U.S. initiative could be devised to lead the 
way to a final resolution by the first of these three options. 

It is not hard to understand why an issue of such great moment 
should remain so long unresolved. Yet here, surely, is an opportunity 
for decisive U.S. initiative, based on long and thoughtful analysis, 

»° Huddle, Mekong Project, p. 67. 

"' Ibid., p. 68. 

333 U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, a study in 
the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcomn ittee on National 
Security Policy and Scientific Developments by George Doumani, Science Policy Research Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971:79. 


planning, and preparation. Unlike the atomic bomb issue that struck 
U.S. diplomats unawares, the seabed question has evolved slowly; 
tapping the oil in the seabed of the Gulf of Mexico and off the Cali- 
fornia Coast came in the 1940s. The early 1960s saw the ill-fated 
Mohole Project, which demonstrated the feasibility of deep ocean 
drilling. Knowledge of the manganese nodules has been with us for 
half a century. Much of the substance of the 19th century diplomacy 
dealt with fishing rights. In two great wars, 1812 and 1917, issues of 
freedom of the seas were at stake. Now, in the context of dwindling 
global reserves of petroleum and minerals, and food from the sea. with 
many claimants for these valuable resources, the control of the inter- 
national commons of the oceans remains unresolved and a continuing 
threat to international amity. 

case six: u.s. -soviet commercial relations 

This study offers two important lessons regarding the formulation 
of initiatives — and. conversely, regarding the shaping of reactions — - 
of one "superpower" to another. Failure to exploit the expanding 
commercial opportunities toward detente between the United States 
and the Soviet Union could have unfortunate consequences: 

The present period appears to be a critical one in U.S. -Soviet relation*. 
If the two countries move ahead in developing commercial relations, progress 
in political, cultural, and other areas may be facilitated. The failure to do so 
may engender disappointments, frustrations, and suspicions which could ulti- 
mately result in a return to the pre-Summit atmosphere. In short, an opportunity 
is now available to the United States which might conceivably lead to either sub- 
stantially expanded relations over a 10- to 20-year period or, if the opportunity 
is not seized and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade is not now expanded, to continued diversion 
of the Soviet market to Western European and Japanese suppliers and to a sharp 
deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations. 333 

The other lesson is that initiatives must be built on knowledge, 
rather than hopes or expectations: 

Because political benefits are the main measure of net gain to the United States 
from any pattern of increased U.S.-Soviet trade, careful calibration of the risks 
and uncertainties is in order. 

If the Soviet Union is indeed in the process of reordering priorities and accepting 
greater involvement in the international political and economic system — i.e.. 
accepting the rules of behavior of that system — a significant reduction of impedi- 
ments to trade may result : this would be much more beneficial to the United States 
than would the modest economic gains to be derived from expanding markets. 

If, however, Soviet trade overtures do not extend further than a willingness to 
settle old accounts, such as Lend Lease, and purchase of more grain and techno- 
logically advanced equipment, in exchange for relaxation of trade and credit 
restrictions. U.S. policymakers may be well advised to limit concessions and 
engage in hard bargaining, with expectation of only modest political and economic 

The policies followed by the Lnited States and the Soviet Union will greatly 
influence the probabilities of alternative outcomes. As the policy objectives of th\ 
Soviet leaders are especially crucial to such a projection, it cannot be known for 
some time with any certainty which different alternative courses, or what com- 
promise between them, is being followed. 

Thus as knowledge of which of the alternatives will prevail may not be evident 
for several years, very careful official and public scrutiny of each step in the 
progress of the Joint L T .S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission discussions would 
appear to be in order for both the executive and legislative branches. 

[J.S. Coi -: :; House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.^S 'Inflation*: The Interplc; 

of Economics, technology Transfer, and Diplomacy, a study in the series on Science. Technology, and American 
Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by 
John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973: 78. 


These two observations can be generalized to the two propositions 
that an activist foreign policy can be constructive, but that it must 
have a firm foundation of supporting knowledge of the real world. 

issue one: the evolution of international technology 

This early study in the series develops the theme of the importance 
of technology for diplomacy. Thus, "technology has been shown 
capable of advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives, but it is neither 
infallible nor invariably beneficial." 

The question, then, is how to determine what the Federal policy should be 
with respect to technology, for purposes of U.S. diplomacy. It is certain, in any 
event, that technology will continue to advance. Once set in motion, it has a 
momentum of its own. The question is whether and how the dynamics of this 
changing feature of the American culture can be guided and directed to serve the 
objectives of U.S. international relations. Implicit in this question is the further 
issue of whether such diplomatic gains should be pursued or abandoned when they 
are found to conflict with domestic or regional programs. What sacrifices are 
necessary? Are they tolerable? Who should decide? Who should determine the 
rules of the game — the criteria and values on which the choice is made? What 
organizational resources are available to make these decisions? Are they adequate 
for the purpose? What else needs to be done? 33i 

A short section of the study recounts the "Frustration of U.S. 
Efforts to Wield Technological Power." During the period 1950-70, 
despite many seeming opportunities for the United States to assert a 
constructive world leadership by enlisting its technological superi- 
ority, "the undoubted promise of technology had not achieved ful- 
fillment." The study asked why — 

Was it because technologists were unable to produce unflawed innovations? 
Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies for global 
effect.-? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplomats to 
achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product? Where did — and do — 
the weaknesses lie? 33s 

This perplexity, expressed in 1970, is altogether as valid today. Why 
indeed has superior U.S. technology been so weakly employed as an 
instrument of diplomacy? 

One answer to this question was suggested in the stud}-: 

It seems evident that modern diplomats and policymakers require special 
training in understanding and using technology, and in formulating plans that 
Involve the new uses or development of new kinds of technology. Parliaments are 
called upon to evaluate and approve agreements and treatie- with a technological 
Content. New information is needed for a<se><ing the relationship between tech- 
i nological information and practical politic.-. 336 

There were abundant opportunities for the diplomatic exploitation 
of technological leadership, and the Nation was internationally 
J active in many of them. The study noted the growth — 

... of international participation in Earth satellite systems for global com- 
munications, resource surveys, weather prediction, navigation, and other useful 
ices derived from the space program. One effect of this activity has been to 
advertise globally the technological accomplishments of the United States Ln a 
difficult and costly field. Another effect has been to encourage a global attitude 
toward the Earth itself — perceiving it as itself a "spaceship," whose passengers 
share its fate, irrespective of country or region. A third effect is to tie together 

p U.S. Congress, I i ouse, Commitipoon Fomen Afairs. Tht Evolution of Inffrrnlmnal 7>e/wfrv;y, astudy 
reehnoloey, and . iplcmacy prepared for the Subcommittee on K 

Securiry Policy and Sri< by Franklin P. Huad e, £ '<'. x-arch Division, 

ional Rcsearc) 3 . Washington, D.C U.S. Govt, Print. OG., 1970: 9. 

. !). 17. 

•* Huddle, Erolution of International Technology, p. 42. 


into single systems global communications, transportation systems, resources, 
environmental effects, and weather and climate. International participation in 
space projects is demonstrably being stimulated by the opportunities for tangible 
benefit as well as by the prestige they afford. 337 

There were both costs and rewards: "Leadership in large international 
projects of technology contributes to diplomatic influence at the same 
time that diplomatic skills are needed in the design and construction 
of international consortia to execute such projects." 

The study quotes the report of a Presidential task force on science 
policy, April 1970, that offered a virtual catalog of opportunities for 
initiatives. These were addressed to a formula based on U.S. leadership 
in large projects, shared efforts on mutual problems, technical assist- 
ance where appropriate, and the building of national capabilities for 
self-help. Excerpts from the catalog include the statements that: 

— The intrinsic nature of science results in unusual opportunities for 
international scientific cooperation and assistance. 

— Some technological enterprises — the space program, for example — offer 
unusual opportunities for foreign policy and international initiative. 

— Universal human interests crossing all international boundaries — in 
agriculture, health, clean air and water, education, and communications — all 
suggest similar though more diffuse opportunities. 

— . . . The Federal Government is . . . making insufficient use of our exten- 
sive scientific and technological capabilities as instruments of foreign co- 
operation and understanding. 

— The question of international technology transfer — the delivery and 
application of scientific and technological knowledge, methods, and tech- 
niques from one nation to another — is one to which the United States should 
give very searching consideration in its formulation of a more effective science 

— . . . It is unlikely that indiscriminate efforts to transfer technology will 
be effective; technology, to be useful, must be related properly to local en- 
vironment and cultural and economic restrictions. 

— . . . Much greater emphasis must be placed on the transfer of research 
and development capabilities, rather than of technolog}' itself. 

— . . . An enlarged program of educational assistance in areas of science 
and technology should be made an essential element in our foreign aid 

(U.S. President's Task Force on Science Policy. "Science and Technology: 
Tools for Progress." The report of the President's Task Force on Science 
Policv. April 1970. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, 
page 4042.) 338 

The study addressed directly the U.S. tendency toward a reactive 
foreign policy: 

In Riesman's book, "The Lonely Crowd," he develops a theorj'" of a society 
divided into persons characterized as "Inner-Directed" and "Other-Directed." 
If nations were so categorized, in aspects of their behavior, it might be said that 
in the field of technology the United States to a considerable degree is "Other- 
Directed." The great efforts of the United States in science and technology — since 
1940, at least — were inspired by external events. The Manhattan Project was 
initiated from fear that Nazi Germany might achieve nuclear power first. Work 
on the H-bomb was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the 
Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic missile submarine was a response to the 
Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race was an effort to 
catch and pass the Soviets in an area in which they had assumed a lead. The great 
technological programs supported by the United States are still in military, atomic, 
and space developments, and all are motivated by events outside the United States 
or else support for them wanes. 339 

»' Ibid., p. 51. 

w Ibid., pp. 59-«0. 

«» Ibid., pp. 66-67. 


In view of the apparent opportunities for such leadership, this 
"Other-Directed" syndrome suggests a regrettable failure to grasp 

It Beems paradoxical that the United States, best equipped to apply science and 
technology to the solution of man's global problems, and credited with the highest 
development of managerial skills, has been reluctant to devise and implement a 
positive technological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no lack of oppor- 
tunities: Earth resources satellites, ocean and ocean floor development, urban im- 
provement, recovery of resources from all forms of waste, the Oak Ridge proposal 
for large agricultural-industrial-nuclear complexes, and many more. 340 

On the other hand, the reactive mode has apparently been a factor 
in encouraging "high" technology to the neglect of bread-and-butter 
technologies on which most of the world's economies rely. Thus: 

One of the consequences of this "Other-Directed" syndrome in national tech- 
nological strategy is that the United States has concentrated its efforts on tech- 
nologies characteristically remote from everyday experience. It has supported the 
laser but not the science of processing garbage. There are lags in the technological 
levels of a number of industries in the United States: such lags may in time impair 
the credibility of the U.S. posture of world technological leadership. On this point, 
one issue of U.S. technological strategy would seem to be a conscious set of deci- 
sions as to the domestic technological gaps to be closed or ignored. What older 
technologies might be revitalized by an infusion of fresh technological effort, such 
as the railroads, glass and ceramics, coal, lumber, and textiles? What would be the 
diplomatic consequences of a vigorous technological effort in one, several, or all of 
these fields? 841 

Emphasis on high technology may serve useful purposes. But, ob- 
served the study, "in the design of a total national strateg}- of tech- 

. . . the effect of their being already on the scene in great numbers is to provide 
pressures for the United States to keep on doing what it has been doing. Where 
can objective analysis and innovative policy be found that can examine alterna- 
tives or additions to the national program? 342 

The posture suggested by the President in 1970 seems valid still: "If 
our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational 
conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the prod- 
ucts of rational and deliberate choice." 343 

issue two: the politics of global health 

A general characteristic of the subject of this study is that its broad 
objective — world health — does not invite controversy. Controversy 
about the management of means of advancing global health such as 
health care delivery systems, national declarations about epidemics, 
quarantine regulations, and so forth, can be quite lively. But there is 
an underlying content of substantial international consensus in the 
broad field and general acceptance of the moral essence of efforts 
toward health of all peoples. The author suggests the possibility that 

j initiatives in the field of global health, intrinsically beneficial, can 
also yield diplomatic gains because of the universal respect the subject 

i commands. Moreover, the United States as a highly advanced nation 
in the science and technology of medicine and public health is ideally 
equipped to exploit the diplomatic advantages of leadership in the 
effort toward world health by systematically seeking out ways for 
nations of the world to benefit from this resource. 

«• Ibid., p. 67. 
Mi Ibid. 
»« Ibid p. 68. 
»« Ibid., p. 70. 


The study chronicled an interesting initiative in 1851 in the design of 
the First International Quarantine Congress in Paris. By arranging 
that each of the 12 participating nations be represented by one 
diplomat and one doctor, the French government as host ensured 
that the primary conflict would center on technical versus political 
views, rather than on political views alone. Essentially, this amounted 
to a defusing of nationalistic interests. Moreover, it established a 
principle that in the field of global health it was necessary for diplo- 
mats and doctors to talk with each other to seek workable political 
solutions to technical problems. Significantly, a continuity of progress 
in global health has been maintained on this basis down to the present 

Since the study was first issued there have been some moves in the 
direction suggested. However, the field is far from saturated and the 
interrelations between this issue and those in the section to follow 
suggest that the opportunity is still open and the urgency of its ex- 
ploitation increasing. The author's preference appears to be for the 
multilateral approach and he also emphasizes the importance of the 
participatory role of the Congress, the executive branch, and the U.S. 
public. Thus, he concludes : 

It would seem appropriate for the United States to utilize the authority of 
WHO and the power of its international voice in the support of national as well 
as international programs. This country has the resources, the sj'stems skills, and 
the biomedical technology for making WHO a better institution than it now is. 
The United States can be the instrumentality for preparing and shaping WHO 
to manage the common global health problems of the future. 

Yet WHO will shape nothing without stronger support than is now evident for 
international health institutions, in the Congress or at Secretarial levels in the 
Departments of State and of Health, Education, and Welfare. The situation seems 
to be a most peculiar one for world health, namely, commitment without involve- 
ment. The United States is meeting its fiscal obligations to WHO and PAHO 
with very little organizational evidence as yet that it also intends to play a 
positive determinant role in an area where American technical competence is at 
its best, where its presence is least offensive, and indeed where American leadership 
is fully expected by the rest of the world. 

Perhaps there is need to mount an educational program so that a larger segment 
of the public is included in the discourse surrounding the issues of national and 
global public health. The status of the world's health might become a public 
issue; and that issue could stimulate scientific, medical, and economic debate. 
For in the United States, at least, debate is absolutely essential to both clarifica- 
tion and political action. 344 

issue three: beyond malthus 

The theme of this study was that "Finding a solution to the food/ 
population dilemma is the central problem of international develop- 
ment." 345 Initiatives in this complex field encounter deep emotional 
conflict and anxiety. Reaction is called for to respond not only to the 
political views of other nations but also to the more urgent and dra- 
matic needs of their peoples as drought and famine cause food stocks 
to run short. 

"M U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Politics of Global Htalth, a study in the series 
on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments by Freeman H. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division, Congres- 
sional Research Series, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971: 79. 

"5 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Beyond Malthus: The Food! People Equation, a 
studv in the series on Science, Technolo-ry and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on 
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Allan S. Nanes, Foreign Affairs Division, Con- 
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971:51. 


Among the hazards of U.S. initiatives are the personal and political 
resistance to external meddling with the population function, and the 
prospect of destabilizing a society's political structure by food produc- 
tion programs that involve changes in the distribution of incomes. As 
the author, Dr. Allan Nanes, puts it: 

The job of U.S. diplomacy generally speaking is to advance and illuminate the 
goals of U.S. foreign policy. With regard, especially, to a problem as complex and 
delicate as that of achieving a food/population balance, it must do so without 
offending the sensibilities of the countries concerned. As noted earlier the United 
States seeks to promote the Green Revolution and concomitant economic develop- 
ment. It is evident from what has been said already that this U.S. posture creates 
or exacerbates some difficult diplomatic problems. 

U.S. diplomats are faced with the job of urging technological change on the 
leaders of the LDCs, even though such changes may have unsettling social and 
political consequences. Indeed, it is even possible that the very leaders who take 
U.S. advice may find themselves deposed as a consequence of the social instability 
introduced by technological innovation. It seems paradoxical for the United 
States to encourage the LDCs to adopt the new agricultural technology knowing 
that there is a high risk of social turmoil, if a principal aim of U.S. development 
a>>istance is to help bring about stability in those countries. However, it is the 
U.S. hope that any destabilizing effects of the Green Revolution can be confined 
to the short run, and that eventually the position of the United States vis-a-vis 
the LDCs will be stronger, as the role of the Green Revolution in overall economic 
development becomes clearer, and its benefits more manifest. 3 ^ 

An important lesson of Dr. Nane's study is the interconnectedness 
of the food/population dilemma with the whole fabric of concerned 
nations. Careful study is necessary to lay the groundwork for initia- 
tives, and resort to multilateral mechanisms to implement them seems 
the most reasonable course. But while progress, however, slow, toward 
the resolution of the dilemma is a national and a global goal, urgent 
attention to desperate emergencies cannot be neglected. Both 
long-range and short-range action have their complications. Writes 
Dr. Xanes: 

The one conclusion to which the evidence points most insistently is that the 
food/people dilemma cannot be considered in isolation. It is, rather, an integral 
part of the total development process, and beyond that a feature of a maturing 
world. Even if the Green Revolution is successful in feeding a vastly increased 
population, development will not go forward and living standards will only decline 
if population growth is not effectively checked. For population is even more 
intractable a problem than food supply. All phases of development are retarded 
as long as expanding population eats into economic growth. Investment is held 
back or channeled into unproductive areas. Job opportunities are not created, 
and unemployment or underemployment spreads. Social misery continues un- 
checked, and populations — rural and urban — become increasingly susceptible 
to appeals to violence. 347 

The food/population problem will be solved globally in some com- 
bination of two ways — by assuring an adequacy of food or by the 
limiting of population, whether by design or by starvation. As the 
study observes: "There is a regrettable tendency on the part of 
mankind to respond eagerly to rewarding opportunities but to ignore 
the prospect of misfortune and delay action to avert it until convinced 
of its reality by its actual onset." 348 As the primary exporter of 
food, the United States has both the opportunity and the necessity 
to exercise moral and technical leadership in achieving a global food/ 
population balance. Here initiative is greatly preferable to the reaction 
to endless crises of foreign food shortages. Unless this country devises 

«• Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
"' Ibid., p. 96. 
™ Ibid., p. 93. 


and presents to the world community of nations a pattern of successful 
initiatives to solve the dilemma, the alternative will be inescapable: 
the periodic making of ad hoc responsive decisions as to who eats and 
who starves. 

issue four: U.S. scientists abroad 

There is an obvious relationship between the subject of this study 
and that of the IGY case. For purposes of the discussion of the 
initiative/reactive mode question, the two studies might be considered 
together. Or, at least, the support of foreign activities of U.S. scientists 
as a contribution to U.S. diplomacy should be recognized as a benefi- 
cial element of more specific scientific projects of an international 

While international exchanges of scientists and engineers may not 
be considered generally to be an impressive subject for a diplomatic 
initiative nor even, perhaps, as a reaction to another country's initia- 
tive, there may be special cases where it could assume this nature. 
For example, proposals for a major exchange of technical personnel 
with the People's Republic of China or North Vietnam, or for a 
comprehensive technological survey of regional needs in the Middle 
East involving a mixture of American with both Arab and Israeli 
scientists and engineers on a nongovernmental level, might have 
interesting consequences. 

What may be more to the point, though, is a suggestion by 
Emilio Q. Daddario for a scheme to devise an international consensus 
on global science policy. According to this view: 

. . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater 
consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being 
and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational 
effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanisms? 
Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the 
priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term localized 
problems and long-term global problems? 349 

Continuing along this line of reasoning, one might suggest ways in 
which to further such a set of global science and technology goals by 
carefully designed initiatives involving large-scale exchange of persons. 
It should be noted, however, that Genevieve Knezc, 350 author of the 
stud} 7 , warns of the necessity fcr close monitoring and documentation 
of such exchanges to maximize their utility and to design means to 
increase their efficiency. 

issue five: brain drain 

The goal of the United States, according to Dr. Joseph Whelan, 
author of this study, is "a world in balance, with economic and social 
opportunity within the grasp of all inhabitants and a sense of hope 
in all nations." 351 Dr. Whelan devotes considerable attention to 

3" Emilio Q. Daddario. "National Science Policy— Prelude to Global Cooperation." Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (June 1971), p. 22. This statement was presented to the House Committee on Science 
and Astronautics at its 12th meeting with the Panel on Science and Technology, January 1971. 

350 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major 
Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and Ameri- 
can Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments 
by Genevieve J. Knezo, Science Policy Research Division, Library of Congress Washington, D.C. U.S. ! 
Govt. Print. Off., 1974: 162. 

35i U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of • 
International Scientific Mobility, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 
prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Joseph G. , 
Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, j 
Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974: 272. 


cataloging the "push" factors that motivate emigration of trained 
people, and the "pull" factors that draw immigrants. Brain drain, 
he concludes, is a "symptom of underdevelopment," and its solutions — - 

. . . may be the primary responsibility of the LDCs, particularly the task of 
institution-building and establishing an infrastructure of science and technology 
as the basis for modernization, but solutions can neither be devised nor develop- 
ment goals achieved without assistance from the advanced countries like the 
United States. Success in diminishing the "push" factors in brain drain and in 
resolving the dilemma of development by transforming needs into demands would 
seem to rest upon acceptance of the principle of interdependence as a contemporary 
fact of life in international affairs. 352 

Thus, there is still room for U.S. initiatives in helping less-developed 
countries* to build the kinds of infrastructure which will offer employ- 
ment and challenge to citizens of the country who receive their educa- 
tion abroad, and thereby induce them to return. Past U.S. technical 
aid efforts have often been criticized for displacing native efforts 
instead of developing self-help skills and institutions. The problem, 
then, would seem to be one of taking fresh aim. 

issue six: science and technology in the department of state 

This final study in the series gave considerable attention to the 
initiative/reactive dichotomy and in particular to the administrative 
and analytical implications of both modes. For example: 

. . . urgent operational demands on staff attention can distract attention from 
the thinking-through of big problems, the planning of large new initiatives, and 
the sorting-out of uncommon subtleties. This unresolved administrative issue 
will become increasingly nagging as short-term problems of science and technology 
multiply, while at the same time the opportunities for large initiatives tend to be 
neglected for want of staff time and attention. 353 

Elsewhere the study notes that "Historically, the Department of 
State has not been especially alert to the opportunities for technological 
diplomacy." Documentation of this defect is offered from both a former 
Secretary of State and the academic community. 354 Defects in the 
analytical equipment of the Department are also scored by a senior 
member of the Department's science staff. 355 Elsewhere the study 

A persuasive case could be made that the American diplomatic style has tended 
to be reactive rather than initiatory. This hypothesis finds support in the fact 
that the ultimate decisions proposed are those of the President; the departmental 
role has tended to be to staff initiatives rather than to propose them, and to analyze 
the actions and initiatives of other nations to chart the options for U.S. responses. 358 

As to the substantive character of initiatives, the study noted that 
since World War II most U.S. agencies had large foreign missions and 
that "the bulk of the foreign contacts of U.S. agencies have a techno- 
logical content." 357 

The study called attention to the conflicting requirements of staffing 
for initiatives in foreign policy and for the reactive mode. Both modes 
required the same data base, broad knowledge, and analytical capabil- 
ities. But while the initiative mode needed unhurried deliberation, the 

«2 Ibid., p. 270. 

^Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department 0/ State, p. 10. 

m« Ibid., p. 109. 

»» Ibid., pp. 111-112. 

«« Ibid., p. 167. 

"' Ibid., p. 4. 


reactive mode was highly time- dependent. A planning team qualified 
to work in either mode was likely to find its energies totally absorbed 
by the needs of decisionmakers for policy guidance on immediate 
problems. Inherently these would be reactions to external develop- 
ments. Accordingly, the study raised the question as to the desirability 
of staffing separately for both modes. Such a scheme was tentatively 
suggested for the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. 
Also, in view of the large scientific and technological content of both 
initiatives and problems of reaction, a similar division in planning was 
suggested for the Department's Science Bureau. Moreover, it was 
pointed out that there needed to be a close working relationship 
between the long-range (i.e., initiatives development) elements of the 
Planning Staff and OES, as well as between the reactive element of the 
Planning Staff and the operational people in OES. 358 

The requirements of the Department are summed up as follows: 

There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S. 
technological developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the poten- 
tial contributions to U.S. diplomacy of foreseeable future technological 

The heart of science and technology is invention and change. The problem is 
to relate this force for change to diplomacy. It implies for the diplomatic process 
the encouragement of creativeness and increased receptivity toward innovation. 

More particularly, the rate of technological change and its impacts on the 
diplomatic environment call for a strengthened ability of the functional bureaus 
to perceive and interpret these changes and impacts, around the world, and for an 
increased alertness to the predictive power of technology analysis and forecasting. 359 

Of course there is no guarantee that even the best organized and 
staffed teams for planning initiatives and designing responses to 
external events can win acceptance of their concepts and expedients. 
As the study points out: 

One problem that all institutions concerned with policy analysis encounter is in 
being believed by those who make decisions on policy issues. There are repeated 
instances of studies that clearly identified a future danger, or the need to prevent 
a future crisis, and were neglected until the event occurred. Unfortunately, there 
are also repeated instances of forecasts of disaster that didn't happen after all. 
It is worth noting, however, that the confidence level of any technology forecast 
rises not merely when it is accepted by more critics but when it is subjected to 
deeper and more comprehensive analysis. But while the confidence level of a 
study may improve with effort, it is less likely that its political acceptability or 
credibility will be correspondingly enhanced. Guidance on this problem calls for 
much further study. 360 

One entire section (pages 163-165) of the study addressed the 
question of sources of foreign policy initiatives in science and tech- 
nology. It proposed four categories of such initiatives: 

The technical aspects of diplomacy can be categorized roughly as follows: (1) 
policies to encourage the international advance of basic science, e.g., support for 
the International Biological Program; (2) policies to advance and exploit the 
national posture in technology, e.g., agreements for the sale of enriched uranium 
fuel elements; (3) policies to deal with global or international problems calling for 
technological resolution, e.g., satellite surveys of pollution sources and diffusion 
patterns; and (4) policies employing science and technology to alter diplomatic 
relationship in some beneficial way, e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R. science agreement tc* 
further detente. 361 

sss ibid.: see especially pages 98-102. 

'59 Ibid., p. 125. 

»«o Ibid., p. 144. 

mi Ibid., pp. 163-164. 


Success in exploiting these opportunities has not been impressive or 
rewarding. Yet the opportunities seem to exist in abundance. 

It is not evident whether the general want of success of this effort to elicit fresh 
ideas for diplomatic initiatives has been attributable to the lack of appropriate 
organization for creativity, to the uncertainty as to the reception of bold and un- 
conventional concepts, or perhaps an asserted tendency of the diplomatic com- 
munity toward a reactive rather than innovative style of thought. Certainly there 
exist numerous areas in which opportunity for innovation is offered, and in which 
the United States has unique competence. For example, the World Health Organi- 
zation, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and various regional organizations 
of the United Nations have programs that lag seriously and could be greatly 
strengthened at relatively modest cost. The staffing of international organizations 
with technical personnel from the United States as a form of training for their 
future participation in the technical elements of the Department of State or the 
Foreign Service might be considered. Positive action on the U.N. university pro- 
posal, or such aspects of it as studies of the multinational corporation, normaliza- 
tion of world resources, and seabed management, might warrant exploitation as 
mutual interest intiatives. One of the more interesting possibilities is an open 
invitation to foreign technologists to identify and help correct technological lags 
in the United States as a counterpart to U.S. assistance of this type abroad. 362 

Various other options were also offered, but the study stressed 
the need for balancing creativity with caution. And it concluded this 
discussion with a somewhat equivocal observation that — 

Perhaps the best that can be said for this problem is that the study of in- 
stitutions to promote diplomatic creativity, and encouragement of the U.S. 
academic community to generate creative thought in this area, might show the 
way to a higher degree of initiative. The importance of the Department of State 
in this field, moreover, should not be overlooked. 

(Author's footnote:) For example, in discussing the merits of a proposed con- 
gressional diplomatic initiative "to facilitate the transfer to certain less developed 
countries of United States discoveries, inventions, and research develop- 
ments . . . " to be managed by NSF, Dr. H. Guyford Stever, director of NSF, 
warned: "The close interrelation of science and technology with other U.S. 
policies and initiatives in international affairs would seem to argue for the closest 
possible coordination of all of these efforts." Accordingly, it was necessary to 
"take advantage of the capabilities of the Department of State, which I believe 
are essential to the success of such an undertaking." (U.S. Congress, House, 
Committee on Science and Astronautics, International Cooperation in Science 
and Space Subcommittee, International Science and Technology Transfer Act of 
1974, Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., May 21-23, 1974, p. 21.) , 363 

A distinction is suggested between science and technology as re- 
gards utility for diplomatic initiatives. Thus, science ". . . is basically 
an international activity, with a world network of communication 
among practitioners of the separate scientific disciplines." 

Government funding is generally welcomed but government direction is not. 
Science per se has little impact on diplomacy, and that mostly beneficial, while 
diplomacy can pave the way for expanded scientific exchanges of persons and 
joint or multinational projects. Scientific programs are rarely the subject of serious 
diplomatic controversy. They tend mostly to low-cost activities. 364 

Thus initiatives in science tend to be long-range in effect, low-key, 
and pervasive rather than specific. However — 

In contrast with science, the impacts of technology on diplomacy are numerous 
and powerful. While many of these impacts are loosely identified as "scientific," 
it is more precise to refer to them as the technological applications of new scientific 
principles. The spread of technology is increasingly global, tending in the process 
to infringe national sovereignties. The inroads are caused by such technical 
effects as satellite overflights and penetration of the deep oceans, and by such 
institutional developments as the multinational corporation and multination 
cartels. On the other hand, both the uses of technology and the scarcity of re- 
sources consumed in these uses may encourage a more intense nationalism. 

"2 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
»« Ibid., p. 165, 
»" Ibid., p. 169. 


Science may respond beneficially to diplomatic initiatives, but technology de- 
termines in major ways the whole environment of diplomacy and national 
power. It is therefore a fit subject for broad policy analysis on a major and con- 
tinuing basis. It requires extensive information inputs. Quantitative as well as 
qualitative factors are involved. Technical knowledge and understanding are 
needed in the analysis, but broader social and political understanding are also 
essential. 365 

An interesting suggestion appears in the study (with particular 
reference to technology, it must be asserted) that the resources of the 
National Academy of Sciences be more systematically mobilized in 
the quest for diplomatic initiatives. A report by the Academy had 
found that technical matters of diplomacy ". . . receive little leader- 
ship or effective guidance until they reach crisis proportions or cause 
major political problems." Thus it called for an advisory council in 
the Executive Office of the President, closely coupled with the De- 
partment of State and the National Security Council. Said the NAS 

That coupling would enable the council to provide in international matters 
the early warning and coordinated attention to crisis management and selective 
program development that have been suggested here as among the principal 
functions of the council. It would enable the council to intervene, side by side 
with those within the Department of State responsible for scientific affairs, at 
the points where policy is actively determined, particularly where Presidential 
initiatives or interests are immediately involved. 366 

Some Concluding Observations 

Granting the overlapping nature of the initiative and reactive modes 
of diplomacy, there is evidence that the United States tends toward 
the latter. There may be reason to believe that concentration on 
responsive rather than initiative diplomacy can be more dangerous 
for a nation's security in the long run, and conversely, that the initia- 
tive mode is both more rewarding and less burdensome. 

The United States is still the technological leader of the community 
of nations. This advantage offers a potential for diplomatic exploita- 
tion, especially since the bulk of modern problems and issues in inter- 
national relations have substantial technical content. 

It is important also to note that technology has been a major factor 
in the gradual development of interdependence among nations. 

Accordingly, exploitation of scientific and technological opportuni- 
ties for diplomatic purposes and toward diplomatic goals seems an 
imperative form of the initiative mode. Then what are its re- 

Foremost among the requisite elements of an initiative technical- 
diplomatic mode are planning institutions with adequate data base, 
analytical capabilities and innovative character — and influence in the 
policymaking process. 

Among the kinds of opportunities that could be explored are the 
relative advantages of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, of global 
and regional programs of development, and of attention to health, 
population, food, the seabed, nuclear safeguards, and global science 
projects. Particularly attractive is the relatively noncontroversial and 
nighty acceptable area of global health. 

"5 Ibid., pp. 169-170. 

36« National Academy of Sciences, ad hoc Committee on Science and Technology, Science and Technology 
in Presidential Policymaking: a Proposal. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences, June 1974: 45. 


Both tho initiative and reactive modes of diplomacy in the modern 
world require a pooling of the best efforts and skills of technical and 
diplomatic manpower. Collaboration needs to extend throughout the 
institutions charged with the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy. But the exercise of initiative is the main point of this essay; 
it signifies the kind of leadership best calculated to produce movement 
toward the diplomatic goals at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. 

Some Questions for Farther Consideration 

How can a democratic political system operate effectively in the 
initiative mode? 

What planning institutions are most useful for either the reactive 
or initiative mode, and particularly for the latter? 

What national goals might be adopted as the targets of a diplomacy 
in the initiative mode? 

Is it realistic to fix goals for the reactive mode and if so what might 
they be? 

Is it practicable for the United States to move more extensively 
into the initiative mode of diplomacy without close coordination 
between the legislative and executive branches? 

What aspects of the external world require particular attention 
in the conduct of long-range planning in the initiative mode? 

Can any generalizations be made as to whether leading nations 
of the world consciously follow either of the two modes? 

How are bilateral and multilateral relations related to the initiative 
and responsive modes? Do they pair up in any constructive or useful. 

Is the regional approach to diplomatic goals identified clearly with 
the initiative mode or could it be a vehicle for the reactive mode' 
(as President Johnson attempted to make it)? 

How does the reactive initiative dichotomy relate to various 
conceptual power structures of the world: bipolar, multipolar, etc? 

VI. Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships 

In the construction of institutional arrangements of the United 
States with other nations for sustained scientific research and tech- 
nological development programs of common concern, an important 
issue is whether to employ a separate bilateral, "one-to-one" relation- 
ship with each participant, or to bring together all or many interested 
nations in one or more multilateral arrangements. Manifestly there 
will be occasions on which one form will be unmistakably superior 
to the other, as for example when the subject matter is of interest to 
only two nations, or conversely, when the participation of many 
nations is essential to an enterprise. 

However, for many programs of international science and technol- 
ogy with which the United States is concerned, there are no compel- 
ling or obvious reasons for choosing either the bilateral or the multi- 
lateral approach. The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss 
some of the considerations on which such a choice might be based, 
and to suggest the need — and some possible directions — for further 
study of this matter. 

Historically, multilateral and bilateral treaties, treat}^ institutions, 
formal and tacit agreements, and shared programs have existed 
alongside each other. The 12 studies in the Science, Technology, 
and American Diplomacy series contain many references to the simul- 
taneous occurrence of both multilateral and bilateral relationships 
among nations. 

In drawing from the various studies examples of these contrasting 
alternatives, the purpose is not to urge the superiority of either form 
of relationship, nor even to define comprehensively the kinds of 
substantive problem or task for which each is better suited. Rather, 
it is to document that some subjects are in fact more compatible with 
bilateral associations, and others with multilateral associations. From 
this observation, the paper then suggests that extensive further study 
of the bilateral/multilateral alternatives could help to chart the future 
course of American diplomac}^. Although the present focus is on 
scientific and technological matters of diplomacy, it is likely that the 
principles adduced would be more widely applicable. 

Appearance: oj the Issue in Earlier Parts of the Study 

The bilateral-versus-multilateral approach to international rela- 
tions does not appear to have received sufficiently systematic analysis 
aimed at identifying opportunities for the advancement of diplomatic 
goals. Repeated reference has been made in many of the 12 studies 
to this dimension of U.S. foreign relations. The series demonstrates 
a wide variation in form, purpose, scope, organization, degree of 
formality, and backstaffing arrangements. As a general proposition, 
purposeful standardization of forms aimed at optimizing cost-effective- 
ness across the board could be a constructive exercise. Although 
organizational forms need to be tailored to the endless varieties of 
requirements of particular agreements or relationships, needless and 



purposeless variations in form increase administrative difficulties 
and perhaps unnecessarily raise the costs. Decisions on choices be- 
tween bilateral and multilateral forms should be based on hard evi- 
dence and reasoning, rather than on a kind of seat-of-the-pants 
approach or personal bias. 

While the discussions of issues and cases in the present study do not 
examine systematically the full array of problems and opportunities 
associated "with the bilateral-multilateral dimension, enough informa- 
tion is developed to show the importance and ramifications of the 
subject. The discussions of this operational issue, chapter by chapter, 
are presented herebelow under corresponding chapter headings. 

case one: the baruch plan 

In this study of an early (1946-47) case, the nature of the problem 
and the tenor of the times assured that the subject of international 
control of atomic energy would be dealt with as a multilateral problem 
calling for multilateral agreement. Failure of the effort was not neces- 
sarily related to the multilateral approach. Basically the Baruch 
Plan foundered on the problem of replacing national sovereignty with 
international (i.e., multilateral) control. It is this same problem that 
besets the nations of the world in attempting to resolve the questions 
of seabed mineral development, control of direct TV broadcasts from 
satellites, and Landsat mineral surveys. However, in the case of the 
Baruch Plan, not only national sovereignty but national survival 
was at stake. On so momentous a matter it is not evident that a bilat- 
eral approach could have offered any more promising option than 
did the multilateral approach that failed. 

case two: commercial nuclear power IN EUROPE 

This case presented a large number of different examples of both 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Thus, when the Congress 
directed that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission make available to 
cooperating nations the "benefits of peaceful applications of atomic 
energy," the AEC proceeded to negotiate bilateral agreements with 
individual nations or with regional defense organizations. 367 The ad- 
ministrative advantage of this arrangement was that such agreements 
were simpler to negotiate and did not require Senate approval. (How- 
ever, such agreements did require explicit approval of the President 
and were required to "lie before the Joint Committee [on Atomic 
Energy] for 30 days while Congress is in session.") 

Bilateral atomic agreements were considerably stepped up following 
the diplomatic initiative of President Eisenhower, December 8, 1953, 
in his Atoms for Peace message. 368 Two years later bilateral nuclear 
agreements had been completed with 22 countries, and the pace 
continued. 369 These bilateral agreements [concluded Donnelly] 
". . . obtained from the United States unusual rights not available 

3« 7 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Inter- 
action of American Diplomacy with a New, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- 
ments by Warren H. Donnelly, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service. Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972: 25. (The initial provision was contained in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, P.L. 5S5, 79th Cong. , 60 Stat.755-75.) 

368 See ibid., pp. 20-30, for an necount of the speech and its aftermath. 

*»» Ibid. Table I, p. 33, and Table II, p. 45. 


through the more traditional and presumably more potent and durable 
instruments of international relations." 
On the one hand they were beneficial — 

In retrospect, negotiation and administration of the safeguards provisions of 
the U.S. nuclear bilateral agreements has proven to be a unique and extraordinary 
achievement in international relations. The technological promise of nuclear 
power, reinforced by incentives and pressures of foreign policy, gave the United 
States the unusual right to send its own inspectors into foreign jurisdications to 
inspect and verify the use and holding of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials. That 
no major confrontation has arisen from the administration of the safeguard pro- 
visions of the bilateral agreements gives reasons for some optimism in the future 
of international relations. For, despite the arguments and analyses of those who 
consider sovereign rights unalterable, there can be pragmatic biddings and 
accommodations when this is sufficiently in a nation's interest. 370 

On the other hand, their existence may serve to obstruct progress in 
international control: 

The success of the U.S. bilateral agreements, however, worked against one 
major goal of Atoms for Peace. Because the agreements provided many ad- 
vantages to the other countries, and because this web of agreements obtained for 
the United States influence and leverage that it otherwise might not have had, 
there has been a reluctance to shift the channel for U.S. technical assistance for 
nuclear power in Europe and elsewhere, from country-to-country agreements to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. From a global viewpoint, it might be 
seen that the United States and other world leaders in nuclear power are in com- 
petition with the International Agency when they deal directly with other coun- 
tries in supplying technical assistance. There is an implied balancing of advantages 
to goals of individual nations versus the anticipated advantages of a strengthened 
International Agency. 371 

Accordingly, Dr. Donnelly raises the question as to whether the time 
is at hand for a reexamination of the relative roles of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. The bilateral approach lent itself to the 
immediate and practical problems of a highly technical transaction 
involving patents, safeguards, audit and inspection, and safety. 
Nevertheless, said the author: 

Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States and world peace 
to see the Nonproliferation Treaty operate at full effectiveness, it may now be 
time for the United States to reexamine the present roles of bilateral agreements 
and of the International Agency as the means for furnishing future technical 
assistance and incentives for nuclear power. Channeling more U.S. aid through 
the IAEA could be expected to strengthen the agency. However, to deemphasize 
the present network of bilateral agreements with individual nations and with 
multinational bodies such as Euratom would lose for the United States the 
benefits associated with direct dealings. 372 

One interesting development has been the negotiation of bilateral 
agreements with multilateral organizations, viz., the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. These grew out of a deliberate 
decision by the United States not to replace bilateral with muti- 
lateral atomic dealings. Secretary Dulles had favored the multilateral 
approach for three reasons: 

(1) Although the bilateral agreements included adequate provisions for safe- 
guards, unless there was an international agreement on common standards. 

uture competition among supplying nations for the nuclear fuel market would 
almost certainly erode the safeguards of the bilateral agreements ; 

(2) Nations with bilateral agreements with the United States for development 
of nuclear power would not indefinitely accede to U.S. inspection of the nuclear 

*™ TM., p. 44. 
' 7 i Ihid., p. 44-4.5. 
» 7 2 Ibid., p. 45. 


powerplants. "They will accept international supervision indefinitely, but they 
will not, 1 think, indefinitely accept mere inspection by another nation"; 

(3) The United States lacked adequate technical personnel to meet all potential 
needs for inspection. It would be preferable to avoid this drain by sharing the 
task with others. 373 

However, AEC Chairman Strauss "clearly favored use of bilateral 
agreements." According to Dr. Donnelly's account: 
The United States, [Strauss] testified, 

. . . should not abandon these direct agreements with other countries when 
the Agency came into existence, or at any time in the foreseeable future. He 
anticipated that the Agency would stress activities in which many nations had 
a direct interest and in which the greatest progress could be made by a multi- 
national approach. At the same time, the United States through bilateral agree- 
ments would be able to extend to individual countries nuclear cooperation 
which . . . conforms more precisely to our traditional and special relationship 
with those particular countries." He did acknowledge possibilities of some 
resistance to bilateral agreements. Some countries, he said, had not responded 
to U.S. overtures to enter into bilateral agreements with them. However, these 
nations had shown their willingness to accept from an international agency 
limitations on their sovereignty unacceptable from the United States. 374 

case three: the political legacy of the international 
geophysical year 

The IGY study dealt with nongovernmental multilateral coopera- 
tion among; scientists in a very large research enterprise. The coopera- 
tive spirit demonstrated by the participants led observers to suggest 
that this spirit might be carried over to the political sphere, and that 
political problems "might be amenable to scientific principles properly 
applied. Commented Mr. Bullis: 

Refreshing as the intent underlying such beliefs may be, it nonetheless under- 
estimates the formidable differences existing between the scientific and political 
communities. 375 

While the central question of the IGY study was whether scientific 
internationalism encouraged other forms, the study also raises by 
inference the possibility that in scientific matters a multilateral 
approach is more likely to be fruitful than a bilateral approach. 
Mr. Bullis suggests that this possibility is attributable to the nature 
of science itself: 

Traditionally, cooperation in solving scientific problems has always appeared 
immeasurably less complex than cooperation in solving political problems. As 
pointed out by Astin, since — 

. . . science is concerned with external phenomena which are usually measure- 
able and whose manifestations are demonstrable and repeatable, there is less 
cause for disagreement, for controversy, than there is ... in politics. . . . 
Furthermore, the preoccupations of . . . scientists are usually less charged with 
emotion than are those of . . . politicals]. . . . The consideration of po- 
litical . . . plans or policies tends to arouse . . . passions, whereas delibera- 
tions [on scientific matters] tend to proceed more calmly. 376 

Thus scientists tend to have fewer social problems since their research is gener- 
ally focused upon common, well-defined objectives offering "a natural point of 

« Ibid., p. 53-54. 

>■* Ihid., p. 54. 

3,5 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysi- 
cal Year, a study in the series on Science, Technoloey, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcom- 
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold. Bullis. Science Policy Research 
Division, Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. On*. 
1973: 52. 

176 Allen V. Astin, "The Scientific Community and International Cooperation," Department of State 
Bulletin 61 (July 14, 1969), p. 33. 

6S-196— 76 16 


convergence, namely, the correct result." 377 Unlike politicians, they are not engaged 
in conflict resolution as a profession and are not charged with responsibility for 
the protection of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the existence 
of a common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency toward social 
cooperation despite all obstacles, a tendency which has become a characteristic 
of the international scientific community. 378 Scientists tend inherently to recognize 
the interdependence of their efforts and accept that interdependence as one of 
the basic conditions of the environment in which they work. It is then relatively 
easy for them to accept the extension of this principle to the environment in 
which they live. 379 

And finally, there is the strongly suggestive evidence that the multi- 
lateralism evident in the IGY may have helped to further the multi- 
lateralism of the Antarctic Treaty, the Test Ban Treaty, and the 
Space Treaty 380 and to establish other patterns of multilateral 
cooperation, both go vera mental and professional. (On this general 
point see also Case Three, under Outcome.) 


The thought behind the selection of this subject was that the same 
internationalism manifested by the scientists in the IGY program 
might also be found among technologists engaged in a mutual project 
of regional development. As with the IGY, the forms of agreement 
in the Mekong Project were almost entirely multilateral. They were 
also conscientiously technical. Of regionalism, one quoted study of- 
fered the opinion that regional cooperation measures ". . . have the 
best chance of success when they achieve a net maximum of two goals: 
the maximum of intraregional political neutrality and colorlessness." 

Resistance to multilateral development and a preference for bi- 
lateralism was expressed b} r officials of the U.S. program of foreign 
assistance. Said the Mekong study (p. 64): 

Bilateral aid problems were thought hard enough to deal with, without the 
necessity of becoming involved in multinational plans and programs. However, 
the "spirit of the Mekong" has been shown to have exerted a durable cooperative 
influence on the Riparian States for nearly two decades. Given a forum for 
consultation, and a shared opportunity for economic growth and development 
with many donor nations contributing, the nations of a region can demonstrabh" 
work together, despite a long history of conflict and instabilities. 

In practice, regionalism appears to open the door to a veritable 
catscradle of multilateral associations, institutions and arrangements. 
Said the study (p. 64): 

When a regional development project involves both a plurality of recipient 
nations and a plurality of donor nations (and perhaps also an array of United 
Nations instrumentalities) the administrative complications may grow but the 
political complications seem actually to be reduced. One reason for this is the 
doubly "lowered profile" of the individual donors, even though their contribu- 
tions may be 'of commanding importance on an individual program unit in some 
one country. The various arrangements for task management by the World 
Bank or some other institution, plus the coordinating organization for the total 
regional program, tend to insulate the donor from the recipient. In terms of 
imposing conditions on the recipient, this insulation may limit the benefits of the 
arrangement to the donor, but in terms of its general acceptability to all recipients 
and amity among all participants it is highly beneficial. At the same time, as 
President Nixon has said: "I am confident that our role can be kept in consonance 
both with our interests and with those of the increasingly self-reliant and inde- 
pendent Asian states." 381 

377 Senate Document No. 56, International Cooperation and Organization, p. 20S. 

*™ Astin, "The Scientific Community," p. 32. 

379 Bullis, Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. p. 53. 

&° Ibid., pp. 5.5-61. 

« l U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, House Document 92-53, p. 76. 


However, there are also practical reasons for preferring multilateral 
to bilateral regional development. Testimony on this point is offered 
by Eugene R. Black, who suggests that a "vast program of regional 
cooperation" was needed to "counteract the ill-effects of the Vietnam 
War." He urged the reduction of the "U.S. presence" and the building 
of a "strong multilateral framework." Said the study (pp. 64-65): 

As a development banker, Black is "frankly a partisan of multilateral and 
regional organizations . . . ," because this arrangement insulates development 
finance from political considerations. ("Or to put it the other way around, it 
does not stand to reason that the U.S. Government should undertake in the name 
of development to intervene wholesale in the domestic affairs of six dozen or bo 
poor countries.") It also is able to draw on many sources of capital and skill, and 
promotes international cooperation. 382 

The study concluded with the suggestion that a regional approach 
to multilateralism might serve as a replacement for the formalism 
of the United Nations: "The concept of dealing with multinational 
geographic regions rather than with nations, and extending aid from 
a multinational base instead of bilaterally, has been credited in the 
literature with a number of attractive characteristics." (The study 
cited eight of these, page 67.) There followed some suggested ques- 
tions for policy analysis : 

The resultant alignment of nations and international structures from a delib- 
erate program of world regionalism acceptable to developed and developing 
countries might warrant further study and analysis. What actions could help 
to encourage a world system of economically and technologically better balanced 
regions? Would there be any effect on the levels of international tensions, either 
in the regions or in the relations among the major powers? Might regional voting 
in the United Nations General Assembly and the associated U.N. agencies 
provide a better or more representative arrangement than the present, admittedly 
awkward system of one-country-one-vote? 383 

case five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 

This case grew out of the evolving technology for offshore drilling 
for oil and the emerging technology for recover}' of hard minerals from 
the deeper ocean floor. International law has traditionally viewed 
the oceans as an international commons, with an unresolved issue 
as to how far from shore the commons begins. Inherently, then, the 
control of the international commons is regarded as a multilateral 
matter, while the fixing of offshore boundaries is subject for dispute — 
to be resolved by multilateral agreement, by bilateral agreement 
between two nations, or by bilateral agreement between individual 
claiming nations and an institution representing all interested nations. 

Pending resolution of these two sets of issues, the exploitation 
rights to the deep ocean presumably conform with ancient practices 
of nationality and freedom of the seas. Right of capture devolves 
upon the nation with the best technology until a more orderly marine 
jurisprudence can be devised and accepted. 

Claims of nations to sovereignty over a 200-mile span of coastal 
"shelf" and claims of landlocked countries to a share of marine 
riches complicate the resolution of the problem. 

One possibility is to introduce the concept of regionalism into the 
marine environment. If, in general, the ease of resolution of issues 

m Euc^ne R. Black: Alternative in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 166-168. 
« Huddle, Mekong Project, p. 67. 


ib inversely proportional to the number of interested parties, perhaps 
the designation of oceanic subregions and identification of claimants 
to each might enable a fairer sharing by all. 

It is also likely that the reduction of seabed issues to a network 
of bilateral altercations would be fraught with peril, exacerbating 
tensions and conflict over sovereignties in question. 

On the other hand, shared efforts of a consortium of nations to 
discover, and to develop a mutual ability to exploit, mutual wealth 
seems as logical for a designated ocean region as for the Lower Mekong 

case six: u.s. -soviet commercial relatioxs 

Assessment of the securit} 7 , political, economic, and technological 
implications of the October 1972 commercial agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union is the focus of this study. A< 
such, it is inherently a study of a single, highly important bilateral 

As the study points out, this agreement was only one of many 
vehicles for progress in relations between the two countries, others 
being agreements on science and technology, nuclear weapons, space 
cooperation, medical science, and the environment. The emphasis of 
the study on the trade part of this series of bilateral agreements 
enabled the placing of other bilateral elements in perspective. 

The intricate calculus of the slowly evolving detente between the 
two "superstates," as presented in the study, shows the importance 
as well as convenience of the bilateral approach in application. The 
flawed management of the grain negotiations that accompanied the 
broader agreement suggests that even when devised in isolation a 
major bilateral initiative can overextend the skills of top U.S. 
negotiators to achieve a workable diplomatic trade strategy. The 
aftermath of the trade agreement, moreover, shows that U.S. diplomacy 
can be frustrated if the executive branch assumes sole charge and 
neglects the diplomatic role of the Congress. 

Undoubtedly the diplomatic problem was usefully simplified 03* 
being managed bilaterally, while ignoring such obviously important 
related elements as technological competition from other highly 
developed states, the interests of other grain-exporting states, the 
special case of the People's Republic of China, the interests of the 
emerging "Third World," and the underlying threat of further 
nuclear proliferation. 

While the study, steadily bilateral in scope and limited to trade, 
was evidently complex and far-ranging in its implications, there are at 
least three reasons for enlarging this problem to a multilateral canvas: 

First, it became necessary to examine the political, economic, and 
technological impacts — actual or potential — of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade 
negotiations on many "third countries." 

Second, in the background and not taken into account is the ques- 
tion of the gradual transition of the political world from a bipolar to a 
multipolar character. 

Third, as events since 1972 have shown, U.S. trade policy must 
adapt flexibly to multiple markets and sources of supply; it cannot 
safely be shaped too extensively by the special requirements of U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. trade. (The rewards of such trade for the United States are 


mainly political, and there are both political and economic reasons 
for balancing this U.S. policy against the needs for preserving other 
essential political and economic relationships abroad.) 

issue one: the evolution of international technology 

This paper, written about 2 years after President Nixon took office, 
took account of the President's early effort to shift the primary em- 
phasis of U.S. foreign policy in technology from bilateral to multilateral 
institutions. In his first message to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, 
the President emphasized Western Hemisphere programs: ''He urged 
that bilateral relations be replaced by a multilateral approach, de- 
veloped multilaterally." 384 

With respect to more general foreign assistance, the President 
Magain stressed the importance of multilateral rather than bilateral 
relations, and of the need for the developing countries to take the 
initiative in charting their own development strategies." 385 

In his message the President cited two reports, referred to in the 
studv as the Peterson and the Pearson Reports. The Peterson Report, 
March 4, 1970, told the President that: 

"For the first time in history, it appears feasible to approach this world prob- 
lem [i.e., international development] on a worldwide basis." The report called for a 
less prominent and obtrusive role for the United States in extending aid to de- 
veloping countries. It urged greater partnership with developing countries, with 
the aided countries earning out more of the strategic planning. It urged re- 
peatedly that bilateral assistance should be reduced and multilateral assistance in- 
creased. The goal should be the achievement by the aided countries of a self- 
sustaining posture of development. To implement the proposed change in emphasis 
of the U.S. aid program, the task force recommended the establishment of four 
Institutions. These were (1) a U.S. International Development Bank, (2) a U.S. 
International Development Institute, (3) the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) which the task force noted had already been authorized by 
the Congress, and (4) a U.S. International Development Council. 388 

The Pearson Report, issued in the previous year under U.X. aus- 
pices, recognized the deficiencies of multilateral agencies and pro- 
grams. There were reasons, it said, why nearly 90 percent of develop- 
ment assistance in 1967 was bilateral: 

Apart from historical colonial relationships, bilateral aid was often more effi- 
cient. Personnel recruitment was less of a problem. Bilateral programs could be 
more flexible and experimental in their procedures. They could encompass a wider 
scope of responses to real need. 387 

The Pearson Report also identified as political considerations some 
asserted weaknesses of multilateral programs: 

Most countries will usually feel that at least some multilateral agencies are 
unduly dominated by the "wrong" countries, whether aid-givers or recipients; or 
that they are following erroneous aid philosophies, either too hard or too soft, too 
interventionist, or too lax; or that they are simply badly run and that their pro- 
cedure^ are slow and expensive, (p. 209) 388 

Nevertheless, the Report continued, there were favorable aspects to 
multilateral aid: 

It reduced any overtones of charity or interventionism. It helped provide a 
framework within which bilateral aid to whole nations could be better integrated 

1 Huddle, The Eiolution of International Technology, p. 59. 

s Ibid. 

' Hid., p. 60. 

Ibid., p. 63. 



into a total program. It would reduce unequal geographical preferences in aid 
distribution. It would stimulate regional integration among developing countries. 
It would pave the war for international centers of documentation, advice, and 
guidance, (pp. 213-214)389 

In the study itself, the question was left open as to whether bilateral 
or multilateral aid was preferable. The discussion was concluded with 
the following passage: 

The issue of multilateral versus bilateral aid is complicated by a practical 
political consideration. Some of the objectives ascribed to the early Truman pro- 
gram, still persuasive for some groups, are largelj- incompatible with the patterns 
of cooperation essential in a multilateral program. A multinational program of 
assistance is likely to find few friends and fewer sponsors. It may be easier to win 
political support for foreign assistance, no matter how strongly supported by theo- 
retical or policy considerations, if the U.S. electorate can identify directly the 
relationship with the recipient. 

And finally, the problem remains unsolved of how to assess the impacts of pres- 
ent and future technology at all these different levels, in relation to the various 
sets of national and international objectives. The United States is only beginning 
to appreciate the difficulty of assessing technology domestically. The task is 
recognized as one of transcendent difficulty. The power of technology to alter the 
human condition, so evident in the United States, can be equally potent on the 
world scene. Effects of technology can be favorable or adverse. Combinations of 
technological effects can operate synergistically toward good or bad results. The 
many nations of the world differ widely in their sophistication, their grasp of these 
considerations. How far the United States should go in exercising leadership, 
globally, in the international transfer of technology, and in the effort to separate- 
good from bad technology, in view of all the other elements of this great catscradle 
must remain an open question. 390 

issue two: the politics of global health 

The essence of the findings of this study is that all nations share- 
an interest in the health of their peoples, and that this shared interest 
strongly motivates a multilateral approach to advance the health of 
all. Nevertheless an incredible multiplicity of programs and institu- 
tions, public and private, national and international, bilateral and 
multilateral, are engaged in efforts to improve the health of mankind. 
Along with real accomplishments, these have resulted in confusion, 
cross-purposes, and large areas of serious neglect. 

The study called particular attention to the utility of the World 
Health Organization, a United Nations agency, as the focal center of 
global health efforts. Said the author, Dr. Quimby: "Recent trends 
reflect the deliberate movement of international health activities from 
bilateral programs to multilateral ones such as the United Nations 
Development Program and the World Health Organization." 391 He 
cited President Nixon's 1970 message to Congress and the Peterson 
Report and noted that "The move [toward multilateral programs] has 
already started, beginning with the multilateralization of the malaria 

»S9 Ibid. 

**> Ibid., pt>. 64-65. The reference to the "early Truman program" includes a passage that reveals the mixed 
motives with which the proeram was undertaken. The passage reads: 

One difficultv with the program was that its objectives were seen differently by the various groups 
involved; various of its supporters looked for different outcomes. Was it a humanitarian program to raise 
living standards in poor countries? Was it intended to effect political stabilization of these regions to halt the 
spread of communism, under the containment doctrine of the period? Was it to render the political soil less 
fertile for subversion? Was it to strengthen with gratitude U.S. relations with less-favored nations, was 
it to provide assured future sources of essential materials for U.S. industry or possible wartime military re- 
quirements? All of these were offered at one time or another during the two years in which the Point 1\ 
Program was debated in Congress. , . ., , ., . . 

The point is that irrespective of whether a program is bilateral or multilateral it can hardly succeed it its 
motives and goals are so convoluted and contradictory. 

* 91 Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, p. 75. 


eradication program." ,92 Dr. Quimby observed, however, that the 
Peterson Report's assertion that "a predominantly bilateral U.S. 
program is no longer political tenable in our relations with many 
developing countries" ran counter to congressional preferences for 
bilateral programs. 

The rationale for a shift from bilateral to multilateral programs in 
the health field, according to Dr. Quimby, is as follows: 

The expansion of national public health interests to global dimensions calls 
not only for diplomacy or statesmanship of the conventional type; it calls for 
worldwide experience with science, medicine, and public health as political 
systems themselves and for experts in the subject matter. The more reliance 
there is on multilateral organizations for controlling disease and assisting all 
the countries of the world in improving their state of health, the less need there 
is for a national or bilateral point of view. The more the health of the State 
becomes dependent upon the health of the world, the more the interests and 
technology of the State become blended into those of the world. If and when 
it appears that the only feasible approach to the problems of human health is 
indeed a worldwide approach, it will be necessary for knowledge to be shared 
and exchanged by those who are in possession of it and who by tradition and 
practice are used to sharing and exchanging it. The multilateral health organiza- 
tions are simply institutional devices for encouraging this process in the inter- 
national health profession. 393 

The concept of multinational regionalism, developed in the Mekong 
study, 394 offers signal opportunities in the field of health. Regions of 
endemic disease and regions in winch particular disease vectors are 
common might warrant cooperative control measures by the nations 
in the region, perhaps with the support of WHO. While some success- 
ful programs of this sort have been recorded, as for example the work 
of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the principle 
seems capable of more extensive exploitation as indeed Dr. Quimby 

issue three: beyond malthus 

The two subjects of this study — food and population — both require, 
for completely different reasons, a multilateral approach. The global 

j allocation of food to alleviate starvation and desperate shortage can 
scarcely be managed on the basis of a network of bilateral agreement-. 

•' The unfortunate experience of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain transaction 
(discussed in Case Six above) demonstrates this clearly. To be sure, 
the equitable distribution of foods to all populations on the globe is 
still a remote goal. But the present scheme of production and distri- 
bution has already become too complex an international operation 
to be resolved by an intricate series of bilateral arrangements. 

The matter of population involves a quite different set of considera- 
tions. Long regarded as a personal or familial matter from which all 
officiaHntervention was excluded, the right to procreate is increasingly 
recognized as posing a general political problem related to the future 
well-being of nations and indeed the entire world's people. As this issue 
becomes clarified and its policy requirements are defined, perhaps there 
will be further adaptations in the approaches to its political and 

»w Ibid., p. 76. 

»» Quimby, The Politics of (TlobaJ Htalth. r>. 77. 

■< U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Mekona Project: Opportunities and Problems 
of Regionalism, a study in the series on Science, Technoloev, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policv and Scientific Developments bv Franklin P. Huddle. Science 
Policy Research Division, Conere«sional Research Service, Librarv of Congress, Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1972, 86 pages. (Committee print.) 


diplomatic management. Logic suggests that this is a necessary- 
conclusion. But when the study Beyond MaJthus was first prepared, 
the issue of population control was (as it still is) primarily personal, 
familial, and national; its study, however, is increasingly bilateral 
and even more multilateral — both regional and global. 

The issue of bilateral versus multilateral assistance in food and 
population balance was dealt with in the study both generally and in 
respect to a specific problem. As the author, Dr. Xanes, expressed it: 

The inherent advantage of multilateral over bilateral assistance is that the 
diplomatic profile of the donor is lowered. Motives of the donors are under less 
suspicion. Another presumed advantage is that recipients may be more likely to 
contribute substantively to the planning of general programs. If they are involved 
in the planning, they are more positively committed to the implementation of 
plans. Burdens of cost can be more widely distributed. Results can be better 
analyzed on the basis of international comparisons. Contributions to a genuinely 
global program can be expected to come earlier from those nations which are 
initially recipients. Some forms of assistance practically demand a global approach. 

For example, Herman Pollack, Director of the Bureau of International Scientific 
and Technological Affairs, Department of State, has suggested the systematic 
exchange of germ plasm, a basic ingredient of agricultural development. 

Cooperative exchanges developed by the Department of Agriculture [said 
Pollack] have been instrumental in providing new germ plasm to widen the 
breeding base. For example, a variety of hard red wheat was acquired from 
Turkey resistant to various races of stripe rust. In Montana alone, use of this 
variety has prevented losses estimated at $2-$3 million annually. Similarly, a 
tomato variety acquired from South America provides wilt resistance to about 
100 varieties grown in the United States. In Ohio alone, it is estimated that the 
wilt resistance gained from this acquisition has saved growers $1 million per 
year. A peanut variety acquired from South America was planted on 400,000 
acres annually from 1962 to 1968 and is estimated to have increased production 
by as much as $9 million annually because of its higher yield. Following an ex- 
change developed with the Soviet Union, United States corn breeders received an 
early maturing variety having good stalk quality. This germ plasm is now found 
in hybrids having an annual value of 8-500,000 for the seed alone. Many other 
similar examples in agricutlure could be cited. 395 

Whether it would be more effective to continue the exchange of germ plasm on 
a low level, based on bilateral contacts, with countries at different levels of 
technical sophistication, or to mount a global program of germ plasm management, 
would seem to warrant considerable attention and analysis. 396 

ISSUE four: U.S. SCIENTISTS abroad 

Extensive anah>is of present arrangements for sending U.S. 
scientists aboard on research and educational projects suggests that 
the bilateral/multilateral dimension is salient. The study observes 
that in the bilateral exchange programs, "Very little attention is 
given ... to determining priorities systematically or to relating 
programs to the objectives of U.S. foreign science and technology as 
outlined by the Department of State." Accordingly, the >tudy 

Wider and more public scientific diplomatic and executive, legislative interfaces 
seem to be required of all programs to cope with the differences between the means 
and ends of science and diplomacy, to determine appropriate program priorities. 
and to correct program inadequacies. 397 

Particular attention was addressed to the essentially political 
nature of bilateral agreements for science exchanges. To this character 

' i5 Testimony before Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space. House Com- 
mittee on Science and Astronautics, Mav IS, 1971. Reproduced in State Department Bulletin (.June 28. 
1971). pp. 839-840. 

»°« Nanes. Bfvond Malthus: The Food'Peoph Equation, p. 90. 

" ; Knezo, U.S. Scientists Abroad, p. 150. 


was attributed such weaknesses of the bilateral science agreements as 
"undersubscribed rates of participation by U.S. scientists or lower 
quality scientific participation. . . ." More generally, the study suggests 
that "'. . . bilateral scientific and technological links alone may no 
longer be sufficient in a world increasingly interdependent in harness- 
ing the fruits of science and technology and in solving the problems 
they generate." Knezo gives it as the opinion of one author, Victor 
Basiuk, that the absence of multilateral cooperative scientific relation- 
ships with Europe imperils transatlantic security. On a larger scale, 
Emilio Q. Daddario was quoted as urging a broad international con- 
sensus on science policy. 398 

And the study concludes, mentioning the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, and UNESCO, 
with the suggestion that ". . . it may be to the common advantage 
of science, U.S. foreign policy, and international cooperative 
science policy for policymakers to consider incorporating some U.S. 
science and technology exchange programs into these same cooperative 
international mechanisms." 3 " 

issue five: brain drain 

It is interesting that the international movement of technically 
trained people, although clearly of deep concern to many govern- 
ments, does not appear to have been the subject of either bilateral or 
multilateral agreement among nations. Perhaps the main reason for 
this apparent neglect is that except in totalitarian states where close 
control is exercised over emigration, movement of persons is regarded 
as a right of individual freedom; and, of course, in the case of the 
Soviet Union, the interest of other nations in the emigration of persons 
from that country has been disallowed as an "internal" matter. 

Dr. Whelan's comprehensive assessment in this study identifies the 
many "pull" and "push" factors that motivate movement of scien- 
tists from one country to another. Most of these are matters beyond 
the reach of international agreements, bilateral or multilateral. 
However, as the study makes clear, the analysis of brain drain and 
the measurement of its consequences is a legitimate subject for multi- 
lateral study, although probably not appropriate for bilateral agree- 
ment except in unusual circumstances. It is a conclusion of the author 
that a better understanding of the measures and consequences of 
brain drain could motivate national action to improve adverse con- 
ditions or differences in opportunity for personal advancement that 
encourage trained people to move to other countries. At the same 
time, multilateral — and in the case of the less developed countries, 
regional — action is needed to support certain efforts which are beyond 
the means of individual countries, as in the establishment of regional 
science and technology centers geared to the low-technology problems 
of development. 

*« Ibid., pp. 151, 160-161. 
*» Ibid., p. 103. 

issue six: science and technology in the department of state 

In this study, which concentrated on the organizational aspects of 
science, technology, and American diplomacy, particular attention 
"was given to the "Emergence of the Bilateral Science Agreement." 
Less attention was given to multilateral arrangements. 

Advantages of the bilateral agreement were said to include con- 
venient evidence of detente, increased interaction in a professional and 
noncontroversial field, an impetus toward further cooperation, 
increased prestige of local scientists, increased local support for 
science, facilitated exchange of personnel and information, and easier 
exchange of materials and equipment. A diplomatic advantage of 
bilateral agreements is that they can serve as the opening wedge to 
begin a dialogue with unrecognized states. 

A principal disadvantage of bilaterals is that while easy to make 
they are awkward to terminate. Compared with multilateral arrange- 
ments they cost the participants more in relation to the benefits 
they yield. As they increase in number they impose a substantial 
burden of administration and coordination. 

One problem posed by the present array of some 28 bilaterals is 
that they did not come about as a consequence of a deliberate deter- 
mination that these were the best places to have such arrangements, 
that all were meritorious and any others would be less so. Nor was 
there a conscious effort to design an optimal plan that could generally 
be followed in each case, with only minor modifications. Planning and 
priorities appear to have played little role in the&e decisions; instead, 
an ad hoc approach wa» followed, and the designs of the arrangements 
evolved out of the circumstances at the time. 400 

This variation was justified as experimentation. However, observed 
the study: 

It should also be noted that to justify the experimental nature of the design 
variation requires that information be drawn from the experiment. Which de- 
signs work best and why? What criteria of effectiveness have been established? 
What principles can be adduced? If additional bilateral science programs are 
proposed, by what criteria will they be evaluated and how should they be designed 
for optimal effect? If there are variations in existing programs, should they be 
reviewed and revised to enhance their effectiveness? If there are inactive or unre- 
warding programs, should they be rebuilt, renegotiated, or terminated, or allowed 
to drag on? 401 

And fundamentally, "to be diplomatically as well as scientifically 
useful, the science bilateral needs to have a solid technical justification, 
and sustained technical and administrative support on both sides." 
The analysis further develops this theme as follows : 

So numerous have these agreements become, and so diffused the responsibilities 
for cooperative overseas programs of U.S. agencies, that the time seems appro- 
priate for a general review of the mechanism of bilateral science and technology 
cooperation. Agreements are easy to make, costly and time-consuming to imple- 
ment, difficult to keep track of, duplicative in effects, and painful to terminate. 
Federal agencies find themselves committed to programs abroad for which no 
funds can be obtained for support. Expectations are likely to run ahead of per- 
formance. In some cases, of course, there are tangible economic benefits in 
terms of dollar saving from joint or collaborative researches, valuable results, 
and shared facilities. But only by a vigorous and competent management, supplied 
on an overall basis by the executive branch, can these agreements ultimately be 

«» Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 
«i Ibid., pp. 79-80. 


assured of yielding more good than harm. Only if programs are carefully planned, 
•on a joint basis, toward explicit and useful tasks, with assured leadership, person- 
nel, and funding, can the product justify the effort. 402 

The study dealt much less extensively with the subject of multi- 
lateral agreements and institutions, mainly because these receive less 
•close attention of the Department of State. On this matter one opinion 
as expressed by Herman Pollack, foimer chief of the Science Bureau of 
the Department of State, was that existing relationships between the 
United States and U.N. technical agencies were "fundamentally 
sound" but that in "coordination as among U.N. technical programs 
and in oversight" U.S. performance was "weak." Manpower was 
"entirely insufficient to get on top of the problem." 403 A similar view, 
expressed by a study for the United Nations Association, proposed the 
"development of a high-level evaluation and planning unit in [the 
State Department's Bureau of International Organizations Affairs] — 

. . . devoted to the evaluation of the effectiveness of international institu- 
tions and their programs, to the development of specific initiatives for strengthen- 
ing these institutions, and to enhancing U.S. participation in them. This would 
include an evaluation of any need for creation or elimination of organizations in 
particular problem areas, as well as the formulation of major reforms in existing 
institutions and their mandates. It would also involve encouraging international 
organizations themselves to perform much of this program evaluation, (pp. 
85-86) * M 

The study concludes with an observation provided from the Foreign 
Service Journal that called attention to the essentially multilateral 
character of the large technological problems confronting the world's 
nations. Said the statement, in part: 

What then does this new proximity of nations, brought about by rapid techno- 
logical change, require of diplomacy? It seems to ask for something more than 
traditional bilateral ironing out of differences and development of cooperative 
arrangements. Technological advance has created problems which affect all of 
the world's nations, and require their cooperation for the solution. For example, 
arrangements to prevent the pollution of the seas cannot be made bilaterally. 
What is necessary is a new innovative multilateralism. 405 

And the statement concluded: "The diplomats of the future will 
require all of the tools they can get if they are to succeed in this new 
multilateral diplomacy." 

Some Concluding Observations 

It appears from the evidence of the 12 studies reviewed above 
that both bilateral and multilateral agreements on scientific and 
technological subjects have a legitimate place in the apparatus of 

The policy governing bilaterals seems to call for considerable 
strengthening and the application of more restraint. Procedures should 
be standardized. Criteria of establishment should be more explicit and 
; less adventitious. Sound technical justification is needed for subjects 
of agreement, as is sound technical management of ongoing programs. 
Factual reporting of costs, operations, and results is essential not only 
for improvement of management but also to facilitate congressional 

*"* P>id., the Department of State, p. 86. 
♦« Ibid., p. 105. 
<w Ibid., p. 153. 
* l Ibid., p. 180. 


oversight. Budgeting of bilaterals requires advance estimate of costs 
of proposed programs and assurance that participating U.S. agencies 
are properly supported in overseas assignments. 

The policy governing multilaterals warrants much further study. 
The politics of the United Nations is taking on a reality separate from 
that of the participating nations, and the emergence of large numbers 
of new voting states complicates the process of pohcymaking in 
multilateral institutions. Lessons from the World Health Organization 
experience are relevant here: the recognition of the need to achieve 
solid technical results, to coordinate programs by technical expertise 
rather than by political influence, and the general elevation of the 
substantive element over the diplomatic relationship. The suggested 
principle seems to be that technical advances can help pave the way 
to resolution of political differences. In this connection, the adoption 
of the regional approach to multilateral organization offers attractive 
opportunities for exploitation as well as economy of means. 

Probably the most important neglected element of multilateral 
program management for the United States is that in neither the 
multilateral agencies nor in the Department of State nor even in the 
U.S. mission agencies concerned with multilateral programs is there 
a clear mandate for accountability to the U.S. Congress. In simplest 
terms, the Congress needs to know what the individual programs cost 
in total, and the cost to the United States, and also what benefits 
accrue generally to the participating nations and particularly to the 
United States. It is not now apparent that this kind of information is 
available to the Congress, from which funding support is expected. 
At present it is not evident whether in the interest of U.S. diplomatic 
goals particular programs should be maintained at current level-. 
reduced, or expanded. 

Some Questions for Further Consideration 

Perhaps to explore further the dimension of bilateral versus multi- 
lateral diplomacy, the following questions may be helpful. This 
dimension is central to the future management of the interface of 
science and technology with diplomacy. And, as has just been ob- 
served, the diplomats of the future will need "all of the tools they can 


What are the special advantages and disadvantages of each form of 

What are the advantages of combining the two forms in various 
ways, such as for example: a bilateral agreement between a nation 
and a multilateral institution; a bilateral agreement between two 
multilateral (e.g. regional) organizations, a bilateral agreement be- 
tween two nations to implement program elements of a regional or 
global multilateral organization, a multilateral consortium to coor- 
dinate a variety of activities developed under a number of different 
bilateral agreements, and so on? 

What particular characteristics or consequences of agreements 
should be addressed in order to test the relative efficacy of bilateral 
versus multilateral forms of agreement? 

What differences in sanctions are there as between bilateral and 
multilateral agreements? To what extent is either of the two forms 
able to incorporate self-enforcing elements? 


"With apparent increase in interdependence among nations, is the 
bilateral or is the multilateral form of relationship better able to 
accept the burdens of expanded coordination? 

What adjustments in the structure of the U.S. Government are 
likely to be needed as bilateral and multilateral agreements increase 
in number and scope? 

What planning institution would be useful to analyze the bilateral/ 
multilateral agreement structure and its domestic U.S. demands, in 
order to strengthen the general backstopping organization? 

What opportunities are there for diplomatic benefits from opening 
bilateral agreements to participation by third, fourth, and more 

What large technological problems are in the offing that will require 
diplomatic attention, and will they be more appropriate for bilateral or 
multilateral attention? 

What guidance is available to the Congress to assess the manage- 
ment of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and to evaluate in 
advance the proposals for additional agreements? What data bases 
needed for this purpose are now lacking? 

VII. High-Techxology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology 

The theme of this essay is the importance of national policy in 
technology for diplomacy. Manifestly, other elements complement 
technology in affecting the relations among nations: defense policy,, 
economic policy, labor policy, and policy on aid to industry for ex- 
ample. But the focus here is on technology policy per se. The approach 
used is to distinguish two kinds of technology, and to distinguish 
their separate relations to diplomacy, in order to define the different 
ways in which diplomats need to interest themselves in technology 

The evidence presented in the 12 studies in this series indicates that 
technology is a major force in shaping the world of diplomacy. Various 
attempts have been made to distinguish different classes of technology 
and to formulate distinctive national strategies for each. One form of 
classification has been based on size : the concept of "economy of scale, "" 
by which increases in size of units of capital produced marginal gains 
in economic efficiency. Thus, "big industry" was able to outpace 
"small industry" in competition for markets and profit ability. Another 
form of classification was based on the idea of "heavy" versus "light " 
industry; in the Soviet Union, for example, great stress was placed 
on such heavy industry as steel-making, which was considered the 
key to industrial power. 

Emergence oj High Technology 

However, during the Cold War Era, with its emphasis on nuclear 
weaponry, electronic systems, computers, and aerospace, another 
scheme of classification came into use. This was the concept that the 
industry of highly developed countries could be classified according to 
the rate of change and degree of "sophistication" in its designs, based 
on extensive use of applied science. Research-intensive industries were 
described as "high" technology, while more traditional and older — 
often less progressive — industries were "low technology." However, it 
is significant that the larger an industry grows as it exploits the ad- 
vantages of economy of scale, the less easily can it adapt itself to 
technological innovations. 

In the late 1960s, concern was expressed — especially in France — 
over the asserted superiority of the United States in the industrial 
exploitation of new technolog}^. 406 This alleged superiority was as- 
sociated, in the literature, with the heavy U.S. Government invest- 
ment in science and technology for atomic energj", weaponry, aero- 
space, and supporting technologies, as well as management skills, 
high standards of education, technical training, and the existence of a 
large and affluent market at home. The role of the U.S. -based multi- 
national corporation was also seen as of great importance. 

406 s ee especially J. J. Servan-Schreiber. The American Challenge, translated from tbe French by Ronald 
Steel. New York.'Atheneum, 1P68, p. 27. Also Franklin P. Huddle, Science, Technology, tmd American Diplo- 
macy: The Evolution of International Technology. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, pp. 14, 41, and 52-53. 



Further confirmation of the significance of technology for overseas 
U.S. trade was offered in a series of studies by Dr. Michael Boretsky 
of the Department of Commerce. An aspect of Dr. Boretsky's studies 
was the comparison of low and high technology products as elements 
of the U.S. balance of international payments. lie offered evidence of a 
positive correlation between level of industrial investment in research 
and development and economic growth and profitability as well as 
ability to exploit export markets. A major reward of high technology 
was the cash return from the sale of patents and licenses. Since one 
criterion of the difference between high and low technology is the 
intensity of the use of scientific research and development, these 
studies led to the conclusion that applied science was a powerful 
stimulus to export trade. 

Need for Attention to Low Technology 

It might be said in addition that high technology, based on extremely 
high levels of "value added by manufacture," was science-limited, 
while low technology, involving close profit margins and large 
"through-put," was resource-limited. To the extent that this dis- 
tinction is valid diplomats must needs give attention to the implica- 
tions of the low-technology sector: the increasing reliance of the United 
States on imported raw material at ever-increasing prices imposes cost, 
penalties and threat of shortages on those industries least able to 
tolerate them. Moreover, since the largest part of the Nation's indus- 
try (e.g., steel, wood, paper, glass, and the like) would be classed as 
"low technology," the need to strengthen this industrial sector is 
apparent. Among the policy alternatives presented by this trend in 
analysis would seem to be the following: 

— Intensification of research and development supportive of' 
high technology to sustain and perhaps to advance the U.S. 
lead in an industrial sector yielding a return both for exports of 
hardware and for exports of technology itself: 

— Intensification of research and development in technological 
advances for use in low technology industries to strengthen their 
competitive position vis-a-vis their overseas counterparts, such 
R. & D. to be coupled with improved arrangements for dissemi- 
nating the technology to industrial users in the United States; 
— Development of vigorous programs for the international 
commercial exchange of technology — both low and high — to 
enable all nations including the United States to benefit fiom the 
best technology on a global basis, on the theory that every nation 
will enjoy some particular form of comparative advantage; 

— Selection of a more limited number of specific industries, 
perhaps including some from both high and low categories, for 
more intensive scientific support, using the criterion of probable- 
U.S. comparative advantage in the selection of candidates. 

Bole oi the Department of State 

It would appear that a number of Government departments and 
agencies have roles to play in the formulation and execution of a 
strategy to build a strong base for U.S. export industry. Thus, the 
Energy Research and Development Administration is expected to 
generate a portfolio of valuable new technology useful at home and 
abroad to ease the energy shortage. The Department of Agriculture- 


has a similar role in the technology of food, wood, and natural fiber 
production. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
has a broad charter for health-related research. The Department of 
Commerce has a concern with ocean resources technology, while 
NASA and the Department of Defense are concerned with such high 
technology areas as aerospace, telecommunications, and computer 
hardware. Apart from mission-oriented research, the National Science 
Foundation has a general concern for the health and activity of basic 
research and a limited amount of applied research. These are illustra- 
tive of the specific areas of direct Federal intervention in the appli- 
cation of science and technology for public purposes. From the 
commercial point of view, apart from the special cases of agriculture 
and energy, the role of the Federal Government is both more modest 
and less contributory. Tax policies, environmental and other regu- 
lations, uncertainties over antitrust enforcement, and various require- 
ments for forms and documents are widely viewed by industry as 
hobbles to progress. Yet it is from the private sector that come the 
bulk of the innovations augmenting U.S. exports, as well as the 
skills that support the technological aspects of U.S. foreign policy. 


What, then, is the role of the Department of State in ensuring 
that both high and low technology are so managed as to support 
U.S. diplomatic goals, and that a proper groundwork of research and 
education is provided for their future support? High technology, 
sponsored by the Federal Government, is a major ingredient in this 
complex. The Department of State would seem a proper claimant for 
some voice in its management for diplomatic purposes, and for the 
coordination of aspects of agency missions affecting U.S. diplomacy. 
But there could also be a useful role for the Department of State in 
assessing ways in which the interests of the United States in low 
technology fields could be better served. Thus, the Department is 
already concerned (through U.S. AID) in the export to developing 
countries of low technology. There is also evidence that lagging 
technology in some U.S. industries might be benefited from the im- 
port of more advanced technology from abroad; the Department 
might conceivably find institutional or procedural arrangements to 
secure these benefits. In addition, the Department could perhaps 
add its voice to others in this country to urge a stronger national 
R. & D. effort to advance these lagging industries through domestic 

Clearly, the scope of this interest of the Department of State 
encompasses determination of the influences of high and low tech- 
nology on U.S. foreign policy 7 aims and posture, the impacts of U.S. 
technology abroad, the ways in which foreign technology affects 
or might affect U.S. industry, problems and opportunities in the uses 
of technolog3 T to support U.S. foreign policy objectives, institutions 
that service the transfer of U.S. technology abroad or that bring 
foreign technology to the United States, and ways in which action 
by the Federal Government could beneficially affect all these proc- 
esses and institutions. 

It is a reasonable hypothesis that the application of basic and applied 
science to any technological area can enhance its effectiveness. It 


would also seem to be a reasonable hypothesis that those areas of 
technology in which applied science has been least active would offer 
the largest scope for major progress, while those areas in which science 
has been most intensively applied would be benefited more marginally 
from further investment in related science. Scientists themselves make 
a distinction of this kind when they describe a held of research as 
being "ripe for exploitation." 

Enough has been said here to validate the thesis that the Depart- 
ment of State lias an interest in both low and high technology as these 
relate to foreign policy. It is also apparent that different sets of policies, 
programs, and supporting analyses are required to deal with the two 
classes of technology in question. However, it may be of interest to 
Inquire as to what obstacles tend to obstruct the entry of the Depart- 
ment into this held. 


In the Held of high technology, individual designs, pieces of hard- 
ware, and systems have particularly potent diplomatic significance. 
They include such items as desalting plants, nuclear power stations, 
large-capacity computers, air defense systems, military aircraft elec- 
tronic communication links, and so on. These tend to be costly items, 
often one-of-a-kind, and close to the state of the art. They do not 
lend themselves readily to economic analysis and are frequently the 
subject of controversy as between military and diplomatic policy- 

In the field of low technology the problems tend in general to be 
more massive, and the significance of technology more obscure. In 
terms of national economic significance, low technology is much more 
important than high technology. Moreover, it is in these areas where 
U.S. technology often appears to be lagging. It is sometimes pointed 
out that in some of these industries (steel, for example), the United 
Stales exports more technology than it imports. But it could also be 
true that this condition is less a measure of technological superiority 
than of the alertness of foreign technologists to borrow — and there- 
after to improve upon — the best U.S. technology in this field. The 
possibility exists that U.S. technologists, corporate or governmental, 
pave not been equally alert to the opportunities to learn from foreign 
technology when it outpaces its U.S. counterpart. 

There are historical reasons why U.S. industries tend to invent and 
innovate rather than import technology. The early abundance of 
industrial materials conferred a comparative advantage on this country 
so that the pressure for technologies of materials conservation could 
be neglected. The great influx of European migration to the United 
States during the 19th century brought with it a rich harvest of 
technological expertise from many countries; an important source of 
American ingenuity was the interaction among American and immi- 
grant technologists so that names like Steinmetz and Tesla rank 
along with Edison and Kettering. There was more invention in the 
United States than industry could digest, so that practical interest 
in foreign technology was minimal. 

The importance of this issue is that the United States has a problem 
of relying on imports f materials and fuels to support a large indus- 
trial system. Volume of imports and prices of the imports are both 

68-196—76 17 


rising. U.S. exports must keep pace. But if — as seems possible — U.S. 
"low technology" basic industries are beginning to lag technologically 
behind like foreign industries, the United States appears to be con- 
fronted with the need to formulate a new strategy of technology. 
The options would seem to include: 

— A greatly increased effort to identify and acquire techno- 
logical improvements in basic industries from abroad ; 

— A systematic effort to upgrade the technological level of 
U.S. basic industries by support for related scientific research, 
creation of well-funded applied research institutes in appropriate 
fields, a closer coupling of industrial and academic research in 
related sciences, and removal of barriers to innovation in the basic 
industries. 407 


One tangible advantage enjoyed by the United States in world food 
and fiber trade is that for more than a century U.S. agriculture has 
received governmental support for R. & D. and the dissemination of 
research results. Although commonly regarded as belonging in the 
"low technology" category-, U.S. agriculture has accumulated a vast 
reservoir of truly scientific information on all phases of crop produc- 
tion, harvesting, preservation, processing, and marketing. In con- 
sequence the United States is the leading exporter in the world of 
agricultural commodities and is helping to feed both highly industrialized 
and overpopulated developing nations abroad. But the allocation of 
U.S. foods to those importing nations who need them raises its own 
dilemma: many such nations lack the resources to purchase U.S. 
foods, and others are seeking to improve their terms of trade by raising 
the prices of exports of raw materials. If the United States accepts 
these increases in cost without also raising prices of food and other 
exported goods, the U.S. trade balance surfers; if it raises the prices, 
the U.S. consumer suffers and countries lacking the leverage of material 
exports (e.g., petroleum) will go short. 


In general, then, it can* be suggested that different skills and 
different analytical approaches are needed to deal with the diplomatic 
policy aspects of high and low technolog}". The former relates more to 
strategic weaponry, spectacular achievements and related national 
prestige, and such global concerns as space telecommunications, 
information storage and retrieval systems, Landsat, and weather 
satellites. The latter relates more to the bread-and-butter concerns of 
national economies, industrial employment, costs of living, and 
international movement of materials and mass-produced products. 
Government policy is influential in the development of high technology 
and in the international movement of the inputs and outputs of low 

« 07 These barriers are widely regarded in private industry as perhaps the most serious factor retarding U.S. 
technological progress. A significant example of lagging U.S. low technology is the belated entry of this 
country's auto industry into the small car market, thereby giving small imports a foothold quite unneces- 
sarily. However, it is not evident that the principal barriers to this innovative direction were imposed on the 
U.S. auto industry from outside its own domain. Undoubtedly, such external barriers to innovation do 
exist, but whether they are more potent than self-imposed corporate obstacles to innovation is unlikely. 
Probably the main barrier to innovation— as distinguished from invention— is shortage of investment capital . 


For example, the commercial aircraft industry in the United State-, 
|ong dominant in world transportation lines, owes its preeminence to 
the very large U.S. Government investment in the development pf 
military aircraft. On the low-technology side, the steel industry is 
affected more by Government policy with respect to source- of 
materials in developing countries and tariff policy on imported steels 
than by support for research in steelmaking. 

The next question to be considered in this essay is the extent to 
which the high technology — low technology — diplomacy relationship 
surfaced in the six cases and the six issues dealt with in the present 

Appearance in the Study of the Question oi High-Low Technology and 
Some attention was addressed to the question of technological 
impacts in The Evolution oi International Technology (Issue One). 
The question of organizing to analyze and deal with future impacts 
■fas considered at length in Science and Technology in the Department 
of State (Issue Six). In general, the studies tended to emphasize high 
technology over low, partly because the most salient ca<es involved 
novel, government- sponsored developments that were readily identi- 
fiable. The low-technology area tends to escape notice because its 
practice is traditional, unspectacular, and diffused. Moreover, for 
different reasons, both kinds of technology, as such, tend to resist the 
economic analysis on which policy analysis is usually based. Ac- 
cordingly, the main contribution of a number of the studies to the 
question at hand lies in the inferences and interpretation- derived from 
technology analysis rather than from detailed evidence in the form of 
economic data. 

case one: the baruch plan 

The U.S. proposal for international control of atomic energy, the 
earliest instance in the series of the impact of high technology on 
diplomacy, is a foremost example of an unsuccessful effort to reach 
international agreement on a technological issue of transcendent 
importance. Atomic weaponry and atomic energy are incontrovertibly 
'"high technology." It illustrates the principle with which the study 
concludes ". . . the creation and application of new technologies 
arising from scientific discoveries may so change relations among 
nations that a system of international control of that technology 
becomes desirable. . . ." 

. . . Nuclear energy is neither the first nor the last example of a technological 
innovation suggesting the desirability of international machinery and procedures 
for controlling it. But it is probably the most dramatic example to date. 408 

The lesson of this case is that an innovation in the form of a "high 
technology" of tremendous diplomatic significance came into being 
without first receiving deep analysis by diplomatists and scientists — 
working together — to devise a strategy of control that was both 
technically sound and diplomatically acceptable to all parties con- 
cerned. In the long run it is possible that the United States, and the 
world at large, might find that to have withheld the use of the weapon 
in World War II until plans and arrangements for achieving control 

«« Wu, The Baruch Plan, p. 63. 

were well advanced would have been less injurious than its use to ter- 
minate a war already drawing to a close. Certainly the achievement 
of effective and acceptable control of this weapon, now in the hands 
of six or more countries and threatening to diffuse still further, has 
become a foremost task of 20th century diplomacy. The basic point 
is that high technology has the potential for vastly disruptive conse- 
quences in the relations among nations. If these are not assessed at the 
outset, they become progressively more intractable. 

case two: commekcial NUCLEAR POWER IN EUROPE 

How intractable the diplomatic complications of atomic applications 
have become — even in the peaceful u?cs of the technology — is demon- 
strated by this second case. It records the complex history of a series 
of "deliberate policy decisions" by the United States to foster com- 
mercial nuclear power in Europe. One reason for this decision was to 
divert fissionable material away from weaponry. Another was to lessen 
Europe's dependence on imported fossil fuels. A third was to find 
markets for U.S. high technology products and services in the field 
of atomic power. However, in pursuing this policy, the United States 
has magnified the danger of nuclear proliferation, encouraged external 
competition with its own exports, accepted a commitment to comply 
with multilateral control by the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Agency of the domestic U.S. industry, and set in train a series of 
actions pointing toward extensive further international controls with- 
out assurance that all nations possessing nuclear technology will 
equally accept these obligations. 


The most spectacular event of the IGY, and in terms of long-range 
implications one of its most significant achievements, was a high- 
technology development : the initiation of the space age through the 
launching of artificial earth satellites. 

This event, which occurred as an incident in the pursuit of pure 
science, illustrates how science and technology (especialh r high 
technology) may sometimes reinforce each other in a sjmibiotic 
relationship. The earth satellite technology was not a result of IGY- 
connected scientific activities but of earlier scientific discoveries and 
applications; it was brought into play to assist in meeting new scientific 
objectives which could not have been realized without it; resulting 
scientific discoveries and the promise of still further discoveries lent 
force to the further development of space technology. (It was diplo- 
matic requirements, however, which provided the principal impetus 
to this further development.) 

Thus, the technological significance of the International Geophysical 
Year was mainly its spur to high technology in such fields as space 
exploration rocketry, telemetry, weather observation, and communi- 
cations satellites. The diplomatic significance of the IGY was mainly 
in the new prestige of the Soviet Union, and the spur to U.S. scientific 
and technological efforts, in response to the successful orbital flights 
of Sputnik satellites. However, Mr. Bullis suggests that additionally 
the program ''engendered unprecedented international cooperation? 


and good will, at least on the part of scientists," and he quotes Dr. 
Wallace Atwood as asserting that it "further demonstrated the signif- 
icance of scientific factor- in formulating and executing foreign policy." 
Furthermore, Bullis provides suggestive ev deuce that there was some 
causal relationship between the 1GY and several subsequent treaties 
dealing with the control or international use of such high technology 
artifacts as space vehicles and atomic weaponry. 


This study is described in a foreword by Chairman Zablocki of the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- 
ments as a "case study of how science and technology can be utilized 
an alternative to the tragic and bitter conflict winch has engulfed 
Southeast Asia for so many years." It discusses a "technique for 
applying- science and technology systematically to a multinational 
region." The scope of the technique is uncommonly broad, but as the 
following introductory statement of the study clearly shows, the 
backbone of systematic development in a lagging (or "developing") 
region is mainly but not exclusively basic or "low" technology: 

Development of a country is inherently a process of technological application 
toward an economic result. Regionalism — or more precisely, regional develop- 
ment — introduces the idea of a system within which technology is applied more 
coherentlj' to a geographic unit than to a political unit. The technological system 
requires, first of all, an intensive application of science. The scientific base of a 
regional development scheme, of which the Mekong Lower Basin Project is here- 
the prototype, involves an enormous range of research disciplines: meteorology,, 
soil chemistry, biomedicine, forestry, plant genetics, sociology, anthropology,, 
marine biology, entomology, and geology, to mention only a few\ The technology 
and engineering base of such a regional development scheme is similarly broad. It 
encompasses hydraulics, electric power, flood control, electronic communications, 
computer modeling, electrical industries, large demonstration farms, highway and 
bridge construction, fish and agricultural food processing, and many more fields of 
technological applications. 409 

Both high and low technology play a role in the planning for regional 

i management of a great river watershed. Use of satellite surveys of 
land, water, mineral, forest, and crops is one possibility. Computer 
and microwave management of flood control and river flow is another. 

I But the predominant form of technological activity would be areas 

, classed as "low." 

One factor in the preference for low technology in regional develop- 

1 ment is the general desirability of enlisting the active participation of 
the inhabitants of the region in both planning and execution of the 
project. The rewards to the region from training its people in the use of 
nuclear power, aerospace, and otherhightechnologieswouldbenegligible 
and would tend to create a technological elite out of touch with the 
ftst of the population. The cost-effectiveness of many expensive items 

; of high technology would be suspect, and the infrastructure necessary 
for its successful employment would require further intervention of 
outside specialists. 

Indeed, one of the great achievements of the United States in 
agricultural technology was the county' agent and agricultural experi- 
ment station system for transferring technology to using farmers. In 
a developing region it is necessary that the technology to be invoked 

Huddle, Mekong Project, p. 1. 


be compatible with the local culture and that it be effectively trans- 
mitted to those who are motivated to make best use of it. Ideally, the 
leadership in extending the technology to these users should also be 
supplied locally rather than from outside. 

In short, for the large part of the world where development is more 
an aspiration than an accomplished fact, high technology would not 
appear to be of major value. On the other hand, there would appear 
to be great scope for the adaptation of low technology to the special 
needs, circumstances, and cultures of such regions. Even in the more 
highly developed regions of the world, there is likely to be more scope 
for the introduction of basic technology of agriculture, forestry, mining, 
materials processing, manufacturing, and waste recycling, than for 
the application of specialized and costly items of high technology. 
The principle of multinational regionalism in the diplomatic context of 
1976 offers no more attractive target than the energy-rich but water- 
deprived region of the Middle East. The potential economic and diplo- 
matic gains that might accrue from a shared enterprise involving Israel 
with Arab neighbors make this a tempting if immediately unlikely 

case five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 

It is rather difficult to characterize the evolving technology of 
mineral extraction from the surface or subsurface of the deep ocean 
floor as either "high" or "low" technology. That it is a demanding 
enterprise is beyond question. But the problems involve engineering 
more than science, and the products must be quantitative to be 

The Mohole Project 410 was a major scientific undertaking. But the 
science lay in what was to be discovered by drilling deeply in the ocean 
bottom, rather than in the mechanics of the operation. When even- 
tually that project was laid aside, it was because less ambitious and 
vastly less costly projects were accounted more likely to yield valuable 
scientific information than would have been secured by a single drilling 
to the Earth's mantle. 

In essence, the exploitation of the resources of the seabed calls for 
elaboration of present engineering practice to a different and more 
exacting environment. It will be difficult, and the first rewards are 
likely to be marginal, but the technology involved is that of the pe- 
troleum and mineral extraction industries, rather than some new tech- 
nology evolved out of the scientific laboratory. 

If the recovery of resources from the seabed is judged a problem of 
low technology, the same is not necessarily true of the problem of 
protecting the ocean environment from the consequences. Both high 
technology for surveillance and political innovations for control are 
a likely further requirement. Satellite monitoring of oceanic pollution 
is one obvious implication of seabed mining. 

However, the intractable nature of seabed ownership or sovereignty 
owes more to the traditional dilemma of an international commons. 

«° U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Technical Information for Congress, a re- 
port to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and Astro- 
nautics, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960, pp. 161-192. 


Seabed mining technology has merely raised anew this ancient problem 
of international law and diplomacy. The monitoring of the oceans may 
require high technology, but the stimulus is provided by variants of 
technolog}^ practised by the Romans. 

case six: u.s. -soviet commercial relations 

The dilemma for U.S. policy explored in this study is that "ex- 
panded economic relations which facilitate massive technology trans- 
fer from the United States to the U.S.S.R. may create new, potentially 
dangerous dimensions in U.S. diplomacy." Yet — 

On the other hand [the study goes on to explain] there is at least a possibility 
that the process of integrating the centrally planned Soviet economy into the 
market economy of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world 
might unleash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in turn, 
contribute to international interdependence and stability. 411 

In the area of food grains and low-technology products the Soviet 
Union has been a massive but erratic customer. The questions raised 
by the study address this feature of Soviet imports. For example: 

(1) Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods of com- 
mitment than was the case in the past? (2) Does the trade agreement represent a 
part of a new pattern of relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States? and (3) Does the agreement presage a new relationship between the Soviet 
economy and the non-Communist world economic system? If these questions 
can be answered affirmatively, the outlook for political and economic net benefits 
to the United States will be favorable. 412 

In discussing the policy questions of high- technology exports to the 
Soviet Union, the study employs a fairly comprehensive definition of 
"high" technology that encompasses such industries as "electronics, 
agribusiness, petroleum refining, and automotive tooling and forging 
equipment." It also cites "Advanced Industrial Systems" and "Man- 
agement-Control-Communications Systems." While the particularities 
of these are analyzed separately, the general conclusion is offered 
that "Current Soviet requirements for high-technology assistance 
from the United States appear to represent a pattern of technical 
and managerial interrelatedness that would limit the ability of Soviet 
leaders to take short-term advantages, borrow technology, and then 
withdraw from continued United States-Soviet economic relations in 
particular lines." 413 

Stability of trade relations appears to be a major key to a favorable 
and enduring trade partnership of the two countries, and both high 
and low technology exports from the United States could be important 
elements in this relationship. Soviet exports, on the other hand, appear 
likely to be limited for some time to raw materials, petroleum and 
liquefied natural gas, and low-technology manufactures, although the 
Soviets claim that tariff concessions (MFX) would permit large-scale 
sales of their industrial products. Another important factor is the 
extent to which the Soviet leadership is prepared to relax its emphasis 
on military high-technology development, and how the United States 
would be prepared to respond to such a relaxation if it occurred. High 
technology in weaponry, like other forms of high technology, takes a 
long time to mature and cannot easily be turned off for diplomatic 

«•» Hardt and Holliday, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations, p. 73. 

<«» Ibid., p. 45. 

«' Ibid., pp. 44-56, especially p. 45. 


issue one: the evolution of international technology 

The issue that emerged from this study was whether the United 
States should adopt a policy that capitalized on its admitted lead in 
high technology, or whether policy should be addressed instead to 
strengthening the science and technology base of older and long- 
established industries. One advocate of the second policy pointed 
out that the share of the U.S. auto industry of the world market had 
declined from more than 75 percent in 1950 to 34 percent in 1970. 

If it is true that U.S. leadership in high technology exports is eroding, 
despite very large investments in this category, then the implication 
appears to be that only progressively larger investments are required to 
restore this leadership. In view of the rapid international movement of 
high technology, it is easier and much less costly to add minor im- 
provements for commercial purposes after the initial high technology 
breakthrough has been achieved, than to carry a program all the way 
from laboratory to commercial sales. For example, the great scientific 
advances in solid state devices by the United States were quickly 
followed by the marketing in the United States of efficient and well- 
built Japanese pocket radios at low cost. 

Here the distinction between low and high technology is drawn as 
follows : 

The commercially oriented [i.e. "low technology"] part of [the U.S.] technologi- 
cal structure achieves high levels of mass production at low cost, based on high 
levels of productivity of its labor. There is also a "high technology" part of this 
structure (specifically, the aerospace and military systems industry) which 
is characterized by low production of items of high quality and performance; 
workers in this industry include a high proportion of scientific and technological 
professionals, skilled in solving complex and difficult problems. 414 

To illustrate the range of diplomatic-technological issues in the con- 
temporary world the study selected for brief analysis four technological 
areas: atomic weapons and delivery systems, space developments, 
agriculture, and technological infrastructure. From these it generalized 
four trends : 

... (1) the important ways in which evolving technologies add to the prob- 
lems and issues confronting the diplomat, (2) the wa3*s in which technology tends 
to draw nations together in international enterprises, (3) the emergence of many 
positive values and serious dangers of technology that are of concern to many 
nations, and (4) the need generated by technology for explicit governmental 
plans and programs to ensure that its consequences over the globe are compatible 
with U.S. foreign policy. 415 

Six diplomatic effects of that part of high technology devoted to 
nuclear arms were suggested : 

... (1) Unlimited general war is an impractical and irrational enterprise and 
is not regarded as a realistic alternative to diplomatic agreement as was pre- 
atomic warfare; (2) possession of nuclear arms and delivery systems is essential 
to preservation of the mutual deterrent posture of the two superpowers and 
pursuit of nuclear technology is essential in maintaining the balance of terror, a 
form of stability; (3) deployment of new weapons is a competitive activity in 
which both sides lose, which inhibits beneficial diplomatic processes, and which 
obstructs efforts toward agreement in the control of arms; (4) technological 
developments by either party are of intense interest to the other ; (5) the dangers 
in this relationship are so evident that formal means of direct communication 
have been judged necessary to reduce the possibility of a triggering misunder- 
standing of intentions; and (6) the condition of world peace, once only a preferable 
alternative, has become a paramount and imperative goal of diplomacy. 416 

414 Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, pp. 13-14. 
*« Ibid., p. 17. 
«« Ibid., p. 23. 


"Space" diplomacy was very extensive, in both geographic and 
technological scope. It involved, by 1970, 250 project agreements with 
some 74 nations. In addition to the exploration of the solar system, 
the applications of space technology had been extended to global 
telecommunications and television, weather observation, navigation 
aids, and earth resources surveys. 417 The diplomatic impact of the 
high technology of space is summed up as follows: 

... It afforded a new and relatively non-controversial area of opportunity for 
joint US-USSR action. It was inherently global. It offered economic advantages 
and opportunities to all countries. It demonstrated U.S. leadership in practical 
application of a dramatic new technology. As a communications link it brought 
the entire world closer together. It offered promise of solving such grave global 
problems as arms inspections, pollution detection, and resource inventory. At the 
same time, it raised a host of legal and diplomatic questions as to sovereignty of 
near space, content of global television programs, the equities of developing 
countries in an activity beyond their limited means, and the rights of nations and 
individuals to use information secured by satellite. 41 s 

In the discussion of agriculture, essentially a "low technology" 
field, the study identified four aspects as important for diplomacy: 
(1) the problem of feeding a growing world population, and the ques- 
tion of agricultural technology transfer for this purpose; (2) the 
policy of overseas disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses; (3) achieve- 
ment of balanced economic growth in developing countries; and (4) 
the potentially adverse effects on the global environment of tech- 
nologies to increase agricultural production. 

In the broad area subsumed under the term "technological infra- 
structure" the study briefly touched on education and training, health, 
power, transportation, and communications. All of these have some 
high-technology elements but in the main they are based on well- 
established or low technology. Diplomacy becomes involved with the 
low technology of infrastructure through such concerns as aid to 
developing countries, the international transfer of technology, inter- 
national aspects of education and health, and the inherently interna- 
tional character of air and sea transportation and many media of 

Much of the technology cited in support of the 1970 issue of the 
"technology gap" between Europe and the United States was of the 
high technology category. For example, one student cited, among 12 
special advantages po-sessed by the United States (vis-a-vis Europe), 
the following — 

U.S. lead in computer technology 
U.S. lead in atomic energy, aircraft, and space 
U.S. lead in comprehensive communications systems 
while most of the other nine items bore a particular relationship to 
high technology. 419 

The United" States also had its "defenders" during that period of 
alleged technological gap. These called attention to the ability of 
industry in Western Europe and Japan to sell goods, including mass- 
produced items, competitively in the United States. Moreover, said 

*" A more complete listing of possible functions of surveillance satellites appears in ibid., p. 28. 

»« Ihirt., p. 30. 

419 Ibid., p. 52. The other nine items were: Greater I".' 3 , effort in research and development; greater size 
of American firms, with superior profit picture: superior U.S. managerial skills: the flow of European scien- 
tists to the United States; higher U.S. expenditures on education (especially technical 1 ); mobility of move- 
ment geographically and institutionally; superior communications anione and within institutions; absence 
of trade barriers within a large market area; and flexibility and adaptability of social and economic insti- 


one analyst, "In fields such as power generation, primary metals, 
road and rail transportation, consumer durables, and communications, 
European companies are among the world leaders." 420 The same 
could also have been said of Japan. 

Another author pointed out that American preoccupation with 
such science-based high technologies as "strategic" hardware had 
actually worked to the broader economic disadvantage of this country 
by diverting attention of U.S. scientists and technologists" . . . from 
prosaic problems such as those of improving old processes or dealing 
with air pollution and waste disposal." He explained that European 
interest concentrated on increasing the efficiency and productivity of 
commonplace processes, rather than risking development of "frontier" 
technology. 421 The study offered at this point a table of 18 classes of 
items in international trade, showing a considerable correlation 
between the ability of U.S. exports to compete in world markets 
and "scientists and engineers in R. & D. as percent of empWment" in 
these 18 classes. 

U.S. low-technology industries appear to have a number of dis- 
advantages in world trade. Frequently, companies in this category 
got an earlier start in technological development, but then tended to 
rest on their laurels. In some cases foreign companies invested in 
U.S. patents and other "intellectual property," and then improved 
upon them to outdo the older U.S. competition. Destruction of 
industry in Europe and Japan meant that rebuilding was necessary, 
so that more modern production facilities were available. Another 
advantage enjoyed by industries outside the United States is that 
they all adhere to agreed voluntary standards and to the metric 
system, with which U.S. products are often incompatible. 422 Other 
disadvantages frequently cited are U.S. antitrust policies, patent 
policies, onerous administration of pollution controls, and industrial 
and mining health and safety legislation. One comparative advantage 
of foreign competition is asserted to be the close and cordial working 
relationship between industry and government, whereas this relation- 
ship in the United States tends to have an adversarial character. 
Clearly, these alleged disadvantages would be generally more charac- 
teristic of low-technology industries than those in — for example — 
aerospace, military, and nuclear fields associated with high technology 
and large Government investment. A useful comparison might be 
drawn, in fact, between the policies of foreign governments toward 
low technology and the policies of the U.S. Government since 1962 
with respect to agricultural technology development and dissemina- 
tion. To some degree, perhaps, foreign governments have observed 
the extraordinary success of U.S. agricultural development, coupling 
the farm to the county agent and experiment stations, and have 
applied these lessons to manufacturing industry of their own. As 
U.S. workers in the foreign assistance program endeavor to transplant 
this uniquely American system to agriculture of developing countries, 
it is possible that it might also be transplanted to lagging industries 
in the United States. 

« M Ibid., p. 53. 

«• Ibid. 

«2 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 


The study then raises the question as to whether technology, 
recognized as a potent factor of change and national power, 

... is to operate in a random way, or whether it is possible, and desirable, 
to devise a national strategj' to guide and direct it, to stimulate innovation in some 
directions, and possible to slow and inhibit innovation in others. 423 

The study next takes up the question of whether the United States 
should opt for a strategy of high or low technology: "It has supported 
the laser but not the science of processing garbage." Asserted U.S. 
lags in the technology of the commonplace could "impair the credi- 
bility of the U.S. posture of world technological leadership": 

... On this point, one issue of U.S. technological strategy would seem to be 
a conscious set of decisions as to the domestic technological gaps to be closed or 
ignored. What older technologies might be revitalized by an infusion of fresh 
technological effort, such as the railroads, glass and ceramics, coal, lumber, and 
textiles? What would be the diplomatic consequences of a vigorous technological 
effort in one, several, or all of these fields? m 

Even in a country as rich in technological resources as the United 
States still continues to be, there are evident limits. How best can these 
resources be employed, not only for domestic economic health but 
also for worldwide economic stability and growth? What are the policy 
resources the United States can bring to bear on these issues of national 
strategy in materials? Said the study: "U.S. efforts have been con- 
centrated in fields of high technology in a reaction against external 
threats; the result has been to assemble large organizations in the 
fields of military, space, and atomic technologies. That these fields 
continue to be important is not questioned. But in the design of a 
total national strategy of technolog) T , the effect of their being already 
on the scene in great numbers is to provide pressures for the United 
States to keep on doing what it has been doing. Where can objective 
analysis and innovative policy be found that can examine alternatives 
or additions to the national program?" 425 

issue two: the politics of global health 

It is hard to apply the high-low technology dichotomy to the field 
of global health. One area of high technology in medicine is the use 
of the computer for rapid diagnosis and the handling of massive 
quantities of pathology laboratory data. Another is the development 
of "bio-materials." 

However, another kind of analog might be drawn between the 
philosophy of curative medicine in the United States and the em- 
phasis of the World Health Organization on preventive medicine 
(and public health in particular). While both concepts are science- 
based, the expensive equipment, treatment, and operating procedures 
of curative medicine preclude its general availability. Medical care 
in the United States is expensive and growing more so with each 
further innovation of high technology in curative medical practice. 
It is inconceivable that this philosophy of medical care could be made 
available worldwide; even in the United States itself, the trend and 
its implications raise many questions. On the other hand, the sys- 
tematic application of the science, skills, and practical knowledge 
of public health yields massive reductions in the incidence of diseases 

<» Ibid., p. 65. 
«* Ibid., p. 67. 
«s Ibid., p. 68. 


that strike down whole populations. Eradication of communicable 
diseases, correction of dietary deficiencies, and control of disease 
vectors yield larger returns in global health than would an equivalent 
monetary effort applied to medical care. 

Points like these, developed in Dr. Quimby's study, suggest that a 
rough comparability may exist between curative versus preventive 
medicine and high versus low technolog}^ generally. The interest 
and intensive use of science tends to center on the high technology 
of curative medicine; the opportunity for massive improvement at 
modest cost, with moderate further application of new science, tends 
to center on the low technology of preventive medicine. 

While the analogy is inexact in that both medical philosophies 
entail heavy resort to scientific research, the science of preventive 
medicine — once its discoveries are established and accepted — becomes 
widely applicable. It can also make effective use of a higher proportion 
of paramedical personnel. Curative medical science, on the other 
hand, is costly both because of the individual problems it addresses 
and because of the equipment, skills, and effort required in each 
individual case. 

issue three: beyond malthus 

An obviously close relationship exists between this study and the 
Global Health study (Issue Two). The food/population equation 
deals largely with low technology on both sides of the equation. 
Endless modifications of long-established technologies, and social 
institutional innovations to exploit these technologies more fully, 
are the focus of the study. 

Useful, but for the most part probably only modest, contributions 
of high technology are offered in the field of agriculture: for example, 
in weather forecasting and modification, in crop surveys and 
crop disease detection and assessment, in satellite .surveys of soils 
and hydrology, and in computerized management of marketing 

The main lines of opportunity for improvement in agricultural 
productivity in the United States have historically been in incre- 
mental advances in such low technologies as fertilizers, improvement 
of genetic strains, pest control, moisture management, product 
preservation, and the like. The really major innovation in U.S. 
agriculture, lying in the social science area, has been the purposeful 
coupling of new discovery with informed practical application by 
trained and skilled farm technicians. 

Similarly with the population side of the equation: incremental 
innovations in the biology of human reproduction management have 
occurred but the primary factors determining the rate of population 
increase are sociological. The role of high technology in this area ap- 
pears to be negligible to nonexistent, although the possibility remains 
that some innovation may emerge from the interaction of biology and 
electromagnetics. However, corporations skilled in high technology 
do not appear to have attacked this problem. 

issue four: U.S. scientists abroad 

The focus of this study is on people — and in particular on scientists 
rather than technologists. The question of high technology versus low 


technology and the implications of both for diplomacy are scarcely 
touched upon. 

Nevertheless, there ia some involvement with what might be called 
the "high technology of scientific research," viz., high-energy physics 
research with its large accelerators, storage rings, and liquid hydrogen 
bubble chambers; large radiotelescope arrays; deep -eabottom drilling 
rigs; and large-capacity digital computers. 

Much of scientific research carried on by the visiting scientists who 
are the subject of this study requires no elaborate and costly apparatus 
(one measure of "high technology")- ^ e 't some of this research might 
still be regarded as being in the "high technology" area in the sense that 
it is linked to such science-intensive applications as the laser and other 
quantum effects, advanced electronics systems, high-temperature 
alloys for high-performance gas turbine engines, and radiation-resistant 
materials for atomic energy systems. (Probably the most extensively 
tised piece of scientific equipment in the very "high-technology" Man- 
hattan Project was the blackboard.) 

Neglect of science explicitly related to low technology, on the other 
hand, appears to be a characteristic of the entire U.S. program of 
supporting U.S. scientists doing research abroad. Mam' foreign coun- 
tries carry on larger programs in such low technologies as wood, glass, 
plasties, simple composites, railroad transportation, shipbuilding, and 
the like. At a guess, there may well be more visiting U.S. scientists at 
the CERX center for research in subatomic particles than in all of these 
more mundane research facilities put together. And it should be noted 
that the primary means of international technology transfer is by the 
movement and intercourse of knowledgeable people. 

issue five: brain draix 

A distinction between this study and Issue Four (U.S. Scientists 
Abroad) is that the focus is shifted to foreign scientists and tech- 
nologists in the United States. Also, the movement described in 
Issue Four is temporary and that in Issue Five likely to be permanent. 
And finally, the gain is more one-sided: the "brains" are drained ex- 
tensively from countries that need them and yet do not neces-arily 
benefit the United States where the competition among resident 
"brains" is considerable. In short, the gain to the United State- of 
the migration to this country of scientists and technologists from 
abroad does not appear commensurate overall with the loss to the 
donor countries 

The study did not distinguish explicitly between high and low 
technology. Historically, and in the broadest sense, the international 
brain drain has involved a wide range of talent and expertise, from 
that of the semiskilled Greek or Turkish worker in an industrial 
plant in Germany to that of the physicist who has made his way from 
the underdeveloped country of his birth into the Western intellectual 
community. The emphasis in this study, however, is on the most 
talented and highly trained scientists and technologists, the innova- 
tors; hence, on high more than on low technology. The appeal of 
the United States for persons with high-technology qualifications 
is strong because, as Dr. Whelan puts it, 

The United States is a "center of excellence," a term used by students of 
brain drain to define ideal conditions for scientific development. All components 
of these conditions that are lacking in the LDCs and often wanting in many 


advanced countries of the West are amply supplied in the United States: eco- 
nomic resources and research support; universities and scientific institutions; 
laboratories and experimental centers; great teachers; a communication net- 
work connecting all professional organizations into a composite grid; a cooperative 
spirit among the scientific institutions, industry and government — in brief, the 
total infrastructure for the development of science and technology. 426 

The severest brain drain into the United States at present is that 
of the foreign medical graduates (FMGs), most of whom come from 
less developed countries. As pointed out earlier in this essay in 
connection with Issue Two, medicine in the United States tends to 
be a high-technolog}* field. The essence of the brain drain in this 
instance is that less developed countries in desperate need of the low 
technology of preventive medicine may be deprived of it by the 
transfer of talent to the high-technology practice of curative medicine 
in the United States. At the same time, while they fill an actual need 
in terms of the existing structure and philosophy of American medicine, 
these FMGs by their presence foreclose, for a substantial number of 
aspiring and qualified American youth, the possibility of entering 
the field of medicine. 

In general, if it is true that the United States leads the world in 
high technology and lags in low technology (surely a large over- 
simplification but necessary to make the point), then logic would 
have it that the United States should pursue a policy of attracting 
skilled technologists in the low technology area. This was, in fact, 
the policy advocated by Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treas- 
ury in his Report on Manufactures. The rapid evolution of the New 
England textile industry after the immigration of Samuel Slater is a 
case in point. Most studies of technology transfer include among their 
findings an appreciation of the importance of the educated, informed, 
and motivated individual as a transfer agent. How much of this kind 
of transfer actually occurs is undetermined and the extent to which 
it could be s}^stematically and selectively planned to optimize the 
consequences for the countries concerned is a subject warranting 
further investigation. 

issue six: science and technology in the department of state 

This study addressed primarily the organizational, institutional, 
policy, and management aspects of the science and technology inter- 
face with diplomacy. By this point in the overall project it had been 
abundantly documented that technology has a decisive impact on 
foreign policy. Government decisionmaking, by its influences on the 
rate and direction of technological change and innovation, also pro- 
foundly affects the situational factors, the problems, and the processes 
of diplomacy. As the principal agency in the field of diplomacy, there- 
fore, the Department of State has a broad and pervasive concern with 
government decisions affecting technology. 

The question to be dealt with at this point is whether the Depart- 
ment of State, in treating of high versus low technology, should per- 
form on different time scales, should adopt different diplomatic 
and analytical modes, or should in any other way behave differently 
toward issues of high and low technology. 

*» Whelan, Brain Drain, p. 111. 


The most important point to emerge from the study is the necessity 
of studying the long-range future diplomatic aspects of technology. It 
is not evident that the kinds of expertise required for analyzing these 
aspects as between high and low technology have been well considered. 
However, they seem to differ substantially; moreover, within both 
high and low technology there is a wide range of technical specialties. 

1 1 would appear that some effort should be made by the Department 
of State to represent its views on the diplomatic effects of government 

{)olicy toward both low and high technology, in both the short- and 
ong-range future. For low technology, the main concern would prob- 
ably be with the long-range future inasmuch as only small incremental 
changes are likely to result from short-term technological innovations 
in the massive industries characteristic of this category. 

It is important also that the Department of State continuously 
relate emerging or foreseen innovations of high technology to diplo- 
macy, and represent the interests of the Department in Government 
plans to advance or employ individual items of high technology. This 
requirement implies that the Department become aware at an early 
point in the usually protracted evolution of an item of high technology 
as to its potential diplomatic significance, that the technology be 
understood, that the possible directions of its development be fore- 
seen, and that all of these be examined as they relate to U.S. foreign 
policy objectives. 

World War II signaled the emergence of high technology as a potent 
factor of diplomacy. In point of fact, its potency may have exceeded 
the capacity of diplomacj' to cope with it. As Secretar}^ of State, 
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger may well ponder the significance of his 1957 
statement that "if recourse to force has in fact become impossible, 
diplomacy too may lose its efficacy." 427 The great variety and power 
of electronic-guided, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles and all the rest 
of the panoply of modern arms puts an intolerable cost on obduracy. 

However, there are many less threatening offshoots of the high 
technology of modern deterrent weapons: satellites have been found 
capable of performing such peaceful chores as weather studies and 
forecasting, aids to navigation, international communications, and 
many kinds of surveys of the earth's surface. Each time some new 
application becomes practicable the need arises for international 
negotiation toward agreement as to what rules shall govern it. At 
the same time, the nation achieving this first new use wins a degree 
of prestige beneficial in the international marketplace of diplomac}- 
in one sense, technological achievement may have become a surrogate 
for military strength. During World War II Stalin is reported to have 
asked concerning the Pope: "How many divisions does he have?" 
Today the question might be: "How man}' different kinds of working 
satellites has he placed in orbit?" Or, from Saudi Arabia, the question 
might be: "How many barrels of oil can he export?" 

Achievements in high technology, while spectacular, tend to prod 
other nations into feats of their own to equal or surpass the first 
achievement. If the rewards are great, so will be the effort. Hence 
leadership in high technology is a transient as well as costly achieve- 
ment. At best, the exploitation of its diplomatic rewards needs to be 
planned well in advance and exploited promptly and with vigor when 

427 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 1. 


the time is ripe. Lasting gains for diplomacy from high technology 
are few and uncertain. Developed countries see such achievements as 
a challenge to be met, and the developing nations of the Third World 
see them as arrogant demonstrations of "conspicuous consumption." 
On the other hand, the implications of low technology for diplomacy 
are likely to be in the long run of much more significance. Low tech- 
nology meets the needs of the developing countries. It pays the taxes 
that support the costly ventures into high technology. It provides 
the essential base of all industry, and earns the bulk of foreign exchange 
through its exports. In short, it determines the economic health, 
employment, and solvency of the nation. Technological strength and 
adequate scientific support in this category would seem to be of con- 
tinuing relevance for U.S. foreign policy goals and as such a matter of 
enduring concern for the Department of State. It is not evident, 
however, that the Department's organizational scheme provides the 
kind of analysis in depth needed as the basis for departmental positions 
(and governmental leadership) influencing national policy favorable 
to low technology. 

Secondary International Aspects oi U.S. High and Low Technology 
Germane to this discussion of high and low technology and their 
diplomatic significance is a series of studies, hearings, and symposia 
by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1963-72, 
addressing the subject of "Science, Technology, and the Economy." 
An interim report in February 1972 by this title summarized the 
findings at that time. 428 The principal message of the report was the 
expression of concern as to whether the concentration of U.S. research 
and development under Government sponsorship had drained talent 
away from low technolog}- (i.e., the basic staple industries) to achieve 
the prodigious accomplishments in high technology (i.e., military and 
aerospace industries). There appeared to be a substantial consensus 
that technical innovation was the ke}^ to productivity, and some 
witnesses saw a "close reliance of trade, national and international, 
upon S. & T. development." However, one witness suggested that large 
defense and aerospace R. & D. outlays had "inadvertently" diverted 
engineering education from the civilian economy. This asserted diver- 
sion of talent appeared to apply generally, with low-technology in- 
dustries less favored than high technology and its specialized, tech- 
nically skilled people. 

It was pointed out in the report that Government sponsorship of 
high technology involved, first, the outla}^ for extensive applied science 
and technological development and, second, purchase of the product. 
Low-technology industries were less favored in both respects. A British 
analyst distinguished technological progress from scientific research; 
technological advances contributed 3.2 percent of a 4.7 percent rate 
in economic growth. He questioned the evidence as to whether 
scientific research (as contrasted with technological development) 
had any direct or measurable favorable impact on industrial pro- 
ductivity. Other witnesses suggested that basic research, while still 
an important component to technological development, had been 
oversold. Nor was it the sole source of innovation. A summary of the 
conclusion, offered by the committee staff, suggested that to improve 

428 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on Sci- 
ence. Research, and Development. Science, Technology, and the Economy, interim report. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, 40 p. (92nd Cong., 2d sess.) 


the international economic position of the United States it would 
bo necessary to "rethink our policies, reorder priorities, sot specific 
goals." In amplification of this point, the report quoted Prof . Murray 
Wiedenbaum's statement that it was necessary to "emphasize key 
civilian areas to a greater extent." 

The inherent interest of the Department of State in the international 
implications of the high-versus-low-tcchnology question would appear 
to be highlighted by this interim report. But the Department seems 
to have played no role in the extended exploration of the matter. 
It is possible that the diplomatic role of domestic technology, (spe- 
cially in the low-technology industries, may have been neglected as 
attention has been concentrated on reacting after the fact to the 
emergency and spread of more dramatic items of high technology. 

Some Concluding Observations 

A major issue of national policy may be emerging: the question of 
whether Government investment in high technology should be con- 
tinued at past rates — or even expanded; or whether more public 
benefit would accrue from a shift of Government funding support 
to low technology. 

Technology influences many aspects of diplomacy. The effects of 
high technology tend to be specific and programmatic; those of low 
technology more general and economic. High technology produces 
the spectaculars, and the applications of low technology pay for 
them; they also provide mass-produced manufactures that supply 
domestic markets and earn the bulk of foreign exchange. 

While high technology demonstrates the sophisticated skill of 
American technologists and impresses the developing countries, their 
need is for the fundamental knowledge and skills of low technology. 

Government investment in applied science and technology in the 
United States has been concentrated in the high-technolog}- area. 
Except in the longstanding program of agricultural research and 
development. Government investment in low technolog\- has been 
quite minor. 

On the other hand, developed nations in international trade 
competition with the United States maintain extensive research 
programs in low technology, and — also of importance — encourage 
close cooperation within industries and between industry and gov- 
ernment on technological programs. The diplomatic consequences 
that flow from this difference between United States and foreign 
government policy toward low technology warrant examination. 
They are reflected in patterns of world trade, usage of imported 
materials, balances of payments, economic health, currency stability, 
and the prospect of progressive deterioration of the position of the 
United States in the world economy. 

In view of the important relationship of both high and low tech- 
nology for U.S. diplomacy, it seems important for the Department of 
State to participate in the formulation of U.S. policy toward both 
categories. One kind of activity singularly appropriate for the De- 
partment would be the formulation of a policy for achieving a rational 
balance between exports and imports of technological information. 
The Department is unlikely to be able to mobilize the skills necessary 
for managing the substantive aspects of such a two-way transfer of 
technology. But the design of institutional arrangements for this 

68-196—76 18 


purpose would seem to be well within the scope of its responsibility. 
For example, policy toward multinational corporations, a primary 
channel for international transfers of technology, has remained 
uncertain and inchoate. Overseas scholarships of U.S. students do 
not reflect U.S. needs for restoring the balance in low technology 
expertise. Scientific missions in U.S. Embassies abroad still appear 
to be oriented more toward "science" than technology, and toward 
low technology least of all. And the views of the Department toward 
domestic policy in high versus low technolog}^ needs to be deeply 
analyzed and strongly presented in the policy councils of the Executive 
Office of the President. 

It would be the conclusion of the author of this essay that support 
for the development of some elements of both low and high technology 
would be an appropriate strategy for the United States. While some 
industries based on low technology may be fading out, as was the 
case with the 19th century whaling industry and the carriage makers 
before 1920, other low-technology industries continue to be basic to 
the U.S. economy. Examples are the railroads, the automobile, 
housing construction, and various consumer durable goods. To the 
extent that technology lags in these "essential" industries, ways 
need to be found to encourage more intensive application cf science 
to support them. The need is to apply support selectively, rather 
than to adopt a general principle that all lagging industrial tech- 
nologies should be upgraded. Similarly with high technology: the test 
should be whether a particular item contributes more, or less, than 
others to national goals and public needs. The achievement of tech- 
nological spectaculars may have its place, but would need to be 
weighed against other high technologies with a more solid utility. It 
is not feasible for even the United States to fund every conceivable 
technological advance; so choice is necessary. And one important 
consideration is the contribution a candidate technology is likely to 
make to U.S. foreign policy goals. Determination of the criteria to 
resolve this question, and application of the criteria in the choice of 
technologies for public support to advance foreign policy goals, could 
be a major function of U.S. foreign policy institutions. 

Some Questions -for Further Consideration 

This essay raises some of the most fundamental issues in the entire 
project of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. A par- 
ticular advantage of an examination of these issues is that it can 
point the way to specific, tangible legislative actions that can influence 
both the state of the American economy and the U.S. role in the larger 
diplomatic world. Examples of some of these issues that seem to war- 
rant examination are presented in the section to follow. 


What kinds of useful relationships have been established between 
the Department of State and (a) the science community and (b) the 
technological community of the United States that could provide 
guidance in the emphasizing of research and development programs 
favoring U.S. diplomacy? What guidance does the Department re- 
ceive in return from these communities as to diplomatic efforts to 
support their programs? 


Has the Department formulated a long-range plan for diplomatic 
policy respecting selected items of high technology? Has i f identified 

low technologies of particular diplomatic significance and designed 
courses of action to exploit their significance over the long-range 

Have multinational regional patterns of technology been defined 
as a basis for constructive diplomacy by the United States? 

Has there been a determination of future U.S. needs for technology, 
available abroad, that diplomacy might help to meet? Has attention 
been given to the design of processes, procedures, and institutions that 
diplomacy can help to create to meet these needs? Or have existing 
diplomatic processes, procedures, and institutions been examined as to 
their possible usefulness for this purpose? What analytical resources 
are needed and what plans are afoot to mobilize these resources? 

What are the criteria that determine the effectiveness of techno- 
logical diplomacy? 

What academic and other outside resources has the Department of 
State tapped for analyses in these fields? 

What institutions are available to implement technological aspects 
of U.S. foreign relations and how are the}' (or how could they be) 
enlisted for this purpose? 

What are the advantages and disadvantages of international 
transfers of high and low technology, and what are the implications of 
these advantages and disadvantages for U.S. diplomatic policy? 
Might policy deal selectively with the transfers (either export or 
import) of high or low technology? Is technology transfer an ap- 
propriate subject for international treaties? 

What efforts has the Department of State made, or should it make, 
to bring to the attention of decisionmakers the diplomatic interest in 
public investment in R. & D. supportive of high or low technology? 

VIII. Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions 
in International Technology 

The power and reach of technology have altered the role of private 
industry in diplomatic relations. Historically, an important task of 
the diplomat was to facilitate private commercial intercourse across 
national boundaries. Protection of traders and their property was an 
early concern; later, investment and operation abroad of plantations, 
mineral extraction, followed by factories to employ both local materials 
and local labor, called for the diplomacy of early Capitalism — also 
termed by its critics "imperialism" or "colonialism." At best, such 
overseas development added wealth and improved living and ed- 
ucational standards, and built an infrastructure to support home- 
grown economic activity. At worst, it was indeed exploitive 
colonialism. U.S. diplomacy during this period played a relatively 
passive role, protecting U.S. investments by appeals to international 
law without reference to differences in the normative values of the 
activities in question. 

However, from about 1950 on the overseas role of U.S. business arid 
industry has shown a more varied range of characteristics. Both 
industry and diplomacy have advanced to a more sophisticated value 

Kinds of Technological Diplomacy Since 19 o0 

A major feature of U.S. diplomacy, sustained from the early 1950s 
on, has been the transfer of technology to developing countries. 
While the organization and planning of this effort was in govern- 
mental hands, private industry was called upon to provide sub- 
stantive elements in the form of knowledge and artifacts. Consultants 
loaned by private companies worked in the field. Individual companies 
worked under contract to formulate and implement development 

Another major element of diplomacy contributed by private in- 
dustry has been the supplying of sophisticated military systems ac- 
companied by training of indigenous troops in their operation and 

A third major force has been the spread of the multinational corpora- 
ation, generally regarded as the primaiy path for the transfer abroad 
of U.S. technolog}' and management skills. 

As these direct contacts of U.S. private industry penetrate further 
and deeper into economies of other nations, it becomes of progres- 
sively greater interest to U.S. firms to act according to diplomatic 
precepts. In this sense, private industry becomes not only a bene- 
ficiary of diplomacy but an interested participant in the process of 
seeking the mutual 'benefit of the home country and the overseas host. 




This emergence of private support for diplomacy suggests a possible 
model: initially, diplomacy asa means of protecting commercial inarket 
and raw materials interests abroad; then, as development gathers 
momentum, a trend toward teamwork of industry and diplomacy 
for mutual advantage; and perhaps a third stage in which mature 
industrial relations require a minimum of diplomatic intervention, and 
even a fourth stage, in which the economic network becomes world- 
wide and the relationship of industry and diplomacy reflects a com- 
prehensive and amicable interdependence among nations and their 

Whether this idealized process has validity is controversial. 
Another view is that initially the interests of the Government and 
private industry abroad were in close harmony, but that increasingly 
they have become dive: gent. According to this model, either industry 
or Government must alter its objectives in order to restore the pre- 
vious harmony or else U.S. foreign economic policy will become 
increasingly ineffectual. But in any event, a confluence of fierce 
nationalism, effective guerrilla movements, public conscience, and the 
nuclear presence has rendered imprudent if not actually perilous the 
show of force for commercial advantage, while private industry has 
become increasingly international in scope; accordingly, economic 
enterprise needs to become the partner of diplomac}- rather than its 
beneficiary. In prospect is the possibility that the diplomat will learn 
how to maximize the contribution of technology in private hands to 
support diplomatic gods, and that industrial technologists will be 
motivated to perfect their own role in this partnership. It is to be 
hoped, for example, that the multinational corporation will come to 
eterve and to be recognized as a mechanism toward mutually beneficial 
interdependence instead of being regarded as the exploitive villain of 
the piece and a hostile influence toward developing nations. The U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. bilateral agreement lias paved the way for a substantial 
increase in the role of U.S. -based multinational corporations to transfer 
technology to the Soviet Union for mutual benefit. Precisely how, and 
by what agency, the further use of these institutions for diplomatic 
benefit might be stimulated, guided, and if necessary controlled, is a 
lively issue for examination. 

Problems of Diplomacy Inviting Solution by Private Industry 

The skill of private industry in the use and transmission of tech- 
nology can help solve problems associated with lagging productivity of 
foods in developing countries. Food maldistribution, low production, 
inefficiencies in supply management, are all amenable to technological 
solution. Global food problems present some of the most intractable 
and emotion-laden of diplomatic issues. Bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements to mobilize private industrial resources have helped 
overcome some persistent deficiencies but there remains great oppor- 
tunity for further intensification of this effort. Production and dis- 
tribution of fertilizers and pesticides, export of standard or adapted 
farm machinery, design and local production of food processing and 
preservation facilities, and organization of better marketing systems 
could all benefit from U.S. expertise. 


The role of private enterprise in the extraction of petroleum and 
hard minerals from the seabed is another subject of diplomatic con- 
cern. Technologists in private companies are pursuing developments 
in deep sea drilling, the raising of manganese nodules from the ocean 
floor, prospecting for submarine deposits of minerals, extractive 
metallurgy of seabed minerals, and operation of submerged oil rigs. 
Meanwhile, the diplomatic community is wrestling with a host of 
problems like sovereign rights to the ocean floor, protection and 
regulation of seabed property rights, and equitable treatment of 
claims by landlocked nations to a share of submarine resources. In 
this broad area of activity, cooperation is essential between the diplo- 
matic community and the technological entrepreneurs. Resolution of 
the diplomatic problems must relate in its timing to the development 
of technical capabilities to recover seabed resources economically, and 
vice versa. This problem of timing, in fact, is quite characteristic of 
modern diplomatic technology generally. The contemporary problems 
tend to be long-range and to require long-range planning. Present 
decisions will determine the state of diplomatic technology two decades 

One of the most interesting contemporary problems has to do with 
constructive ways of "recycling petrodollars." The rising prices of 
oil from the Middle East result in an enormous accumulation of 
dollar exchange in the possession of the oil-producing countries. 
Characteristically, these countries are technologically "undeveloped," 
despite their great wealth. They have the choice of spending this 
wealth on consumer goods or on the capital equipment and infra- 
structure required for a soundly based, balanced, diversified industrial 
economy. The shape of the future global economy to develop out of 
this present decision has diplomatic significance for the United 
States: should the oil-producing countries be encouraged to become 
mutually advantageous trading partners with the United States or to 
develop economies in sharp competition with U.S. industry for world 
markets? In the special case of the Soviet Union, can U.S. assistance in 
the development of Siberian oil and gas reserves encourage a more 
modern, possibly consumer- oriented, production system in the 
U.S.S.R. or will it permit a continuation of Soviet emphasis on arms 
production and military support? 

Both developed and developing countries are concerned with their 
ability to exercise sovereignty over the foreign-based multinational 
corporations that have penetrated their territories and economies. 
These concerns extend to such matters as corporate control, use of 
foreign management personnel, corporate policy decisions adverse to 
national economic or social interest, excessive payments for the use of 
foreign patents and technologies, tax evasions, insufficient return on 
exported raw materials, and technological incompatibility with the 
host country's industry. As the leading nation in providing a home 
base for multinational corporations, the United States has a strong 
diplomatic interest in minimizing adverse impacts of these institutions 
on U.S. foreign relations and diplomatic goals. In the long run, the 
corporations themselves share this interest. Provisions for cooperative 
coordination of overseas activities of U.S. -based multinational 
corporations in the interests of U.S. diplomacy would seem to be 
generally advantageous to the corporations and to all the countries 


Support of Diplomatic Goals by Private Enterprise 

The questioD is raised as to the ways in which private industry can 
perform profitably in overseas transactions with concurrent benefit to 
U.S. diplomacy. Recent revelations of political interventions, "kick- 
backs" to influential leaders in foreign countries, and like actions for 
private profit are readily perceived to be diplomatically dysfunc- 
tional. A closer relationship between business executives and the U.S. 
diplomatic community might help to distinguish courses of business 
action favorable to both. In particular, objective assessment of the 
future political course of foreign countries can reduce the likelihood 
of shaky reliance on leaders or parties about to be deposed. Conversely, 
establishment of relationships that enable participation in corporate 
decisions by local community leaders abroad might contribute to 
stability even when the national leadership is shaky. 

Exercise of national sovereign t}^ by developing countries over 
mineral resources in their territories, and over corporate properties 
and management policies under their jurisdictions, can impose impos- 
sible obstacles to meeting the necessar}- constraint of private enterprise 
that it be profitable. But this is not an absolute consequence; it is 
amenable to diplomatic adjustment. Moreover, the task of diplomatic 
adjustment is made easier if the resident corporations seek conscious^ 
and overtly to meet the perceived social, technological, and economic 
needs of the host countiy. To the extent that the}- do this, they 
further their own acceptance in the country, as well as furthering the 
diplomatic goals of the United States. And finall}*, the overseas 
diplomatic representatives of the United States can reasonably be 
expected to give guidance to U.S. corporations abroad on social, 
technological, and economic policy. The Department of State can give 
this help only if it deploys abroad people knowledgeable in social, 
technological, and economic policy. 

But there is a great danger in the yielding to short-term economic 
advantage of private industry in the formulation of diplomatic policy. 
For example, a foremost national goal of the United States in diplo- 
macy is world peace. It is difficult to reconcile this goal with the 
vigorous dispensing of sophisticated weaponry to opposing nations in 
the Middle East. From the short-range diplomatic point of view, 
weapons sales or donations may facilitate negotiations and balance 
opposing forces to discourage war as well as providing markets for 
U.S.-produced armaments. But it does so at the cost of raising the 
potential level of intensity of future conflicts and broadening their 
geographic spread. When diplomacy is linked to private industry in 
the dangerous world of the 1970s, long-range diplomatic goals neces- 
sarily ought to take precedence over short-term goals, either diplomatic 
or commercial. 

Lessons for the Public/ Private Interface Found in the Study 

The 12 topics selected for analysis in the present study were chosen 
on the basis of their significance for U.S. diplomacy and their repre- 
sentativeness as parts of the universe of diplomacy, focusing always 
on science and technology in accordance with the main purpose of the 
study. Aspects of the public/private interface were touched on, 
sometimes at length and sometimes only implicitly, in all 12 subjects. 


The hypotheses derived from a review of the treatment of the 12 
topics can be expressed in the form of a chain of logic that runs as 

1. Science and technology are a large part of the substance of 

2. The cases and issues dealing with the technological part of 
the science-technology spectrum have the heaviest consequences 
for diplomacy. 

3. Technology, more than science, is strongly oiiented toward 
the private sphere, toward commercial and profit-making 

4. Therefore, the Department of State, in seeking to advance 
diplomatic goals in the modern technological world, must address 
questions of technology, and in particular must undertake to 
exert influence for diplomatic purposes on the management of 
technology at home and abroad by profit-seeking private enter- 

5. For this purpose a close functional relationship between the 
Department and private industry needs to be established. 

Evidence in support of this set of hypotheses is drawn from the 12 
individual chapters of the study. While clearly- qualitative and 
indicative rather than conclusive, the evidence suggests that further 
investigation is warranted: both as to the validity of the hypotheses 
and as to the actions required if the}* are confirmed. Selected observa- 
tions from the chapters bearing on this matter are presented in the 
following subsections. 

case cxe: the baeuch plan 

Perhaps the most salient point to be drawn from this case is one 
that received little if any attention at the time it was first made, and 
has gone virtually unremarked ever since. It concerns the matter of 
inspection of atomic plants as to compliance with nuclear treaty 
provisions. Great stress was placed on the importance of placing 
inspectors in the Soviet Union, and it was even suggested by one U.S. 
leader that such inspection might be one wa}~ "to alter Russia's closed 
society." 429 

On the other hand, the Board of Consultants who assisted in the 
preparation of the initial U.S. policy report on the international 
control of atomic energy warned that the presence of a large number 
of foreign inspectors would be "as obnoxious to Americans as to any 
others." 43 ° The truth of this cautionary observation is evident when 
one considers the probable reaction of any large American industrial 
corporation engaged in the production of nuclear hardware — pacific 
or otherwise — when confronted with an asserted right of entry of a 
foreign national to inspect the premises and examine the books. 
The unqualified insistence of some bodies of U.S. opinion on the 
necessity for inspection of Soviet territory in connection with the 
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 431 raises interesting questions as 
to the attitude of U.S. industry toward any such proposed provision. 

m Wu. The Baruch Plan, p. 31. 

«• Ibid., p. 26. 

43 > See for example. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Technical Information for 
Congress, a report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science 
and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., pp. 195, 204-20o, 
and 216. 


Would private industry in the United States indeed be willing to 
accept the principle of foreign inspectors of its plants and records as 
a quid pro quo of U.S. inspection of their foreign counterparts? "Was 
any effort ever made to obtain the views of U.S. industry on this 
matter? Had such an agreement been made, would its inspection 
provisions have been legally enforceable and acceptable (or even 
Constitutional!) in the United States? Will there be future demands 
for mutual inspections under arms treaties? 

On the other hand, the Baruch Plan study raised the opposite 
question as to whether secrecy could be relied on in any event. It 
may be too obvious a point to deserve mention that the only value 
a deterrent weapon can possibly have is obtained by its disclosure to 
the adversary whom it is intended to deter. And once the disclosure 
is made, the detailed technology can be more or less quickly duplicated 
by a competent and determined adversary despite efforts to keep it 
secret. 432 Thus, proprietary and secret information can remain so only 
if it is of less than major strategic importance. The protection of com- 
mercial technology may well be analogous: possible only inversely 
in proportion to its commercial value. 

In the absence of severe international patent restriction, the trans- 
fer of technology ma}' be reduced to a matter of convenience and 
utility. Its volume may stand as a greater barrier to its universal 
use than does the effort to withhold from disclosure individual pro- 
prietary items of value. 

Historically, it is recalled that the British Government unsuccess- 
fully sought to prevent emigration to the United States of skilled 
textile technologists. And the Brazilian Government failed to prevent 
the British from obtaining seeds of the rubber tree, native to the 
Amazon Valley. All too often a technology emerges simultaneously 
in two countries, as was the case with the calculus and the reduction 
of aluminum. 


This case raises the interesting question of the conflict between 
national security and private profit. Historically, the role of diplomacy 
is to protect the national security. But diplomacy is also expected to 
serve the overseas interests of the Nation's business. Granted that 
security is paramount, how should private interests respond to this 
priority? Are private companies content to leave questions like this 
to the bureaucracy? 

When, early in the administration of President Eisenhower, the 
U.S. Government's monopoly on nuclear materials was somewhat 
relaxed, private industry took over as commercial activities the 
functions of constructing and operating nuclear power reactors. 453 
Present U.S. policy calls for the eventual transfer to private industry 
of the remaining functions, when ways are found to do this. The 
important function of uranium enrichment has been a virtual U.S. 

« Wu, The Baruch Plan, p. 64. 

433 Donnelly, Commercial Xuclear Power in Europe, p. 116. The only two services retained as Government 
monopoly were the enrichment of uranium (which the customer supplied) and storage of radioactive wastes 
from fuel element reprocessing. 


monopoly but this monopoly may be influenced by several develop- 
ments: transfer of the function to private U.S. companies (and 
perhaps to multinational corporations), transfer of the technology 
to foreign countries, and development of new competitive tech- 
nologies abroad that replace gaseous diffusion with gas centrifuge 
separation or other methods. The public/private policy issues in 
uranium enrichment are epitomized in a series of questions presented 
in the case studj*: 

Will the United States, for reasons of economic and foreign policy, seek to pre- 
serve its position as the world's leading supplier of enriched uranium and enrich- 
ment services? 

What measures should the United States consider if other nations, singly or in 
concert, attempt to break the longstanding U.S. enrichment monopoly by building 
their own enrichment facility? 

Is the further development of gas centrifuge technology in Europe likely to 
lead to a technological surprise for the United States, should the economic and 
technological feasibility of this technology be demonstrated? 

What measures can or should the United States consider to discourage further 
development of the gas centrifuge? 

What diplomatic options are open to the United States should the Soviet Union 
seriously enter the world enriched-uranium market 

Since supplying enrichment services requires the use of large amounts of elec- 
tricity which, in the United States, comes from coal-burning powerplants, and 
considering present air pollution problems of the United States and the environ- 
mental impacts of mining coal, do the foreign policy benefits of supplying enrich- 
ment services to foreign customers balance the energy and environmental costs to 
America? 434 

Two future questions also involve the public/private interface: 
(1) As nuclear power technology moves forward to the breeder reac- 
tor — as it may well do — what role will private industry be permitted in 
this somewhat controversial technology, both in the United States and 
abroad? And, as the world's nuclear industry moves toward the es- 
tablishment of international standards for the design, construction, 
and operation of nuclear powerplants, how should the U.S. interest 
be represented, what standards should be proposed, and what should 
be the respective roles of the Government and private industry in this 

In view of the great uncertainties surrounding the formulation and 
implementation of U.S. energy policy throughout 1975, there would 
appear to be reason for concern that in the particularly complex and 
dangerous area of nuclear power policy, decisive policjmiaking will not 
come easily. Always in the background is the threat that fissionable 
plutonium, a byproduct of power reactors, might be surreptitiously 
diverted to unfriendly use by a foreign power or even by a gang of 
terrorists. The question is whether the separation of control by Gov- 
ernment and operation by industr}- would weaken security against 
such diversion. Again, a close working relationship in these matters 
would seem to be called for, between the Department of State and the 
private sector, supported by a highly competent departmental plan- 
ning staff. 

m Donnelly, op. cit., p. 135. 


case three: the political legacy of the international 
geophysical year 

This case involved worldwide cooperation of scientists, supported 
only in part by governments, with policy on the program largely in the 
hands of the scientists themselves. Certain major projects were, of 
course, managed by governments: for example, the placing of satel- 
lites in orbit, Antarctic expeditions, and the like. But the important 
consequences for private industry were largely unplanned and in- 
advertent, with little consideration given by either the scientists or the 
governments involved in the IGY as to its commercial consequences. 
The converse is also true: the industrial community appears not to 
have recognized the potential commercial significance of the tech- 
nological advances that were to be spurred by the IGY. 

An enumeration of some of these advances in technology may be 
helpful. The stimulus of the first orbiting satellite led to the creation 
of NASA with its multibillion-dollar program of space exploration and 
utilization, along with communications satellites and ground ter- 
minals, useful spin-off technology in computers and solid state devices, 
weather forecasting from space observation, military surveillance 
satellites, and a general stimulus to the ''military-industrial complex" 
in the new field of outer space. 

Another consequence of the IGY was the great impetus given to 
education in the physical sciences. A little more than a decade later, 
Servan-Schreiber 435 was to attribute in part to this U.S. educational 
emphasis a superiority of United States over European economic 
advance, the so-called "technology gap." 

These were only a few of the more outstanding consequences for 
public/private relations with diplomatic significance that grew out 
of the IGY. The question to be asked at this point is whether any of 
them were foreseeable, and whether the Department of State ought to 
have had a voice in guiding the substantive directions of the research 
program. This point leads in turn to the question as to whether the 
Department of State has resources of its own to study such proposed 
scientific initiatives in advance, and also whether communication of 
the Department with the scientific community and with technologi- 
cally oriented people in private industry is not also a required input 
to the study of future scientific initiatives. 


Few diplomatic initiatives could match in intensity or scope the 
potential impact on private industrial opportunity offered by aggres- 
sive support of a regional development program like that of the Lower 
Mekong basin. The concept involved a coupling of engineering control 
of a major river with economic development of the watershed and its 
resources, along with education and training of indigenous populations 
in the best use of these resources to advance their opportunities. 

Clearly involved are social planning and civil works planning and 
construction. But the project extends to the general betterment of the 
condition of populations in the basin: improved agriculture, mineral 

135 J. J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, translated from the French by Ronald Steel, New- 
York, Atheneum, 1968, 291 p. 


discovery and exploitation, development of forest products and af- 
forestation, public health and medical service delivery, education, 
electric power distribution and use by agriculture and industry, 
improved water and land transportation, commercial fishing, and 
development of marketing systems to accommodate a growing list of 
products. Banking and credit facilities are an early requirement. Map- 
ping, surveying, soil sampling, forest inventories, and prospecting, 
as well as demograpliic, health, and educational surveys, are needed. 
Training is required in both technical and entrepreneurial skills. 
Technology transfer, in all its ramifications, is a major feature of such 
projects and entails extensive public-private coordination. 

The regional development concept as epitomized by the Tennessee 
Valley Authority sought to encourage the balanced social, economic, 
and technological development of a geographical area. Basic to the 
plan was the construction of large civil engineering projects: dams, 
roads, port facilities, locks, and powerlines. Production and use of 
electric power was a key element. Another was flood control coupled 
with water transportation, afforestation, and soil erosion control. But 
creation of an infrastructure for development also entailed the im- 
provement of schools and health services, libraries, and technological 
training of valley people in appropriate skills. Xew farm equipment 
was designed and constructed under contract, and then manufactured 
locally for use in the valley. Rural industries were started up by local 
entrepreneurs, using technical processes developed under TVA 
sponsorship, with technical consultative assistance supplied by the 

As the productivity of the inhabitants and local industry rose, the 
Tennessee Valley became a better market for the products from out- 
side the region, while also contributing its own share to national 

This admittedly rosy picture of an American social invention of the 
1930s indeed neglects mention of defects, waning enthusiasm and 
motivation, and evidences of unbalanced growth. No technological or 
social concept can remain long unchanged and still retain its initial 
validity. Adaptation to change is an imperative. 

Nevertheless, the regional development concept offers commanding 
logical validity. Whether applied to a subnational or a multinational 
river basin or other coherent geographical feature, it can be the basis 
for wide-ranging cooperation of industry and the institution that 
undertakes the regional development plan. In this sense, the Lower 
Mekong Basin appears — still — to be a region in which diplomacy can 
lead the way to the participation by the private sector in a construc- 
tive interdependence, with a minimum of nationalistic dissonance. 


The ocean floor is a special region in which diplomacy and national 
interest, technology, and private enterprise are all closely involved, 
both now and prospectively. 

For the most part, the role of diplomacy in this field has been more 
of the traditional character: an effort to assert and protect the interests 
of the private business community under the general rules of equity 
based on international law. Similarly, the industrial interest in the 
seabed remains narrowly addressed to the possibility of profit able new 


ventures. Little attenti >n appears bo hive been given by the diplo- 
matic community as to ways in which new technology for the seabed, 
in the hands of the private entrepreneur, could advance the goals of 
diplomacy. Nor does the private business community appear to have 
given much thought to ways in which it could act profitably in 
developing seabed resources so as to further U.S. diplomatic goals. 

Clearly, the minerals on the floor of the ocean are an immense 
resource for the future. Even so, the unplanned exploitation of this 
resource could disrupt industrial patterns, impair the ocean ecology, 
provoke international confrontations, and obstruct progress toward 
rational resolution of the question of seabed sovereignty. Once private 
industry established the technology, the systems, and the commercial 
structures for seabed exploitation, there would be resistance to any 
change in the rules of ownership, however unsatisfactory these rules 
might be. 


The origin of this case lay in the May 1972 summit meeting between 
President Nixon and Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet 
Union. From this summit meeting there developed a Joint U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, various trade agreements, bilateral 
science pacts, and other agreements. 

The theme of the study was that detente, cautiously approached, 
might help motivate the Soviet leadership away from the arms race 
and toward joining the world economic system, modernization of their 
civilian economy, and expanded production of consumer goods. 

The role envisioned for U.S. industry in this evolving relationship 
would be to provide the Soviet Union with a highly selective set of 
technologies, coupled with technically oriented management. In re- 
turn, the Soviets would provide the United States, initially at least, 
with materials deficient in this country and products in which the 
Soviet Union enjoyed a comparative economic advantage. The case 
study enumerated as potential U.S. exports electronics, agribusiness, 
petroleum refining, and automotive tooling and forging equipment. 436 
Also mentioned were advanced industrial systems for oil and gas 
production, improvements in communications systems, and facilities 
to encourage tourism. However, these exports were greatly overshad- 
owed by the huge grain deliveries to the U.S.S.R. in 1972 and 1973. 

Soviet short-term prospects for export to the United States were 
also assessed in the study, and included furskins, petroleum and 
natural gas, nonferrous metals (nickel, platinum, palladium, and 
chrome ore in particular), and possibly wood and wood products, coal 
and coke, and other raw materials. If the United States elects to ex- 
tend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, as the adminis- 
tration has proposed, and ease tariffs on Soviet manufactured goods, 
Soviet exports of some manufactures might find U.S. markets. 

One problem facing U.S. industry in undertaking projects in the 
Soviet "Union, as well as U.S. exporters to the U.S.S.R., is the control 
structure of the Soviet ccononry. As a state-trading monopoly, the 
Soviet Union confronts the U.S. negotiator with a formidable array of 
officialdom. U.S. industry Mill need to feel its way into this rclation- 

«• Hardt and Hollidiy, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations, pp. 44-47 


ship, learning by experience, with the U.S. Departments of State, 
Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce standing by as anxious 

In the background will remain the question of the effect of this 
interaction on Soviet military potency and Soviet military intentions. 
While the main actors in this drama, insofar as the United States is 
concerned, are the American industrialists and businessmen, "polit- 
ical benefits are the main measure of net gain to the United States 
from any pattern of increased United States-Soviet trade. . . , 437 

Thus, the study documents a clear-cut need for U.S. private enter- 
prise to act in U.S. diplomatic and national security interests, in 
particular the facilitating of a reorientation of Soviet production away 
from armaments to consumption goods with a consequent slowing of 
the arms race. It would seem to be a further responsibility of the U.S. 
participants in dealings with the Soviets to keep U.S. officialdom 
fully informed of all transactions. The Soviet counterparts, them- 
selves a part of the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union, presumably 
coordinate better. Accordingly, U.S. diplomats may be placed at a 
serious disadvantage if they are less well informed than Soviet diplo- 
mats. But it is also a responsibility of the Department of State to 
provide a central institutional arrangement for the receipt, aggrega- 
tion, synthesis, and analysis of this information. 

issue one: the evolution of international technology 

The theme of this study is that technology has grown from a national 
concern to a global force, even as it continues to be the principal source 
and measure of national power. On both counts it is of foremost 
concern to the field of diplomacy. But the development, use, manage- 
ment, and transfer of technology are largely left in private hands. 
So the question is posed squarely: what useful functional relation- 
ships need to be developed between the U.S. diplomatic community 
and the private sector for the purpose of developing, using, managing, 
and transfering technology for diplomatic purposes? If the diplomatic 
impact of technology depends on private decisions, to what extent and 
in what ways can and should these decisions be influenced by diplo- 
matic considerations? 

Kinds of impacts cited in the study include : 

— Whether to support the transfer of simple industrial tech- 
nology to developing countries that put U.S. industry using the 
same technology at a comparative disadvantage; 

— Whether to export production equipment used by U.S. 
industries ; 

— Whether to encourage in the United States a high-con- 
sumption domestic economy (with a high throughput of materials) 
that increases U.S. dependence on overseas sources of materials; 

— Whether the export of U.S. technology unsuited to the re- 
cipient, or otherwise flawed, works to the disadvantage of the 
U.S. image abroad; 

— Whether the trend toward economies of scale invites serious 
consequences for the global environment; 

<" Ibid., p. 78; 


— Whether exchange of technology would serve diplomatic 
goals better than do one-way transfers of technology ; 

— Whether adoption of voluntary standards (and the metric 
system) by the rest of the world works to the disadvantage of 
both U.S. industry and U.S. diplomacy; and 

— Whether multilateral rather than bilateral diplomacy affords 
a more constructive forum for the effective management of tech- 
nology to serve U.S. diplomatic interests. 

IS soe two: THE POUXIC8 o, global health 

This study, with its emphasis on preventive global medicine ad- 
ministered by multilateral institutions, conveys only by inference 
the possibility of a role for the technologist in the private sector, or 
the need for public-private interaction with respect to health 

It is quickly evident that the philosophy of medical care in the 
United States with its stress on personal curative service is economi- 
cally out of the reach of most of the world, and indeed is raising 
questions in the United States as to the feasibility of its indefinite 
further extension. The cost-effectiveness of preventive medicine, by 
comparison, offers attractions for global application and extension. 
The role of the private sector in this field may have lagged quite as 
seriously as has U.S. exploitation of the diplomatic opportunities for 
enlargement of its role in furthering global preventive medicine 
through association with the World Health Organization, the Pan 
American Health Organization, and other multinational health bodies. 

One question, not touched on in the study, is whether the multi- 
national corporation might serve as a useful instrument for the inter- 
national transfer and development of systems of preventive medicine. 
Certainly it is of interest to such corporations that health standards 
be adequately maintained in all countries in which they operate or 
might desire to enter. There are also market opportunities in such 
fields as electronic medical diagnostic equipment, for which the study 
proposes the establishment of global (WHO) standards. And speaking 
more broadly, it is difficult to conceive of a field in which the com- 
petence of management and skill in technological development of the 
multinational corporation could be employed with greater social and 
diplomatic advantage and with less dissonance than in the global ap- 
plication of the principles and practice of preventive medicine. 

issue three: beyond malthus 

An extraordinary array of opportunities for the private sector to 
participate in programs beneficial to U.S. diplomatic goals is offered 
in this study. The technological and managerial resources appropriate 
to the tasks delineated in the study could be available, given the 
motivation, the funding support, and the policy guidance. 

For example, in the field of food production and distribution, a 
serious lack is crop information. Satellite surveys of crops, supple- 
mented by local information of a less aggregated character, is well 
within the present state of the art. Another lack is in food nutrients 
and fertilizers and other agricultural necessities, to be made available 
on easy terms to needy countries. Another possibility is that U.S. 


technologists could help the developing countries find ways of reducing 
the enormous losses of foods to spoilage and rodents. 

In the thorny field of population, the dilemma described in the 
study is that scientific knowledge about human reproductive processes 
and the development of technologies for their control are concentrated 
in the United States and other technically advanced countries. In the 
United States in particular, standards of drug and medical equipment 
testing are extremely exacting, costly, and time-consuming. Standards 
appropriate to the United States are not necessarily as relevant to the 
conditions of developing countries. In consequence, the technology 
they need may not be provided. The question is suggested as to why 
the technologists are not transferred, rather than the technology, to 
resolve the dilemma. 

A further problem, highlighted by the "Green Revolution," is the 
worldwide trend toward urbanization — the movement of rural 
populations into the cities. Easement of this problem, which also 
afflicts the United States, calls for a total reversal of the U.S. produc- 
tion philosophy. Traditionally, the emphasis of "scientific manage- 
ment" in the United States called for reducing hours of labor by 
intensive use of materials, capital, and electrical energy. However, 
in the developing countries — and increasingly in the United States- 
shortage of labor has less bearing while shortages of capital and 
energy are acute. Thus, the design of small industry in urban areas 
needs to produce useful items for consumption or export, based on 
high input of labor and low mechanization. Opportunities in this 
field, and training in the management of small enterprises, would seem 
to be the necessary direction of effort. Whether U.S. skills in 
technology, marketing, and entrepreneurship are transferable to this 
environment is less evident. 

issue four: U.S. scientists abroad 

This study was silent on the subject of the private/public dichotomy 
The scope was restricted entirely to private scientific ventures, publicly 
supported. But the question is implicit: if the main impact on 
diplomacy comes from the technological part of the science-and- 
technology spectrum, why is there no interest in the encouragemenl 
of overseas study (and its reverse counterpart) in such technological 
subjects as engineering, design, tool-making, plant layout, production 
engineering, quality control, inspection, and so forth? Has the United 
States nothing to learn from the rest of the world on these matters'? 

It is true that most large corporations in the United States and 
abroad would not require financial assistance to support their own 
technical. personnel to travel and study abroad. Also, U.S. AID 
supports some programs to train technologists from developing 
countries in the United States and sends some U.S. technologists 
abroad on its own programs. But smaller corporations, and even 
large corporations that are not technology-intensive, might benefit 
from exposure to foreign training and expertise. Tax incentives and 
technological internships in U.S. Embassies abroad might be a means 
to this end. 

Even in the developing countries, there are local technologies- 
including what for the contemporary U.S. culture are forgotten arts 
and crafts — that could be useful in the United States. Recognition 


of this fact, and acting upon it, might replace the "lady bountiful" 
image with one of fair exchange. 

issue five: brain drain 

The United States has drawn skilled labor and technologists from 
abroad over much of its history. Private enterprise provided the 
magnet of opportunity. Periodic unsettled conditions in Europe 
added a "push" factor, to which were added the ideological stresses 
of the 20th century. By the 1970s, the movement to the United 
States of "brains" had shifted somewhat: from the developing 
countries came medically trained people and students seeking ad- 
vanced degrees (and usually subsequent employment); while from 
the developed countries came engineers and scientists whose inputs 
could find employment in the high-technology fields of aerospace 
and atomic energy. 

While the international movement of highly trained people — 
especially if it goes one way — has considerable diplomatic significance, 
no policy seems to have been applied or formulated to deal with it 
in the United States. Private industry, as the chief instrument for 
employment of imported "brains," is thus an actor in U.S. diplomatic 
policy in this area, but without guidance as to its relationship to 
broader national diplomatic goals. The study makes clear that freedom 
of the individual to move from one country to another to seek oppor- 
tunity and amity is a prized value in most countries. However, little 
attention is given to the equity — the concept of fair exchange — in 
human transfers. The need is apparent, as the study suggests, for new 
diplomatic initiatives in the field of "brain drain," but they have not 
been forthcoming and neither Government nor private enterprise 
has provided an answer. 

issue six: science and technology in the department of state 

Increasingly during the 1970s, interests and aspirations of the de- 
veloped and developing nations have involved materials, energy, and 
[environment, and the unifying feature of technology. Management of 
jdiplomacy to reconcile the goals of developed and developing countries 
jhas thus become increasingly concerned with the development and 
( management of technology. 

The purpose of this study was to explore the organizational resources 
Df the Department of State to manage the diplomatic aspects of science 
and technology. It was recognized that science and technology are a 
principal item on the diplomatic agenda, a primary force, and the sub- 
stance of international relations. It was therefore necessary for the 
Department of State ". . . to translate the generalized and normative 
j?oals of American foreign policy into operational goals to which 
American technological superiority can contribute" and ". . . to 
establish a closer functional relationship between [these goals] and 
domestic programs of science and technology and to enlist the com- 
munities of science and technolog}- in support of these foreign policy 
?oals. . . ." 438 

Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, p. 3. 



The study observed that the "community" of technology is less 
coherent than that of science. Technologists tend to be mission- or 
company-oriented rather than national or international in their 
outlook. In particular, and unlike the case of the sciences, "inter- 
national associations of engineers are neither very large nor very 
active." 439 On both counts, the technological community — mostly 
in private industry — is not easily accessible to the diplomatic commu- 
nity either to receive diplomatic guidance from, or to give technological 
guidance to, the diplomats. Yet it is very evident that many of 
diplomacy's problems, goals, and solutions are shaped by technology. 
Dr. Leo S. Packer, director of the OES Office of Technology Policy 
and Space Affairs, spoke to tins point as follows : 

For example, how do you balance short-term economic gains against long-term 
competitive risks? How do you weigh the anger and possible retaliation of a foreign 
country? How do you account for intense competition for the business by foreign 
industries? How do you consider the capacity of the overseas customer to assimilate 
the technology transfer to our later disadvantage? How do you deal with foreign 
customers who want an independent R&D capability rather than products'? 
How should government provide useful guidance and help to U.S. industry 
How do you measure the existing technology gap in a specific technology area? 
What are the probable rates of progress in the U.S. and overseas and what will 
the future trend be in the technology gap? What should our attitude be toward 
exporting management and systems integration skills? How can we encourage 
the import of certain commercially valuable technologies developed in Japan, 
USSR, Europe and elsewhere? What are the risks of technology diversion to 
undesired military use or to third parties? What are the comparative risks of 
transferring various embodiments of technology by different modes of transfer? 
To what extent does U.S. government action actually control the diffusion of 
technology and what is the likely impact of possible actions? M0 

One possible bridge to the U.S. industrial, technological, and 
business communities is the Department's Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs. 441 The Bureau of Oceans and International Environ- 
mental and Scientific [and technological] Affairs (OES) is another 
bridging institution. On the private industry side, the multinational 
corporation could be employed as an integrating or bridging element. 
Others might be the National Academy of Engineering, technical 
societies, and the technical universities. 

It may be unrealistic to expect the Department of State, with so 
many different categories of expertise demanded of it (languages, 
political systems and power structures, national and international law. 
flows of persons and values, and negotiations between and among 
systems) to add the further burden of required expertise in tech- 
nology. Yet, as technology moves to the center of the diplomatic 
scene, the planning and conduct of U.S. foreign policy require hard 
and mature understanding of such matters as — 

— The changing structure of U.S. industry: 
— Needs for U.S. technology in developing and developed 
countries ; 

— Vulnerability of U.S. industry to uncertain supply of im- 
ported raw materials; 

— Effects of changes in technological levels of developed and 
developing countries; 

— Comparative receptivity of industry at home and abroad to 
technological innovation; 

«» Ibid., p. 7. 

«• Ibid., p. 112. 

«• ibid.: see especially pp. 106-110. 


— Progress of technology having special international signifi- 
cance, e.g., satellite communications, weather forecasting, re- 
source surveys, and military surveillance; strategic weapons; 
weather modification; deep seabed mineral mining; and the like; 

— Transnational and oceanic environmental threats posed by 
refineries, irrigation projects, large tankers, supersonic aircraft, 
deep sea mining, offshore oil drilling, and the spread of toxic 
agricultural and other effluents. 
The traditional pattern of diplomacy does not appear to provide the 
kind of alert perception and early readiness needed to deal with such 
matters as these. Contacts are necessary not only with the diplomats 
of other nations but also with technological leadership in the United 
States. The diplomatic impacts of technology must be assessed in ad- 
vance, and remedial action devised to meet future needs. An important 
fact about technological — i.e., industrial — change is that it takes time. 
Industry may indeed be adaptable to shortages of materials or en- 
vironmental regulation, but not without time delays. Diplomatic 
resolution of problems arising out of technological change must be 
sensitive to this constraint. 

It is not evident that the Department of State, and in particular 
the science bureau, is structured to collect, analyze, and use tech- 
nological information inputs for diplomatic policy guidance. For 
example : 

— The Advisory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs was 
permitted to lapse. 442 

— Although the "scientific attaches" were restyled several years 
ago as "scientific and technological attaches," and attempt to keep 
abreast of technological matters, they are not adequately staffed 
to do very much in this direction. 

— Technological resources of the Department in the functional 
bureaus are modest to nonexistent. 

— While the Department's science bureau has recognized the 
importance of "technology," the word itself was removed from 
its formal title and the heavy load of operational chores makes 
difficult any substantial attention to this complex subject. 

— The Secretary of State has been generous in his commitment 
of the United States to international programs to advance 
technology, but the ability to implement these commitments is 
in doubt. 

— Xo significant effort appears to have been made to search 
out or coalesce the views and advice of the U.S. technological 
community on present or future impacts of technology on U.S. 

—Significant technology -based diplomatic initiatives of the 

United States have been few and far between, despite U.S. 

technological preeminence. 

The main point of this recital appears to be the need for a closer 

coupling of diplomats and technologists, and between private industry 

and the formulation of foreign policy. 

*° Ibid., p. 41. 


Some Concluding Observations 

To a considerable extent the role of private industry has changed 
from one of reliance on the Department of State for assistance in 
overseas transactions to one productive of major if unguided impacts 
on the substance of diplomacy. This change implies the need for the 
Department to adjust its relationship towards private industry in 
the United States. There is no substantial evidence that it has done 

Large international problems growing out of technological change 
already confront the Department; others are in prospect. These 
problems give plenty of advance warning of their impact. But the 
Department seems not to have taken advantage of these forewarnings. 
The emergence of problems may be slow but technological adjustments 
to change are also slow. Time is thus a resource to be used effectively 
if it is not to be wasted. Prompt and early recognition of problems 
and the planning of vigorous correctives are required. 

Some Questions jor Further Consideration 

In the further development of the theme of this essay, the following 
questions are offered to indicate the scope and possible directions of 
the inquiry: 

What should be the relationship between the Department of State 
and U.S. industry engaged m overseas operations? 

In what ways can private companies support and advance U.S. 
diplomatic goals? 

What areas of technology offer particularly promising opportunities 
for private contribution to U.S. diplomatic goals? 

How can the motivation of private industry be increased in the 
conduct of operations and initiatives beneficial to U.S. diplomacy? 

How can the views of other countries best be obtained and trans- 
mitted to U.S. -based companies on their constructive participation 
in coherent programs abroad? 

How can the dilemma be resolved of the wide gap between formal 
ethical standards and evidences of individual breaches of ethics in 
the relations between U.S. businesses and officials of foreign govern- 

Is there a distinction between U.S. diplomatic goals and the U.S. 
national interest? 

Has the Department of State made available to U.S. businesses 
any general guidelines on the conduct of foreign activities? 

Does the Department maintain an awareness of the consequences 
for the U.S. economy of overseas commercial and technological 

Conversely, does the Department maintain an awareness of tech- 
nological developments in U.S. private industr}^ having a potential 
for beneficial or injurious consequences for overseas diplomatic 

By what means and through what channels can the Department 
of State communicate to U.S. industry on social, technological, and 
economic trends affecting diplomacy, and with reference to U.S. 
diplomatic goals? 

When major new international scientific programs are proposed 
and activated, should the Department of State examine then- possible 
implications for new industrial technology of diplomatic significance? 


At what point? With what kinds of expertise? Should the private 
scientific and technological communities be consulted on these 
matters in the course of such an examination? 

What multinational regions in the developing parts of the world 
might be candidates for the sort of regional development plan 
evidenced by the Tennessee Valley Authority? Are the opportunities 
for constructive participation of the private sector in such regional 
schemes adequately appreciated? Might this same regional concept 
be applied to the seabed? 

What arrangements can ensure that contracts and negotiations 
between U.S. businesses and offices of state-trading (communist) 
nations are made known to the U.S. Departments of State and 
Commerce for policy planning and coordination purposes? What 
policy guidance is available to U.S. companies and how can it be 

Are there special diplomatic considerations regarding relationships 
between the Soviet Union and U.S. -based multinational corporations? 
How are these to be evaluated? 

Should thought be given "to the formulation of a more explicit 
technological strategy designed to increase the social return of its 
immense investment in science and technolog3 r and to minimize its 
negative environmental effects?" What are the policy resources the 
United States can bring to bear on issues of national strategy in 
technolog}*, and how are these to communicate with the industrial 
sector where such a strategy must be implemented? 

In the field of global health, can the tremendous medical and 
industrial technology resources of the United States be mobilized 
in support of U.S. diplomatic objectives? What initiatives might best 
serve this purpose and how might they be organized and guided? 

What technologies might further the general objective of im- 
proving global health and where does the responsibility lie for sponsor- 
ing their development and use? 

Could cooperative arrangements be developed for oil-rich countries 
to work with the U.S. chemical industry to provide fertilizers and 
pesticides to developing countries? Might such cooperation be 
furthered by assisting the oil-rich countries to develop petrochemical 
industries to produce these high-energy agricultural materials? 

Should there be recognition that transfers of value can include 
more than finished goods, materials, capital, and credit? (For example: 
transfers of technology and human expertise.) Might a system of 
equity be devised in which exchanges of tangible values and exchanges 
of knowledge and knowledgeable people are taken together, so that 
all parties benefit from the combined exchange? 

Even if it is not possible to maintain a strict accounting of the 
value of transferred technolog} 1 " and "brains," should not these be 
recognized as important elements in the flow of value from nation 
to nation? 

What organizational and institutional changes are needed in the 
Department of State to improve the coupling of technology and 

How can the Department tap the private industrial community 
for technological expertise to make diplomatic policymaking more 
responsive to technological forces for change? 

What actions by private industry, at home or abroad, might 
contribute toward U.S. diplomatic goals and how can the Department 
motivate and coordinate such a private effort? 


A disturbing feature of the world of the mid-1970s is the widespread 
and seemingly growing opposition between the forces of independence 
and those of interdependence. Both forces appear to have great 
potential for helping to solve the world's major problems. But if badly 
managed in relation to each other or out of control, they may have 
an even greater potential for destruction. 

Interdependence has many meanings. As the term is used in this 
study, it signifies a dynamic condition in which the forces of growth 
and change oblige the nations and peoples of the world to rely 
increasingly upon each other for their security and welfare — though 
relying no less (but rather more) upon themselves. Self-reliance, 
mutual (bilateral) reliance, and common (multilateral) reliance are 
all embraced in this usage of interdependence. Also implicit in this 
usage is the need to achieve a workable balance between independence 
and interdependence. Further implicit is the need for diplomacy to 
mediate the growing intercourse among nations — the greater the 
degree of interdependence in economic, environmental, security, and 
other areas of human affairs, the greater the need for competent 
diplomatic personnel, institutions, procedures, and, above all, under- 
standing of the forces which are shaping today's and tomorrow's 
world. (The last requirement applies beyond the Foreign Service, 
the State Department, and the White House to the entire Govern- 
ment, including both domestically and internationally oriented 
departments.) 443 

The purpose of this essay is to draw insights from the 12 Science, 
Technology, and American Diplomacy studies that bear on the 
independence-interdependence dichotomy. In particular, the role 
of technology in fueling and in reconciling the opposition of the two 
forces needs to be noted. In a more immediate sense, diplomacy is 
the agent of reconciliation: can there be hope that enlightened di- 
plomacy will bring about an Hegelian "higher synthesis" in which 
the constructive values of independence and interdependence are 
merged and their destructive potentials blunted? This question is 
one with which the governments of the world's nations must come to 

Independence as an Historic Force 

The concept of independence is associated with such ideas as liberty, 
self-determination, and self-reliance. A manifestation of independence 
which has special relevance to this study is nationalism. 

443 It should be further ncted that the terms independence and interdependence are used in this essay mainly 
with reference to sovereign nation-states and their interrelationships. It will not escape the reader, however, 
that many parallels exist with regard to the independence-interdependence spectrum in the interrelation- 
ships of states or provinces, cities; a great variety of organizations other than governmental, and just individ- 
ual people. 



"Nationalism," wrote Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson in 1942, 
"has developed from the deepest of primitive instincts and emotional 
forces in mankind." They continued: 

It gathers from a thousand springs of common race with its common language, 
religion, folklore, traditions, literature, art, music, beliefs, habits, modes of expres- 
sion, hates, fears, ideals, and tribal loyalties. . . . 

From all these racial instincts and mores rises the eternal yearning for inde- 
pendence from foreign subjection or domination. . . . Nations are eternally 
striving for independence. . . . 

Who can even recite the repeated wars for independence of the Greeks, the 
Germans, the Spanish, the French, the Romans, and their successors, the 
Italians? . . . 

Nationalism can readily expand into dangerous forms . . . [but] will continue 
as long as man inhabits the earth and will have to be embraced in any plan to 
preserve the peace." 4 

The words seem prophetic. Writing early in World War II when the 
hope was widespread that victory would bring an end to nationalist 
excesses everywhere, the authors were referring to a world of only 60 
separate nations. Now there are about 150. The behavior of many 
nations today tends — despite the emergence of new internationalist 
forms and vocabulary — to reinforce the skeptical view of human 
nature and its selfish motivations which Hoover and Gibson shared 
with the Founding Fathers and which is reflected in the system of 
checks and balances built into the Government of the United States. 

Independence has been a constructive force in the development and 
growth of the United States and many other countries. It has not 
generally been achieved and maintained by following Marquess of 
Queensberry rules. The tactics of nations which are challenging the 
Western industrial democracies on both political and economic fronts 
today, however distasteful to those challenged, may sometimes effec- 
tively advance the independence-related interests of the challengers. 
On the other hand, some of the tactics — blindly, or at least not 
farsightedly, pursued — ma}' be contrary to those interests in the 
lon^ term, and perhaps even in the short term. They may collide with 
national interests which would be better served by a posture of inter- 
dependence, or by a more carefully adjusted balance between inde- 
pendence and interdependence. 

No nation in history has been better nourished in its independence 
than the United States — nourished by a vast natural endowment of 
land and other resources, by the insulation of great oceans and weak 
neighbors, and by the imaginative development and application of new 
technologies. Understanding the potential of this endowment and 
sharing with Washington a keen distrust of foreign entanglements, 
Hamilton and Jefferson sought autarky: i.e., economic, as well as 
political, independence from the rest of the world. The Jeffersonian 
concept was one of self-sufficiency with an agricultural base; the 
Hamiltonian, self-sufficiency on a foundation of industry. But not, 
for Hamilton, total self-sufficiency: industry, more than agriculture, 
implied trade, and Hamilton favored trade. And trade implied the 
development of varying degrees of economic interdependence. With 
the growth of the Republic and its industry, trade relations also grew, 

*" Herbert Hoover and Hueh Gibson, "The Problems of Lasting Peace," in Prefaces to Peace: A Sympo- 
sium, cooperatively published hv Simon and Schuster, Doubleday, Reynal and Hitchcock, and Columbia 
University Press. New York, 1W3. pp. 160-161. 


and the United States moved by gradual stages from a unique position 
of substantial independence to one of substantial dependence on 
other nations. 445 

Technology and Interdependence 

Technolog}', more fundamentally than trade, created interdepend- 
ence. The Age of Technology which began with the Industrial Revolu- 
tion has now, in a new and explosive phase which began with World 
War II, become the Age of Interdependence as well. It was an achieve- 
ment of high technology, the atom bomb, which ushered in the Age 
of Interdependence and has since served as one of its more ominous 
reminders. Writing in 1948 to Herbert Hoover, then heading the 
Hoover Commission study of reorganization of the executive branch, 
Henry L. Stimson (who had served as President Hoover's Secretary 
of State) observed that "The progress of science and invention brought 
with it a vastly- increased interdependence among the nations of the 
world." 416 

In 1964 a book by Vincent P. Rock entitled A Strategy of Inter- 
dependence outlined an approach for applying technology to the control 
of conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. instead of to 
the escalation of armaments. Rock quoted from an address in June 
1963 by President John F. Kennedy at Frankfurt, Germany: "'We 
live in an age of interdependence." 447 

Interdependence as a Growing Concern of Political and Other Leaders 

In 1975 — the year in which, ironically, celebration of the Bicen- 
tennial of American Independence began — public references to 
the theme of interdependence assumed epidemic proportions, 
prompting one well-informed observer, Richard X. Gardner, to call 
it "surety the political catchword of our time." Writing in a special 
magazine issue marking the 30th anniversary of the United Nations, 
Gardner went on to say: "The crises of energy and food, of infla- 
tion and depression, all testify to the increasing interdependence 
of our world." 448 In the same special issue, Secretary of State Henry A. 
Kissinger registered regret "that outmoded expressions of rivalry 
should be increasingly asserted at the very time when a more elevated 
and unified sense of global obligation is required," 449 and Harlan 
Cleveland asserted that "Our problem ... is ... to cope with 
interdependence." 450 Particularly noteworthy not only for its per- 

445 One measure of this dependence is the special effort which the administrations of Presidents Nixon 
and Ford felt it necessary to give to establishing and publicizing "Project Independence," an expensive 
and protracted campaign to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign energy sources. 

446 Huddle, Science and Tfchnolngy in the Department of State, p. 18. 

447 Vincent P. Rock. ,4 Strateoy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict Between the United 
Stale-? and the Soviet Union. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. 399 p. (President Kennedy's statement 
is quoted more fully on p. 364: "We live in an age of interdependence as well as independence — an ace of 
internationalism as "well as nationalism. . . . Today there are no exclusively German problems, American 
problems, or even European problems. There are world problems.") 

Hi UX30: A Special Issue of The Inter Dependent (Journal of the United Nations Association of the United 
States of America, New York), vol. 2, no. 7, August 1975. p. 16. (Currently Professor of Law and Interna- 
tional Organization at Columbia University, Gardner served from 1961 to 1965 as Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for International Organization Affairs.) 

4 " Ptid., p. 20. 

450 Pjid.. p. 9. A one-year "National Commission on Coping with Interdependence" was created in Decem- 
ber 1974 under the auspices of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. Oririncting in a suggestion by 
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs John Richardson, the Commission seeks 
answers to four questions: (1) What adjustments in American lifestyles and workways seem indicated in 
view of err.wing U.S. interdependence with other nations? (2> How ready are th? American people for the 
projected kinds of changes? (3) To what extent are U.S. institutions capable of perceiving and analyzing 
These changes and of reacting to them accordingly? and (4) What new attitudes and arrangements may be 
required to enhance the capacity of Americans to cope with interdependence? A major conclusion reached 
by the Commission, as set fortn in "Coping With Interdependence: A Commission Report," was that the 
main obstacles seemed "to arise from the pervasive assumption that the line between 'domestic' and 
'international' is still a useful and relevant tool in making institutional policy." (Undated repc 
Institute for Humanistic Studies, Princeton, N.J.) 


ceptive analysis but also for the fact that (while not an official view) 
it resulted from a State Department initiative was Prof. Lincoln R. 
Bloomfield's article, "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence," 
published bv the State Department Bureau of Public Affairs as a 30- 
piage Special Report (Xo. 17, July 1975). 451 

A wider selection of recent statements on the theme of interdepend- 
ence might include such examples as the following: 

— President Gerald R. Ford's nationally televised "State of the 
World" address of April 10, 1975, in which he characterized 
technology as presenting "a vast new agenda of issues in an 
interdependent world." 

— Numerous references in the press. On September 3, 1975, for 
instance, the Washington Post observed editorially that "It is 
comforting to think of a world in which all nations recognize that 
both necessity and civility commit them to policies of interde- 
pendence. But domestic political considerations and national 
economic and political interests regularly cut across the impera- 
tives of interdependence." 452 (In another editorial, 4 days 
later, the Post referred to "the new interdependence that the IMF 
[the International Monetary Fund, meeting in Washington the 
previous week] convened here to discuss.") *" On July 3, 1975, the 
Grinnell [Iowa] Herald-Register printed a report by its managing 
editor on a conference on international problems he had attended 
in June, in which a Canadian participant had said that "the U.S. 
needs to refresh its views of other countries' views . . . interde- 
pendence does not necessarily lead to cooperation." i5i 

— The statement b}" Dr. Edmundo de Alba, Scientific Coun- 
selor, Mexican Embassy, at the August 1974 conference at 
Henniker, New Hampshire, on National Materials Policy Re- 
quirements: "No country in the complex technological world of 
the present day is completely self-sufficient in the raw materials 
consumed by its people. Even the so-called 'supplier' countries 
in their turn need materials from other countries. This interlinking 
of availabilities and necessities is the most profound reason to 
mount an effort to resolve the problem of world materials supply 
b-v interdependence within international justice." 455 

451 The article summarized portions of a 4-volume study, Analyzing Global Interdependence. The study 
was the product of a year-long inquiry that the State Department, through its external research program, 
had commissioned the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to conduct. It was prepared by Professors 
llayward R. Alker. Jr.. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, and Xazli Choucri. In "Toward a Strategy of Interdepend- 
ence" Bloomfield distinguishes among the main kinds of interdependence (environmental, security, and 
economic) and examines interdependence separately as "fact," as "good," as "bad," as determined partly 
by how it is perceived, and as balanced or unbalanced. Unbalanced or asymmetrical interdependence, he 
emphasizes, is dysfunctional— the more so as it is perceived to be unbalanced. Bloomfield goes on to discuss 
the requirements and implications of a U.S. "interdependence strategy." The first element in an effective 
interdependence strategy for the Uiuted States, he contends, is "a program of modest 'decoupling' of those 
interdependent links which threaten to create excessive strain through excessive 'presence' "—economic, 
both governmental and commercial, as well as military. A second element is increasing as rapidly as possible 
the number and complexity of links between the United States and the principal oil-producing exporters. 
A third involves applying to alliance relationships "the insights gained from analyzing the psychological 
aspects of dependencies." Finally, many security, economic, and environmental functions traditionally 
managed on a national basis can "no longer be confined by national boundaries; collective management is 
inescapable. Bloomfield adds that all contemporary governments are inadequately organized to deal effec- 
tively with contemporary problems, and that, in the case of the United States, "there should be a strongly 
enhanced capacity to perform 'cross-sector' analysis of interdependence issues; this entails . . . fad 
improved capability to the Department of State, and the Executive Branch generally, for anticipating 
crises and insuri'-icr that the foreign policy system is better organized for the long pull. 

•" Washington Post editorial. "A World Economic Order." Sept. 3. 1975. 

«« Was'.inoton Post editorial. "A Recession Abroad," Sept. 7, TJ75. 

•* Pinder. A. J. Report on Wilton Park IV Conference, sponsored by the American Friends of Wilton 
Park and held at the Wingspread conference center, Racine. Wisconsin. 

4 « U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. RequirementM for Fulfilling a Xational Materials 
Policu: Proceedings of a Conference Organized by the F< dt rations of Materials Societies for the Office of T ■ 
Assessment. August 11-10. 1974. Edited bv Franklin P. Huddle, Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress Foreword by Emilio Q. Daddario. Director, Office of Technology Assessment. Published by 
arrangement of the American Society for Metals, 1975, 194 pp. (P- 84.) 


— The statement at the same conference bj r Jean-Pierre Hugon, 
Ministere de lTndustrie et de la Recherche, Republic of France: 
"... the most important fact is that we are now entering a new 
era of worldwide interdependence. There is not any estimation 
to be done: we are condemned to interdependence. Inferences 
must be drawn from that new state of things, all over the 
world." 456 

— The observation by former diplomat and Japan Times editor 
Kazushige Hirasawa in an article on "Japan's Emerging Foreign 
PoUc}' - " in Foreign Affairs: "Because of their economic vulnera- 
bilities, and development experience, the Japanese have become 
one of the world's most active proponents of global economic 
interdependence." 457 

— Congressional hearings and reports, as well as numerous 
statements in the Congressional Record. The theme appears, for 
example, in the title of the printed record of hearings before the 
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy 
in May 1974: "Global Scarcities in an Interdependent World." 458 

— The observation of the Murphy Commission Report (which 
also states the case, in principle, for a constructive balance be- 
tween independence and interdependence): ". . . an inter- 
dependent world will intensify relations between states and 
peoples and place a premium on international cooperation, [but] 
it does not diminish the need to retain that independence neces- 
sary to provide leadership, to secure cooperation in satisfactory 
terms and to make the contribution to world needs which na- 
tional skills, resources and experience permit." (The Report 
further states: "We believe that the interdependence of foreign 
and domestic policy will grow.") 459 
Man's perspective on the world has undergone a drastic change 
since the Age of Interdependence began, more or less simultaneoulsy 
with the founding of the United Nations: 

Thirty years ago, the UN's Founding Fathers did not (could not?) foresee the 
interlocked conflicts of values and scarcities we now call the "interdependence 
issues." On food, we worried about surpluses. Population planning was almost 
unmentionable and certainly untouchable by governments. Energy was cheap, 
air was largely unpolluted, water was free and plentiful, the seas were a zone of 
liberty, and raw materials were there for the benefit of those with the wealth and 
the power to extract them. Trade and investment were "free," which meant they 
were often expensive for the poor. And the monetarj' system was managed by 
those with the hardest monej r . 

Today, the international system built on those assumptions is in disarray be- 
cause the assumptions are on the cutting room floor. . . . * 60 

Obstacles and Problems Affecting Constructive Interdependence 

A word on some of the obstacles to the various forces that appear to 
be thrusting interdependence upon the peoples of the world, and on 
the complex dimension of growth versus ecological stress, may assist 
in rounding out the context for the examination of the six cases and 
six issues which follows. 

** Ibid., pp. 84-8.5. 

457 Kazushige Hirasawa. "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policv." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, October 
1975. p. 170. 

458 U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. 
Global Scarcities in an Interdependent World. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., May 1, 8, 9, 15, and 22, 1974. Wash- 
ington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 259 p. 

459 Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy 
(the Murphy Commission), Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. OS., June 1975, p. 26. 

«« Harlan Cleveland, "The Pace of Mutation," UN SO (op. cit.), p. 11. 



Virulent political nationalism is perhaps the most obtrusive of the 
obstacles. It is paradoxical that many of the nations which have 
recentlv achieved political independence, but are economically and 
technologically dependent on the rest of the world, are aggressively 
asserting their sovereignt.y. Along with the emergence of ministates 
with their collective tendency to create imbalances in the United 
Nations and in other international forums or relationships, the trend 
toward nationalism is in seeming conflict with the broader and longer- 
range imperatives of interdependence. 

Sometimes accompanying this political nationalism, or an ingredient 
of it, is a tendency toward a limited form of economic nationalism. 

One kind of economic nationalism follows Western economic and 
industrial models but seeks to bend them to further advantage 
through such devices as expropriation and nationalization of extractive 
industries or formation of cartels to control the supply and price of 
energy and mineral resources. Another rejects Western ideas of 
progress and reflects distrust of Western industrial society and its 
patterns of technology, development, and growth in general. 402 A 
point of view associated with the latter position was expressed recently 
by Mahbub ul Haq, Director of Policy Planning and Program Review 
for the World Bank; he maintained — 

. . . that the Third World must return to considering the needs of its land 
and peoples first. . . . He said that the real que>tion waa not -whether the Third 
World had a future, but whether the industrialized Western world had a future. 
In the next 25 years, he sees the economic, financial and cultural balance of 
power shifting to the Third World. 463 

Economic nationalism of either kind may sometimes serve the 
immediate interests of the country which adopts it. It runs counter, 
however, to the purposes associated with proposals for worldwide 
economic cooperation advanced by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
in his message to the United Nations General Assembly of September 1, 


In the U.X. address that Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan delivered 
for him, 464 Mr. Kissinger said: "It is not enough to insure the minimal 
economic security of the developing countries. Development i- a 
process of growth, of acceleration, of greater productivity, higher 
living standards, and social change. This is a process requiring the 
infusion of capital, technology, and managerial skills on a massive 

«' Professor Edgar S. Robinson of American University, who reviewed this essay in draft, comments in 
a note to the associate project director (November 17, 1975): " 'Quickie nationalism,' as manifested in the 
LDOs in the wake of imperialism's withdrawals, is rather doubtfully to be lumped together with 
the lengthy, gradual evolution of nationalism in the West. The distinctive, diversified assertions of inde- 
pendence characterizing many LDCs, frequently in spite of internal heterogeneity, have properties peculiar 
1 to them and not necessarily associated with such classic Western attributes as the consolidation of a middle 
class [and] a matrix of urbanization. . . . Thus, 'naticnalism' seems to be a catch-all caption somewhat 
wanly endowed to convey the elements, Havor, and nuances of behavior in lands remote from its origins. . . . 
I don't know what can be done to alleviate this conceptual problem . . . other than to stipulate its existence 
as an 'alert' to the reader. We seem to be stuck with an emotionally taut, empirically slack, word." 

•■ It would probably be more accurate to say "seeks to reject."" The course of outright rejection is. as a 
practical matter, hardly open to any nation todav. Nations can, however, resist economic penetration and 
slow it down somewhat. This is a point closely related to the factor of cultural and psychological resistance 
to interdependence, discussed below. 

4M Thecla R. Fabian. "Does the Third World Have a Future?" (Report on a work session of the Second 
General Assembly of the World Future Society, held in Wasliingto